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ABSTRACT 
Since the election of the new government in South Africa in 1994, a process of 
reconstructing and prioritising social problems has been underway in which firearms 
have been afforded prominence. A 'gun problem' has been constructed based on the 
traditional premise that illegal private possession is the issue and most interventions 
have targeted the reduction of unlicensed guns. However, despite more than 35 years 
of research worldwide, this foundational premise lacks empirical support. Moreover 
relevant work on South Africa has been scarce. Utilising this as the basic assumption 
of a contemporary conception of the 'gun problem' would thus seem unwise. Hence 
an alternate approach was adopted, starting with the question of whether guns were 
actually problematic in this context. A case study was conducted using a complete 
sample (1555) of fatal shootings in metropolitan Cape Town from 1984 to 1991. The 
overall aim was to paint a comprehensive picture of lethal gun use that would enable 
the identification and prioritising of problems, and the shaping of interventions. A 
pencil-and-paper device was constructed to extract information from mortuary 
registers, inquest and criminal court records. Variables included characteristics of 
victims, shooters, circumstances, weapons, injuries, and the legal process. Specific 
attention was paid to restraint in homicides; various indicators were used to ·measure 
levels of minimum force and proportionality. The data were transferred into a 
customised computer database for analysis. Statistical significance was assessed using 
chi-square tests and the analysis of standardised residuals for selected single and 
cross-tabulated variables. A range of problems were revealed that varied across gun 
accidents, suicides and homicides, and implied a multifaceted intervention strategy. 
However, gun homicides were the principal problem: a ratio of one accident to 25 
suicides to 94 homicides. More specifically, police, private security and civilian 
shooters used licensed and unlicensed guns with a marked lack of restraint whether 
their purposes were lawful or criminal, and irrespective of the situation -- political 
conflict, everyday circumstances, public order policing or general law enforcement. 
The majority also violated the principles of minimum force and proportionality. 
Even licensed guns employed lawfully, were used too readily and the result was 
unnecessary loss of life. Contrary to conventional notions lawful users, particularly 
the police and private security officers, were shown to be a major part of the 'gun 
problem'. Notably, a poor quality of police evidence was revealed as a key 
impediment, along with lax application of legal provisions on restraint by inquest 
courts, and a low probability of criminal sanction for unlawful killing, with some 
indication of undue leniency in the treatment of police shooters. At a policy level 
emphasis was placed on continuing to address macro-level factors fueling social 
conflict, improving public confidence in the institutions of collective security and 
education to change attitudes to violence. A co-ordinating body was recommended to 
oversee planning, implementation and monitoring of a firearm strategy. Promoting 
empirical research and developing data sources, especially a national computerised 
database, were underscored. Specific interventions were proposed to reduce gun 
homicides comprising a combination of rule tightening, expanding less-than-lethal 
alternatives and training in safety and violence-reduction techniques based on the 
sequential decision-making and use-of-force-options models proposed by Scharf and 
Binder (1983), and Graves and Connnor (1992). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A DIRECTION POINTER 
Guns have been afforded priority as a distinct social problem in many Western 
countries since the sixties and internationally a major field of research has been 
developed on the topic. In societies like the USA, where firearm possession and 
violence have been prevalent, empirical investigation has flourished and powerful 
non-government organisations (NGOs) have emerged -- some aimed at reducing 
civilian gun possession, others at opposing additional restrictions -- which have 
fueled ongoing public controversy. Canada appears to have been more successful 
than many other nations at reducing private gun ownership and firearm-related 
violence. It is also one of the few countries in which gun-related policy initiatives 
have consistently been shaped according to research findings; by using empirical data 
to identify specific problems relating to firearms and to clarify targets for 
intervention. 1 
This dissertation is about the use and abuse of firearms in South Africa, with a 
specific focus on the fatal use of guns by civilians, police and private security 
officers (PSOs) in the large metropolitan area of Cape Town, from the beginning of 
the civil war over Apartheid in 1984 to 1991 and the transition to democracy. 
Rather than beginning from an assumed problem, as has generally been the practice 
in this field, the starting point was the question of whether guns were problematic. 
Firearms are abundant in South Africa and the mortality rate due to violence· has 
been high, especially in the last two decades (The MRC, 1995; Bradshaw et al, 
1984). Private gun ownership is an established tradition among whites and a rapidly 
growing practice among black people (The Sunday Independent, 6 October 1996). It 
has long been customary for the police to be armed with firearms and today a 
substantial number of PSOs also routinely carry guns. Despite these characteristics, 
it is only recently that firearms have been treated as a key social problem in this 
country. For almost 50 years the previous Nationalist government did not afford the 
issue political priority and funding for research in this field was scarce. Prior to the 
nineties public debate over gun control was torpid compared to the controversies that 
have raged in countries like the USA and Canada. Until 1994 there was no 
nationally organised lobby for gun control and very little empirical work had been 
conducted on firearm use or possession. However, this situation changed rapidly 
after February 1990 when the transition to democracy and the dismantling of the 
system of Apartheid were formally announced. As the objective of peace was 
1 See The Department of Justice for Canada (1994); Sproule and Kennett (1989); 
The Canadian Solicitor General (1983) and Stenning and Moyer (1981). 
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gradually embraced, calls for the reduction of violence multiplied and these included 
demands to diminish firearm-related death and injury. Unfortunately there was very 
little reliable research data on guns available to assist policy development. 
Indeed, the first sizable empirical investigation of gun use by civilians and 
police in a South African context was published in late 1990 (Hansson, 1990). This 
work, entitled: "Firearms Used with Deadly Effect: A Study of South African Law 
and Practice", was based on an almost complete sample of fatal shootings in 
metropolitan Cape Town from 1984 to 1986. The method used -- secondary analysis 
of mortuary and court records -- was a novel way of overcoming the scarcity of 
accessible and relevant data on frrearms at this time. It also proved to be an 
effective means of investigating gun use: the data collection procedure was viable 
and yielded a range of useful findings. Most notably, the study pointed to a lack of 
restraint in the use of firearms as a core problem. 
The decade between 1984 and 1994 saw the outbreak and resolution of a civil 
war between the Apartheid State, its supporters and the Anti-Apartheid liberation 
movement in South Africa. Major sociopolitical changes occurred after the mid-
eighties and by the time that Hansson's findings on firearm use in the first three 
years of the civil war were published in 1990, the negotiated settlement of the 
conflict was already in the pipeline. Since updated research was clearly warranted, 
in 1991 the author initiated a follow-up investigation of the period after 1986. 
Hansson's 1990 study was utilised as a pilot and after critical appraisal the main 
shortcomings were identified and addressed. Arguably, the most serious flaw 
revealed was an inadvertent bias in the original sample in favour of more serious 
Supreme Court cases because fatal shootings tried in the lower Regional Magistrates' 
Courts had been excluded. This deficit was rectified by tracing cases to conclusion 
in Inquest, Regional Magistrates' and Supreme Courts.2 The procedure for 
collecting data was reviewed and streamlined. In particular the data collection 
device was redrafted and used to construct a customised computer database for 
storage and analysis. In this process some of the variables were modified, some 
were replaced and a number were added. 3 Wherever feasible, variables with 
unacceptably high levels of missing data were redefined. Three new composite 
measures of proportionality were introduced; reflecting the defence-of-life and 
protection-of-life standards and the principle of not foreseeably endangering third 
parties. Overall, the aim was to include a wider range of more reliable and valid 
variables. Given the changes in the research parameters, the data for fatal shootings 
that occurred between 1984 and 1986 were collected anew using the revised 
instrument and analysed along with the later cases (1987 to 1991). Finally, a more 
intensive analysis of the data was conducted; instead of mere counts and single 
2 Wherever feasible. 
3 See Appendix A. 
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variable analysis, cross-tabulations were carried out and the statistical significance of 
the findings was assessed.' Preliminary results from this inquiry were first reported 
in a research paper produced for the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in 
1996 and entitled: "Firearms Used with Deadly Effect -- Part II: An Empirical 
Investigation of Firearm Fatalities in Metropolitan Cape Town over the period 1984 
to 1991" (Hansson, 1996). However, these results were limited to frequency counts 
and percentages for single variables prior to statistical testing. It should be noted 
that the data presented in Chapters Seven and Eight of this dissertation were the 
product of different analyses, and therefore vary in important respects from the 
preliminary findings. 
The new multiracial government, which was democratically elected in April 
1994, has implemented a process of reconstruction and development that is 
profoundly changing South African society. Despite the many reforms and contrary 
to what was hoped, thus far the post-election years have been characterised hy 
ongoing violence and rising rates of crime. Fear of violent crime and concerns 
about personal safety are rampant. Public confidence in the institutions of collective 
security, which was shattered under Apartheid, has not yet recovered and 
restructuring initiatives have tended to disrupt the functioning of State agencies (The 
Inter-Departmental Strategy Team, 1996[a], 1996[b]). In such a context it is hardly 
surprising that private gun ownership, legal and illegal, has spirall~d upwards and 
that there appears to be strong opposition to additional curbs on civilian possession.s 
Notably, this period has seen the construction of illegal possession and firearm crime 
into a specific and pressing social problem. At the end of 1994 the Gun Free South 
Africa Campaign (GFSA) emerged; a national organisation which has subsequently 
been developed into a politically influential prohibitionist lobby. As expected, this 
has heen met by a backlash from anti-prohibitionist groups and a public controversy 
over civilian possession is in the making. Since 1996 the National Crime Prevention 
Strategy (NCPS) has been addressing ftrearm-related crime as a priority and a range 
of interventions have been introduced to this end (The Inter-Departmental Strategy 
Team, 1996[b ]).6 Hence, the systematic investigation of ftrearm-related issues has 
become even more relevant since 1991 when this research was first envisaged As 
the current period seems to constitute a window of opportunity for clarifying, 
prioritising and addressing social problems, the work presented here is intended as a 
contribution to the emergent dominant discourse on guns and related policy in South 
Africa. 
The subsequent text was constructed around the following frame of objectives: 
first to critically review pertinent overseas research in order to extract lessons that 
4 See Chapter Six for procedural details. 
5 Understandably Africans have been opposed having only recently heen 
afforded equal access to private gun ownership. 
6 See Table 10.2. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
4 
might be relevant within the South African context. Hence, the next four chapters 
comprise a review of the literature: Chapter Two deals with key work on civilians in 
relation to guns in other countries, and Chapter Four addresses this topic with regard 
to police. 7 The second objective was to evaluate literature on firearms in South 
Afiica (SA) and to gather and compile previously fragmented statistics of relevance: 
civilians and guns in this country thus constitute the focus of Chapter Three and, in 
Chapter Five this subject has been addressed in relation to the erstwhile South 
African Police force (SAP). The third objective was to contribute a new set of 
empirical findings (see Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine), and then to synthesise the 
information in the light of recent changes, clarify gun-related problems and suggest 
feasible interventions (see Chapters Nine and Ten). 
7 North American work dominates because it constitutes the majority of the 
research in this field. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW PART I: 
A Critical Overview of Key Work on Civilians and Guns 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
During the last three to four decades a plethora of research has been conducted on 
the subject of firearms and, more specifically, on how to control the possession and 
use of these weapons (Haw ley, 1993). Whilst the bulk of work on civilians1 and 
guns has been carried out in the USA, the issue has been treated as a significant 
contemporary social problem in a wide range of countries, particularly Australia/ 
Canada,3 the Netherlands,4 and the United Kingdom (UK).' This chapter comprises 
a critical evaluation of the key academic literature available on the topic of civilians 
and guns worldwide, 6 although most of this work pertains to the USA. Literature 
concerning South Africa has been discussed separately in Chapter Three. 
In the sixties, North America was characteris d by heightened political protest 
and many demonstrations culminated in violent confrontations between civilians and 
police. 7 The high public visibility of this conflict fuelled popular concern over 
violence which was gradually shifted onto the issue of crime. The federal 
government's National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence was 
particularly influential in linking this social problem to the issue of guns. s In 1971 
this Commission concluded publicly that guns were the leading cause of violent 
crime in the USA and recommended reducing the availability of firearms, 
particularly handguns (Toch & Lizotte, 1992; Zimring, 1985). It also called for the 
development of policy to decrease handgun accessibility and the number of privately 
owned firearms. Substantial government funding for research in this field boosted 
policy-oriented work and studies of firearm violence. For this reason 1971 has been 
noted as the watershed for the development of research on civilians and guns in 
North America (Toch & Lizotte, 1992; Zimring, 1985). Since then the study of this 
topic has grown into a major research field in academia, mainly in the disciplines of 
law, medicine and the social sciences. Work has spanned gun ownership and use in 
The term civilians has been used to distinguish those who are not police 
officers or members of the defence forces, however, it includes PSOs. 
2 See Chappell (1992), Neal (1989), Chappell et al (1988) and Forster (1984). 
3 See The Department of Justice for Canada (1994), The Editor (1987, 1985) 
and Stenning and Moyer ( 1981). 
4 See Roest (1989[a], 1989[b]), Colijn et al (1985) and Slothouwer (1985). 
5 See The Mail on Sunday (27 August 1997), The Daily Mail (12 June 1997), 
Reuters (16 October 1996), Chapman and Milroy (1992) and Burton, 1990. 
6 Mainly in English. 
7 Particularly civil rights protests for racial equality and anti-war demonstrations. 
8 Established in the wake of the Kennedy and King assassinations. 
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relation to law, culture and social structure (Hawley, 1993). 
The National Commission's recommendation to reduce private gun ownership 
ignited public dispute over gun control which developed into a divisive political 
polemic of substantial magnitude (Green, 1987). A powerful political movement has 
been built around the issue of civilian gun possession and many believe that the 
debate has now reached an impasse (Robin, 1991). Whilst there is a continuum of 
public opinion with regard to gun control, there are two distinct opposing 'camps'. 
On one side there are those who would permit the majority of law abiding adults to 
lawfully possess firearms, with gun ownership prohibited among non-adults and 
those prone to violence including offenders, the mentally ill and substance abusers. 
This kind of regulation has been common in most Western countries for many 
years.9 By contrast, those on the opposing side of the gun-control-continuum would 
completely prohibit private firearm ownership.1o Therefore, the North American 
gun-control-controversy is not actually a dispute about whether the possession and 
use of guns by civilians should be regulated, but rather dissension over the degree to 
which gun possession should be restricted. 11 Hence, the popular terms pro- and anti-
gun control are misnomers; it being more accurate to speak of those who favour 
greater or lesser gun control, since the majority on both sides of the debate tend to 
agree that certain civilians should be prohibited from legally possessing firearms. 
For the purposes of this discussion, those who would outlaw private gun ownership 
have been termed prohibitionists, and those who oppose complete prohibition have 
been termed anti-prohibitionists. 
It is noteworthy that key issues in the public controversy on gun control are 
reflected in academic discourse on the topic (Hawley, 1993). In fact political 
concerns have, to a significant extent, set the agenda for research in this field. The 
following literature review is, in effect, an evaluation of the research evidence on the 
main claims and counter-claims comprising the gun-control-controversy. 
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF RESEARCH EVIDENCE 
The Lethality Issue 
Firearms have been viewed as a prime cause of violent death, mainly because they 
are considered to be the most lethal type of weapon commonly available to civilians 
(e.g. Chappell et al, 1988). Although more people are generally assaulted with 
other weapons, firearms are more likely to cause death (e.g. Turner & Leyens, 
1992; Neal, 1989). 12 It has been shown that gun assaults are five times more likely 
to kill than knife attacks (Turner & Ley ens, 1992). In the USA over the past two 
decades, gunshots have caused twice as many deaths as knives, although firearm 
9 Like Britain, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Italy. 
lO Or at least handguns, e.g. Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and Greece. 
ll See Nisbet (1990) on the US debate. 
12 Except explosives. 
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assaults have been half as common as attacks with knives (The Unifonn Crime 
Reports 1970-1989 cited in: Turner & Leyens, 1992:206). The greater lethality of 
firearms-- also tenned the nassault intensifying effectn -- is arguably the most basic 
premise undergirding the hypothesised relationship between gun prevalence and 
heightened violence (Kleck, 1986[a]:36). It has been argued that fatalities from 
suicides, accidents and homicides would be reduced if the number of privately 
owned guns were decreased (e.g. Po1sby, 1986). Succinctly put, n[f]ewer guns 
would mean fewer deaths" (Zimring & Hawkins, 1987:197). 
Gun Prevalence and Suicide 
In 1986, the USA had the fifth highest suicide rate in the world and the top firearm 
suicide rate of eight per 100000 p.a. (The World Health Organisation in: Time 
Magazine, 17 July, 1989:61). More than half of the 30000 gun deaths in North 
America were suicides, 43% resulted from homicides and only two per cent from 
accidents (Turner & Leyens, 1992:201). Guns are among the most lethal suicide 
methods providing a quick, simple and relatively certain means of ending one's life 
(Newton & Zimring, 1970). It has been estimated that just over three-quarters of 
those who attempt suicide with a gun actually die. However, the mortality rate for 
attempted suicide with a gun is similar to that for suicide methods like hanging, 
drowning and carbon-monoxide poisoning, that are commonly substituted in the 
absence of guns (Kleck, 1998). 
It is crucial that research aimed at assessing the impact of gun prevalence on 
the suicide rate be designed to check for a substitution effect, namely, the degree to 
which people resort to alternate suicide methods when access to guns is restricted. 
Testing for this effect requires that both the overall suicide rate and the rate of gun 
suicide be examined. If both rates show equivalent decreases, then there is no 
significant substitution effect. The accumulated findings for the USA and most 
European countries support a strong substitution effect (e.g. Lester, 1991[b], 
1988[a], 1988[b], 1987[b]; Killias, 1990; Lester & Frank, 1990; Rich, 1990). In 
short, if guns are not available people intent on suicide tend to substitute other 
methods. 
However, decreasing the availability of guns generally reduces the rate of gun 
suicide. For instance, there is evidence of lower rates of firearm suicide following 
the outlawing of gun possession by the mentally ill, and the implementation of Jaws 
requiring firearm dealers to be licensed at federal, state and local levels (Sommers, 
1984, 1980; Blose & Cook, 1980). The rationale in the latter instance is that the 
cost and hassle of extra licensing requirements reduces the number of dealers, which 
in tum decreases the accessibility of ftrearms, so deterring those who decide on 
impulse to buy guns to commit suicide. Several studies spanning the USA and 
Canada have shown significant decreases in gun suicide rates, following the 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
8 
introduction of laws designed to reduce legal access ~o handguns (e.g. Hung, 1993; 
Leenaars & Lester, 1993; Mundt, 1993, 1990; Loftin et al, 1991; Boor & Bair, 
1990). The studies of Kellerman et al (1992) and Brent et al (1991), are worthy of 
particular note in this regard: According to the former investigation, the presence of 
a gun in a home increased the risk of firearm suicide fivefold (Kellerman et al, 
1992:469). Similarly, the latter study showed that the risk of gun suicide among 
adolescents was raised threefold by the presence of a firearm in the home, 
irrespective of the type of gun or whether the weapon was locked away (Brent et al, 
1991 :2989). To conclude, the accumulated evidence supports a significant 
substitution effect, and a positive association between gun prevalence and the rate of 
gun suicide (Kleck & Patterson, 1993). Nevertheless, it has been argued that if 
fewer guns were available, the less resolute may be deterred from attempting 
suicide. In particular, limiting access may prevent suicides resulting from impulsive 
decisions, common among adolescents and those whose judgement is impaired by 
depression, alcohol and/or drugs. 
Gun Prevalence and Accidents 
In view of the lethal nature of firearms, gun-related accidents are often fatal, and at 
very least, result in severe injuries (Turner & Leyens, 1992). It has thus been 
proposed that there would be fewer accidental firearm fatalities and injuries, 
particularly among children, if fewer civilians had access to firearms (e.g. Lester & 
Murrell, 1986; McDowall & Loftin, 1986; Polsby, 1986). The topic of firearm 
accidents has been relatively neglected within gun control- debates and research, 
where attention has been focused on crime, homicides and suicides (McDowall & 
Loftin, 1986). 13 Whilst earlier work on this topic showed a positive relationship 
between levels of civilian ownership and the risk of gun accidents, serious 
methodological deficiencies have cast grave doubt upon these findings (e.g. Newton 
& Zimring, 1970, Kleck & Patterson, 1993 resp). 
By contrast, results from later studies indicate that neither gun prevalence, nor 
interventions to reduce availability, have significantly affected the rate of fatal 
firearm accidents (Kleck & Patterson, 1993). It has been argued further that 
prevalence is not the most significant factor in relation to gun accidents (McDowall 
& Loftin, 1986). Instead, the critical variable is training and experience in the safe-
handling of guns. McDowall and Loftin (1986) investigated the reasons for a sharp 
rise in fatal firearm accidents that occurred after a sudden increase in private gun 
ownership. The civilians concerned acquired firearms for protection during a spate 
13 However, see Kleck (1984), Klein et al (1976); Heins et al (1974), Rushforth 
et al (1974), Waller and Whorton (1973) on gun accidents. 
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of crime and violent public protests. This impulsive acquisition of guns by 
inexperienced and untrained persons led to an increase in firearm accidents. 
Similarly, Stenning and Moyer ( 1981) found that people who only borrow firearms 
to engage in seasonal hunting are more prone to accidents. It has thus been inferred 
that the risk of accidents is heightened by a lack of experience and training in the 
safe-keeping and handling of guns. 14 Importantly, studies like these highlight the 
danger of attributing complex social processes to single causal variables and 
underscore the importance of investigating factors beyond the mere possession of 
guns. 
Gun Prevalence and Homicides 
Positive Correlations 
The presumed causal relationship between high rates of gun ownership and criminal 
violence, put forward by the National Commission in 1971, has remained the basic 
premise of the prohibitionist position and undergirds the majority of legislated gun 
controls, not only in the USA but internationally. Given the key nature of this 
assumption, it is not surprising that a substantial amount of research has focused on 
testing its validity. 
Numerous comparisons have been used to show positive associations between 
the prevalence of guns among civilians and violent crimes such as criminal homicide, 
aggravated assault, and robbery. International comparisons have been a most 
popular way of demonstrating a relationship between these variables, and the USA 
has tended to top the scale of gun possession and violence in the world, with the UK 
and Japan bringing up the rear (e.g. Williams et al, 1984). To illustrate more 
specifically, in 1995 the approximate rate of gun ownership among civilians was 
83734 in the USA, as compared to 1546 per 100000 in the UK (Oprah Winfrey, 29 
February 1996; Reuters, 16 October 1996 resp). North America has also been 
characterised by a rate of firearm homicide three times higher, and a robbery rate six 
times higher, than that in Britain (Time Magazine, 20 December 1993:25). 
Similarly, the contemporary rate of legal gun ownership in Canada is well above the 
British rate and the firearm fatality rates for these countries reflect this difference, 
namely, six and 0.1 per 100000 resp. (The Department of Justice for Canada, 
1994:1-2; Reuters, 16 October 1996 resp). Considering these international findings, 
the incidence of legal ownership and gun-related violence appear to be positively 
associated. 
Intranational statistics have also been employed to indicate a strong positive 
correlation between civilian gun possession, crime and violence. For instance, 
Wallace (1986) demonstrated such an association for New South Wales, Australia, 
14 Lizotte et al (1981), Bordua & Lizotte ( 1979) and Caetono (1979) have 
provided tangential support. 
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over the period 1968 to 1981 . However, the most renowned figures are those 
showing similar dramatic increases in the levels of civilian gun ownership and 
violent crime in the USA from the sixties onwards (e.g. Turner & Leyens, 1992; 
Turner et al, 1977; Newton & Zimring, 1969). Violent crime rose tenfold between 
1960 and 1975, while civilian gun ownership increased by 65 million from 1969 to 
1978 (e.g. Turner & Leyens, 1992; Turner et al, 1981, Wright et al, 1983 resp). 
More recently, a statistically significant positive relationship has been demonstrated 
between the rate of new handgun ownership and the rate of firearm homicides in the 
USA between 1961 and 1982 (Turner & Leyens, 1992:204). 
Inter-regional comparisons have consistently revealed a significant association 
between high rates of civilian gun ownership and criminal violence across North 
American states, with the southern states characterised by the highest rates (e.g. 
Newton & Zimring, 1969). A well known intercity comparison demonstrated 
correlations between civilian gun ownership and rates of gun homicide, aggravated 
assault and robbery across eight North American cities (Zimring & Hawkins, 1987). 
These researchers also conducted the much cited intracity investigation of Detroit 
between 1965 and 1968. The results revealed a fourfold rise in firearm homicide 
rates and a doubling in the rate of armed robberies after a sudden increase in legal 
gun ownership (Zimring & Hawkins, 1987). Based on a comprehensive review of 
the available findings, they concluded that the evidence of a positive link between 
the availability of guns to civilians and violent crime in the USA was convincing. 
Furthermore, some authors have claimed that these kinds of significant correlations 
indicate causality (Turner & Leyens, 1992). 
C01111ter-Expltmtltions 
That there are other equally feasible explanations for the statistical association 
between these two variables has, however, effectively undermined the validity of the 
former causal claim. To expand, Wright et al (1983) have argued that it was highly 
improbable that the increased rate of violent crime in the USA between 1969 and 
1978 was the direct result of the introduction of 65 million new guns, because: (1) 
25 million of these were simply replacements for defective and confiscated guns, (2) 
the increase in the number of households over this period accounts for 25 million of 
the new guns, (3) 10 million were long-guns which are not commonly used in the 
perpetration of crimes, and (4) approximately five million of the new guns were 
police weapons. When these factors are taken into account, there seems to have 
been an effective increase in new handgun ownership by civilians of around five 
million, rather than 65 million. This substantially lower increase in gun ownership 
is not enough to adequately explain the dramatic tenfold rise in violent crime (Turner 
& Leyens, 1992). Furthermore, the proportion of households in which firearms are 
kept has actually remained remarkably consistent in the United States (US) after 
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1959 (Cook, 1983). It is the percentage of handguns which has increased 
significantly; from 25% to 50% after 1978 (Cook, 1983:50 & 79). Therefore, the 
reported increase in criminal violence was more likely to have been the product of 
another variable such as the growth in the population aged 15 to 30 that took place as 
those born in the postwar baby boom began to reach maturity between 1960 and 
1975 (Wright et al, 1983). Since it is people in this age category who most 
frequently perpetrate violent crimes, and the violent crime rate began to decrease 
after 1980, this factor seems to explain the rise in violent crime during the earlier 
period (Turner & Leyens, 1992). 
The link between high rates of criminal violence in the southern states of the 
USA and the widespread availability of guns in this area has also been challenged. It 
has been pointed out that a high proportion of the guns in the South are long-guns, 
owned by civilians in rural areas, whereas the bulk of criminal violence is generally 
perpetrated with handguns in urban areas (Turner & Leyens, 1992). 
Ascertaining the meaning of statistical correlations between gun prevalence and 
rates of violence has also been complicated by the fact that gun ownership may well 
increase as a response to rising violence, that is, it may be an effect rather than a 
cause of increased violent crime (e.g. Smith & Uchida, 1988; McDowell, 1986; 
McDowall & Loftin, 1986; Kleck, 1984). A significant positive relationship 
between gun prevalence and rates of violence does not support the single conclusion 
that increased prevalence leads to heightened violence. It is also feasible to conclude 
that rising violence prompts the defensive acquisition of guns. Overall research has 
rwt demonstrated that gun levels significantly effect homicide rates (Kleck, 1998). 
To conclude statistical associations between gun prevalence and rates of violent 
crime may be spurious, with changes produced by different and possibly unrelated 
factors (e.g. Turner & Leyens, 1992). And any relationship between these two 
variables is neither simple nor direct (Wright et al, 1983). 
Methodological Shoncomings 
Studies of the relationship between gun prevalence among civilians and rates of 
violence have been seriously marred by a range of methodological problems. Many 
investigations have relied upon legal ownership as the sole measure of gun 
prevalence. This variable is an inaccurate measure of the total number of guns in 
civilian hands, for it excludes the substantial number of firearms illegally possessed 
and it is particularly important to include unlicensed firearms in the equation when 
assessing the impact of guns on rates of criminal violence, as they are more 
commonly used for criminal purposes (Wright et al, 1983). Accurately measuring 
gun prevalence has proven inordinately difficult and measurement errors have been 
common (Hill et al, 1985). Estimating the number of illegally owned guns has been 
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a major obstacle. Most countries keep records of licensed guns which provide an 
indication of the number of legally owned tirearms in circulation, 1s but there are no 
equivalent data sources on unlicensed guns. Estimates of illegal possession based on 
the number of tirearms reported lost, stolen, recovered and confiscated are 
undercounts as they exclude guns obtained on the black market, homemade weapons 
and unreported missing guns. Statistics derived from rates of prosecution or 
conviction for illegal possession also produce underestimates by excluding those who 
have not been arrested or successfully prosecuted. Measures derived from firearm 
crime statistics are also inaccurate, for not all guns used in lawbreaking are illegally 
possessed. Therefore, the questionable validity of measures of prevalence, one of 
the two key variables in much of the research on guns and violence, casts doubt on 
the validity and reliability of many of the findings in this field. 
In view of such difficulties, some researchers have resorted to composite 
indicators of gun prevalence rather than relying upon separate figures for legally and 
illegally owned firearms. Gradually, a range of indirect measures of gun prevalence 
has been developed including inter alia: the proportion of known suicides, 
homicides, aggravated assaults and robberies committ d using guns; the fatal gun 
accident rate; the rate of gun ownership among members of gun associations; and the 
monetary value of property stolen using firearms. There is now consistent empirical 
evidence that, used together, this set of indicators provides a valid measure of 
handgun prevalence at the city level (Kleck & Patterson, 1993). National estimates 
of gun prevalence, however, remain equivocal. Whilst composite measures may 
enable increased measurement validity at one level, there is a disadvantage to their 
use. Retaining separate estimates of legal and illegal gun ownership, as well as 
figures reflecting the legal and criminal use of guns, is critical to investigating the 
hypothesis that it is illegal gun owners who constitute the problem in relation to 
violent crime (McDowall et at, 1991). 
Gun Controls as Indicators of Prevalence 
Some researchers have focused on the stringency of gun controls assumed to reduce 
prevalence, rather than attempting to measure gun prevalence directly. Such studies 
have attempted to assess the impact of a set of gun controls on rates of violence. If a 
significant decrease has been demonstrated in a particular type of violence following 
the introduction of gun controls, the usual conclusion has been that the interventions 
concerned have reduced violence by decreasing the prevalence of firearms. All too 
often, however, this deduction has been unfounded. In some studies for instance, it 
is unlikely that the interventions in question would have affected the prevalence of 
guns. 
15 After taking into account licences revoked, guns reported defective, lost, 
stolen, recovered and confiscated. 
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Deductive errors have also resulted from the erroneous assumption that gun 
controls function as intended. Even if an intervention designed to diminish firearm 
prevalence is followed by a reduction in violence, this consequence ought not to he 
automatically attributed to a change in the availability of guns. For the publicity that 
often accompanies legal reforms may produce a temporary change of attitude to gun 
use, which increases restraint and decreases violence, even if the number of guns 
remains constant. Thus, findings from studies in which the processes by which gun-
related interventions function are assumed rather than investigated directly, should be 
treated with extreme caution. 
Many gun control studies have been marred by a failure to examine the discrete 
effects of single interventions or the interactive effects of different combinations. 
The hulk of work in this area has focused on the overall impact of aggregate gun 
controls and this has not advanced our understanding of which interventions, 
singularly and in what combinations, work by what specific means, to effect what 
kinds of violence, and in what ways. 
In cross-sectional research on firearm-related interventions, rates of violence 
have been measured and compared over a specific period in jurisdictions with 
different gun controls. By contrast the most po ular longitudinal design, interrupted 
time-series analysis, has involved the comparison of rates of violence in a 
jurisdiction, at various points in time; usually before and after the implementation of 
interventions. Rates of violence are affected by a multitude of known and unknown 
factors and, in longitudinal designs, it is difficult to control eY.traneous confounding 
variables. Despite this problem, some such studies have failed to include control 
areas and others have assumed that similar extraneous variables have been operating 
in control areas. 16 Rates of non-gun violence in a jurisdiction have sometimes been 
used as internal controls, but this practice rests on the faulty premise that firearm 
violence is affected by the same variables as other violence (Loftin & McDowall, 
1984, 1981). Gun controls are frequently one among many reactions to increases in 
violence, making impact evaluation difficult. It is tricky to isolate the specific 
effects of gun controls as opposed to other interventions. Also, because they are 
usually implemented after an increase in violence, one cannot be certain that a 
subsequent decrease would not have occurred without intervention: fluctuations in 
rates of violence may follow an independent cyclical pattern. In view of the 
problems with longitudinal research, cross-sectional designs have been favoured in 
this field. Nevertheless, even these studies have been beleaguered by difficulties in 
the identification of extraneous variables, not to mention impact measurement. The 
bigger the jurisdiction investigated, the greater the potential for unidentified 
confounding effects.n Consequently, cross-sectional research on smaller areas like 
16 See Pierce and Bowers ( 1981). 
17 Known as aggregation bias. 
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cities has been advocated (e.g. Cook, 1979; Geisel et al, 1969). 
Specific Effects on Violent Behaviour 
Introductory Comment 
Work restricted to gun prevalence has proven to he rather limited in advancing our 
understanding of the relationship between firearms and violence. Merely possessing 
or being armed with a gun doesn't mean that the weapon will actually be used to 
shoot someone. For violence to occur, a firearm must be accessible, operable and 
fired. There is evidence indicating that, at least in some countries, a high proportion 
of legal gun owners never fire their weapons outside of a shooting range (e.g. 
Stenning & Moyer, 1981). It is thus preferable to consider the factors that affect 
whether or not a gun is used and, if so, to what effect. This requires the study of a 
wider range of variables affecting violence such as the accessibility of weapons, 
attitudes to the use of guns and violence, and the specific effects of firearms on 
behaviour. 
The Substitution Effect 
Many authors have contended that factors other than the availability of guns motivate 
people to behave violently .18 The argument is that people who intend to perpetrate -&::,.... 
violence and cannot obtain firearms will simply find alternate means (e.g. Lester & 
Frank 1988; Kaplan, 1986). This is kn wn as the substitution effect. However, a 
number of studies have consistently shown no evidence of this effect across a range 
of countries including Western Europe, Canada and the USA (e.g. Lester, 199l[b], 
1987[b]; Killias, 1990; Sproule & Kennett, 1989, 1988). In contrast to homicide, 
weapon substitution has been demonstrated in relation to robbery; it seems that when 
handguns are less accessible to would-be robbers, long-guns are substituted and, 
when neither type of firearm is freely available, other weapons like knives are 
employed (e.g. Kleck, 1986[a]). This highlights the importance of)ntention as a v 
mediating variable. But even without a substitution effect, a reduced prevalence of 
guns would not necessarily result in a lower rate of homicide, for those who possess 
firearms might kill more frequently. It has been shown that compared to other 
weapons, gun homicides more often involve multiple victims (Sproule & Kennett, 
1989). 
The Disinhibiting Effect 
A most popular hypothesis has been that guns have a disinhibiting effect which 
heightens the probability of use. Unlike most weapons, firearms allow the infliction 
of injury from a distance, without physical contact and without having to observe the 
damage done, and being armed with a gun markedly increases a person's power in 
18 Particularly economic and political inequities. 
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relation to others who are not equivalently armed (Kleck & McElrath, 1991; Cook, 
1982; Goode, 1972, 1971 ). Firearms may also give some people the audacity and 
means to commit crimes that they might not otherwise have considered feasible (e.g. 
Kleck, 1986[a]; The American Bar Foundation, 1967). Therefore it has been 
postulated that guns serve to embolden the fearful, the physically weak and the 
squeamish, so encouraging violent and often lethal confrontations that may not 
otherwise have taken place (e.g. Kleck & Patterson, 1993; Cook, 1991, 1982; 
Newton & Zimring, 1970). 
The Intensification Effect 
It has long been claimed that when used, guns are more likely to kill than other 
weapons (Turner & Leyens, 1992; Chappell et al, 1988; Block, 1981, 1977). 
However, this apparently self evident notion has been challenged. It has been 
maintained that firearms more commonly cause death because these weapons are 
selected by people who intend to kill (e.g. Cook, 1991, Zimring, 1968). Therefore, 
it is not the technical properties of guns that are the key variable but the intentions of 
users (e.g. Kleck, 1986ra]). In support of this claim it has been shown that the 
'success rate' of gun assaults is higher when the intention is to kill (Newton & 
Zimring, 1969). But other empirical evidence has not confirmed this postulate. 
Toch (1969) interviewed a sample of men convicted of firearm homicide and found 
that the majority had intended to hurt rather than to kill. It has been demonstrated 
further that most aggravated assaults are not preplanned, but take place on impulse 
with weapon selection determined by immediate availability (e.g. Toch & Lizotte, 
1992, Cook, 1991). These incidents usually result from acts of violence committed 
during altercations like bar-room disputes, arguments between intimate partners and 
family quarrels (e.g. Toch & Lizotte, 1992; Berkowitz, 1974; Newton & Zimring, 
1969; Toch, 1969). Unfortunately, if guns are accessible in such situations, the 
outcome is more likely to be fatal (e.g. Neal, 1989; Polsby, 1986). It has been 
demonstrated that 90% of firearm fatalities involve guns belonging to people in the 
victim's immediate social circle (Turner et al, 1977). It has also been shown that 
legally owned handguns are six times more likely to be used on a family member or 
friend than on an intruder, 19 and that a firearm in the home significantly increases 
the risk of homicide among family members and friends (Kellerman et al, 1993; 
Time Magazine, 6 February 1989; Kellerman & Reay, 1986). 
Overall it seems that, while some people are determined to kill so select guns, 
for many others the intention to kill or harm is transient and the choice of weapon is 
determined by immediate availability. When the intention to kill is weak or short-
lived availability often determines the type of weapon used and hence the likelihood 
of death (Cook, 1991; Zimring, 1968). Therefore, if guns are not available under 
19 In accidents, homicides and suicides. 
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such circumstances, fewer confrontations are likely to prove fatal. Logically these 
kinds of findings have been used to promote the reduction of frrearm availability as a 
means of decreasing certain types of homicide. 
The Weapons Effect 
The instigatory effect of firearms has been investigated from another angle, namely, 
that of a person confronted with a gun. Since the late sixties a substantial amount of 
research has been conducted on what Berkowitz and LePage ( 1967) originally termed 
the weapons-effect. This is the notion that guns incite violence in conflictual 
situations by provoking aggressive retaliation, and is based on the hypothesis that a 
person is more likely to express aggression in the presence of stimuli s/he associates 
with aggression. It has been theorised further that, through enactive and 
observational learning, guns become aggressive stimuli by frequent association with 
aggressive acts in everyday life and the mass media (e.g. Huesmann, 1988; 
Berkowitz, 1984, 1974). In short, guns are said to stimulate impulsive aggression 
facilitating reactions (e.g. Berkowitz, 1968). 
A large number of laboratory and field investigations of the weapons-effect 
have been carried out in different countries, with findings both f()I'20 and againstJ1 
A number of studies have shown that under specific and somewhat artificial 
conditions, guns may instigate aggressive behaviour in certain men i.e. habitually 
irritable men already angered by some event (e.g. Caprara et al, 1984; Turner et al, 
1975). However, the accumulated evidence suggests that the weapons-effect is 
unlikely under realistic conditions (K.leck, 1998). 
The Inhibitory Effect 
Although guns can stimulate violence they can also evoke anxiety that inhibits 
aggressive reactions (e.g. Cahoon & Edwards, 1985; Leyens & Parke, 1975; Buss et 
al, 1972; Ellis et al, 1971; Fraczek & McCauley, 1971). The relationship between 
frrearms and aggression has been recognised as complex, with effects shaped by the 
contextual meanings individuals learn to attach to guns (Turner & Leyens, 1992). It 
'\. / is thus imperative to explore how individuals perceive weapons in order to 
understand their reactions (e.g. Turner & Leyens, 1992; Turner et al, 1975). 
Studies of children living in war conditions and their responses to toy firearms, have 
provided additional support for the latter postulate. It has been demonstrated that the 
presence of toy guns increased co-operative behaviour and decreased aggressive 
conduct among Palestinian and Yugoslavian children. These children had come to 
associate frrearms with freedom and security, rather than with aggression, because 
20 For example see Leyens and Dunand in: Turner and Leyens (1992), Carlson et 
al ( 1990), and Turner et al (1977). 
21 For example see Cahoon and Edwards (1985), Buss et al (1972), Ellis et al 
(1971), and Page and Scheidt (1971). 
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they had been exposed mainly to firearms in the hands of soldiers who functioned as 
a protective force (Mahjoub, Leyens and Yzerbyt, and Zuzul in: Turner & Leyens, 
1992). 
Clearly, the mere presence of a gun in a confrontation does not necessarily 
result in death or even injury. To illustrate, people were killed or injured in only 
two per cent of the one million defensive shootings that took place in the USA 
during 1980 (Cook, 1985). And crime victims were killed or injured in only three 
per cent of the 639000 offences in which guns were used (Rand, 1990).22 Various 
options are available to a person who holds a deadly weapon: s/he may frighten, 
coerce compliance, injure someone non-fatally and/or kill (Kleck & McElrath, 
1991). However, relatively little is known about the impact of various weapons on 
the outcome of interpersonal conflicts (Wright et al, 1983). 
Kleck and McElrath ( 1991) conducted one of the few empirical studies of 
threatening encounters between strangers.n They examined whether confrontations 
escalated into actual physical attacks and whether injury or death resulted. This 
investigation showed that the presence of a gun in a potentially violent interpersonal 
confrontation increased the probability of death only if the encounter escalated into a 
· physical attack (Kleck & McElrath, 1991). But when just one party to such a 
conflict was armed with a gun, the chance of a physical attack decreased, as did the 
risk of injury. This is compatible with the earlier finding that the threat of a gun 
often substitutes for an actual attack (e.g. Goode, 1971). It has also been used to 
explain lower rates of injury among victims of robberies and rapes comniitted with 
guns (e.g. Luckenbill, 1982, 1981; Block, 1981, 1977; Cook & Nagin, 1979; 
Hindelang, 1976; McDonald, 1975). Under certain circumstances then, the presence 
of a gun can serve to defuse a potentially violent situation so diminishing the chance 
of injury and death.~ In fact, "[t]he same qualities of weapons [guns] that make 
them dangerous if used to attack can inhibit or preclude the necessity of actually 
using them" (Kleck & McElrath, 1991:673-4). 
Such research serves to highlight the importance of expanding the focus from 
fatal outcomes of gun use, to the potential consequences of firearms in different 
situations. Whilst the high reliability of gun fatalities make them an attractive 
measure for research purposes, the widespread use of homicide as the indicator of 
firearm violence has produced a somewhat narrow and simplistic construction of the 
impact of guns. Death is the most severe consequence of firearm use. Nonetheless, 
it is neither the sole nor necessarily the most common outcome of interactions in 
which guns are available. Not only should non-fatal firearm violence such as 
injuries and missed shots be investigated, but also situations in which guns are 
22 Annual average in the USA between 1979 and 1987. 
23 In the USA from 1979 to 1985. 
24 See Kleck and Delone (1993), Kleck and McElrath (1991), Turner et al 
(1975), Fraczek and McCauley (1971), Goode (1971) and Fischer et al (1969). 
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present but not used and particularly ~e extent to which the mere threat of a firearm 
results in the aversion of actual violence. Furthermore, to better understand the 
impact of guns, studies must not be limited to crime but must include lawful 
violence. The nineties have seen a more sophisticated approach develop. Research 
attention has been shifted to identifying the specific circumstances in which firearms 
are deployed, the range of outcomes, and the sequences of events that escalate into 
shootings (e.g. Toch & Lizotte, 1992; Kleck & McElrath, 1991). 
Interim Conclusion 
The bulk of empirical research into the relationship between gun prevalence and 
rates of violence has been seriously impaired by methodological shortcomings; most 
significantly low levels of measurement validity in relation to key variables. The 
results have been mixed, negative or rather weak. Considering the most reliable 
findings, the evidence indicates that the level of legal private gun ownership does not 
significantly affect the overall rate of homicide (Kleck & Patterson, 1993; Kleck, 
1986[a], 1984). In view of the contradictory effects among numerous mediating 
variables, it should not be surprising to find that the net effect of guns on homicide 
may be close to zero (Kleck & Patterson, 1993). It has become evident that the 
impact of firearms on violence is a more complex matter than previously 
acknowledged. A comprehensive understanding requires that research be designed to 
examine the discrete and interactive effects of each relevant variable on the outcomes 
of potentially violent situations. Finally, it has been concluded that, despite the 
profusion of work in this field, there is still no consistent and reliable support for the 
assumption that the prevalence of guns has a causal effect on rates of violence (e.g. 
Kleck & Patterson, 1993; Kleck & McElrath, 1991; Wright et al, 1983). Given that 
it is people, not guns, who kill and many factors motivate people to pull a trigger, 
they might still kill at a similar rate if guns were not readily available. 
Gun Prevalence and Crime 
Introductory Comment 
Although research on guns in relation to crime overlaps with work on firearms and 
homicide, the former field is broader in scope. Numerous studies have examined the 
impact of guns on the overall crime rate. Some investigations have focused on 
specific crimes, particularly robbery and aggravated assault, these being the offences 
most frequently perpetrated with firearms (Kleck, 1986[a]).~ 
Given the low reliability and validity of crime measures, extreme caution 
should be exercised in evaluating fmdings reported from studies in which the crime 
rate has been employed as a central variable. Fluctuations in the number of reported 
25 And relatively uncommon in rape, mugging, burglary and theft, see Kleck 
(1986[a]). 
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offences, prosecutions and convictions, are generally not just the product of changes 
in the amount of lawbreaking. For example, the introduction of victim-sensitive 
police procedures may serve to increase the rate at which rapes are reported, and the 
prosecution rate for certain offences may rise due to the adoption of a tougher 
policy. Crime figures that are based on the number of reported offences, 
prosecutions and/or convictions neglect the so-called dark figure of unreported 
lawbreaking. Even data derived from self-report surveys of crime, arguably the 
most accurate of the available crime statistics, are distorted by a range of factors. 
Guns as a Criminogenic Factor 
A prevalence of licensed guns provides law breakers with a ready supply of firearms. 
This is one of the main ways in which lawful gun possession is said to facilitate 
crime (e.g. Kleck, 1984; Moore, 1981; Newton & Zimring, 1970). This claim has 
found empirical support at least in the USA where it has been shown that between 
40% and 70% of handguns used in law breaking were originally stolen {Wright & 
Rossi, 1986: 196). Many of these weapons are redistributed among law breakers via 
quasi-legal, private sales of second-hand guns (e.g. Kleck, 1986[a]; Wright & Rossi, 
1985; Burr, 1977). 
The findings from research into the relationship between legal gun ownership 
and overall rates of crime have been contradictory. In general, Canadian studies 
have indicated reductions in the crime rate following the introduction of stringent 
gun controls designed to reduce civilian ownership (Hung, 1993). But similar 
research in the USA has not generated.such consistent evidence. 26 
More dependable findings have been produced from studies of gun availability 
in relation to individual offences. The accumulated evidence with respect to robbery 
indicates that, due to substitution and displacement effects, the availability of 
firearms does not have a significant net effect on the overall rate of robbery (e.g. 
Kleck & Patterson, 1993); Kleck, 1986[a]; McDowall, 1986; Cook, 1983, 1982, 
1979). So when access to guns is restricted, would-be robbers appear to change 
weapons, victims or move to areas where firearms are accessible. But the causal 
relationship between intention and weapon type seems to be two-way; "the task 
determines the tool and the tool determines the task" (Cook, 1983:56). 
Additionally, the relative vulnerability of a crime target/victim significantly affects 
the choice of weapon: guns are preferred when the crime target is well defended. 
Hence, those who rob banks and other secure premises almost always carry guns 
(e.g. Kleck, 1986[a]; Cook, 1983, 1980; Cook & Nagin, 1979; Skogan, 1978; 
Cook, 1976). Reducing the availability of guns to potential robbers appears to 
decrease robberies against tougher targets yet increases offences against more 
26 See Kleck and Patterson (1993), McDowall and Loftin (1986), Magaddino and 
Medoff (1984), Wright et al (1983), Clotfelter (1981), Bordua and Lizotte 
(1979), Kleck (1979) and Seidman (1975). 
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vulnerable victims (e.g. Kleck, 1986[a]). Furthermore, because firearms enable 
lucrative robberies, the rate of offending may increase when guns are in short supply 
(e.g. Kleck & Patterson, 1993). Lowering gun prevalence may also increase the rate 
of homicide associated with robberies (e.g. Cook, 1982, 1979). It seems that armed 
robbers are less likely to kill their victims, probably because guns evoke greater 
compliance. However there is some encouraging evidence suggesting that the 
following interventions can reduce the rate of armed robbery: stricter licensing of 
gun dealers, and harsher penalties for carrying unlicensed firearms and for armed 
robbery (e.g. Kleck & Patterson, 1993; McPheters et at, 1984; Blose & Cook, 
1980; Deutsch & Alt, 1977). 
A cross-sectional investigation by Sloan et at ( 1988) is commonly cited in 
support of the effect of gun prevalence on aggravated assault. This group of 
researchers claimed to have demonstrated a significant decrease in aggravated assault 
in Vancouver (Canada), after the implementation of interventions to reduce gun 
prevalence. In Seattle (USA), the control city where there had been no new firearm-
related interventions, they found no change in the rate of aggravated assault (Sloan et 
at, 1988). However, these two cities were characterised by similar levels of gun 
prevalence (Kleck, 1998). Hence, the main conclusion reached in this study is 
invalid: differences in gun prevalence were not responsible for differences in the 
rates of aggravated assault. 
However, there is some indication that stricter licensing laws for gun dealers 
(that restrict availability) tend to lower the rate of aggravated assault (e.g. Blose & 
Cook, 1980). Reductions in aggravated assaults as a consequence of decreased gun 
availability may be explained in terms of the intensification effect: because a large 
proportion of assaults are impulsive, limiting firearm availability may serve to 
decrease the chances of altercations escalating into homicides. But it is also 
important to note that, limiting gun availability may increase the vulnerability of 
those who rely on firearms for self defense because they are weaker than their 
assailants, for example, women who use guns to defend themselves against abusive 
male intimates, and elderly people who employ firearms against younger attackers 
(e.g. Kleck, 1986[a]; Cook, 1982). On the positive side, however, it may reduce 
attacks on less vulnerable targets, like younger males and police officers, against 
whom firearms are commonly employed (Cook, 1983). 
GfliJS as a Crime Inhibiting Factor 
Thus far, work concerned with guns in the hands of Jawbreakers has been 
considered. But, firearms " ... empower both those who would use them to victimize 
and those who would use them to prevent their victimization" (Kleck, 1988: 17). 
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The defensive use of guns by civilians is relatively common in North America: 
averaging about 340000 incidents p.a. (Kleck, 1986[a]:45). And it seems that 
handguns are used in self defence as often as they are used to commit crimes (Kleck, 
1988).27 Furthermore, at times, civilians have shot and lawfully killed more 
offenders than the police (Kleck, 1986[a]:44). Thus, while the possession of guns 
by offenders may have a crime facilitating effect, legal gun ownership may be crime 
inhibiting (Kleck, 1988, 1986[ a]). It has been theorised that defensive civilian gun 
ownership works to reduce crime by two key mechanisms: first by decreasing the 
chance of certain offences being completed, as guns enable civilian victims to resist 
offenders especially residential burglars (e.g. Kates, 1991; Robin, 1991; Kleck, 
1988, 1986[a]; Green, 1987; Young, 1985; Kleck & Bordua, 1981). The second 
crime inhibiting effect is known as dete"ence, that is, lowering the probability that 
certain offences will be committed (Kates, 1991). Deterrence is said to operate in 
two main ways: general deterrence, which means that lawbreakers refrain from 
committing certain crimes in order to avoid the risk of being confronted by armed 
civilians (e.g. Time Magazine, 6 February 1989; Wright etal, 1983; Firman, 1975). 
And specific deterrence, which means that lawbreakers, who actually experience 
resistance from gun wielding civilians during attempted offences, are discouraged 
from engaging in further lawbreaking (e.g. Green, 1987). 
There is some evidence suggesting that defensive private gun ownership and 
use may reduce the completion rate and the risk of injury and death for victims and 
lawbreakers in certain crimes. For instance, in cases of attempted robbery and 
burglary, it seems that resistance with a gun is the most effective victim-reaction. A 
number of studies have found that victims armed with guns are more likely to resist 
lawbreakers and to prevent the completion of offences, and less likely to be injured 
in the process (e.g. Kleck, 1988; Kleck & Bordua, 1981).28 Moreover, even if 
defensive gun ownership does not reduce the rate of offending due to displacement, 
the risk of injury and death associated with the substitute offence may be lower. For 
example, it has been demonstrated that when burglars perceive civilian gun 
ownership to be widespread, they are more likely to choose unoccupied premises to 
decrease the probability of violent confrontations with victims (e.g. Mayhew, 1987; 
Rengert & Wasilchick, 1985; Kates, 1983; Waller & Okihiro, 1978; Block, 1984).29 
Overall it appears that defensive civilian gun ownership may lower the completion 
rate and the risk of death and injury for some offences, particularly burglary and 
robbery. However, it is also noteworthy that the families of civilians who acquire 
guns for self defense are at greater risk of domestic homicide victimisation 
(Kellerman et al, 1993). 
It has been postulated further that widespread licensed gun ownership among 
27 Based on a 1980 national sample. 
28 But not true of other weapons. 
29 Re the UK, USA, Canada and the Netherlands. 
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civilians may deter the commission of certain kinds of offences, like residential 
burglary, robbery and assault by burglars (e.g. Green, 1987). One way of testing 
the crime inhibiting impact of civilian gun ownership has been to examine the 
association between levels of defensive possession and rates of offending for specific 
crimes (e.g. Seitz, 1972; Newton & Zimring, 1970; Geisel et al, 1969). 
Unfortunately, the findings from this kind of study have been problematic, mainly 
because of the focus on actual levels of gun ownership rather than lawbreakers' 
perceptions of this threat. After all, potential offenders' views are the essential 
ingredient for general deterrence; dependent on their impressions of whether 
potential victims are likely to be armed with guns and also the likelihood of victims 
actually using guns in resistance (e.g. Kleck, 1988). 
Two alternate approaches have thus been developed to test the deterrence 
hypothesis: studies of offenders' opinions about the effect of civilian gun ownership 
and natural quasi-experiments in which crime rates have been examined after well 
publicised increases in defensive civilian gun ownership. 30 Whilst opinion surveys 
have tended to support the specific deterrence hypothesis,31 most findings have been 
seriously marred by reporting errors and the use of unrepresentative samples. At 
best, such studies reflect the views of offenders who have been caught and it is 
logical to surmise that their opinions may well differ from those who have offended, 
but have not been arrested or convicted (Green, 1987). 
The quasi-natural experimental approach has been adopted in a range of 
investigations including, inter alia, examinations of: (I) the rape rate in Orlando 
(Florida) following the implementation of a training program in defensive gun use 
for women (e.g. Kleck & Bordua, 1983; Krug, 1968); (2) retail-store robbery in 
Kansas City (Kansas) after the police trained store personnel in defensive gun use 
(e.g. Silver & Kates, 1979; The United States Small Business Administration, 1969); 
(3) burglaries in Kennesaw (Georgia) subsequent to the passing of a local ordinance 
requiring every household to possess a firearm (e.g. McDowall et al, 1989; Kleck, 
1986[b]; Benenson, 1982); (4) burglary after the introduction of a law prohibiting 
the sale of handguns in Morton Grove and Evanston (Illinois) (e.g. McDowall et al 
1991); and (5) burglary in the state of Colorado following the implementation of 
legislation permitting homeowners to kill in order to defend their property (e.g. 
Wilbanks, 1990). On the whole the evidence derived from these kinds of 
investigations has been somewhat disappointing. 
"[G]eneral deterrence seems to have been directly demonstrated for a 
particular offence [rape] in one jurisdiction for a short while. Where 
evidence has been found to support absolute crime reduction through 
deterrence [general and specific], it has been marred by concerns about 
displacement" (Green 1987:76). 
30 Or after incidents in which victims have successfully resisted offenders. 
31 See Wright and Rossi (1986), Link (1982) and Firman (1975). 
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In short, although certain crimes may decrease, others may increase, so offending 
may not decline: lawbreakers may simply select different victims, often those who 
are more vulnerable and less likely to offer armed resistance. 
After reviewing the accumulated findings, McDowall et al (1991) maintained 
that, at best, widespread legal gun ownership by civilians has neither a significant 
nor a sustained inhibitory effect on crime. Despite the persuasive logic of the crime 
inhibiting postulate, the accumulated evidence does not convincingly support the 
claim that well publicised, high levels of defensive civilian gun ownership deter 
crime, either specifically or generally (McDowell et al, 1991). More generally, it 
has been concluded that firearms tend to have a violence-reducing effect in the hands 
of law-abiding citizens, but in the hands of lawbreakers these same weapons can 
have both violence increasing and decreasing effects (Kleck, 1998). 
Factors Affecting Private Gun Ownership 
Introductory Comment 
Research on variables affecting lawful gun ownership among civilians has developed 
as an offshoot of work on gun prevalence (Toch & Lizotte, 1992). The main goal in 
this rather substantial subfield has been to identify those factors that encourage 
civilians to acquire firearms, usually in order to inform interventions aimed at 
diminishing private possession. 
Guns are privately owned for a variety of reasons including as collectors' 
items, for recreation such as target shooting, for work purposes like culling and 
subsistence hunting, and for self defence (e.g. Tonso, 1984). There are also those 
who possess firearms in order to perpetrate offences. However, in contemporary 
North America, the majority of civilians who own licensed guns have acquired these 
weapons for protection (e.g. Cook, 1991; Kleck, 1988). Defensive civilian gun 
ownership is thus currently viewed as a key contributory factor to the rising 
prevalence of guns in the USA and much work is . being done to ascertain which 
factors prompt civilians to obtain guns for the purposes of self defense (e.g. 
Marciniak & Loftin, 1991; Smith & Uchida, 1988; Young et al, 1987; Young, 
1985, 1984; Wright, 1984). In this regard the collective security hypothesis has 
attracted most of the attention (Young et al, 1987). 
The Collective Security Hypothesis 
In an industrialised democracy, collective mechanisms like the police and the legal 
system are established to provide for the security of citizens and on this basis, each 
individual's right to protect her/himself is limited (Maine, 1954). If these collective 
institutions fail, however, individuals become highly vulnerable to victimisation. 
Citizens' compliance with this arrangement is thus tentative as the threat of violent 
crime provides strong motivation for non-compliance (Young et al, 1987). It has 
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been argued that the contemporary North American public have lost confidence in 
the police and legal system because these institutions have failed to stem the rising 
tide of violent crime. Fear of criminal victimisation has thus risen and, in response, 
civilians have increasingly acquired guns in order to protect their interests. The bulk 
of civilians own guns for protection and, notably, the defensive use of guns by 
civilians in response to offences like robbery and burglary is at least as common as 
police arrest (Kleck, 1988). In this context, defensive civilian gun ownership is a 
structured form of social action (Smith & Uchida, 1988). 
The collective security hypothesis is something of a chain of subpostulates, and 
researchers have attempted to test the validity of different links in this hypothetical 
chain: there has been consistent empirical support for a significant association 
between the end links, that is, factors that lower public confidence in collective 
security institutions and increases in defensive civilian gun ownership.n Notably, 
evidence showing increased legal gun ownership as a consequence of rising violence 
and crime has been much stronger than that indicating fireann prevalence as a cause 
of increased violence (e.g. Kleck & Patterson, 1993; Lester & Murrell, 1986; 
Magaddino & Medoff, 1984). Studies have also shown that factors like increased 
rates of violent crime and civil conflict tend to lower public confidence, especially 
when people consider the responses of collective security institutions to be 
inadequate (e.g. Young et al, 1987; McDowell & Loftin, 1986, 1983). 
Additionally, there is systematic evidence of an inverse relationship between public 
confidence in collective institutions and defensive civilian gun ownership (e.g. 
Young et al, 1987; McDowall & Loftin, 1986, 1983; Young, 1985). 
However, the links between public confidence and fear of crime, and between 
fear of crime and defensive civilian gun ownership, have not been demonstrated 
sufficiently. To the contrary, studies have revealed that the effect of public 
confidence on civilian gun ownership is independent from fear of crime (e.g. Young 
et al, 1987; Young 1985). After reviewing the relevant literature, Wright et al 
(1983) have concluded that there is no reliable evidence of a significant relationship 
between fear of crime and defensive civilian gun ownership and more recent studies 
have supported this conclusion (e.g. Arthur, 1992; Archer & Erlich-Erfer, 1991; 
Bankston, 1990). Thus, it may be concluded that it is not fear of crime which is the 
most significant predictor of defensive civilian gun ownership, but rather public 
confidence in the institutions of collective security. 
Nevertheless, work on the relationship between fear of crime and defensive 
gun ownership has continued. A number of mediating factors have been revealed 
enabling the modelling of a more complex relationship among the variables. 
Research has demonstrated that fear of crime is highest among people who are 
32 See Kleck and Patterson (1993), McDowell and Loftin (1986, 1983), Kleck 
(1984, 1979), Clotfelter (1981 ), Lizotte et al ( 1981 ), Bordua and Lizotte 
( 1979) and Seidman ( 197 5). 
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commonly exposed to criminal victimisation, those who perceive themselves to be at 
risk and those with few resources for coping with the consequences of criminal 
victimisation (e.g. Bankston & Thompson, 1989; Ortega & Myles, 1987). In the 
USA, it appears that black people, women and the elderly are most afraid of 
criminal victimisation (Ortega & Myles, 1987). But these groups do not have the 
highest levels of defensive gun ownership, which underscores the fact that, on its 
own, fear of crime does not inevitably lead people to acquire guns. In fact, living in 
a densely populated, large city is the best predictor of civilian handgun ownership 
and within the urban populace it is whites, men, younger people and those in higher 
income brackets who are most likely to own handguns for protection (e.g. Bankston, 
1990; Bankston & Thompson, 1989; Young 1985). Furthermore, socio-economic 
status, sex, age and race have significant mediatory effects on both gun ownership 
and fear of crime, which are said to be simultaneously detennined (e.g. Arthur, 
1992; Marciniak & Loftin, 1991; Hill et al, 1985; DeFronzo, 1979). For instance, 
it has been found that heightened fear of crime increases the probability of defensive 
gun ownership among higher income, white men in the USA (e.g. Whitehead & 
Langworthy, 1989; Young et al, 1987). Here racist stereotyping and gender role 
socialisation provide credible explanations. In North America, the mass media have 
constructed a stereotype of violent criminals as young, black males (e.g. Young, 
1985). This menacing image has served to bolster already existing racist attitudes 
and appears to have increased fear of crime among whites. Actively defensive 
behaviour, particularly in relation to women, children and property, is a key aspect 
of the masculine gender role. Hence, defensive gun ownership among men may well 
be an aggressive response to the perceived threat of crime which, for white men, has 
been shaped by racial prejudice (e.g. Young, 1985). However, this explanation does 
not account for the recent marked growth in handgun ownership among young, black 
women living in high crime urban areas in North America (Toch & Lizotte, 1992; 
Thompson et al, 1991). It is now clear that not everyone who fears crime resorts to 
acquiring a gun for protection and, more importantly, that only a subgroup of those 
who possess guns actually use these weapons defensively. Nevertheless, there does 
appear to be a psychological benefit to possessing a handgun for protection, that is, 
less fear of crime (e.g. Lizotte et al, 1981; Lizotte & Bordua, 1980). 
It would thus seem important for research to map who owns what types of 
guns, for what purposes and, more importantly, who uses firearms and under what 
circumstances. Unfortunately, work of this specific nature is still rather limited. 
Even though somewhat outdated now, Stenning and Moyer's (1981) national survey 
of the Canadian population is a good example of the kind of research that is needed. 
Their findings demonstrated unequivocally that factors like gender, age, occupation 
and size of community affect the ownership and use of firearms. More specifically, 
they showed that, in Canada, licensed tirearm owners were most likely to be older 
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males who lived in urban areas, performed white-collar jobs and had formal training 
in the handling of firearms. Significantly, over half of these gun owners had never 
fired their guns except during shooting practice and this finding was used to develop · .. 
interventions designed to dissuade civilian gun ownership. The investigation also 
revealed that hunting accidents were most common among younger males living in 
urban areas, who borrowed guns but had not been trained in their safe-use. Policy 
requiring instructional programmes in the safe-handling of guns was developed for 
this target group. Such research underscores the value of using reliable empirical 
data to identify specific problems pertaining to guns and tailor-make interventions. 
Cultural and Structural Variables 
The central role played by meaning has been clearly demonstrated in gun use. 
Numerous studies have examined factors affecting the meanings associated with 
firearms and people's willingness to use guns (Toch & Lizotte, 1992). The 
investigation of firearm-related meanings within different groups has been a popular 
focus. Various researchers have compared civilians' attitudes to firearms across 
societies, regions and subcultures (e.g. Brennan et at, 1993; Harding, 1993; 
Whitehead & Langworthy, 1989; Tonso, 1984; Lizotte & Bordua, 1980; Bordua & 
Lizotte, 1979). Some studies have revealed significant international variations in 
civilians' attitudes to the possession and use of guns (e.g. Brennan et at, 1993; 
Harding, 1993; Mauser, 1990). Most notably, the British are said to be less inclined 
than North Americans to use firearms (Reuters, 16 October 1996; Kopel, 1993, 
1992). 
A substantial amount of research has been conducted on inter-regional 
differences in attitudes to guns and violence within the USA. It has been established 
that the rate of civilian gun ownership is highest in the southern states and lowest in 
the north-eastern states (Toch & Lizotte, 1992). Much attention has been focused on 
explaining higher rates of homicide and firearm possession in the southern states 
(e.g. Brennan et at, 1993; Hill et at, 1985; Loftin & Hill, 1974; Shannon, 1954). 
Prevalent gun ownership in the South has been attributed to the fact that this was the 
first frontier region to be settled. Over the years behaviour, attitudes and norms 
pertaining to gun ownership have been transmitted intergenerationally, giving rise to 
a longstanding and tenacious subculture of firearm possession among Southerners. 
Today civilian gun ownership in the South is viewed as part of a cultural heritage 
(e.g. Toch & Lizotte, 1992). This Southern subculture centres on the ownership of 
guns for protection, sport and hunting (e.g. Dixon & Lizotte, 1987; Lizotte et at, 
1981 ; Lizotte & Bordua, 1980). Because a high proportion of the southern 
population is rural, long-guns are most popular especially shotguns which are used 
predominantly for hunting small game (e.g. Toch & Lizotte, 1992; Dixon & Lizotte, 
1987; O'Connor & Lizotte, 1978). 
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The South is also said to be characterised by a subculture of violence: the use 
of violence in interpersonal disputes is allegedly condoned to a greater extent in the 
South than it is in other regions of the USA (e.g. Hackney, 1969). This subculture 
has been explained as an established tradition, emanating out of the long conflictual 
history of this area and based on the widespread belief that Southerners have been 
victimised by malicious external forces (e.g. Huff-Corzine et al, 1991; Corzine et 
al, 1986). It has been shown that when people attribute blame for negative 
circumstances to factors beyond themselves, they are more likely to express their 
anger and frustration as homicide than suicide (Henry & Short, 1954). Indeed the 
externalisation of culpability is one of the key justifications for the use of violence 
against others. However, this notion of a subculture of violence giving rise to a 
higher level of homicide in the southern states of the USA has not been consistently 
supported by empirical evidence (e.g. Toch & Lizotte, 1992). It has been 
demonstrated to the contrary that the use of violence in general, and guns in 
particular, is not condoned within the gun-related subculture of the South any more 
than it is among people in other regions of the US (e.g. Toch & Lizotte, 1992; 
Lizotte et al, 1981; Lizotte & Bordua, 1980). Significantly the evidence shows that 
structural, rather than cultural, factors generate the greenhouse conditions for 
violence in the southern states. The crux of this explanation is that relative 
economic deprivation fuels frustration and externally directed aggressicn (e.g. Baron 
& Straus, 1988). In general, people in the South are economically disadvantaged 
compared to those in the North, and black people in the South are the most 
economically deprived group in the entire country. Notably, rates of lethal violence 
are highest among black people in the South (Huff-Corzine et al, 1991). The 
accumulated findings indicate that relative economic inequality mediated by race is 
the significant expl"-"atory variable in relation to higher rates of homicide in the 
South (Huff-Corzine et al, 1991).33 
Other User Characteristics 
Just as race and sex have been found to mediate between gun acquisition and fear of 
crime, these social divisions shape attitudes to the use of violence in general and to 
guns more specifically. The USA, like other contemporary societies, is gendered 
and male dominated. Biological females and males are socialised to fulfil different 
social roles. Several studies have demonstrated that women and men kill, and are 
killed, in ways that are clearly gendered (e.g. K.irsta, 1994; Jurik & Winn, 1990; 
Stark, 1990; Howard, 1986). It has been shown that men more frequently kill 
strangers and that women more commonly kill in self defence (Gartner et al, 1991). 
Furthermore, psychological research consistently shows that gender role socialisation 
develops in females the tendency to internalise, rather than to externalise, aggression 
33 Also see Lester (1987(a]), Brenner and Swank (1986) and Messner (1982). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
28 
and that the opposite occurs in relation to males (e.g. Rohrbaugh, 1981). This 
explanation has been used to theorise the finding that, in most countries, it is men 
who are the main peqJetrators of violence including gun-related violence (e.g. 
Ferreira DeCastro et al, 1991, 1986; Danielsen, 1989[a], 1989[b], 1989[c], 1989[d], 
1989[ e]; Lunden, 1989; Zahn & Sagi, 1987). Internationally, the overwhelming 
majority of homicides are peqJetrated by males (e.g. Ferreira DeCastro et al, 1991, 
1986; Lunden, 1989; Zahn & Sagi, 1987; Henry & Short, 1954) .14 Indeed, the 
homicide rate is significantly lower in societies in which females outnumber males 
(e.g. Stark, 1990). Thus, even though women may be more afraid of and vulnerable 
to violence than men, they appear as a group to be less willing to use violence 
against others (e.g. Plate & Schneider, 1989).ls It should be noted that, although the 
effects of gender on attitudes to violence and on the actual use of force are highly 
significant, they are not independent. Instead, gender interacts with other variables, 
particularly race and socio-economic status, in shaping gun ownership and attitudes 
to the use of guns (e.g. Gartner et al, 1990). It has been shown, for example, that 
the probability of women killing their children increases when their participation in 
the paid labour force is high, hut their economic and social status remains low (Fiala 
& Lafree, 1988). 
Race is also a significant predictive variable in terms of gun use in the USA 
(e.g. Williams et al, 1984). In this country, the people who are most likely to use a 
firearm are young black males who use alcohol, those who have experienced gun 
violence before, and those who have previously been arrested by the police 
(Williams et al, 1984).36 Moreover, assailants who use guns tend to have similar 
social characteristics to their victims, and most violence in the USA is intraracial 
(e.g. Mulvihill et al, 1969; Huff-Corzine et al, 1991; Bell, 1987 resp). 
Characteristics of Victims 
In the USA firearms are a leading cause of non-natural death, whereas in Britain 
guns are responsible for relatively few fatalities (Fingerhut, 1993; Chapman & 
Milroy, 1992 resp) .3' In the same way that violent gun use is more common among 
certain groups than others, firearm victimisation is not randomly distributed (e.g. 
Williams et al, 1984). Economic disadvantage increases vulnerability to homicide of 
all kinds, including firearms (e.g. Loftin & Parker, 1986). In North America, those 
who fall victim to gun assaults are usually socially similar to their assailants, that is, 
young, economically disadvantaged, black males residing in urban areas (e.g. 
Sorenson et al, 1993; Block, 1985, 1977; Williams et al, 1984; Cohen et al, 1981; 
34 Also see Sakuta (1989), Ayral et al (1985) and Fishbein et al (1985) on 
murder-suicides. 
35 See Ben-David ( 1993) on female violence. 
36 See Arbit ( 1990) on adolescents who kill and Gartner and Parker ( 1990) on 
homicide and age internationally. 
37 See Grabosky ( 1989) on violence in Australia. 
' 
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Hindelang et al, 1978).38 It has been shown that black males aged between 16 and 
24, living in urban areas, are at least twice as likely to he assaulted with a firearm 
than white males of the same age-group (e.g. Fingerhut, 1993; Kopel, 1993; Rand, 
1990).39 
Like race, age is a highly significant factor in firearm victimisation. The rate 
of gunshot wounds sustained by those under 16 doubled in the USA between 1987 
and 1990 (Time Magazine, 20 December 1993:28). While guns took second place 
as a cause of death for people between 10 and 34, they were the leading cause for 
black males in this age-group in North America in 1992 (Fingerhut, 1993). Gun 
assault victims are more likely to have previously experienced violence and had 
contact with the police. They also tend to justify the use of force in a wider range of 
circumstances and many perpetrators have themselves been subjected to gun assaults 
(e.g. Williams et al, 1984). 
As previously noted, violence is a gendered social phenomenon. Research 
shows that males are most likely to be killed by male strangers in public places, 
whereas females are more likely to be killed in their homes by intimate male partners 
(e.g. Gartner et al, 1991; Abel, 1986; Howard, 1986; Edwards, 1985). Women are 
twice as likely to be fatally shot by an intimate or ex-intimate male partner, than by 
a stranger (Oprah Winfrey, 29 February 1996). Notably, the hulk of primary 
homicides perpetrated against females are the final outcome of a series of violent 
conflicts between male and female intimates over issues of male control and 
independence (Stark, 1990).40 Indeed quarrels between heterosexual intimates are 
the most deadly of arguments (e.g. Howard, 1986). 41 It is noteworthy that women 
of low socio-economic status who engage in socially unacceptable gender role 
behaviour are at greater risk of being killed by male strangers (Gartner et al, 
1990). 42 
Alcohol use has long been viewed as a contributory factor in homicide. Over 
the years numerous studies have supported the claim that alcohol consumption by 
perpetrators and victims is a catalyst to all kinds of violence (e.g. Wieczorek et al, 
1990; Williams et al, 1984; Coleman, 1976; Bensing & Schroeder, 1960; Wolfgang, 
1981, 1958). It is thus notable that alcohol does not appear to contribute 
significantly to firearm violence. For instance, a study of Eric County in the USA 
showed that gunshot victims were Less likely to have used alcohol than other 
homicide victims (Abel, 1986).43 
38 See Van Den Eshof and Bergsma (1989) on Dutch victims, and Karlsson et al 
( 1993) and Petersen and Gudjonsson ( 1990) on Scandinavian victims. 
39 But firearm homicides increased significantly among white males during the 
nineties, see Fingerhut ( 1993). 
40 Usually known to service providers. 
41 See Hagaman (1987) on family homicides. 
42 Like lesbians and sex-workers. 
43 Between 1977 and 1984. 
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Relatively little research has been conducted on the social distribution of 
firearm accidents in the USA (McDowall & Loftin, 1983). However, the available 
evidence suggests that black, low income, younger people, especially those aged 
between 15 and 34, are the group most prone to gun accidents (e.g. McDowall & 
Loftin, 1983; Rushforth et al, 1974; Newton & Zimring, 1970; Iskrant & Joliet, 
1968). It is promising to note that the rate of accidental gun fatalities among 
children in the USA has been halved since 1970. Indeed, in 1993 only one per cent 
of the deaths of children under 15 were the result of guns (Kopel, 1993). 44 Another 
group that appears to be at risk of firearm accidents are those who handle guns 
without being appropriately trained or experienced, especially people who 
impulsively acquire firearms and those who borrow guns (e.g. McDowall & Loftin, 
1986; Stenning & Moyer, 1981) 
It has been shown consistently that, in the USA, firearm suicides are more 
common among women, whites, those over 25, unmarried people and those who 
suffer from depression (e.g. Lester & Frank, 1990, 1988; Lester, 1989[a], 1989[b], 
1987[a], 1987[c]}.45 Of late, public concern has been expressed over the increasing 
number of teenagers who commit suicide using guns (e.g. Oprah Winfrey, 29 
February 1996; Kellerman et al, 1992; Range & Kastner, 1988). 
Overall Conclusion on Guns, Violence and Crime 
A decade ago academics acknowledged that, due to methodological flaws, little 
could be reliably concluded from the available research on the relationship between 
guns, violence and crime in the USA (Polsby, 1986). In 1986, Kleck concluded that 
"[t]he relationship between gun availability and crime and violence is still very much 
in doubt" (1986fa]:39). Today the situation appears to be much the same. Deriving 
meaningful conclusions from the empirical findings in this field, when feasible, is 
extremely difficult as it is not valid to merely compare the accumulated findings for 
and against any particular hypothesis. The use of combinations of different 
dependent and independent variables, across disparate time periods and a wide 
variety of jurisdictions, makes the findings from many studies incomparable. 
Furthermore, the results are often inconsistent and the majority of studies suffer 
from numerous procedural defects that undermine the validity and reliability of the 
findings. Nevertheless, it is realistic to conclude that the accumulated empirical data 
pertaining to the USA have not demonstrated that gun prevalence has a significant 
net positive effect on overall rates of violence including homicides, accidents and 
crime in general ( Kleck & Patterson, 1993). 46 Thus: 
44 See Goetting ( 1990) on child victims. 
45 See Crombie ( 1989) on suicide in Scotland. 
46 But suicide is causally related to gun prevalence, see Kleck (1986[a]) and 
McDowall and Loftin ( 1986). 
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"[a]lthough popular accounts have suggested that the ready availability of 
firearms is a major factor contributing to criminal violence, empirical 
evidence does not support this premise" (Turner & Leyens, 1992:219). 
Since guns have diverse and sometimes contradictory effects on various types of 
violence in different circumstances, it should not be surprising that the overall effect 
may approximate zero. To illustrate: when potential burglars believe that civilians 
are often armed with guns which they are willing to use, these offenders may begin 
to burgle unoccupied business premises. Such displacement may lead to a decrease 
in the number of homicides and injuries associated with burglaries because 
confrontations between burglars and victims are less likely. However, more 
firearms in homes may push up the rate of impulsive homicides resulting from 
domestic conflicts. In this hypothetical instance, a higher prevalence of guns among 
civilians could both decrease and increase homicides, and the overall impact on the 
homicide rate would depend on the relative size of each of the effects. Most of the 
research conducted to date has been too general and not sufficiently sophisticated to 
render a detailed picture of the separate effects of guns used under different 
circumstances. Also the focus on possession has resulted in a relative neglect of the 
more important question of gun use, and particularly which civilians use their guns 
against which victims, for what reasons and with what outcomes. 
Despite the copious amount of research in this field our understanding of the 
relationship between guns, violence and crime is somewhat fragmented. However, 
this work has served to cast serious doubt on the core assumptions undergirding 
arguments for gun control. It is now apparent that gun prevalence does not have a 
simple, direct, causal effect on violence or crime, nor do firearms necessarily cause 
significantly more deaths and injuries. Whilst guns are potentially lethal weapons, 
their actual impact depends on many inter-related factors, particularly situational 
dynamics and the intentions of users (Kleck & McElrath, 1991). Notably then, the 
validity of the fundamental premises in this field can no longer be assumed. 
Table 2.1: 
Key Questions and Answers from Research. 
Does the availability of guns to civilians significantly affect the net rate of: 
suicide? 
accidents? 
homicide? 
robbery? 
aggravated assault? 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Perhaps 
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KEY GUN-RELATED INTERVENTIONS: NATURE AND EFFICACY 
Introductory Comment 
Interpersonal violence has become an issue of international concern, particularly 
since the late sixties. Despite the lack of empirical evidence, it has been widely 
accepted that the prevalence of guns, more than other factors, is responsible for 
increased rates of violence among civilians (Nay, 1990). Legislative attempts to 
restrict and regulate the private ownership of firearms have been one of the most 
common violence reduction interventions made by governments the world over 
(Kleck & Patterson, 1993). In general, legal provisions aimed at regulating the 
availability or accessibility of guns to civilians have been termed gun controls and 
have pertained to the transfer, possession, carrying and safe-keeping of firearms. 
What follows is a critical overview of the main research evidence on the impact of 
key gun controls. 
Legal Provisions to Limit Possession 
An Overview 
Most countries have legislated sets of provisions that prohibit certain groups of 
civilians from lawfully possessing firearms and impose penalties for the illegal 
possession of guns. 47 The tradition has been to limit legal gun ownership to those 
citizens deemed to be law abiding, as well as mentally and emotionally mature and 
stable. It has been common to have a minimum age requirement, usually 18 or 21, 
to exclude people with a history of psychological problems, mental handicaps and 
those who have committed violent offences or have criminal records. 
Generally speaking, civilians who wish to legally possess guns require specific 
authorisation from a rele ant state authority. 48 Firearms are usually marked in some 
way for identificatory purposes and each weapon is registered to a particular 
licensee. In many countries, applicants for firearm licences are required to 
demonstrate a legitimate need for possessing a gun such as work, sport, collecting or 
self protection (see Table 2.2). Some licensing procedures involve background 
checks to determine whether applicants meet the legal requirements, but the rigour of 
such screening varies greatly across countries and jurisdictions. Mandatory waiting 
periods have become increasingly popular in recent years. For instance, in Canada, 
28 days must elapse between applying for, and being granted, a gun licence (The 
Department of Justice for Canada, 1994). The Brady Bill of 1993 introduced a five 
day waiting period for the USA (Time Magazine, 20 December, 1993). Such 
deliberate delays have been designed to enable more thorough background checks 
and to deter the impulsive acquisition of firearms. Some nations now require that 
applicants pass a competency test, although these vary markedly in nature and 
47 Or certain types of guns. 
48 Like the police or a firearms inspectorate. 
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stringency. In vanous countries applicant-; for firearm licences must undergo 
comprehensive practical and theoretical training in the safe-keeping, handling and 
use of guns, and must pass practical and written competency tests. 
Table 2.2: 
Examples of Legal Provisions on Private Guo Ownership. 
Austria: 
Britain: 
Canada: 
Denmark: 
France: 
minimum age of 21 
no criminal record 
no history of psychological problems 
a demonstrated legitimate need for possessing a gun 
minimum age of 18 
no prison convictions in last three years 
deemed not to be dangerous 
a demonstrated regular and legitimate use for a gun 
minimum age of 18 
no relevant criminal record 
no relevant psychiatric history 
active membership of registered gun club 
two suitable referees to verify information supplied on 
application 
a demonstrated legitimate need for possessing a gun 
successful completion of competency test 
re-established need for possession every five years 
a demonstrated legitimate need for possessing a gun 
no criminal record 
medical certificate and statement from doctor regarding 
mental health status 
no criminal record 
police inquiry to establish suitability of applicant 
Sources: PA News (27 October 1996), Reuters (16 October 1996) and The 
Department of Justice for Canada (1994). 
A number of legal provisions relate to the safe-keeping of firearms and are directed 
mainly at preventing accidents and the theft of guns. For example, when not in use, 
civilians may be required to keep privately owned guns in safes or special secure 
containers, to ensure that guns are unloaded, disassembled and/or fitted with trigger 
locks, and to store ammunition separately from firearms. In the UK and Australia, 
there has been strong support for prohibiting the keeping of guns in homes and 
proposals that privately owned firearms be housed at approved facilities like 
registered gun clubs (e.g. Neal 1989). Generally the acquisition and possession of 
ammunition has been regulated by law and the types and quantity of ammunition 
have been restricted. 
Gun controls have not only addressed the possession of guns and ammunition, 
but also the production and transfer of these items. Firearm law has generally 
included provisions for controlling the manufacturing, importing, exporting, selling, 
purchasing and moving of guns and ammunition. Licences have usually been 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
34 
required to manutacture and trade in such goods, and relatively severe penalties have 
been established for illegal trading, as well as for providing guns or ammunition to 
unlicensed persons. Furthermore, many countries have established co-operative 
agreements with neighbouring nations regarding the policing of international gun 
trafficking (e.g. Phillips, 1993; VanDuyne, 1993). 49 
In the USA, relatively few gun controls have been legislated at federal level 
and most of the main issues have been dealt with in state laws and local ordinances 
(Kleck, 1986[a]). It is somewhat difficult to discuss North American gun control on 
the whole, as there are over 20000 provisions in operation (Toch & Lizotte, 1992).~o 
Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that US restrictions on civilian gun ownership 
are moderate when compared to other countries (e.g. Kleck, 1986[a]). However, 
inteijurisdictional discrepancies in the stringency of gun controls have been identified 
as key tactors enabling interstate gun running in North America. Firearms have 
been transported from states with less restrictive gun controls, to states that are 
governed by harsher provisions (e.g. Ewing et al, 1993; Time Magazine, 6 February 
1989). Furthermore, US controls on dealing in firearms and ammunition have been 
notably lax and kitchen-table operators have proliferated (Time Magazine, 6 
February 1989). In 1993, for example, an annual dealer's licence which authorised 
the wholesale purchasing of unlimited quantities of guns and ammunition, cost about 
10 dollars and was available to anyone over 21 with a fixed address and no criminal 
record (Time Magazine, 20 December 1993). Availability has also been boosted by 
the fact that a dealer's licence has not been required for the buying and selling of 
second-hand, guns (Time Magazine, 6 February 1989; Kleck, 1986[a]). This has 
proven highly problematic because the majority of firearms used in offending are 
purchased on the second-hand market (e.g. Wright & Rossi, 1983; Burr, 1977). 
Since the late eighties, these factors have been taken into consideration in designing 
US gun controls (e.g. Boor & Bair, 1990; Nay, 1990; Walker, 1989). In many 
states the cost and difficulty involved in acquiring a dealer's licence has been 
increased. In some jurisdictions provisions requiring that dealers be licensed at 
federal, state and local levels have been introduced, with stricter criteria for 
assessing applicants (Newsweek, 6 December 1993). Federal legislation is in the 
pipeline which will further restrict the interstate transfer of firearms and prescribe 
that all gun purchases and sales be made via registered dealers (e.g. Time Magazine, 
20 December 1993). 
Research Evidence on Efficacy 
Methodologically sound evaluations of the impact of individual gun controls have 
been scarce. Perhaps the best exceptions are studies by Kleck and Patterson (1993) 
49 Similar agreements have been made between states in the USA, see Ewing et al 
(1993). 
50 See Lester (1985) on state gun controls in the USA. 
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and Loftin et al (1991). ln the former investigation, the separate effects of 19 
different North American provisions were assessed, taking into account differential 
levels of enforcement. The findings showed inter alia that: prohibitions on the 
possession of guns by mentally ill persons were associated with lowered rates of 
suicide;51 and that stricter laws on dealer licensing were associated with decreased 
rates of suicide, aggravated assault and armed robbery. n Loftin et al ( 1991) 
demonstrated an impressive reduction in both homicide and suicide rates following 
the implementation of restrictive gun licensing provisions and regulations for the 
safe-keeping of firearms.n lt has also been shown that training and experience in 
the safe-handling of guns can reduce the likelihood of accidents (e.g. McDowall & 
Loftin, 1986; Stenning & Moyer, 1981). This suggests support for compulsory 
competency training and testing for licence applicants, and requiring that gun owners 
be active members of shooting clubs and be regularly re-tested for competency. 
By contrast, mandatory waiting periods before the granting of firearm licences 
have had little appreciable impact in the 22 states where these have been 
implemented (Newsweek, 6 December 1993). Such waiting periods appear to be 
ineffective unless used to conduct thorough background checks on applicants (Kleck 
& Patterson, 1993). Inadequate screening has been identified as one of the main 
impediments to gun control in the USA: in 45 states civilians have been able to buy 
guns including assault firearms without being screened, simply by signing a 
declaration that they have no previous convictions. The Omnibus Crime Bill, passed 
by the US senate in late 1993, introduced a mandatory waiting period and made 
dealers legally obliged to run background checks on those seeking to purchase guns 
(Newsweek, 6 December l993)Y 
Key Problems 
On the whole, the demonstrated impact of gun controls designed to restrict legal 
ownership is not very impressive. Some have argued that this is because the 
availability of guns among civilians is not the key factor contributing to crime and 
violence (e.g. Turner & Leyens, 1992). Others have contended that this lack of 
success is, at least in part, due to poor enforcement. Gun controls relating to 
possession and safe-keeping have not been strictly policed. Arrests, prosecutions 
and convictions solely for illegal possession or failure to safe-guard firearms have 
been relatively uncommon (Kleck, 1986[a]). Systematic enforcement is vital if 
51 Also see Sommers (1984). 
52 Also see Blose and Cook (1980). 
53 In Columbia, New England. Requiring that firearms be kept disassembled, 
unloaded and locked away when not in use. 
54 Also see Abell ( 1989). 
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provisions designed to control possession and safe-keeping are to have the intended 
impact (Morgan & Kopel, 1993). To this end it has been proposed that specialist 
police units be set up to enforce gun control provisions, and that courts staffed by 
specially trained prosecutors and judges be established to deal with these types of 
violations (e.g. Kleck, 1986[a); Saar, 1986).55 However, such measures are costly 
and are not likely to be given priority in contexts where there is heightened public 
concern over violent crime. 
Prohibitions on Specific Guns 
Introductory Comment 
It is something of a longstanding practice for governments to outlaw the private 
possession of guns that are deemed to be particularly high-risk weapons. For 
example, as far back as 1934 the possession of fully-automatic firearms was 
prohibited among civilians in the USA. In most countries fully-automatics have 
been the first kind of firearm to be banned from the realms of civilian ownership. 
The rationale has been that the capacity of these weapons to discharge a large 
number of bullets very rapidly makes fully-automatic firearms extremely dangerous 
and unsuitable for sport, hunting or self defence. 
In general, categories of guns have been banned because they have been 
viewed as constituting a particular problem at a certain time. ·Often prohibitive 
legislation has been passed in response to particularly shocking incidents involving 
the firearm in question. To illustrate, in Britain the recent ban imposed on all 
handguns over 0.22 inches was a direct governmental response to the Dunblane 
shooting incident in which numerous children were killed (Reuters, 16 October 
1996). In the USA in 1934, sawn-off shotguns and fully-automatic firearms were 
outlawed because these were viewed as the favoured weapons of gangsters, and in 
1968 the 0.22 inch Saturday Night Special handgun was banned as this was 
considered to be the weapon of criminals (Zimring, 1989; Kleck, 1986[b]; Kates, 
1984[b]). In the late eighties assault firearms like the AK-47, the Mac-10 and the 
Tec-9 became the focus of attention in North America, particularly after the 
infamous Stockton schoolyard shooting in California in early 1989 (Time Magazine, 
6 February 1989). s6 The present concern over assault weapons is due to the 
increased availability of these firearms and their frequent use in drive-by shootings 
and gang/drug-related offences (Time Magazine, 20 December 1993). 
Internationally speaking, in the last decade legislative debates over prohibition have 
been focused on two particular categories of guns, namely, assault firearms and 
handguns. 
55 See Slothouwer ( 1985) on specialist prosecutors. 
56 In which five children were killed and 29 wounded with a semi-automatic rifle. 
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Assault Firearms 
In 1992 the Canadian government banned civilian ownership of the majority of 
military and paramilitary tlrearms and, in 1994, a number of specific guns were also 
outlawed (The Department of Justice for Canada, 1994).57 Similarly in the USA in 
1993, the Brady Bill prohibited the private ownership of 19 specified types of semi-
automatic assault firearm (Newsweek, 6 December 1993). The rationale for 
prohibiting civilian ownership of combat weapons overlaps with the reasoning for 
banning fully-automatic guns: assault firearms are considered to be high-risk mainly 
because of their large magazines and capacity to tire many bullets in rapid succession 
(Robin, 1991). Although most of these guns were originally designed to operate as 
semi-automatics, they can be easily and cheaply modified to function as fully-
automatics (Time Magazine, 6 February 1989). In short, assault firearms are 
designed for killing. It has been argued that although not yet widely used in crime, 
given their increased availability and relatively low cost, it is only a matter of time 
before offenders begin to make more frequent use of these extremely lethal weapons 
(Oprah Winfrey, 29 February 1996; Newsweek, 6 December 1993).58 
Whilst there has been relatively little public resistance to the banning of assault 
firearms, there has been some debate over the optimal legislation (e.g. Morgan, 
1990). It is necessary not only to prohibit the possession of certain types of high-
risk firearms, but also the importing, manufacturing and selling of these guns and 
their components (Morgan & Kopel, 1993; Zimring, 1989; Kleck, 1986[a]). There 
has been controversy over the legal definition of assault firearms and it has proven 
difficult to construct a definition that accurately distinguishes between some types of 
semi-automatic hunting rifle and paramilitary assault firearms (Time Magazine, 6 
February 1989). Laws like the Brady Bill, in which guns are simply listed by name, 
have been heavily criticised because this does not prevent the substitution of similar 
firearms (e.g. Morgan & Kopel, 1993; Zimring, 1989). It has been proposed 
instead that a legal definition be devised that prohibits fireanns with certain 
mechanical attributes such as magazines over 15 rounds and semi-automatic firing 
capacities (Zimring, 1989). This is the approach which has recently been taken by 
the Canadians and the Australians. 59 In Canada, civilian acquisition of semi-
automatic handguns with magazine capacities over 10 shots, and centre fire semi-
automatic rifles and shotguns with magazine capacities over five shots, has been 
outlawed (The Department of Justice for Canada, 1994). Exemption may be granted 
on the grounds of sporting needs and the so-called grandfather caveat has been 
applied to certain gun types. The latter permits current owners to retain possession 
57 Including the Ruger mini-14, the Colt AR-15, all variants of the Kalashnikov, 
the AK-47 and the Tec-9. 
58 In the USA about 10% of crimes involved assault firearms which comprised 
three per cent of privately owned guns, see Zimring ( 1989) and Kassirer 
(1993). 
59 Although the Canadian legislation includes a list of specified firearms. 
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but outlaws the transfer of ownership or the acqms1t10n of new weapons. In 
Australia, civilian possession of self-loading firearms was banned in July 1996, after 
an incident in which 35 people were killed with a semi -automatic gun (Reuters, 16 
October 1996). 
Handguns 
The lobby to outlaw civilian handgun ownership has grown in recent years. In 
countries like Canada, the USA and the UK the key argument for the prohibition of 
handguns has been the frequent use of these firearms in the commission of offences 
(Time Magazine, 20 December 1993; K1eck, 1986[a], 1984). At present, the 9mm 
semi-automatic pistol is the most common privately owned handgun in North 
America (Oprah Winfrey, 29 February, 1996). While civilians have tended to use 
long-guns mainly for legitimate ends like hunting and culling, handguns have been 
employed for a variety of purposes including the commission of crimes (Eskeridge, 
1986; Robin, 1991 resp.). In most nations there has been substantial and organised 
public opposition to the proposed banning of handguns, most notably in the USA and 
recently in the UK (Time Magazine, 20 December 1993; Reuters, 16 October 1996 
resp.). In North America, the infamous National Rifle Association (NRA) with a 
membership of over three million, has successfully opposed bids to outlaw 
handguns, especially those promoted by the opposition; the 200000 strong 
organisation, Handgun Control Incorporated (Time Magazine, 20 December 1993). 
In Britain recent polls have shown that 70% of adults favour a ban on handguns, but 
there has been significant opposition from the British Shooting Sports Council and 
the Sportmen's Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which have 
threatened to constitute a political party to oppose the prohibition of handguns 
(Reuters, 13 October 1996; PA New, 27 October 1996 resp). Nevertheless in 1997 
the British government passed legislation outlawing all handguns over 0.22 inch 
calibre and a complete ban seems probable in the near future (The Mail on Sunday, 
24 August 1997). 
The Canadian government has dealt with public resistance by gradually 
introducing prohibitions on more and more categories of handguns -- small calibre 
handguns, those with short barrels and semi-automatics with magazine capacities 
over 10 shots --and today the bulk of handguns have been effectively outlawed (The 
Department of Justice for Canada, 1994). Handgun ownership is limited mainly to 
collectors, target shooters and those requiring firearms for work purposes (Sproule & 
Kennett, 1989). The Australian government has managed to ban all semi-automatic 
handguns, probably because the firearm of choice in this country is the long-gun 
(Neal, 1989). 
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Key Problems 
There are numerous problems associated with prohibitions on the ownership of 
handguns by civilians, but enforceability has been raised most frequently (Mellor in 
Reuters, 16 October 1996; Morgan & Kopel, 1993). Given the characteristically 
poor enforcement of gun controls by the police and courts, the efficacy of handgun 
bans depends largely on the voluntary compliance of civilians. However, this is 
unrealistic in countries where there is strong public opposition. In fact, in the USA 
talk of handgun bans has typically resulted in gun buying frenzies and according to 
polls, 75% of North Americans maintain that they will not give up their handguns 
even if these are outlawed (Toch & Lizotte, 1992:235). 
The second major disadvantage of handgun prohibition is the enormity of the 
cost of compensation that is generally offered for firearms (e.g. Hasko, 1986[b]). To 
illustrate: the recent compulsory surrender of handguns in Britain cost the 
government around 150 million pounds in compensation (The Mail on Sunday, 24 
August 1997). An alternate approach is the use of the so-called grandfather clause 
which has been employed by the Canadian government. In effect, this means that 
only new acquisitions of certain firearms are prohibited. Those who already possess 
guns that are to be banned are permitted to retain these weapons hut are prevented 
from transferring ownership. The problem with this approach is that large numbers 
of guns remain in circulation for lengthy periods. 
One of the unintended consequences of handgun bans is the stimulation of the 
black market in illegal firearms. Nigeria provides one of the best examples: the 
Firearms Act 7 of 1958 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Lagos made it illegal 
for civilians to possess guns and for firearms to be manufactured, imported, bought 
or sold in this country. However, a lucrative market in illegal guns subsequently 
developed and, by the mid-eighties, armed robbery had reached an all time high. 
The upward spiral in this offence was explained as follows: "[r]obbers are 
emboldened ... because they have a monopoly of arms while their victims do not 
have" (Adinkrah, 1986:67). Thus, even if a handgun prohibition is successful, it 
generally serves to remove firearms from law abiding civilians rather than criminals, 
and if such hans were to reduce the availability of handguns to lawbreakers, it is 
probable that long-guns would be substituted (Kleck, 1986[a]). The barrels of long-
guns can be shortened to make these weapons more manageable and concealable. 
Since long-guns, particularly those with shortened barrels, are more lethal than 
handguns, a substitution of modified long-guns would likely exacerbate violence 
associated with crime (Kleck, 1986[a]). It has also been demonstrated that 
reductions in the availability of firearms to would-he robbers, results in displacement 
from less to more vulnerable targets, thus shifting " ... the burden of robbery from 
those best able to hear it to those least able to do so" (Kleck, 1986[a]:38). Hence, if 
legal prohibitions on guns did decrease the number of firearms in offenders' hands, 
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this could lead to an increase in one-on-one robberies and muggings, particularly 
those involving more vulnerable victims like the elderly and women (e.g. Kleck, 
1986[ a]; Cook, 1979, 1976). Similarly, since women commonly use handguns in 
self defence against men, and older men against younger men, preventing these 
groups from possessing guns may leave them particularly prone (e.g. Kleck, 
1986[a]; Howard, 1986). All factors considered, it seems that outlawing civilian 
ownership of handguns is something of a "blunderbuss approach" (Kleck, 
1986[a]:40). 
Research Evidence 
Prohibiting the possession of particularly destructive firearms, like those with large 
magazines and rapid firing capacities, appears to be a worthwhile legal intervention 
if consistently enforced. But considering the unintended negative consequences, it 
seems to be neither feasible nor desirable to ban the private ownership of firearms or 
even handguns. The evidence suggests that the most workable and effective gun 
control has been the prohibition of ownership by those who are prone to violence. It 
has been empirically demonstrated that not everyone is similarly likely to perpetrate 
serious violence and that " ... people who are seriously violent in the present almost 
invariably have been seriously violent in the past" (Jackson, 1989; Kleck, 1986[a] :40 
resp). The effective enforcement of selective prohibition requires the accurate and 
efficient identification of people who are violence prone. In this regard, minimum 
age specifications are appropriate. Those who have been convicted of violent 
offences and fugitives from justice constitute a second high-risk group that is 
relatively easy to distinguish using criminal records, especially when this information 
has been computerised. However, at best this method serves to identify only about 
half of the actual high-risk group as it neglects violent people who have not been 
convicted (Kleck, 1986[a]). Perpetrators of so-called domestic violence are of 
particular concern here as relatively few are convicted. 60 A third group, which has 
commonly been excluded from gun ownership by law, are those who have histories 
of psychiatric or psychological problems. It has been argued convincingly that this 
is a problematic category. Since psychiatric records are not generally accessible to 
the police, it is difficult to conduct proper checks on gun licence applicants. 
Furthermore, only a small proportion of those who have experienced psychological 
difficulties are likely to be prone to violence (Kleck, 1986[a]; Blose & Cook, 1980). 
In order to screen and exclude certain applicants for firearm licences it has been 
proposed that a computerised database be established of persons admitted to 
psychiatric facilities for their violent behaviour or risk of suicide. (Kleck, 1986[a]). 
There have been few sound, empirically based evaluations of the impact of 
banning certain types of guns. However, Kleck and Patterson reviewed the 
60 See Chappell (1992) on protection orders and guns. 
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accumulated findings and assessed numerous gun control provisions. 
concluded that: 
" ... even fairly strong measures such as banning sales of 'Saturday night 
Specials' and de facto bans on handgun possession appear generally to 
exert no negative effect on violence rates" (Kleck & Patterson, 
1993:282). 
They 
The collective evidence suggests that the following basic gun control provisions can 
have a violence reducing impact: licensing requirements for civilian owners 
combined with thorough background checks, stricter criteria for gun dealers, and 
prohibitions on the ownership of guns by those with criminal records and histories of 
mental illness (Kleck & Patterson 1993). 
Gun Carrying Provisions 
Legal provisions that restrict the carrying of firearms have generally been aimed at 
reducing accessibility rather than possession. In some countries the carrying of 
loaded firearms has been outlawed unless necessary for work purposes. For 
instance, special authorisation is required for civilians to carry guns in the 
Netherlands, and in Canada loaded firearms may not be transported and guns may 
only be loaded in a place where it is lawful to discharge them (Slothouwer, 1985; 
The Department of Justice for Canada, 1994 resp). By contrast, only a minority of 
the states in the USA have specifically disallowed the carrying of loaded guns and 
many of these prohibitions apply only to younger persons (The Center for the 
Prevention of Handgun Violence, 1993; Hawley, 1993). 
There is some empirical evidence suggesting that the introduction of a legal 
prohibition on the carrying of loaded firearms can produce a short term reduction in 
rates of gun assault and armed robbery (e.g. Walker, 1989; Jung & Jason, 1988). 
But it has also been found that the firearm homicide rate has not increased 
significantly in areas where the carrying of guns has been legalised (e.g. Cramer & 
Kopel, 1993). Overall, it seems that if prohibitions on the carrying of firearms are 
consistently enforced, these may have some reductive impact on violence (Kleck & 
Patterson, 1993). 
Civil Liability 
It has been suggested that dealers be held civilly liable for consequent damages if 
they supply guns or ammunition to unauthorised persons, or if they fail to conduct 
adequate background checks on their clients (Kleck, 1986[a]). This has been viewed 
as a way of enhancing the enforcement of legal prohibitions on civilian gun 
possession. Similarly, it has been proposed that firearm manufacturers be held 
civi1ly liable for avoidable injuries caused by their productc; (e.g. Turner & Leyens, 
I 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
-• 
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1992; Turley, 1982).61 The legal rationale here is that manufacturers have a duty to 
minimise the dangers associated with the guns and ammunition they produce and 
ought to be held legally accountable if they fail to do so, e.g. in the case of accidents 
in which children handle guns not fitted with adequate safety mechanisms. This 
notion has prompted discussion around the development of standard features for 
firearms such as child-proof locks and indicators showing when firearms are loaded 
(e.g. Kassirer, 1993). 
Harsher Penalties 
Like restrictive licensing provisions, increased penalties for firearm-related offences 
have been a standard gun control strategy in most countries (Nay, 1990). This 
approach, which is based on the highly controversial premise that punishment deters 
lawbreaking, has generally involved three kinds of intervention: (1) the introduction 
of a mandatory minimum prison sentence for offences in which an offender has been 
armed with a gun; 62 (2) increasing the penalties for violations of legal provisions 
pertaining to the possession, safe-keeping, carrying, manufacturing, and transferring 
of guns and ammunition, and/or offences committ d using firearms;6J and (3) 
restricting parole and probation for those serving prison sentences for firearm-related 
offences.64 Numerous authors have concluded that none of these interventions 
significantly reduces crime or violence (e.g. Toch & Lizotte, 1992; Robin, 1991; 
Nay 1990; Walker, 1989; Stout, 1989; Jung & Jason, 1988).~ After rigorous 
evaluation, Kleck and Patterson ( 1993) have stated that there is some indication that 
rates of armed robbery decrease following the introduction of harsher penalties for 
the use of a firearm during a robbery, and mandatory prison sentences for illegal 
carrying. 66 Furthermore, Nay ( 1990) compared 26 countries and showed that, when 
gun control provisions are enforced consistently, heavier penalties for the illegal 
possession of firearms can have a significant deterrent effect. 
Inconsistent application by the police, prosecutors and courts appears to be the 
main impediment to the efficacy of harsher punishment for gun-related offences 
(Toch & Lizotte, 1992). The already overloaded prison system in North America 
has been noted as a key contributory factor. Studies have revealed that the police 
tend to selectively report the involvement of guns in offences, that prosecutors use 
61 See Smith ( 1987) on the ultrahazardous activity doctrine and Boser ( 1992) on 
strict liability. 
62 Canada has a four-year minimum prison sentence for selected firearm offences, 
see The Department of Justice for Canada (1994). 
63 In California, one extra year for being armed with a gun during an offence, 
two extra years for shooting and three extra years for a sexual offence with a 
gun. See Reuters (16 October 1996), The Department of Justice for Canada 
(1994) and Lizotte and Zatz (1986). 
64 See Morgan and Kopel (1993), and Saar (1986). 
65 Also see Stout ( 1989), Lizotte and Zatz ( 1986) and Carlson ( 1982). 
66 Supported by McPheters er al ( 1984) and Deutsch and Alt ( 1977). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
43 
the threat of heavier sentences as a lever in plea bargaining, and that the Courts 
either ignore additional sentencing requirements or acquit accused rather than 
handing down longer prison sentences (e.g. Toch & Lizotte, 1992). 
Gun Control 'Packages' 
It is being recognised increasingly that the complexity of the issue of gun-reJated 
violence and crime necessitates a multifaceted programme of interventions. In 1988 
a National Commission on Violence was established in Australia to examine causes 
and propose interventions. Inteijurisdictional disparities in legal provisions were 
identified as a key obstacle to effective gun control (Chappell, 1992; Chappell et al, 
1988). Hence the Commission's main objectives were to develop a national gun 
control strategy, to create national uniformity in firearm policy and to reduce the 
civilian arsenal. However, only some of the comprehensive set of recommendations 
were accepted for implementation,67 and the Australian government was heavily 
criticised for not going far enough (Peters & Eggers, 1991). Nonetheless the 1991 
National Strategy is an example of a broader and more strategic approach to the 
firearm issue (see Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3: 
Selected Aspects of Australia's 1991 National Gun Control Strategy. 
* Confirmation of existing prohibitions on the importation and possession 
of fully-automatic firearms. 
* Prohibition on selling military-style, semi-automatic, non-military and 
self-loading firearms. 
* New standardised and more stringent gun licensing procedures. 
* Legal provisions detailing the circumstances in which gun licences must 
he cancelled and weapons confiscated. 
* Empowering police to confiscate firearms from people who have 
protection orders against them. 
* Further restrictions on the sale of ammunition. 
* Additional requirements for the safe-keeping of privately owned guns. 
* A legal obligation on gun sellers to ensure that buyers are authorised. 
* Amnesties from prosecution for the voluntary surrender of illegal guns. 
Source: Chappell (1992). 
The Canadian government has adopted a more comprehensive and longer term 
strategy concerning civilian gun ownership and the social problem of frrearm-related 
crime and violence. From 1976 onwards, a carefully planned 'package' of 
legislative reforms pertaining to private firearm possession was introduced including 
inter alia: stringent national licensing and screening procedures for applicants, the 
67 By the Special Premiers Conference of 1991. 
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registration of guns, the prohibition of several categories of firearms, increased 
penalties for gun-related offences and violations of gun control provisions, stricter 
requirements for the safe-keeping and handling of firearms, and additional 
regulations on trading (The Department of Justice for Canada, 1994). Between 1980 
and 1983 the impact of these reforms was systematically assessed and, according to 
various authorities, the results were most promising (e.g. The Department of Justice 
for Canada, 1994; Hung, 1993; Sproule & Kennett, 1989; Sloan et al, 1988). The 
proportion of offences committed with firearms was found to have decreased along 
with rates of suicide and gun-related accidents. Furthermore, the overall homicide 
rate was said to have dropped due to a reduction in the rate of firearm homicides. 
On the negative side, however, this evaluation showed that the overall robbery rate 
had not decreased and that there had been a substitution of weapons in robberies 
(The Department of Justice for Canada, 1994). 
It is not only the favorable outcome of the Canadian reforms that is impressive 
but various aspects of the strategy: the interventions were informed by sound 
empirical research data; the impact of the strategy was systematically evaluated; the 
legislative reforms were introduced gradually over a period of time; the changes 
were widely publicised and combined with public education around the issue of safe 
and responsible civilian gun ownership and use; and the enforcement of gun control 
provisions was improved (The Department of Justice for Canada, 1994). Notably, 
the public and incremental nature of this approach appeared to reduce civilian 
resistance to the banning of many types of handgun. The demonstrated success of 
legislated gun controls in Canada stands in stark contrast to findings indicating that 
similar interventions have had little significant impact on gun-related crime and 
violence in North America. Such differential effects have been attributed primarily 
to the stringency and interjurisdictional uniformity of gun controls in Canada, the 
consistency of enforcement and cultural attitudes to violence (e.g. Hung, 1993; 
Sproule & Kennett, 1989). 
Civilian Attitudes 
Some authors have emphasised that differences in civilian attitudes to gun ownership 
and use are a key factor shaping compliance with gun controls and violent behaviour 
more generally (e.g. Kopel, 1992). Disparities in rates of gun-related violence and 
crime have often been linked to variations in cultural attitudes. Perhaps the most 
frequent comparison has been between the UK and the USA. It has been contended 
that the cultural attitude that private gun ownership is a privilege rather than a right 
accounts, at least in part, for the comparatively low prevalence of firearms in Britain 
(e.g. Neal 1989). By contrast, in North America firearm ownership is viewed as an 
inalienable constitutional right (e.g. Halbrook, 1986, 1984; Kates, 1986, 1984[a]). 
Indeed, the second amendment to the American Constitution states that "[a] well 
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regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed". Although no federal court in 
the USA has yet invalidated gun control law on the basis of the second amendment 
' 
this clause has been effectively employed as a key element of the NRAs anti-
prohibitionist propaganda in which gun control has been cast as undermining civil 
rights (Russell, 1995). Certainly this extremely powerful political movement has 
expanded and reinforced belief in the right to possess firearms. NRA tactics have 
included inter alia, support for political candidates who oppose gun control, 
harassment of prohibition advocates and extensive public relations campaigns against 
gun control (e.g. Davidson, 1993; Kassirer, 1993; Langbein & Loftus, 1990). 
However, recent polls have indicated that the NRA is losing ground and that the 
proportion of North Americans who support a federal ban on handguns has increased 
substantially (e.g. Kassirer, 1993). Nevertheless, anti-prohibitionist movements can 
be powerful forces shaping civilian attitudes to gun ownership and, hence, must be 
taken into account in designing gun-related interventions. 
Despite the lack of support, interventions aimed at decreasing civilian gun 
ownership generally rest on the dubious premise that gun prevalence significantly 
increases rates of crime and violence. It would be preferable instead, to base 
violence reduction strategies on an understanding of factors affecting gun use rather 
than ownership. Indeed many contend that internalised controls, like attitudes, are 
stronger deterrents of violent behaviour than external prohibitions (e. g. Kopel, 1992; 
Lester & Slothouwer, 1985). However, relatively little empirical work has been 
conducted in this vein. There has been some investigation of attitudes to gun use 
among civilians in different countries. For instance, it has been shown that the 
majority of both North Americans and Canadians are of the opinion that it is 
legitima~e to use firearms for the protection of loved ones and property (e.g. 
Mauser, 1990). Unfortunately, the effects of such attitudes on actual gun use have 
not been explored systematically. Research evidence has indicated that boosting 
public confidence in a state's ability to deal effectively with crime and violence 
appears to be a more effective means of decreasing gun prevalence than legislated 
gun controls (Young et al, 1987; McDowall & Loftin, 1986). Also, reducing 
firearm ownership among one generation of adults is likely to reduce possession in 
the next (e.g. Wright et al, 1983).68 
Recommendations to modify the ways in which firearm use is depicted on 
television and in films have become increasingly common as an intervention for 
reducing gun-related violence (e.g. Reuters, 16 October 1995; Morgan & Kopel, 
1993; Chappell et al, 1988; Chappell & Graham, 1985). 69 Such proposals rest on a 
rather substantial body of empirical research on the relationship between aggressive 
68 Adults are more likely to own firearms if their parents had guns when they 
were children. 
69 The UK, the USA, Australia and Canada resp. 
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behaviour and the v1ewmg of media violence. Although there is ongoing 
controversy over the conclusions that may be drawn from the accumulated evidence 
in this field, 70 it is generally agreed that children who watch more television violence 
exhibit increased aggression (e.g. Freedman, 1992; Huesmann et al, 1992). 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated consistently that aggression is learned as a 
preferred way of solving problems at an early age and, unless modified, becomes 
increasingly impervious over time (e.g. Huesmann et al, 1992; Huesmann et al, 
1983). For this reason, gun use should not to be depicted on television or in films as 
the preferred and most effective means of resolving problems, and safety and 
restraint in firearm use ought to be emphasised. Notably, some success has been 
reported in teaching children to view inappropriate portrayals of violence in the 
media as ineffective soluti?ns to real life problems (e.g. Huesmann et al, 1983). 
Similarly, programmes designed to teach non-violent conflict management skills to 
scholars have become popular (e.g. Bell, 1987). Another encouraging finding has 
emerged from work on the weapons-effect. It has been shown that aggressive 
responses to guns can be successfully modified by a process known as "decentration" 
which involves shifting attention from the destructive to the aesthetic qualities of 
firearms (Turner & Leyens, 1992:218; Leyens et al, 1976 resp). Such findings 
would seem to be of value in devising public education programmes for changing 
attitudes to guns. 
Structural Factors 
Legislative and other criminal justice interventions aimed at reducing gun-related 
violence have failed to address the underlying social, political and economic factors 
that predispose people to violent behaviour (e.g. Kopel, 1993; Kaplan, 1986; Kleck, 
1986[a]; Bailey, 1984). It has been established that relative economic deprivation is 
the best predictor of rates of homicidal violence in the USA, and that unemployment 
is strongly associated with heightened levels of violent behaviour (e.g. Lester, 
1987[a]; Brenner & Swank, 1986; Messner, 1982; Huff-Corzine et al, 1991; Baron 
& Straus, 1988; Kleck, 1986ra1 resp). 71 Hence, decreasing poverty, unemployment 
and inequality ought to be adopted as central violence reduction strategies. In short, 
conditions that make people feel that life is of little value need to be understood and 
changed (Kopel, 1993). In the words of Kleck, 
"... it is ridiculous to suggest that we must rely on gun control laws, or 
indeed, any strategies using criminal law or the criminal justice system, 
to reduce violence ... To accomplish a significant reduction in violence 
will require a return to serious consideration of the fundamental social 
and economic causes of violent behavior, a course which criminologists 
have repeatedly advocated for decades" (1986[a]:61). 
70 Chiefly whether the findings support a causal relationship between the 
variables. Also see Freedman (1992) and Huesmann et al (1992). 
71 Also see Krahn et al ( 1986) on homicide and income inequality internationally. 
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However, governments have frequently dismissed such proposals on the basis of the 
expense involved, an apparently irrational response in view of the exorbitant costs of 
firearm violence and traditional gun controls. For instance, it has been estimated 
that gun violence costs the US economy around 15 billion dollars p.a. (Time 
Magazine, 20 December 1993 :25). The financial consequences include factors such 
as medical treatment for gunshot casualties, 72 loss of earnings and alternate support 
for dependents of victims and perpetrators, and the expense involved in 
apprehending, trying and punishing offenders (Neal, 1989). n 
Overall Conclusion 
Since the early eighties numerous scholars have evaluated the accumulated research 
evidence on the impact of legal interventions aimed at reducing gun possession 
among civilians in the USA (e.g. Kleck & Patterson, 1993; Toch & Lizotte, 1992; 
Turner & Leyens, 1992; Walker, 1989; Kleck, 1986[a], 1984; Wright et al, 1983). 
Notably, there seems to have been little change in the prevailing academic opinion 
over the past decade. To illustrate, the following denouement was made in 1983: 
" ... the probable benefits of stricter gun control (itself a nebulous concept) in terms 
of crime reduction are at best uncertain, and at worst close to nil" (Wright et al, 
1983:22). Compare this with the weJl substantiated 'verdict' reached a decade later: 
"[t]aking prior research as a whole, it would be fair to say at this point that a 
consistent, credible case for gun control efficacy in reducing violence has not yet 
been made" (Kleck & Patterson, 1993 :255). Hence, the following advice appears to 
be most judicious, at least in relation to the USA: "[i]n the absence of more clear-cut 
evidence, we have no basis for recommending efforts to restrict the availability of 
guns as a means of reducing the rate of criminal violence" (Turner & Leyens, 
1992:219). However, the efficacy of legislated gun controls appears to be context 
dependent and considerable variations have been reported across countries. Some 
gun-related interventions have yielded consistent and significant reductions in 
violence in Canada, yet appear to have had little impact in the USA (e.g. The 
Department of Justice for Canada, 1994; Hung, 1993; Mundt, 1993, 1990; Sproule 
& Kennett 1989). This underscores the importance of conducting context specific 
assessments of violence reduction strategies. 
In North America, the reduction of gun-related violence has been stymied 
primarily by a failure to recognise the complexity of the link between guns and 
violence. Arguably the key lesson to be learned from over thirty-five years of 
research in this field is that the issues must be systematically disaggregated (Toch & 
72 Estimated at about one billion dollars p.a, see Time Magazine (20 December 
1993). 
73 Mandatory third party insurance for licensed gun owners is one way of 
reducing the State's financial burden re gun violence, see Chappell (1992). 
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Lizotte, 1992). It is also imperativ-:- to shift focus away from gun availability and to 
develop a comprehensive understanding of when, how, why and by whom firearms 
are actually used. This would provide a more sound basis for the development of 
effective interventions. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW PART II: 
Civilians and Guns in South Africa 
INTRODUCTION 
Considering the vast amount of work which has been conducted on a wide range of 
topics relating to civilians and guns, particularly in the USA, the most striking 
feature about such research in the South African context is its paucity. This is 
somewhat surprising as South Africa has high rates of private gun ownership, crime 
and violence; factors that have been associated with the development of this field in 
other countries. From about 1984 through to the early nineties this country was 
wracked by a violent civil war over Apartheid. But even since this conflict formally 
ended, violence has prevailed and crime rates have sky-rocketed (The Minister of 
Justice in: Hansard, 10 May 1995). Indeed contemporary South Africa has been 
deemed the most violent nation and the second most heavily armed country in the 
world (The Argus, 7 September 1993; Hansard, 10 May 1995:786 resp). 1 
Whilst a great deal was written on the political conflict, until recently the 
specific role played by firearms and most forms of non-political violence were 
relatively neglected. 2 Overall, very little scholarly attention was paid to the use and 
abuse of guns by civilians in South Africa between 1960 and 1990.3 Only a handful 
of pertinent writing was found in the literature survey conducted for this dissertation. 
Empirical studies have been particularly scarce and most of the work has comprised 
theoretical commentaries on the law pertaining to private gun possession. Unlike 
related work in other countries, the South African focus has been narrow, and 
pivotal matters have been neglected. There has been very little research on critical 
issues such as the validity of the basic assumptions undergirding gun control, the 
impact of different interventions, characteristics of civilian gun owners, motivation 
for possession, the circumstances in which civilians fire guns and the outcomes of 
armed confrontations. 
Although academic literature on this topic is sparse, official statistics on 
civilians and guns are relatively abundant. In fact there is an array of numerical data 
on the legal and penal systems in this country, some of which dates back to 1910 
when Jacob De Villiers Roos, the tirst Secretary of Justice and Director of Prisons, 
introduced the practice of state agencies producing detailed and largely quantitative 
annual reports (Van Zyl Smit, 1990). Over the years of Nationalist rule, this 
1 After the USA. 
2 Attention is now being focused on all forms of violence. 
3 Although much has been written on the police and guns, see Chapter Four. 
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practice became entrenched and a Central Statistical Service (CSS) was established 
specifically to produce a wide range of official statistics on a regular basis. The 
following publications generally included various figures on the topic of civilians and 
guns: the annual reports of the Commissioner of Police, the Departments of Justice 
and Correctional Services, the CSS publications on statistics of offences and national 
mortality, and the section of parliamentary debates in which members answer 
specific questions that have been posed. 4 While these data are problematic in many 
respects, some have proven useful especially in tields where research has been 
limited (e.g. Hansson, 1988). Since the official statistics available on civilians and 
guns were somewhat fragmented, pertinent data were compiled for inclusion in this 
chapter. 
A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
Private Gun Ownership and Control 
Over the past 25 years there has been very little academic w rk on the topic of gun 
control in South Africa (Hansson, 1990). Scholarly writing in this field has been 
dominated by theoretical appraisal of various aspects of the law pertaining to 
firearms (e.g. Cowling, 1993; Jagwanth & Thipanyane, 1993; Sarkin & Varney, 
1993; Van Rooyen, 1978). In general, the validity of the basic premises 
undergirding gun control have been assumed rather than empirically tested, and the 
impact of legislative controls has not been systematically assessed. However, two 
texts written during the seventies stand as notable exceptions: the first comprises an 
empirical evaluation of the efficacy of legislated administrative controls on the 
private possession of firearms in South Africa before 1973 (Zazeraj, 1973). The 
second was a submission to the South African Law Commission on the question of 
whether to create the offence of negligent injury with a firearm, and included a 
critical assessment of criminal sanction as a strategy for controlling gun abuse (Van 
Rooyen, 1978). 
In South Africa, as in most countries, gun control has been premised on two 
basic assumptions: (l) that decreasing the availability of firearms to civilians 
significantly reduces the use of guns in crime, and (2) that the availability of 
frrearms can he effectively reduced hy legally restricting gun possession among 
civilians. In the early seventies, Zazeraj used national mortality and conviction 
statistics to test these hypotheses in relation to South Africa (1973). Importantly, 
this study revealed that knives constituted "a far greater threat to public safety" than 
firearms. To illustrate: in 1967 firearms were responsible for six per cent of all 
homicides, while stahhings accounted for 60% (Zazeraj, 1973:93). The research 
concluded further that the widespread possession of unlicensed guns clearly 
demonstrated the inefficacy of restrictive tirearms legislation. Strategies designed to 
4 In publications known as Hansards. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
51 
reduce crime by limiting the number of licensed guns were doomed to failure 
because offenders generally prefer unlicensed firearms.' Since legislated gun 
controls do not prevent unlicensed possession, these are also unlikely to reduce 
firearm accidents or suicides. The overall conclusion reached was that: 
". . . there is no direct and measurable relationship between the presence 
of firearms in society and their use in crime on the one hand, and the 
adoption of restrictive firearms legislation. . . . Crime, and particularly 
violent crime, involves very much more than the private possession of 
firearms, and the restriction on their possession to only 'fit and proper 
persons' neither lessens the crime rate, nor does it make the attacks on 
innocent people less deadly" (1973:95 & 103). 
Remarkably this author stressed the meaning of firearms rather than their availability 
and rejected the traditional approach to gun control that was dominant throughout the 
Western world at this time.' Instead of proposing increased restrictions on lawful 
gun ownership by civilians, Zazeraj promoted the relaxation of legal controls 
combined with stricter penalties for illegal possession and unlawful use, challenging 
policy makers: 
" ... to acknowledge that laws should be based on empirically derived 
requirements rather than untested assumptions .... [O}n these grounds 
firearms control laws in particular are questionable in principle" 
(1973: 117). 
This early study is problematic for numerous reasons, perhaps the most serious being 
the under-representation of Africans in the statistics that were used. Indeed this 
piece of research appears even more flawed when viewed from a contemporary 
perspective and many of the results have since been contradicted. For instance, 
there is now consistent evidence showing that reducing the legal availability of guns 
lowers the suicide rate. 7 But even though Zazeraj's actual findings are of dubious 
validity, his study remains a significant contribution to the South African field 
because it is a rare example of a critical evaluation, using empirical data, of the basic 
assumptions of gun control. 
Van Rooyen's submission to the South African Law Commission in 1978 is 
another of the few critical pieces in this field. In commenting on the proposed 
introduction of a new frrearms offence, this author examined the broader issue of the 
efficacy of criminal sanction in controlling firearm abuses. In direct contrast to 
Zazeraj (1973), he argued for a shift in focus away from punishment toward 
improved administrative licensing controls; proposing the introduction of more 
5 Because they are more difficult to trace. Also see Greenwood (1972) on the 
UK. 
6 Although some dissenters had emerged, like Greenwood ( 1972) in the UK and 
Miller (1973) in the USA. 
7 See Chapter Two. 
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stringent gun licensing requirements based on the criteria of knowledge, proficiency, 
safety and proven need that were being used in Germany at this time. According to 
Van Rooyen (1978), these were particularly relevant concerns for South Africa 
considering that 80% of licensed gun owners had never tired their guns (The Rand 
Daily Mail, 26 January 1978). Overall he argued that, in dealing with the t1rearms 
issue, South African policy-makers had generally rushed to criminal sanction without 
adequate consideration of alternate interventions or subsequent evaluation of their 
impact, and advised therefore that: 
"... we should no longer rely blindly upon the use of the criminal 
sanction to 'solve' our social problems, but that we should thoroughly 
investigate alternative means of social control. In short, our approach 
should be to prevent, not merely to punish" (Van Rooyen, 1978:23). 
Most notably, this author emphasised that the deterrent efficacy of criminal sanction 
on firearm-related offending was an unsubstantiated assumption and that evaluative 
research was urgently required in this field. 
Regrettably, however, such work was not forthcoming and even by the mid-
nineties crucial issues -- like the examination of basic assumptions, impact studies 
and the exploration of preventative interventions -- were all but neglected. During 
the eighties there were very few academic publications on the topic of gun control in 
South Africa but the nineties are seeing a kindling of scholarly interest in the issue. 
Indeed, a pioneering empirical investigation was published in 1990 which pointed to 
inconsistent enforcement by the Courts of legal provisions on the use of deadly 
force, as the key impediment to the prevention of firearm abuse in this country. In 
the author's words: 
" ... despite the law, people use guns with little restraint and furthermore, 
they do not face certain or serious legal sanction for doing so. When 
determining liability the legal system is failing to apply controls strictly 
and consistently when firearms are used to kill. In effect this means that 
a high level of restraint is llQt required on the part of those who use 
deadly force in order for their actions to be deemed lawful and hence, for 
such persons to avoid legal sanction" (Hansson, 1990:ii). 
Interestingly, the approach to intervention proposed in this work rejects legislated 
prohibitions on private gun ownership as the key means of reducing tirearm abuse, 
and promotes attitudinal change as the primary objective of gun control. In sum the 
author argued that: " ... instead of trying to prevent people from possessing guns, the 
short term aim should he to train as many people as possible to use guns with greater 
restraint. In the long term, the goal should he to reduce the public's desire to 
possess and use firearms" (Hansson, 1990:114). 
In 1993 a leading South African journal published a special focus on the law 
pertaining to the private ownership, carrying and safe-keeping of guns. One of these 
three articles was a review of the Arms and Ammunition Act along with proposals 
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for a range of legal reforms (Jagwanth & Thipanyane, 1993). The approach taken to 
gun control in this paper was focused on improving the administrative management 
of firearm ownership using the following kinds of interventions: the establishment of 
a committee to periodically review frrearm legislation, the introduction of more 
stringent and standardised criteria for deciding gun licence applications, the 
development of scientific systems for testing applicants, restrictions on the quantity 
of ammunition and the number of guns that may be legally possessed by individuals, 
stricter controls on the borrowing and carrying of guns (Jagwanth & Thipanyane, 
1993). 8 This approach is discordant with those taken by Zazeraj (1973) and Hansson 
(1990), but in keeping with Van Rooyen's (1978) perspective. Furthermore, in stark 
contrast to these earlier writers, the work of Jagwanth and Thipanyane (1993) is 
marred by an uncritical acceptance of the dubious assumption that there is a causal 
link between the availability of guns and the rate of violence in society. According 
to these authors their: 
"... article is based on the presumption [added emphasis] that easy 
availability of firearms is a major factor contributing to violence and 
aggression. . . . It is essential that excessive availability of frrearms be 
reduced as a means of curtailing escalating violence. By means of more 
stringent legislation and harsh penalties being imposed for unlawful 
possession of arms, a general disarming of society towards achieving the 
end of non-violence is possible" (Jagwanth & Thipanyane, 1993:22 & 
28). 
A second paper in the aforementioned triad provided an evaluation of the law on 
carrying dangerous weapons, discussed in the context of the political conflict in 
South Africa (Sarkin & Varney, 1993). The authors maintained that this aspect of 
the law had become chaotic and should be simplified considerably to prohibit, in 
general, the carrying of dangerous weapons in public. They also stressed that the 
efficacy of new prohibitions depended on the consistency and stringency of police 
enforcement. 
The third and final article in this group was an examination of the legal 
requirements for the safe-keeping of firearms (Cowling, 1993). The central point 
raised in this paper was that legislative amendments had raised the standard of care 
required of legal gun owners to a level that was unfair and unrealistic if strictly 
applied. According to the author, it is " ... counterproductive to demand a standard 
of perfection within the context of caring for firearms that is beyond the reach of the 
ordinary possessor" (Cowling, 1993:37). He thus suggested that when the Courts 
applied the standard they took account of the fact that civilians needed guns to 
protect themselves. 
Together, these three journal articles reflect an approach to gun control that is 
characterised by a legalistic orientation, a neglect of critical evaluation in relation to 
8 And that amendments awaiting commencement be implemented forthwith. 
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underlying assumptions and an over reliance on legal reform as a means of reducing 
firearm-related violence. However, an alternate and promising approach to firearms 
emerged later in 1993 in a paper by Lerer and Hansson, in which the perspective 
forwarded in Hansson (1990) was honed. In essence, the authors suggested that 
guns, as a social problem, be addressed more as a matter of public health and less as 
a criminal justice issue. After all, the primary social problem associated with 
firearms is death and injury, and: 
"llegal] reforms have failed to limit either the illegal possession of guns, 
or the abuse of firearms by licensed and unlicensed users. Despite 
relatively strict laws, people use guns with little restraint" (Lerer & 
Hansson, 1993 :639). 
Therefore firearm-related interventions should be focused on changing people's 
attitudes to guns and violence in general, e.g. by educating the public on the dangers 
of keeping guns in the home and non-violent means of resolving interpersonal 
conflict (Lerer & Hansson, 1993). Interestingly, this work echoes two of the key 
points Zazeraj (1973) made some twenty years before, namely, the relative 
inefficacy of traditional gun control legislation, and the importance of considering 
the meaning that people attribute to situations when seeking to modify gun-related 
behaviour. The main objective of this approach was to reduce death and injury by 
developing a culture of disarmament and non-violence (Lerer & Hansson, 1993). 
The public health approach has recently benefited from epidemiological studies that 
have identified groups most at risk of gun-related violence (e.g. The MRC, 1995). 
A QUANTITATIVE PICTURE 
Firearm Fatalities Nationally 
National mortality figures published annually by the CSS have been the best 
available source of quantitative data on firearm fatalities in South Africa for some 
forty years. 9 Because the statistics have been classified according to the causes of 
death prescribed in the International Classification of Diseases (lCD), statistics for 
the main types of firearm fatalities have been included consistently, that is, 
accidents, suicides and homicides. 10 Breakdowns by sex, race and age-group were 
also routinely provided. 11 It is thus disturbing to find that in 1993 the CSS stopped 
furnishing figures for each cause of death and has since provided only composite 
totals for so-called natural and non-natural deaths (Van Niekerk, 23 January 1997). 
This is a serious loss of one of the few sources of longitudinal data on firearms in 
this country . 12 
9 But no equivalent source of information on firearm i(\juries. 
I 0 Including legal intervention. 
11 Racial breakdowns were terminated from 1991 when Apartheid was removed. 
12 Despite a number of written enquiries by the author, the CSS has not provided 
a rationale for this change in practice. 
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Table 3.1: 
Firearm Death Rates per 100000 in South Africa, 1983-1992. 
Years 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Averages 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Averages 
Accidents 
0.4 
0.2 
0.4 
0.5 
1 
0.5 
1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
Suicides 
2 
2 
1 
2 
NA 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
Homicides 
2 
3 
2 
3 
4 
3 
4 
4 
NA 
10 
7 
6 
Overall 
4 
5 
3 
5 
NA 
4 
6 
6 
NA 
12 
8 
8 
Sources: calculated from population data in The CSS (19941 i]) and mortality data in 
The CSS (1992(i] to 1983(i)). 
As the research for this thesis pertains to the period 1984 to 1991, tigures on tirearm 
fatalities for the slightly longer period from 1983 to 1992, have heen inducted. The 
data have heen converted into various averages and rates in order to increase 
reliahi I ity and enhance the validity of comparisons. 13 
According to the five-year averages in Tahle 3.1 the rate of gun death douhled 
over the ten-year period from 1983 to 1992 due to an increase in homicide. By 
contrast, the five-year average mortality rate for tirearm accidents decreased hy more 
than half and the suicide rate remained constant. Tahle 3.2 shows that guns 
accounted for a relatively high proportion of suicidal deaths and according to the 
tive-year averages there was little change in the proportion of suicides perpetrated 
with firearms hetween 1983 and 1992. Comparatively, guns accounted for a lower 
average proportion of homicides and the tive-year average percentage of gun 
homicides more than douhled over the period. The vast majority (68%) of the gun 
deaths that occurred hetween 1983 and 1992 were homicidal; only 26% were 
suicidal and six per cent were accidental (See Tahle 3.3). 
13 Figures have heen rounded to the nearest whole numher and when appropriate 
to the first decimal place. NA indicates tigures that were not available at the 
time of writing. 
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Table 3.2: 
Firearm Suicides and Homicides as Percentages of All Suicides and 
Homicides, South Africa, 1983-1992. 
Years Firearm Suicides/ Firearm Homicides/ 
All Suicides (%) All Homicides (%) 
1983 29 6 
1984 NA 8 
1985 28 8 
1986 33 10 
1987 NA 11 
Averages 30 9 
1988 30 10 
1989 26 8 
1990 41 NA 
1991 37 26 
1992 29 35 
Averages 33 20 
Sources: calculated from mortality data in The CSS (1992[i] to 1983[i]). 
Homicides and suicides were clearly the major causes of firearm fatalities and 
accidents accounted for a relatively low proportion of firearm deaths. Table 3.3 also 
shows that the average proportions of ftrearm fatalities resulting from suicides and 
accidents decreased substantially from the first to the second five-year period, but the 
proportion due to homicides increased markedly. Together these mortality data 
suggest that homicide was the key public health problem in South Africa between the 
early eighties and the early nineties: there is consistent evidence of a real increase in 
homicidal deaths caused by firearms. 
According to Table 3.4 males were over-represented as victims of every type 
of gun death in South Africa between 1983 and 1992. Notably, it was firearm 
suicides that claimed the highest proportion of female victims. Furthermore, 
Africans were over-represented as victims of gun homicides, whereas whites were 
over-represented as victims of firearm suicides and accidents. Coloured people were 
over-represented as victims of gun accidents, but Asians were under-represented in 
every category of gun death. 
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Table 3.3: 
Firearm Accidents, Suicides and Homicides as Percentages of Gun 
Deaths in South Africa, 1983-1992. 
Years 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Averages 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Averages 
Accidents (%) 
10 
5 
1 1 
1 1 
NA 
9 
9 
3 
NA 
1 
1 
3 
Suicides (%) 
38 
41 
37 
37 
NA 
38 
29 
32 
NA 
17 
12 
23 
Homicides (%) 
52 
54 
52 
52 
NA 
53 
61 
65 
NA 
82 
87 
74 
Sources: Calculated from mortality data in The CSS (1992[i] to 1983[i]). 
Like race, age affects the risk of firearm death. According to the CSS mortality 
statistics for the 1983 to 1992 period, people aged between 15 and 29 were at 
greatest risk of fatal gun accidents, those between 20 and 39 were at highest risk of 
committing suicide with a firearm, and those aged between 20 and 34 were most 
prone to gun homicide. But it was young adults in the 20 to 29 year age-group who 
were most vulnerable to all types of firearm death. 
Table 3.4: 
Average Percentages of Firearm Deaths by Victims' Sex and Race-
Groups, South Africa, 1983-1990.'4 
Causes 
Accidents 
Suicides 
Homicides 
Averages 
Pop. 
African 
% 
60 
8 
85 
51 
69 
White 
% 
22 
87 
7 
39 
17 
Col. 
% 
17 
4 
7 
9 
11 
Sources: calculated from mortality data 
population data in The CSS ( 1994[ i]). 
m 
Asian 
% 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
The CSS 
Male 
% 
94 
80 
91 
88 
50 
( 1992[i] 
14 Note, racial breakdowns were not published after 1990. 
to 
Female 
% 
6 
20 
9 
12 
50 
1983[iJ) and 
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Guns and Political Conflict 
There is little doubt that contemporary South African society is highly violent: the 
homicide rate is said to be six-times higher than the notoriously violent USA (The 
Argus, 7 August 1993). Certainly political conflict over Apartheid raised the 
incidence of non-natural death and injury, especially during the eighties (e.g. The 
South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), 1995 to 1985; Howe, 1989; 
Knobel, 1986). In 1984 about one person in every 100000 died due to political 
contlict, but by 1990 this death rate had risen to 12 per 100000, and as recently as 
1994 it was still six-times higher than the 1984 rate (The SAIRR, 1995 to 1985). 
But even before the civil war took its toll, violence and injury were already major 
causes of death for people under 44 in South Africa (Bradshaw et al, 1984: 11-18). 
In other words, violence has been a longstanding social problem which has been 
exacerbated by protracted political conflict over the last 10 to 15 years. Hence, the 
substantial body of accumulated literature and statistics on the topic of violence in 
this country is not surprising. 
It has generally been assumed that guns played a key role in the civil war. 
However, official statistics showing the actual proportion of politically-related deaths 
and injuries attributable to firearms are only available for the first two years of the 
conflict. The Nationalist government explicitly refused to release this information 
from 1986 onwards (The SAIRR, 1986). According to government figures for 1984 
and 1985 shooting was the leading cause of death and injury, accounting for 
approximately two-thirds of all politically-related deaths and 74% of injuries (The 
SAIRR, 1986:485). Notably, the majority of the fatal shootings that took place 
during the first two years of the conflict were perpetrated by police and members of 
the defence forces (The SAIRR, 1986). 
Research on Metropolitan Cape Town 
The sample of shootings used for this dissertation was drawn from metropolitan 
Cape Town. Hence, work pertaining to civilians and guns in this particular 
geographic area have been selected for review. One such study examined injuries 
and deaths in the region between May and July of 1986 when approximately 6<XXJO 
African people were dislocated (Hoffman et al, 1986). The investigation showed 
that rates of gunshot injuries and deaths rose significantly in the flashpoint areas over 
this period. It also revealed that the gunshot fatality rate was unnecessarily high 
because many of the injured were not medically treated. In 1994 MacDonald and 
Lerer examined the question of whether there had been a proportional increase in 
firearm homicides in Cape Town over the period 1986 to 1991. Their analysis 
revealed a statistically significant increase in the proportion of gun homicides after 
June 1991 which was attributed to factional fighting over lucrative routes for mini-
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bus taxi's (MacDonald & Lerer, 1994). 
The most informative of the city-based studies relating to tirearms have been 
those of Knobel (1986) and the Medical Research Council ( 1995). The combined 
data from these two studies facilitates a view of firearm-related mortality over two 
decades and enables firearm death to be viewed in relation to non-natural mortality. 
Because Knobel ( 1986) analysed mortuary data for the period 1976 to 1985 and the 
MRC appraised this information for 1994, it is possible to compare gun mortality at 
the approximate mid-points of three successive decades, namely, 1976, 1985 and 
1994. To enhance comparability the figures from these two investigations have been 
converted into percentages and presented in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: 
Relative Percentages of Main Causes of Non-Natural Deaths in Cape 
Town. 
Causes 
Transport Accidents 
Sharp Injuries 
Blunt Injuries 
Firearm Injuries 
1976 
% 
51 
22 
14 
13 
Sources: Knobel (1986) and the MRC (1995). 
1984 
% 
44 
35 
14 
7 
1994 
% 
39 
33 
8 
20 
According to Table 3.5 transport accidents were the major cause of non-natural death 
in the mid-seventies, with sharp injuries second, blunt injuries third and firearm 
injuries fourth. Indeed transport accidents accounted for about half of the deaths in 
these four categories. Over the next twenty odd years, however, the proportions of 
deaths resulting from sharp and firearm injuries rose considerably, whilst those 
caused by transport accidents and blunt injuries dropped. Although transport 
accidents remained the major cause of non-natural death, sharp injuries became a 
closer second cause and firearm injuries surpassed blunt injuries. By 1994 stabbings 
and shootings accounted for a higher proportion of non-natural deaths and firearms 
were responsible for a greater percentage of suicides and homicides than 20 years 
before (The MRC, 1995). The temporal pattern is also interesting: firearm deaths 
dropped suddenly after 1976 and remained consistently low over the next eight years 
until 1985, when there was a sharp increase and subsequent peak in 1994. In recent 
years a number of authors have attributed such marked upsurges in firearm fatalities 
to heightened political contlict (MacDonald & Lerer, 1994; Knobel, 1986). 
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Table 3.6: 
Percentages of Firearm Homicides and Suicides, Cape Town. 
Causes 
Homicides 
Suicides 
Ratios 
I983 
50 
50 
1 : I 
Sources: Knobel (1986) and the MRC (1995). 
I984 
56 
44 
1 : 1 
I985 
78 
22 
1:4 
I994 
80 
20 
I :4 
According to Table 3.6 the ratio of firearm homicides to suicides was symmetrical 
before the onset of the civil war in I983. In 1985, as the conflict escalated, there 
was a substantial increase in gun homicides in relation to suicides, and this pattern 
persisted into the mid-nineties. In 1983 there was approximately one gun suicide to 
every gun homicide, but from 1985 onwards there were four gun homicides to every 
gun suicide. 
Table 3.7: 
Homicide and Suicide Rates per 100000 in Cape Town, 1994. 
Homicide 
Suicide 
African Col. 
93 
5 
80 
10 
Source: calculated from The MRC (1995). 
White 
10 
20 
Cape Town 
68 
1I 
Cape Town is a particularly violent city. In 1994 almost a third of the deaths in this 
area were due to violence and injury, and the homicide rate was more than seven-
times higher than the average US rate. Furthermore, a substantial 46% of non-
natural deaths were homicides, with stabbings (52%) and shootings (26%) being the 
two most common homicidal means. Males, Africans and those aged between I5 
and 34 were over-represented as homicide victims in Cape Town in I994. 15 This 
same group was over-represented as victims of gun homicide (The MRC, I995: I4-
15). Males, whites and those aged between I5 and 34 were over-represented as 
suicide victims in Cape Town (The MRC, I995: I7 & I9; The CSS, I9941 i[: 7 & 9). 
15 But firearms were the leading cause of homicidal death for whites. 
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Shooting was the most common means of suicide, accounting for 39% of suicidal 
deaths in 1994 (The MRC, 1995: 17). 16 These figures include fatalities perpetrated 
by both civilians and police. With the exception of Knobel ( 1986) and Hansson 
( 1990), few studies have reported the relative proportion of civilian to police fatal 
shootings in South Africa.n 
Hansson's ( 1990) study is worthy of further note here for it was the first 
relatively large empirical investigation of firearm fatalities in South Africa that was 
not limited to mortality data. 18 For the purposes of this investigation fatal shootings 
were traced from the mortuary through the legal process to culmination either at 
inquest or criminal trial. This method yielded a wider range of information than 
previous studies because it enabled the reconstruction, at least partial, of the 
circumstances surrounding each gun-related death, as well as the Court's finding 
regarding lawfulness. The approach also facilitated investigation of the hitherto 
neglected question of restraint, that is, the extent to which shooters employed less-
than-lethal means before killing their victims. Although this pioneering study 
constituted a significant advance in the field, unfortunately the research sample was 
skewed in favour of more serious criminal cases. Nevertheless, the work revealed 
the following important, albeit preliminary, findings: the vast majority of the fatal 
shootings in Cape Town between 1984 and 1986 were homicides rather than 
suicides, and firearm accidents were extremely uncommon. Despite the widespread 
political conflict which characterised this period, the bulk of the gun deaths took 
place in everyday circumstances rather than in situations that were overtly pol.itical. 
The vast majority of the shooters and the victims in this sample were males, Africans 
were over-represented as victims, and whites were over-represented as victims and 
shooters. Interestingly, handguns were the most common type of firearm and 
l.icensed outnumbered unl.icensed guns. In general, civilians and police were found 
to have used firearms with alarmingly little restraint, and to have violated the basic 
legal principles of minimum force and proportionality. However, few of these 
shooters were held criminally liable for killing in spite of the lack of restraint with 
which they had employed guns. 
Gun-Related Crime 
General speaking, estimates of crime prevalence derived from surveys of crime 
victims are arguably more accurate than figures based on reported offences, 
prosecutions or convictions as the former reflect some unreported crime (e.g. Glanz 
et al, 1992). Because such survey data are not yet available with respect to South 
Africa, those working in the field of crime have tended to rely on the range of 
official statistics published in the annual reports of the Police, the Department-; of 
16 The second being hanging (21 %). 
17 That is, 72% and 34% of gun homicides resp. 
18 Until 1996 this was still the only study of its ki~d in South Africa. 
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Justice and Correctional Services and the CSS. Together these government 
publications have generally provided the annual frequencies of reported cases, 
prosecutions and convictions with respect to a wide range of crimes including the 
following firearm-related offences: illegal possession of guns and/or ammunition, 
illegal supplying of guns and/or ammunition, theft of guns, pointing a gun, and 
robbery, attempted murder and murder with firearms. 
Of the three basic variables; convictions, prosecutions and cases reported to the 
police, the latter has generally been accepted as the most reliable indicator of crime 
prevalence. For, " ... the further the statistic is 'removed' from the actual crime, the 
less accurate it becomes since the information becomes 'eroded' along the path of the 
legal process" (Glanz et al, 1992:1). Unfortunately, however, over the past decade 
tigures showing the frequency of reports for each type of firearm offence have not 
been published consistently. By contrast, statistics for prosecutions and convictions 
with respect to gun-related offences have been published regularly. Whilst it is 
acknowledged that conviction and prosecution rates are affected by many factors 
other than changes in rates of offending, conviction rates have been selected as the 
best available indicator of gun-related crime for the purposes of this discussion.I9 
Furthermore, convictions have been chosen over prosecutions because a conviction is 
arguably a more reliable indicator of whether an offence has taken place. After all, 
the facts of a case have to he tested in a court of law in order to secure a conviction. 
Table 3.8: 
Average Percentages of Convictions for Selected Firearm Offences. 2o 
Offences 
Att. Murder with Guns 
Murder with Guns 
Robbery with Guns 
Theft of Guns 
1984/89 
% 
60 
16 
13 
0.4 
1989/94 
% 
72 
18 
17 
0.3 
Sources: calculated from conviction data in The CSS ( 1995 to 1986). 
Averages 
% 
66 
17 
15 
0.4 
Table 3.8 shows convictions for each type of gun-related offence as a proportion of 
convictions for the relevant background offence, e.g. murder with a firearm in 
relation to all murder convictions. According to these figures the majority of 
convictions for attempted murder were for offences involving firearms. By contrast, 
19 Note: when considering temporal trends there is a variable time lapse between 
offence and conviction. 
20 From July to June. 
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gun murders constituted a low proportion of murder convictions, and rohhery with 
firearms and gun theft comprised small percentages of rohhery and theft convictions. 
Notahly, the proportions of convictions for attempted murder, murder and rohhery 
with guns all increased over this period. 
Table 3.9: 
Average Conviction Rates per 100000 for Selected Gun-Related 
Offences. 21 
Offences 
Ill ega 1 Possession 
Rohhery with Guns 
Att. Murder/Murder 
Pointing Guns 
Theft of Guns 
Illegal Supplying 
1984/89 
10 
5 
4 
2 
1 
0.4 
1989/94 
12 
4 
4 
2 
I 
0.3 
Sources: calculated from population data in The CSS ( 19941 i]) and conviction data in 
The CSS (1995 to 1986). 
The figures in Tahle 3.9 indicate that hetween 1984 and 1994 illegal possession was 
the firearm offence of which people were most commonly convicted, and illegal 
supplying was the least common. Furthermore, the average rate of conviction for 
illegal possession increased, hut those for rohhery with a gun and illegal supplying 
decreased. 
From July 1987 the State hegan to provide statistics showing the numher of 
convictions for attempted murder and murder for the following three categories of 
gun type: handguns, long-guns and heavy-calihre guns. Tahle 3.10 shows that 
hetween July 1987 and June 1994, the average conviction rate for murder/attempted 
murder with handguns was higher than those for long-guns and heavy-calihre 
tirearms. Additionally, the average rate of conviction for murder/attempted murder 
with handguns rose, whereas those for long-guns and heavy-calihre firearms 
decreased. According to the percentages presented in the lower part of Tahle 3. 10 
the hulk of the convictions for murder/attempted murder with a tirearm involved 
handguns. 
21 From July to June. 
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Table 3.10: 
Conviction Rates per l 00000 and Percentages for Murders/ Att. Murders 
by Gun Type.22 
Murders/ Att. Murders 
Handguns 
Long-guns 
Heavy-calibre guns 
Handguns 
Long-guns 
Heavy-calibre guns 
87/8 88/9 89/9 90/ l 91/2 92/3 93/4 
Rates--> 
3 2 2 4 3 4 4 
2 l 1 1 1 1 1 
l 1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Percentages -- > 
56 58 75 73 71 79 79 
33 22 18 19 23 15 15 
11 20 7 8 6 6 6 
Averages 
3 
1 
0.5 
70 
21 
9 
Sources: calculated from population data in The CSS (l9941i]) and conviction data in 
The CSS ( 1995 to 1989). 
Although long-guns played a moderate role, a very low proportion of these offences 
involved heavy-calibre firearms. The temporal pattern suggests that the percentage 
of murder/attempted murder convictions for handguns increased and those for long-
guns and heavy-calibre firearms decreased markedly during this time. 
Table 3.11: 
Reports per 100000, Nationwide and Western Cape. 
Offences 
Illegal Possession 
Pointing Guns 
Theft of Guns 
Robbery with Guns 
Att. Murder with Guns 
Murder with Guns 
W. Cape Rates 
29 
25 
18 
75 
67 
18 
National Rates 
33 
30 
13 
170 
42 
19 
Sources: calculated using offence data from The Commanding Officer of the 
W.Cape (13 Aprill995) and The Commissioner of the SAP (1993), and population 
data in The CSS (19941iJ). 
22 From July to June. 
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The data in Tahle 3. 11 were included to enable comparison, albeit somewhat crude, 
between provincial and national rates of reponed tirearm offences. Caution is 
advised because the rates for the Western Cape pertain to 1994 hut the national rates 
are for 1992. According to these tigures the rates of gun theft and attempted murder 
with guns were higher in the Western Cape than nationally, whereas the rates for all 
other gun-related offences were higher nationally than in this region. 
Internationally, research has shown that in most countries it is younger men 
who perpetrate violence including tirearm-related violence. Official crime statistics 
suggest that this is also the case in contemporary South Africa. Glanz et al (1992) 
analysed figures for the 32 year period from 1956 to 1988 and showed consistently 
higher conviction rates for males. In terms of race, in 1988 the conviction rate was 
highest for coloureds and lowest for whites: with the rate for coloureds three times 
higher than Asians and Africans, and four times higher than whites (Glanz et al, 
1992: xiii). A I though the conviction rates for white males, and Africans and Asians 
of hoth sexes decreased, the rate for coloured males remained relatively constant 
from 1956 to 1988. Also, younger people and those with little formal education 
have heen consistently over-represented in relation to convictions for serious 
offences (Glanz et al, 1992:9 & xiii resp). Overall then, in South Africa as in many 
other countries, convicts have tended to he young adult~, male, hlack and poorly 
educated. 
Table 3.12: 
National Average Percentages of Males Convicted of Gun-Related 
Offences. 23 
Offences 
Rohhery with Guns 
Att.Murder with Guns 
Pointing Guns 
Illegal Possession 
Illegal Supplying 
Murder with Guns 
Theft of Guns 
1984/89 (%) 
98 
95 
97 
96 
94 
93 
93 
1989/94 (%) 
99 
97 
97 
97 
94 
94 
92 
Sources: calculated using conviction data in The CSS ( 1995 to 1986). 
The tigures in Tahle 3. 12 show that from 1984 to 1994 males consistently comprised 
most of those convicted of seven key tirearm offences. The highest proportion of 
females were convicted of gun theft. Considering that males constituted only half of 
23 From July to June. 
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the population, they were significantly over-represented as convicts for every one of 
these gun-related oftences, and the ratio of male to female convict~ remained 
relatively constant over time. 
Table 3.13: 
National Average Percentages of Juveniles Convicted of Gun-Related 
Offences.24 
Offences 
Rohhery with Guns 
Theft of Guns 
rllegal Possession 
Att. Murder with Guns 
Murder with Guns 
Pointing Gun~" 
Illegal Supplying 
1984/89 (%) 
8 
12 
4 
5 
4 
3 
3 
Sources: calculated using conviction data in The CSS ( 1995 to 1986). 
1989/94 (%) 
12 
9 
7 
7 
7 
4 
3 
According to Tahle 3. 13 most of those convicted of gun-related crimes over the 
period 1984 to 1994 were adults hut the average proportion of juvenile (under 18) 
convicts did increase over this period. Rohhery with a firearm and gun theft were 
the firearm offences for which the highest proportion of juveniles were convicted. 
Table 3.14: 
National Conviction Rates per I 00000 by Race-Group for Gun-Related 
Offences, July 1987-June 1988. 
Offences African White Col. Asian 
Theft of Guns I 2 3 1 
Rohhery with Guns 5 1 9 I 
Murder/ Att. Murder with: 5 2 10 3 
Handguns 3 2 6 1 
Long-guns 2 0 3 1 
- Heavy-calihre 0 0 1 1 
Source: Glanz et al (1992:75-9). 25 
24 From July to June. 
25 As in the source zero's indicate figures less than one. 
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Unfortunately, figures indicating the relative proportions of each race-group 
convicted of tirearm offences have heen published too inconsistently to enable 
reliable temporal analysis. However, according to the available data (see Tahle 
3.14) coloureds had the highest rates of conviction for gun theft, rohhery and 
murder/attempted murder with tirearms. 
Together the statistics included thus far suggest that adult'i, males, Africans and 
coloureds (hlack people) have heen over-represented with respect to convictions for 
tirearm offences in South Africa during the decade 1984 to 1994. Notably, these 
groups also appear to have heen over-represented in terms of convictions in general. 
Regrettably, however, this profusion of conviction statistics do not support contident 
conclusions ahout changes in the prevalence of gun crime in this country. In fact, 
these tigures prohahly indicate more ahout the operation of the criminal justice 
system than ahout lawbreaking. Nevertheless, it is currently accepted that the crime 
rate has risen since the early nineties and according to the Minister of Justice "[t]he 
hig issue in our country at the moment is crime, and especially crime involving 
violence" (Hansard, 10 May 1995:786). A marked increase in violent crime, and 
particularly offences involving the use of guns, has heen reported (The Argus, 7 
September 1993; Glanz et al, 1992). For instance, between 1993 and 1994 reports 
of gun murders increased hy seven per cent and rohheries with firearms hy 21% 
(Hansard, 10 May 1995:786). Contemporary experts in the tield view firearms as a 
key aggravating factor in relation to violent crime, and particular concern has heen 
expressed over an apparent increase in the use of large calibre assault firearms in 
violent crime (Cilliers & Van Zyl Smit, 1995). For example, a 61% increase in the 
use of AK-47 rifles in armed rohheries was reported between 1991 and 1992 (The 
Argus, 7 September 1993). The use of unlicensed firearms in offending also seems 
to have increased hy: 93% in rape, 56% in rohhery and 20% in murder cases from 
1991 to 1992 (The Argus, 7 October 1993). Importantly, this reputed increase in the 
use of guns in violent crime has heen attributed to a greater availability of illegal 
firearms mainly on the hlack market (Cilliers & Van Zyl Smit, 1995). 
Private Possession 
Introductory Comment 
Although South Africa is said to have a particularly high rate of private gun 
ownership, recent data suggests that licensed possession is somewhat middle-of-the-
road, falling between contemporary Australian and Canadian levels (see Table 
3.15). 26 Of course, this tigure does not include unlawful possession which in 1996 
was estimated to he around four million (The Sunday lndependent, 6 October, 
1996). If illegal possession was even half this level in 1994, the overall rate of 
26 Caution is advised because the Australian figures are for 1992 and the others 
pertain to 1994. 
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civilian gun ownership would have heen significantly higher at ahout 9441 per 
100000. This would have placed the South African rate ahove the Canadian, hut still 
far he low the US rate of an estimated 83594 per l 00000 (Oprah Winfrey, 29 
February 1996). 
Table 3.15: 
Rates of Licensed Civilian Gun Possession. 
Countries 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
South Africa 
Australia 
Rates per 100000 
1546 
4380 
4495 
4550 
Sources: calculated from data in Reuters (16 October 1996), The Department of 
Justice for Canada (1994), The CFR (15 September 1995) and Chappell (1992). 
According to key role-players in the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), 
there has heen a proliferation of firearms in South Africa in recent years (The lnter-
Departmental Strategy Team, l996[b]). The main political factions in the civil war 
had armed military wings which were generally well equipped with sophisticated 
weapons of war. Although numerous efforts have heen made to disarm private 
armies, many paramilitary firearms have remained in circulation. Since the mid-
eighties hoth the demand for and the supply of guns has increased signiticantly and 
there has been a marked upsurge in private ownership. Most notably, in the post-
election period, firearm possession among Africans has risen from two to 60% (The 
Sunday Independent, 6 October 1996). The endemic political violence and recent 
increases in crime have bred a widespread fear of violence among people in this 
country and concerns over safety have fuelled the civilian demand for firearms. Not 
surprisingly, there has also been a substantial growth in the private security industry. 
By the close of 1995 there were approximately 300000 private security officers 
(PSOs) in the country, a high proportion armed with guns (The Inter- Departmental 
Strategy Team, l996[b] :31 ). 
There have been ample supplies of legal and illegal firearms to meet the 
growing civilian demand. A thriving domestic arms industry was developed in 
response to international sanctions and this source has consistently provided 
reasonably priced guns for the commercial market. The main source of illegal 
firearms has heen the black market which is run by organised crime syndicates and 
stocked hy gun smuggling from borderline states. Somewhat surprisingly, the State 
armoury has also heen a significant source of illegal firearms, with an estimated five 
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million security force guns having passed into civilian hands since the onset of the 
contlict (The Inter-Departmental Strategy Team, 1996[hj:31). Finally, the theft of 
licensed guns has heen noted as a source of illegal tirearms, alheit rather 
insigniticant hy comparison (The Commissioner of the SAP, 1993). 
Legal Possession 
In South Africa information pertaining to private gun ownership has heen collected 
routinely hy the Central Firearms Registry (CFR), a division of the police force. In 
general this data source has heen relatively inaccessihle to independent researchers 
although the Commissioner of Police has, on occasion, puhlished selected pieces of 
information in various annual reports. It was fortunate then that the CFR agreed to 
make some hasic tigures availahle to the author (The CFR, 15 Septemher 1995, 2 
Septemher 1992). 27 These data were transformed into more comparahle rates and 
averages and have heen included in Tahles 3.16 to 3.19. 
Table 3.16: 
Selected Statistics on Licensed Guns in South Africa. 
Years Applications Average Guns Licensed Declared Untit 
per 100000 per person per 100000 per 100000 
1986 NA 2 3802 3 
1987 518 2 3792 9 
1988 447 3 3757 8 
I989 437 3 3727 28 
1990 741 3 3825 29 
1991 632 3 3885 22 
1992 710 NA NA NA 
1993 789 NA 5024 15 
1994 765 NA 4495 NA 
Sources: calculated from The CFR (15 Septemher 1995, 2 Septemher 1992), The 
Commissioner of the SAP (1987 to 1992), and population data in The CSS (1994[i]). 
Tahle 3. 16 shows that from 1987 the rate of applications for firearm licences 
increased markedly, as did the rate of licensed firearm owners and the average 
numher of guns licensed to each individual. 
27 Despite requests, hreakdowns hy sex, race-group and age were not provided. 
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Table3.17: 
Selected Figures on Gun Licence Applications. 
Years Applications Refusals Granted %Granted 
1984 NA NA 120558 NA 
1985 NA NA 135382 NA 
1986 225386 5165 220221 98 
1987 148164 7627 140537 95 
1988 130856 7391 123465 94 
1989 130655 7240 123415 95 
1990 226577 11533 215044 95 
1991 197509 18268 179241 91 
1992 NA NA NA NA 
1993 256989 14009 248976 97 
1994 254526 20351 236620 93 
Sources: The CFR ( 15 Septemher 1995, 2 Septemher 1992) and The Commissioner 
of the SAP ( 1993 to 1988). 
According to Tahle 3. 17 the police have consistently granted a high proportion of 
gun licence applications, at least since 1986. In other words, most of those who 
have applied for licences to possess firearms have heen successful. Interestingly, 
however, the rate at which people have heen declared untit to possess guns has also 
increased significantly over this time. Further research is required in order to 
reliahly interpret these apparent trends. ln particular the following key issues should 
he considered: (1) the stringency of the procedure for assessing gun licence 
applications, and (2) reasons for the increase in declarations of unfitness to possess 
firearms. 
Tahle 3. 18 shows that the numher of licensed guns reported missing increased 
threefold after 1986, hut less than one per cent of licensed firearms were reported 
missing each year and around half of these were usually recovered. According to 
these figures firearms stolen from licensed owners were not a major source of illegal 
guns over this period. 2s Nevertheless, it is alarming to note that in 1992 only 20% 
of the guns that were reported missing were recovered. This prompted the police to 
focus greater attention on the issue and the figures for recoveries have since 
improved: 83% of missing guns were suhsequently recovered hy the police hetween 
April 1993 and June 1995 (The Sunday Independent, 6 Octoher 1996). 
28 Although not all missing guns are reported. 
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Table 3.18: 
Licensed Guns Reported Missing and Recovered. 
Years Reported Missing 29 Recovered Not Not Recovered 
Missing % Recovered % 30 
1986 4838 0.2 2526 2312 48 
1987 8804 0.3 3703 5101 58 
1988 7524 0.3 3434 4090 54 
1989 7760 0.3 3678 4082 53 
1990 10305 0.3 4303 6002 58 
1991 11577 0.4 6715 4862 42 
1992 13284 0.3 2718 10566 80 
1993 13670 NA 5313 8357 61 
1994 16819 NA 8963 7856 47 
Sources: The CFR ( 15 Septemher 1995, 2 Septemher 1992) and The Commissioner 
of the SAP ( 1993 to 1988). 
This is a society m which civilians have increasingly armed themselves with 
tirearms, a trend attrihuted to a heightened fear of crime and a prevailing culture of 
violence. The civil war followed hy an increased crime rate in the post-election 
years fanned fear among civilians, many of whom have heen prompted to acquire 
guns for protection. Legal acquisition has heen made relatively easy and the police 
have tended to treat licence applicants somewhat leniently. Furthermore, after 
almost a decade of violent political contlict, it seems that violence has hecome the 
preferred means of dealing with contlict (Hansard, I 0 May 1995). In the words of 
the NCPS Inter-Departmental Strategy Team: 
"South Africa's violent history has left us with a 'culture of violence' 
which contrihutes to the high levels of violence associated with criminal 
activity. l Violence] has come to he regarded as an acceptahle means of 
resolving social, political and even domestic contlict~" (l996[h] :4) 
In stark contrast to the USA, however, researchers in this country have not yet 
empirically tested the actual predictive capacity of the two key variahles, fear of 
crime and the culture of violence. 
29 Of all licensed guns. 
30 Of those reported missing. 
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OVERVIEW OF KEY FIREARM-RELATED INTERVENTIONS 
Gun Control Legislation 3! 
Introduction 
Legislative gun control is something of an estahlished tradition in South Africa. 
Even hefore Union in 1910 the territories that were later to comprise the Repuhlic of 
South Africa (RSA) each had separate legislation governing the possession and sale 
of firearms and ammunition, including laws requiring civilian gun owners to license 
their firearms (Zazeraj, 1973). 32 After 1910, however, the laws of the pre-union 
territories were repealed and replaced with a single new Arms and Ammunition Act 
28 of 1937 in terms of which all privately owned guns had to he relicensed.B Over 
the next 32 years this statute was amended seven times hefore it was finally replaced 
in 1969 with the Arms and Ammunition Act 75. Despite numerous amendments, the 
1969 Act still forms the hasis of contemporary firearms legislation in South Africa. 
Suhstantial changes have heen made to this Act since 1990 when the formal 
dismantling of Apartheid was initiated, and further amendments are likely over the 
next few years as part of the process of reconstruction and development which has 
heen undertaken hy the new government. 
The manufacture, sale, importation, storage, possession and certain aspect~ of 
the use of firearms and ammunition are also regulated in part hy the Armament~ Act 
87 of 1964 as amended, the Armaments Development and Production Act 57 of 
1968 as amended,34 and the Simulated Armament~ Transactions Prohihition Act 2 of 
1976 as amended. In addition, the Tear Gas Act 16 of 1964 pertains to the 
manufacture, importation and possession of tear gas and weapons designed to propel 
the suhstance. In recent years these have included firearms. Finally there is the 
Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 as amended, which applies to the manufacture, 
sale, supply and possession of any object that is " ... likely to cause serious hodily 
injury if it were used to commit an assault", including firearms and imitation guns. 
Since 1992 the State has amended this Act on several occasions, particularly in 
response to increases in politically motivated shootings on trains and the use of so-
called traditional weapons in political contlict hetween memhers of the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in KwaZulu-Natal 
(Sarkin & Varney, 1993). Under the new regulations the carrying of dangerous 
weapons on trains, railway stations and when attending political gatherings in puhlic 
places has heen generally prohihited (The Minister of Safety and Security, 22 August 
31 Shortcomings have heen addressed mainly in Chapter Nine. 
32 Act~ 13 of 1877 and 17 of 1892 in the Cape, Act~ 16 of 1862 and I of 1906 in 
Natal, Act 23 of 1908 in the Orange Free State and Act 10 of 1907 in the 
Transvaal. 
33 A local magistrate had to decide whether an applicant was a "fit and proper 
person". 
34 Act 57 estahlished a state owned corporation for the production of armaments, 
Armscor, the Armaments Development and Production Corporation of South 
Africa Ltd. 
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1996). 
Main Legislative Changes: I 984 to I 991 
In 1973 the Arms and Ammunition of 1969 was amended for the tirst time. 35 Two 
key reforms were introduced: all tirearms had to he stamped or engraved with 
identification numhers,36 and anyone who wished to deal in ammunition had to have 
a specific licence. Then in 1978 a wider range of reforms were made to the Act.J7 
Firstly, machine guns and rilles were specifically de tined as: "any tirearm capahle of 
delivering a continuous fire for so long as pressure is applied to the trigger thereof, 
whether or not that tirearm was originally designed to function in that manner". 
Secondly, a numher of controls were introduced that limited the supply of 
ammunition to those with a dealer's licence or a licensed firearm capahle of firing 
the said ammunition. In addition, in order to acquire ammunition a person was 
required to sign a request form and an ammunition register. Thirdly, the following 
two new offences were created: willfully pointing a tirearm including an air ritle or 
revolver at another person, and contravening any provision of the Act. 
Five years later in 1983 a particularly notahle set of amendments was made to 
the Act. 38 For the first time a limit was placed on the maximum numher of gun 
licences which could he held hy an individua\. 39 Furthermore, the definition of an 
"arm" was expanded to include any firearm with the exception of a cannon, and 
including gas rifles of 0.177 inch calihre or over, gas pistols, gas revolvers, air rifles 
of 0.177 inch calihre or over, air pistols, alarm pistols, alarm revolvers and any 
harrel of a firearm. Signiticantly, the detinition of a "white person" was deleted 
which hrought to an end a long period of legislated racial discrimination under this 
Act. 40 Since 1937 Ministerial permission had heen required for a firearm licence to 
he granted to a hlack person, and in the case of R v Mhauli the Court acknowledged 
explicitly that the law: 
" ... rendered it more difticult for a non-European to ohtain a licence to 
possess a firearm than in the case of a European, therehy indicating a 
greater disapproval of the possession of tirearms hy non-Europeans than 
Europeans" (1954:87C-D). 
A numher of the 1983 amendment.;; were aimed at regulating the temporary 
possession of firearms. After this reform anyone wishing to take temporary 
possession of a gun without holding a licence was permitted to do so only in order to 
protect property owned hy or in the care of the person to whom the gun was 
35 By Amendment Act 35 of 1973. 
36 Plus the manufacturers' serial numhers. 
37 Amendment Act 16 of 1978. 
38 Amendment Act 19 of 1983. 
39 Namely, 12. 
40 Although racism prohah1y continued in practice. 
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licensed. The horrower had to he at least 16, not disqualified from holding a gun 
licence, have a signed statement from the licensee setting forth the period for which 
temporary possession had heen granted and particulars sufficient to identify the 
firearm in question, and the gun had to he kept in the immediate vicinity of, or on 
land occupied or owned hy the licensee. 41 However, if a horrower was actually 
employed to protect the property of a licensee, s/he was required to ohtain a special 
permit from the police for temporary possession without a licence. These 
amendment<; also made it permissihle for a person under I 6 years of age to use a 
tirearm while under the immediate supervision of a licensee. 42 
A group of the 1983 changes were aimed at regulating the carrying of licensed 
handguns in puhlic places. 43 In terms of these new requirement<;, pistols and 
revolvers had to he completely concealed from view when heing carried and had to 
he carried in a manner that enahled effective control to he exercised over weapons at 
all times. Failing to take reasonahle steps to safe-keep a licensed firearm was 
introduced as an additional ground on which to declare untitness to possess a gun. 
The following new offences were introduced: violating the legal requirement<; for 
carrying handguns, failing to safe-guard a licensed firearm that was not heing carried 
or under one's direct control, and losing a licensed gun due to negligence. 
It was in 1988 that the largest nu mher of reforms were introduced. 44 
Applicants for gun licences were ohliged to have their tingerprinto; taken, and a 
licence was required in order to possess pans of firearms such as frames, receivers, 
magazines and revolver cylinders. Applicants for gun and dealers' licences and 
those in temporary possession of firearms were ohliged to acquire a certificate of 
competence and have access to apparatus suitahle for the safe-keeping of firearms. 45 
In addition, anyone in possession of a firearm was required to carry relevant 
authorisation and to produce it, and the tirearm in question, at the request of a police 
officer. At this time the following grounds for declaring a person unfit to possess 
tirearms were also added: having a mental condition, heing inclined to violence, 
heing dependent on alcohol or narcotic drugs, having a conviction for a Schedule 
Two offence,46 an offence in which a tirearm was used, willfully pointing a firearm 
at another, failing to safe-guard a firearm while carrying it, negligently losing a 
firearm, discharging a firearm and negligently killing, injuring or endangering 
another or their property, and negligently handling a firearm. However, the reforms 
also empowered the Commissioner of Police to suspend any part of the three year 
41 f f horrowed for longer than 14 days police endorsement was required. 
42 Of at least 21. 
43 Only hy civilians. 
44 Amendment Act 60 of 1988. 
45 But hy Decemher I 995 these provisions had not heen implemented. 
46 Including high treason. sedition, terrorism, suhversion, sahotage, puhlic 
violence, intimidation, murder, malicious damage to property with a tirearm, 
rape, assault, rohhery, theft of game, house hreaking with the intent to commit 
an offence, kidnapping, childstealing and conspiracy. 
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period for which a convicted person could he declared unfit to possess a tirearm, and 
enahled any person declared untit to appeal. 
The 1988 amendment Act included a set of provisions pertaining to so-called 
weapons of war. The hasic provision in this group was a prohihition on the private 
importation, supply or possession of weapons of war including automatic firearms, 
the ammunition for such weapons and explosives. 47 Furthermore, anyone who 
suspected illegal possession of these weapons was legally ohliged to report this to the 
police. The maximum sentence for illegally possessing, importing or supplying 
weapons of war or failing to report, was set as 25 years imprisonment. Licensed 
firearms lost, destroyed or stolen had to he reported to the police within 24 hours 
and failure to report constituted a crime. The following new offences were also 
added: supplying parts of firearms to unlicensed persons, failing to lock a licensed 
firearm away in the prescrihed apparatus, failing to take reasonahle steps to prevent 
the loss or theft of a licensed tirearm, endangering property or negligently killing, 
injuring or endangering another hy discharging a tirearm, negligently handling a 
firearm, or handling a gun while under the intluence of alcohol or narcotic drugs, 
and supplying a firearm to someone su~'Pected of heing in this state. Lastly, the 
Minister of Law and Order was empowered to grant temporary periods of indemnity 
from prosecution to encourage the surrender of unlicensed firearms and ammunition. 
The main change wrought hy the 1990 amendment Act, 4s was to increase 
penalties for the following firearm-related offences: the illegal possession, dealing, 
supplying, importing, exporting, or manufacturing of firearms, parts of firearms or 
ammunition; forging or altering a firearm licence, permit or authorisation; making a 
false entry in a firearm register; contravening any condition of a licence, permit or 
authorisation; making a false statement in an application for a gun licence, permit or 
authorisation; failing to safe-guard or take reasonahle steps to safe-guard a tirearm 
and having a firearm stolen due to negligence. The penalties for these offences were 
a maximum fine of 12000 rand and/or up to three years imprisonment for a tirst 
conviction, and a mandatory penalty of tive years imprisonment for suhsequent 
convictions. 
Similarly, relatively few reforms were introduced the following year in 1991.49 
The prohihition on the possession, supply, manufacture and importation of weapons 
of war was expanded to include ammunition and imitation ammunition, parts of such 
weapons, and explosive devices. The requirements for carrying firearms in puhlic 
places were extended to apply to all firearms, not only pistols and revolvers: guns, 
including long-guns, now had to he completely concealed when carried.~o In 
47 Unless on hehalf of the State or with Ministerial permission. Including 
cannons, recoilless guns, mortars, rocket launchers, machine guns and machine 
rit1es, or any similar armament. 
48 Act 30 of 1990. 
49 Amendment Act 79 of 1991 . 
50 By civilians. 
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addition, the maxtmum penalty h>r contravening the requirement-; f(>r carrying 
firearms in puhlic places was increased to a tine and imprisonment. It is also worth 
noting that in 1991 the police and others entrusted with tirearms in their ofticial 
capacity were stripped of immunity from prosecution f(>r failing to safe-guard service 
weapons. 
The Current Acrs1 
Legal Possession 
Under the current Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969 as amended, civilians are 
generally prohihited from possessing, supplying or importing weapons of war and 
specitically fully-automatic tirearms such as machine guns and ritles.s2 However, 
private ownership of other kinds of guns is permitted if a civilian holds the requisite 
authorisation granted hy the Commissioner of Police. 53 This licensing requirement 
applies to all tirearms including gas and air ritles of 0.177 inch calihre or ahove, gas 
and alarm handguns, as well as pans of tirearms. 54 A firearm licence remains valid 
unless the holder permanently transfers ownership, surrenders or forfeit-; the gun or 
is declared untit to possess a tirearm. Furthermore, there is no limit to the numher 
of gun licences that may he held hy any individual. 55 The Minister of Safety and 
Security has t!le authority to grant immunity from prosecution, for stipulated time 
periods, to any person who surrenders unlicensed firearms or ammunition to the 
State. 56 
To ohtain a firearm licence a person must he at least 16 and must not have 
heen declared untit to possess a gun. Licence holders must have their fingerptint-; 
recorded and guns must have identiticatory marks engraved into the metal. The 
Minister may request licensees to furnish their addresses and particulars of their 
tirearms. Anyone whose application for a gun licence is refused may appeal to the 
Minister within 60 days of a refusaiY Appeals are considered hy a hoard 
comprising up to three memhers who have heen practising attorneys, advocates or 
magistrates for at least tive years, and/or persons with a specialised knowledge of 
tirearms. A person who does not have a tirearm licence may lawfully possess a gun 
on a temporary hasis if s/he has a signed letter of consent from a licensee, 58 is at 
least 16, has not heen declared untit to possess a firearm and remains in the 
51 As at Decemher 1995 and excluding provisions that had not yet commenced. 
52 Unless on hehalf of the State or with the Ministerial permission. 
53 Hereafter referred to as the Commissioner. 
Excluding those who possess arms on hehalf of the State like police officers, 
presidential guards and memhers of the defence forces. 
54 No authorisation is required for gas and air rifles smaller than 0. 177 inches and 
toy weapons. 
55 Until 1992 the limit was 12 licences per person. 
56 Hereafter referred to as the Minister, and responsihle for the police since 1994. 
57 And anyone declared untit. 
58 For up to two weeks. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
77 
immediate vicinity of, or on premises owned or occupied hy the licensee. Also, the 
purpose of temporary possession must he personal protection or the safe-keeping of a 
weapon. Persons younger than 16 may temporarily possess a tirearm when under 
the immediate supervision of a licensee over 21. 
Like tirearms, the supply and possession of ammunition is strictly regulated hy 
this statute. No person is permitted to possess ammunition unless s/he is also in 
legal possession of a firearm capahle of tiring it. Furthermore, ammunition may not 
legally he supplied unless the recipient is authorised to possess a gun capahle of 
tiring it and has signed the supplier's register. 
Unfitness to Possess Firearms 
A person may he declared untit to possess a tirearm for up to two years.'9 The 
Commissioner may declare the following persons untit to possess tirearms: ( l) 
anyone who has threatened or expressed the intention to kill or injure him/herself, 
(2) anyone who has threatened or expressed the intention to kill or injure another 
person, (3) anyone with a mental condition that makes the possession of a firearm 
contrary to his/her own interests or those of another, (4) anyone who is inclined to 
violence, (5) anyone who is dependent on alcohol or narcotic drugs, and (6) anyone 
who has failed to take reasonahle steps to safe-keep a licensed firearm. Before 
declaring anyone unfit the Commissioner may ask the person in question to attend a 
hearing and give reasons why s/he should not he declared until to possess a firearm. 
The person is entitled to he represented hy legal counsel and to request that the 
Commissioner call anyone who has made a statement ahout the person concerned to 
he cross-examined. If a person is declared untit, the Commissioner must notify 
him/her in writing and provide reasons for this decision. 
Unless a Court expressly determines otherwise, anyone who has heen convicted 
of any of the following offences is deemed automatically to he untit to possess 
tirearms: the illegal possession of a tirearm, willfully pointing a firearm at someone, 
failing to lock away a licensed tirearm, losing or having a licensed firearm stolen 
hecause of a failure to lock it away as prescrihed, failing to take reasonahle steps to 
prevent the loss or theft of a licensed tirearm, negligently injuring or endangering 
another or property hy discharging a tirearm, handling a tirearm negligently or while 
under the intluence of alcohol or narcotic drugs, supplying a firearm to a person who 
is under the influence of alcohol or narcotic drugs, and any other offence involving a 
tirearm. 60 Courts also have the discretion to declare anyone convicted of any of the 
following offences to he unfit to possess tirearms: high treason, sedition, terrorism, 
suhversion, puhlic violence, intimidation, murder, culpahle homicide, malicious 
injury to property, rape, assault, rohhery, theft of game, kidnapping, childstealing, 
59 But any part of this period may he suspended 
60 Except where an admission of guilt tine was paid. 
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and hreaking/entering with the intent to wmmit an offence.61 Before declaring 
anyone unfit to possess a firearm on the grounds of a conviction, a Court is required 
to inform the person, to allow her/him to advance reasons and to present evidence in 
his/her defence. 
Carrying Firearms 
A civilian may carry a licensed firearm in a puhlic place if it is completely covered 
and s/he is ahle to exercise effective control over the weapon at all times. It is 
unlawful to carry a firearm or other dangerous weapon on a train, in a railway 
station or while attending a puhlic gathering (The Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 
1968 as amended). Anyone who carries a tirearm in a puhlic place or has a gun in 
his/her immediate custody must identify him/herself if so requested hy a police 
officer, and may also he required to produce the weapon concerned and the requisite 
authorisation. 
Dealing, lmponing, Exponing and Manufacturing 
Firearms and gun part<; may not he legally supplied unless a recipient has the 
requisite authorisation. A dealer's licence is required in order to deal in tirearms or 
ammunition. These licences are issued on an annual hasis and limit dealing to 
specific premises and conditions. Every firearm dealer must keep a register which 
the police may inspect at any time, containing details of all firearms and ammunition 
received and supplied, and the relevant authorisations. Ministerial authorisation is 
required to import or export firearms and ammunition. 62 Any tirearm imported must 
have a manufacturer's serial numher or other identiticatory numher engraved 
thereon. Ministerial permit-; are also required to manufacture tirearms, ammunition 
and explosive components. A person may, however, load or reload cartridges t{lr a 
licensed gun without specitic authorisation. 
Offences and Penalties 
The large numher of offences that have heen created under the Arms and 
Ammunition Act have heen summarised in Tahle 3.19. If a person is convicted of 
any of these offences, a Court may cause any tirearms and ammunition relating to 
the offences to he forfeited to the State and may cancel authorisations held hy the 
person concerned. 
61 Even if a firearm was not used in the offence. 
62 Excluding transactions on hehalf of the State. 
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Table 3.19: 
Summary of Offences and Penalties under the Arms and Ammunition 
Act. 
lllegal Possession: 
Possessing a firearm without the requisite authorisation -- a fine up to 12000 
rand and/or imprisonment up to three years for a first conviction, and up to 
five years for any subsequent conviction.63 
Possessing more than one tirearm without the requisite authorisation --
implisonment up to 10 years.64 
Possessing ammunition without also being in lawful possession of a gun 
designed to tire it -- a fine up to 12000 rand and/or imprisonment up to three 
years for a tirst conviction, and up to five years for subsequent convictions. 
Possessing more than one hundred rounds of ammunition for an unlicensed 
tirearm --imprisonment up to 10 years. 65 
Possessing any weapon of war without the requisite authorisation --
imprisonment for a minimum of tive years and a maximum of 25 years.66 
Contravening the terms of a licence -- a tine up to 12000 rand and/or 
imprisonment up to three years for a tirst conviction, and up to tive years for 
subsequent convictionsY 
Forging or altering any authorisation -- a tine up to 12000 rand and/or 
imprisonment up to three years for a tirst conviction, and up to tive years for 
subsequent convictions. 68 
Making a false entry in a dealer's register or providing false information -- a 
fine up to 12000 rand and/or imprisonment up to three years for a tirst 
conviction, and up to tive years for subsequent convictions. 
Making a false statement in order to obtain a licence or permit under this Act -
- a fine up to 12000 rand and/or imprisonment up to three years for a first 
conviction, and up to five years for subsequent convictions. 
Failure to Report Illegal Possession of Weapons of War: 69 
Failing to report illegal weapons of war to the police after being in contact 
with a person in possession of these weapons -- imprisonment up to 25 years. 
Failing to report illegal weapons of war to the police after being on premises 
where such weapons were heing kept illegally -- imprisonment up to 25 years. 
Illegal Supplying, Dealing, Importing/Exporting and Manufacturing: 
Permitting or enabling someone under 16 to he in possession of firearms or 
ammunition-- a tine up to 4000 rand and/or imprisonment up to one year. 7o 
63 Any tirearm, including gas and air ritles up to 0.177 inch calibre, gas, alarm 
and air handguns, and firearm barrels. 
64 Excluding tirearms smaller than 0.2 inch calibre, gas and air rit1es, air, gas 
and alarm handguns, tirearm barrels, and shotguns up to 0.410 inch calibre. 
65 Excluding !~rearms smaller than 0.2 inch calibre, gas and air rines, air, gas 
and alarm handguns, tirearm barrels, and shotguns up to 0.410 inch calibre. 
66 Including imitations and ammunition. 
67 Including gun and dealers' licences. 
68 To import or export, possess or deal in tirearms and/or ammunition. 
69 Some of these offences have since been ruled unconstitutional. 
70 With the onus on the accused to prove otherwise. 
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Supplying firearms or ammunition to someone who does not have the requisite 
authorisation -- a tine up to 12000 rand and/or imprisonment up to three years 
for a tirst conviction, and up to tive years for suhsequent convictions. 
Supplying a tirearm to someone who is under the intluence of alcohol or 
narcotic drugs -- a tine up to 4000 rand and/or imprisonment up to one year. 
Dealing in arms or ammunition without the requisite authorisation -- a tine up 
to 12000 rand and/or imprisonment up to three years for a tirst conviction, and 
up to tive years for suhsequent convictions. 
Importing or exporting firearms or ammunition without the requisite 
authorisation -- a tine up to 12000 rand and/or imprisonment up to three years 
for a tirst conviction, and up to tive years for suhsequent convictions. 
Manufacturing tirearms or ammunition without the requisite authorisation -- a 
fine up to 12000 rand and/or imprisonment up to three years for a tirst 
conviction, and up to five years for suhsequent convictions. 
Failure to Safe-Keep Firearms: 
Failing to lock away a licensed firearm as prescrihed -- a fine up to 12000 rand 
and/or imprisonment up to three years for a tirst conviction, and up to five 
years for suhsequent convictions. 
Losing or having a licensed firearm stolen hecause of a failure to lock away the 
gun as prescrihed -- a tine up to 12000 rand and/or imprisonment up to three 
years for a tirst conviction, and up to five years for suhsequent convictions. 
Losing or having a licensed tirearm stolen hecause of a failure to take 
reasonahle steps to prevent the loss or theft -- a tine up to 12000 rand and/or 
imprisonment up to three years for a tirst conviction, and up to five years for 
suhsequent convictions. 
Failing to report the loss, theft or destruction of a licensed firearm to the police 
within 24 hours -- a fine up to 4000 rand and/or imprisonment up to one year. 
Violations of Carrying Provisions: 
Failing to completely conceal and/or exercise effective control over a licensed 
tirearm while carrying the weapon in a puhlic place -- a fine up to 2000 rand 
and/or imprisonment up to six months. 
Miscellaneous Violations: 
Failing to identify oneself to the police at their request -- a fine up to 4000 
rand and/or imprisonment up to one year. 
Failing to produce a firearm and/or the requisite authorisation when requested 
hy the police -- a fine up to 4000 rand and/or imprisonment up to one year. 
Failing to produce a dealer's register and/or stock when requested hy the police 
-- a fine up to 4000 rand and/or imprisonment up to one year. 
Ohstructing or hindering any person performing a duty under the Act -- a fine 
up to 4000 rand and/or imprisonment up to one year. 
Contravening or failing to comply with any notice issued under this Act -- a 
fine up to 4000 rand and/or imprisonment up to one year. 
Contravening or failing to comply with any provision of the Act not otherwise 
stipulated -- a tine up to 4000 rand and/or imprisonment up to one year. 
Specific Criminal Acts witb a Firearm: 
Willfully pointing a tirearm at someone -- a tine up to 4000 rand and/or 
imprisonment up to one year. 
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Negligently injuring or endangering a person or property hy discharging a 
firearm -- a fine up to 4000 rand and/or imprisonment up to one year. 
Negligently handling a tirearm -- a tine up to 4000 rand and/or imprisonment 
up to one year. 
Handling a tirearm while under the intluence of alcohol or narcotic drugs -- a 
fine up to 4000 rand and/or imprisonment up to one year. 
Discharging a tirearm in a puhlic place when this is not legally justified -- a 
fine up to 4000 rand and/or imprisonment up to one year. 
Interim Concluding Comment 
In South Africa the possession of tirearms hy civilians has heen, and remains, a 
carefully circumscrihed privilege and not a right. From pre-union times the aim of 
tirearm legislation appears to have heen the regulation rather than the prohihition of 
private gun ownership. 71 In general, it has only heen those prone to crime and/or 
violence who have heen excluded from possession. More recently, however, 
licensed gun owners who fail to take adequate care of their guns and those who fail 
to keep their tirearms safely have heen harred from suhsequent legal possession. 
While the current legislation dearly outlaws private gun ownership hy certain 
civilians, it also enahles many people to possess a wide variety of guns. In fact, 
weapons of war like fully-automatics and assault firearms are the only guns that have 
heen effectively hanned from private possession. 
Considering the former system of Apartheid it should not he surprising to find 
that, for many years hlack people's access to licensed guns was purposely restricted. 
Until the demise of the Apartheid State in the nineties, it was difficult for hlack 
civilians to acquire guns lawfully and whites owned the vast majority of licensed 
firearms (e.g. The Sunday Independent, 6 Octoher 1996; Zazeraj, 1973). Notahly, 
this form of racial discrimination has a lengthy history: in the late 1880s it was 
unlawful to supply hlack people with tirearms or ammunition in the former 
territories of Natal and the Orange Free State. During the same era in the former 
Transvaal and Cape Colony, hlack people had to ohtain special authorisation to 
possess guns (Zazeraj, 1973). In 1937 when these laws were consolidated into the 
first Arms and Ammunition Act, the lattermentioned provision was included and 
retained over the next 46 years, and until 1983 hlack civilians had to acquire 
Ministerial permission to possess licensed tirearms. Some authors have maintained 
that this legislated difference in the applications procedure for gun licences was not 
designed to limit hlack civilians' access to licensed firearms (e.g. Zazeraj, 1973). 
This seems highly unlikely, however, considering the extent of the legislated racism 
that was implemented hy the Apartheid State. Furthermore, whether it was the 
intention of this provision to limit hlack people's lawful access to guns or not, this 
71 At times the State has actively encouraged certain groups to acquire tirearms, 
e.g. in the Transvaal at the tum of the century free guns were issued to whites 
who were unahle to afford their own tirearms. See Zazeraj (1973). 
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aspect of the law was undeniahly racially discriminatory as it stipulated differential 
extra-legal requirements solely and unjustitiahly on the grounds of race. 
Numerous amendments have heen made to the Arms and Ammunition Act 
since it was introduced some 25 years ago. Considering the key reforms it is evident 
that legislators have tended to pursue two main ohjectives. The first appears to have 
heen the introduction of increasingly harsh criminal sanctions intended to deter 
undesirahle conduct in relation to guns. Over time, more and more hehaviours have 
heen criminalised under the Act and the penalties for firearm-related offences have 
heen holstered. Minimum and maximum sentences have heen increased, maximum 
sentences have heen enhanced for repeated offending, and mandatory minimum 
sentences have heen introduced. 72 The second legislative aim seems to have heen the 
improvement of criteria used to identify those prone to violence and thus considered 
untit to possess firearms. To this end the numher of legal indicators of untitness has 
heen increased significantly. n 
On the whole, the changes indicate a gradual extension of the State's control 
over the private ownership of guns, along with efforts to improve the monitoring of 
I icensed owners and their tirearms. For instance, it hecame law in 1973 for all 
tirearms to he engraved with an identificatory numher, and from 1988 onwards for 
gun licence applicants to he tingerprinted. Furthermore, the range of weapons 
regulated hy law has heen increased to include gas, alarm and air guns, imitation 
firearms and even parts of guns. Notahly during the seventies, administrative 
control was extended to ammunition. Jn 1973 licences for dealing in ammunition 
were introduced and in 1978 it was made unlawful to possess ammunition without 
also having a licensed gun capahle of tiring it. 
Of course, it is not only the written law that is relevant hut the way in which it 
is enforced in practice. Jn North America poor enforcement hy police and the 
Courts has heen identified as a key impediment to the efficacy of legislated gun 
controls. 74 Judges have often heen reticent to punish civilians merely for failing to 
license their tirearms, particularly when rates of crime and violence have heen high. 
This judicial attitude rest~ on a helief, which is widespread in the USA today, that 
civilians have a right to use tirearms to protect themselves. Notahly there is some 
indication in South African case-law of a similar judicial tendency. As far hack as 
1981 in the case of S v Ntanzi, the Court stated rather explicitly that the mere 
possession of an unlicensed firearm was not a serious offence in itself. This opinion 
has endured, for in 1992 in the case of S v Siphetu the Court recognised that the 
motive of self protection must he considered as a mitigating factor in cases of 
unlicensed gun possession, considering the threat posed hy crime and violence in this 
country. Accordingly, in S v Meyer ( 1992), the Court reduced the sentence of an 
72 The tirst was estahlished under the 1968 Dangerous Weapons Act. 
73 Especially since 1988. 
74 See Chapter Two. 
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accused who had heen convicted of illegally possessing a firearm, hecause the said 
weapon had heen owned for the purposes of self defence. 7l These cases retlect the 
opinion that, in a violent society, law ahiding civilians ought not to he punished 
unduly merely for trying to protect themselves and their loved ones. This attitude is 
similar indeed to that which has characterised the North American judiciary and it 
may well he undermining the efficacy of legislated gun controls in this country as 
has heen the case in the USA. Unfortunately, research on this matter has yet to he 
conducted in the South African context. 
Law Governing the Use of Deadly Force 
Introducing Grounds of Justification 
The main statute governing the private ownership and use of guns in the RSA has 
just heen examined. In this section, grounds of justification, another more specific 
aspect of the law pertaining to the use of guns hy civilians has heen addressed 
(Burchill & Milton, 1994). 76 In most Western countries including South Africa, 
these grounds permit acl"i under certain circumstances that would otherwise he 
unlawful. This legal construct gives meaning to the term just(fiable homicide, for 
unless there are !,TfOunds of justitication, killing is unlawful (Snyman, 1993). Hence, 
if a person fatally shoots someone and the grounds of justitication do not apply, 
his/her conduct is likely to he deemed unlawful and s/he may he tried on a charge of 
murder or, alternatively, culpahle homicide. If a Court proves that such an accused 
foresaw that her/his act could have heen unlawful, s/he may he convicted of murder. 
However, if it is proven that the accused did not foresee this possihility it is 
negligence and s/he may he found guilty of culpahle homicide (Snyman, 1993). In 
effect, grounds of justification stipulate the conditions under which it is legally 
acceptahle to kill someone hy any means including shooting. In South African law 
private defence is the most common ground on which killing hy civilians has heen 
justified (e.g. Burchill & Milton, 1994; Snyman, 1993).77 It should also he noted 
that this is one of relatively few countries in which civilians are permitted to kill in 
order to effect an arrest. 78 Because arrest is more commonly associated with law 
enforcement, it has heen discussed in relation to the police in Chapter Five. 
Underlying Principles 
The South African legal controls on the use of deadly force, like those in most 
nations, have heen hased on the internationally accepted legal principles of minimum 
force and proportionality. The third principle, of the incremental use of force, has 
heen less consistently applied. Minimum force is the notion that the least possihle 
75 By suspending six months of an 18 month prison sentence. 
76 Alternatively termed defences that exclude unlawfulness. 
77 Also availahle to police. 
78 Or prevent an escape 
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force should always he .used, and the English Court of Appeal has explained the 
principle thus: 
.. . our courts wi II never regard the use of force as necessary to 
achieve a particular ohjective if that ohjective can reasonahly he 
achieved hy employing a lesser degree of force or a less harmful 
course of action" (R v Mahomed, 1938:34). 
Hence, firearms should only he used when shooting constitutes the least possihle 
force necessary to achieve a lawful goal in a given situation. 
There is a great deal of contention with regard to the second principle of 
proportionality. The controversial issue here is what factors should he considered in 
assessing whether force has heen proportional. For instance, ought there to he a 
halance hetween the weapons employed, hetween the interest heing defended and the 
harm done in order to protect this interest, hetween the harm threatened and that 
used in defence, or among some comhination of these element~? (Snyman, 1993 ). 
The definition that has heen most widely accepted in this country is that force is 
proportional when it is commensurate with the danger or social harm that is to he 
prevented (Haysom, 1987[a]). 
The incremental use of force incorporates the principle of minimum force. 
According to this notion, whenever feasihle, non-violent means must he employed 
hefore violent means, and less-than-lethal means hefore lethal means. Ideally then, 
the starting point ought to he no force at all and forceful means ought to he 
introduced only if unavoidahle, and then gradually, heginning with the least possihle 
force (e.g. The United Nations, 1990). 
Private Defence 
Renowned legal scholars Burchill and Milton have explained private defence thus: 
"[a] person who is the victim of an unlawful attack upon person, property or other 
recognised legal interest may resort to force to repel such an attack. Any harm or 
damage inflicted upon an aggressor in the course of such private defence is not 
unlawful" ( 1994: I 09). Throughout the world private defence or protective force is 
the oldest and hest estahlished defence against unlawfulness (Snyman, 1993). Under 
contemporary South African common law it is lawful to kill in private defence and 
the rationale is as follows: 
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"I i ]t stands to reason that it is impossihle for the state authorities to 
protect the individual at all times against unlawful attack, and for that 
reason every individual today still has the right to 'take the law into his 
[her) own hands', so to speak, in private defence, and temporarily to act 
on he half of the state authority in order to uphold the law. The hasis for 
the recognition of private defence as a ground of justification still is the 
concept that justice should not yield to injustice" (Snyman, 1993 :98). 
More specifically, private defence is a tripartite justification comprising self defence, 
the defence of another, and the defence of property (Burchill & Milton, 1994; 
Snyman, 1993). Private defence may he invoked hy civilians and police. When 
raised in a criminal case as a justification for killing, the onus is on the State to 
prove heyond a reasonahle douht that the accused did not act in private defence 
(Burchill & Milton, 1994; Snyman, 1993). The test is the so-called ohjective test of 
the reasonahle person, explained as follows: 
"[t]he Courts sometimes state that, in order to determine whether X 
acted in private defence, one should ask whether the reasonahle man 
[person] in the circumstances in which X found [her] himself would 
have acted in the same way. . .. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it 
would appear that the courts apply the reasonahle man [person] test 
here merely in order to determine whether X's conduct was reasonahle 
in the sense that it accorded with what is usually acceptahle in society" 
(Snyman, 1993: 106) 
Furthermore, what a defender helieved at the time of an attack is not relevant. 
Instead the Court must decide whether a defender's hehaviour fulfilled the legal 
requirements for private defence. So for instance, a person who kills someone 
whom s/he erroneously helieves to he an attacker, cannot rely successfully on private 
defence (Burchill & Milton, 1994; Snyman, 1993). 
In most cases of private defence the threat involves the commission of an act 
such as an assault hy a hurglar on a homeowner. However, legally speaking, the 
omission of an act may also constitute a threat (Snyman, 1993). To illustrate: on a 
train passenger-Y strikes passenger-X when X refuses to leave the sleeping herth that 
has heen hooked hy Y. In such a case, Y may he found to have acted in private 
defence hecause s/he had heen threatened hy the omission of an act, that is, X's 
failure to vacate Y's sleeping herth (Snyman, 1984). 
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For private defence to he lawful the threat or attack must comply with a 
numher of requirements. First, the threat must he unlawful. Hence, a suspect 
cannot claim private defence if s/he assaults a police ofticer during an attempted 
arrest. It is, however, lawful to act in private defence against a person who is not 
criminally responsihle like a young child or someone who is mentally ill. Secondly, 
the attack must not he completed and it must he an immediate threat. But one need 
not wait to he struck hefore responding, one may strike someone to avert an attack. 
Nevertheless, private defence does not justify act'! of vengeance, punishment or 
attacks to prevent future threats. Thirdly, the defensive act must he directed at an 
attacker and must he necessary, that is, the minimum t(>rce needed to avert an attack, 
to prevent damage to or loss of property (Burchill & Milton, 1994; Snyman, 1993). 
As a corollary, it is usually accepted that if possihle and safe, one should flee from 
an attack. However, there is no legal duty to withdraw and the decisions of the 
Courts on this matter have heen amhiguous (Snyman, 1993). Furthermore, a person 
must he aware at the time that s/he is acting in private defence. This provision 
effectively excludes situations in which an assailant is provoked to attack and those 
in which it is pure coincidence that a defender act'! against an unlawful act. An 
example of the lattermentioned situation is one in which X intentionally kills Y who, 
unheknown to X, is planting a homh at the times/he is killed (Snyman, 1993). 
Table 3.20: 
Summary of Restraints for Private Defence, 1991. 
SELF DEFENCE & DEFENCE OF ANOTHER 
* 
* 
* 
The minimum force necessary to avert the threat. 
Proportionality hetween the threat to he averted and the force used to 
defend. 
Not provoking an attack. 
DEFENCE OF PROPERTY 
* 
* 
* 
The minimum force necessary to protect the property heing threatened 
and no other means of later regaining stolen property or apprehending the 
perpetrator. 
Proportionality hetween the value of the property threatened and the 
force used to defend it. 
Oral warning of the intention to use deadly force. 
In the leading case of Ex Parte the Minister of Justice: In re S v Van Wyk ( 1967), 
the Appellate Division (AD) reiterated the minimum force requirement that deadly 
force may only he used to protect property when less harmful means are not 
availahle. 79 The following two criteria for the use of deadly t(>rce in the defence of 
79 Including the suhsequent recovery of goods or arrest of a suspect. 
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property were also added in this case: (I) whenever teasihle an oral warning of the 
intention to use deadly force must he issued, and (2) deadly force is not justitied in 
detending property of little value. 
Necessity 
"The defence of necessity arises when, confronted with a choice hetween suftering 
some evil and hreaking the letter of the law in order to avoid it, the accused chooses 
the latter alternative. The term 'necessity' is used here to cover this dilemma 
situation whether it is hrought ahout hy the force of surrounding circumstances or hy 
human agency" (Burchill & Milton, \994: 129). In 1972 the AD ruled that necessity 
in the form of compulsion can constitute a complete detence to a charge of murder 
(S v Goliath). In this case the Court did not decide whether necessity is a defence 
hecause it excludes unlawfulness or the fault of an accused; an amhiguity which has 
resulted in ongoing controversy (Burchill & Milton, 1994). For the purposes of this 
discussion, however, the prevailing opinion has heen adopted; necessity has heen 
treated as a defence that excludes unlawfulness. 
Necessity is rooted in South African common law and is closely related to 
private detence. In hoth instances a person acts to protect interest~ of value to 
him/her against imminent threat (Burchill & Milton, 1994; Snyman, 1993). But the 
former justification applies to situations in which a person literally hreaks the law out 
of necessity. To illustrate: Z may he compelled to hreak the law hy killing X, if Y 
holds a gun to Z's head and threatens to shoot her/him if s/he fails to kill X. This is 
an acknowledgement: " ... that it cannot reasonahly he expected of someone to 
sacrifice his own life to save another" (McMare, 1994: 165). A person may also 
hreak the law out of necessity due to an inevitahle evil or an emergency situation 
which is produced hy a non-human intervention like a fire. 
There are a numher of requirement~ for a successful defence of necessity: tirst, 
there must he an immediate threat to some legal interest such as lite, hodily integrity 
or property. Secondly, the threat must have hegun or he imminent and may not he 
already completed or merely expected in the future. Thirdly, the detensive act must 
he directed at the threat and fourthly, the threat to he averted must not he lawful, 
e.g. X may not claim necessity if s/he kills a police officer in order to evade lawful 
arrest. Fifthly, the person claiming this defence must have heen aware at the time 
that s/he was acting out of necessity. And tinally, the defensive act must he 
necessary to avert the threat, and the force used or harm caused hy the defensive act 
must he proportional to the threat to he averted (Burchill & Milton, 1994; Snyman, 
1993). This defence may he invoked hy civilians and police, hut people like law 
enforcement ofticers, soldiers and tire tighters, are not permitted to avert the 
dangers inherent in the exercise of their protession hy infringing the rights of 
innocent parties (Snyman, 1993). Therefore, such persons may not claim necessity 
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as a defence if they foreseeahly endanger an innocent third party when using force to 
carry out their duties. Similarly, no one may claim necessity if s/he foreseeahly 
creates a threat to her/himself. Thus: 
"ri]f X foresees that [sjhe will find (her] himself in an emergency 
situation from which rs]he will he ahle to escape only hy infringing 
the rights of another or hy hreaking the law, and [ s )he nevertheless 
proceeds with [her] his scheme, it is an entirely different matter. 
Then rsJhe has in a sense invited the trouhle [her] himself and cannot 
raise necessity as a defence" (Snyman, 1993: 115). 
The test of necessity is the ohjective test of the reasonahle person and not the 
suhjective question of whether the person concerned considered her/himself to he 
acting out of necessity. And the onus is on the State to prove heyond a reasonahle 
douht that an accused did not act out of necessity (Snyman, 1993). 
Table 3.21: 
Summary of Restraints for Necessity, 1991. 
* 
* 
* 
Proportionality hetween the threat to he averted and the force used in 
defence. 
Not foreseeahly creating the circumstances in which the use of force is 
the only option. 
Not foreseeahly endangering an innocent third party in order to avert 
dangers inherent to the exercise of a profession. 
A Note on Private Security Officers 
In countries with large numhers of armed p1ivate law enforcement officers, it is 
imperative that research on the use of deadly force take into account the role played 
hy this group (Geller & Scott, 1992). Since the mid-eighties, South Africa has 
experienced major growth in the private security industry and hy 1989 there were 
more private security officers (PSOs) than police in the country, that is, 150000 and 
81582 resp. (Hansard, 21 March 1990:614; The Commissioner of the SAP, 1990). 
Despite the significance of PSOs, systematic research on gun use hy this group has 
not yet heen conducted. However, there is specific legislation that regulates the 
private security industry (The Security Officers Act 92 of 1987 as amended). A 
governing hoard has heen estahlished which sets and enforces proficiency standards 
and training requirements, and also deals with allegations of misconduct. Under this 
law PSOs have heen defined as employees who render the service of safe-guarding 
people or property. Anyone who matches this definition is required to register as a 
PSO with the governing hoard, provided they are at least 18, declared "sound of 
mind", and have no "serious convictions for c1iminal offences or improper conduct". 
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CONCLUDING COMMENT 
Private gun possession and use are difticult topics to study empirically. In South 
Africa accessihle sources of reliahle data have heen scarce and there has heen no 
systematic investigation of civilian gun ownership, either lawful or unlawful. The 
Central Firearms Register is the hest source of information on licensed firearm 
possession in this country. But the availahle data have heen limited to somewhat 
general statistics and information on hasic factors like sex, race, rural/urhan 
residence and primary motives for gun possession has not heen released. There is 
clearly a need for comprehensive research on contemporary gun ownership. 
Empirical work on the use of guns hy civilians in this country has also heen scarce. 
Popular concern has heen focused on the use of guns in the perpetration of crime, 
and academic studies have tended to concentrate on the fatal use of firearms. 
Consequently, the following key issues have heen relatively neglected and now 
require urgent research attention: lawful firearm use, gun-related conduct among 
licensed owners, the range of non-fatal outcomes of gun possession, the processes 
antecedent and consequent to various outcomes such as the non-use of guns, averted 
use, missed shots and injuries. 
On the whole, research on civilians and guns in South Africa has heen 
extremely limited hoth in quantity and quality, especially when compared to work in 
this field internationally. In general the academic work on this suhject has heen 
reductionist with little evidence of the complex range of salient issues raised in 
overseas studies. Indeed, researchers in this country have yet to provide hasic gun-
related data on topics such as: who owns licensed guns and who possesses firearms 
illegally, for what purposes firearms are acquired and under what circumstances 
people make use of guns. Fortunately, official statistics on various aspect<; of gun-
related mortality, crime and lawful possession do afford some insight. It seems that 
since the mid-eighties there have heen notahle increases in: ( 1) lawful private gun 
ownership, (2) illegal firearm possession among civilians, (3) gun deaths, (4) gun 
homicides, and possihly (6) some gun-related offences, particularly murder, 
attempted murder and rohhery with firearms. 
South Africa has taken a rather traditional approach to gun control with a 
heavy reliance on legislation hacked hy criminal sanction. Unfortunately this does 
not appear to have heen successful at preventing illegal ownership, gun crime or 
violence. Inconsistent law enforcement hy the police and Court~ has heen 
underscored as a key ohstacle. Of late a lack of restraint in gun use and resultant 
death and injury have hegun to emerge as important puhlic health issues. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LITERATURE REVrEW PART III: 
A Critical Overview of Key Work on the Police and Guns 
INTRODUCTION 
Internationally, the use of force hy puhlic police has drawn fierce dehate on hoth 
academic and popular fronts. In countries where it has heen customary to arm the 
police with guns, however, it is the use of deadly force that has generated the most 
heated controversy . 1 This term is something of a misnomer as it refers not only to 
force that actually kills, hut to force that is reasonahly capahle of causing death or 
serious hodily harm (Geller & Scott, 1992). Because shooting is the most common 
type of deadly force employed hy pol ice forces, deadly force has often heen used as 
a synonym for shooting. This is hoth erroneous and misleading as shooting is only 
one of many forms of deadly force. The now infamous heatings of Rodney King hy 
police in the USA in 1991 and Steve Biko in South Africa in 1977 are stark 
reminders of the potential for police to use deadly force without resorting to 
tirearms. Boots, fist'i and other so-called less-th n-lethal weapons, like hatons and 
stun-guns, can and have heen used hy police to kill and to intlict serious injury. It is 
thus important to hear in mind the distinction hetween shooting and deadly force. 
Worldwide, more has heen written on the topic of police and firearms than on 
the police in relation to any other type of force or weapon. The accumulated writing 
on this issue comprises an extremely large hody of discourse that outstrips the 
suhstantial volume of work on civilians and guns. The prominence of this matter in 
research may seem somewhat surprising considering the relative infrequency of 
police shootings in most Western countries (Geller & Scott, 1992). It is the potential 
of controversial police killings, and particularly shootings, to precipitate urhan 
rioting which has made this an issue of considerahle political import (Sparger & 
Giacopassi, 1992; Brenner & Kravitz, 1979). 2 Indeed it is widely acknowledged 
that: 
"[nJo other single factor exceeds police use of deadly force in fostering 
distrust and even disorder within communities, especial.ly minority 
communities" (Brenner & Kravitz, 1979:ix). 
The main controversy that has emerged with regard to the police and firearms differs 
signiticantly from that which exists in relation to civilians and guns. It is the use 
See Geller and Scott (1992) on the USA, Sarre (1993) on Australia, Chappell 
and Graham ( 1985) on Canada, Uildriks and Van Mi:lstright ( 1991) on 
Scotland, Kruize i:lnd Wijmer ( 1991) on the Netherlands, and Plate and 
Schneider ( 1989) on West Germany. 
2 Particularly in the USA since the sixties. 
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rather than the possession of guns hy police that has heen the key issue. Although 
legislative controls on the use of firearms and deadly force hy police are a 
longstanding legal convention throughout the world, the stringency of such 
restrictions has varied across jurisdictions and time periods. More specitically, 
debates have tended to focus on the conditions under which the police ought to he 
legally permitted to employ deadly force in law enforcement and whether the range 
of circumstances should he reduced or expanded. 
Those who have opposed additional limitations on police use of deadly force 
have tended to argue that this would effectively handcuff ofticers, thus reducing the 
efticacy of law enforcement and compromising the safety of civilians and police 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). On the other hand, those who have favoured further 
restrictions on police deadly force have claimed that these would protect civilians 
from unnecessary police violence, and would facilitate law enforcement hy 
improving puhlic trust in and co-operation with police. 3 It has heen maintained 
furthermore that bolstering restraint in police use of deadly force can reduce the 
prohahility of violence between police and civilians, so enhancing ofticers' safety 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). The rationale is that if the police rarely resort to deadly 
force, then lawbreakers may feel it unnecessary to arm themselves with lethal 
weapons, or when armed, to resort to deadly force if confronted hy police. It has 
also heen emphasised that the unrestrained use of deadly force hy police is 
criminogenic, in the sense that it has often resulted in rioting, and that limiting the 
police use of deadly force would reduce the likelihood of this kind of lawbreaking 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). 
Perhaps predictably, it has heen the police themselves who have heen the most 
adamant opponents of further limitations on their use of deadly force. Until 
relatively recently, proponents of increased restraint hy police were a subordinate 
vo1ce. Since the mid-eighties there has heen a gradual tum in the tide of police 
opinion regarding restraint in the use of deadly force. This has heen a corollary to 
community policing which has been implemented in many countries over the last 
decade as a strategic response to accumulated puhlic discontent with police, volatile 
race relations and increased puhlic protest, especially hy minority groups (Geller & 
Scott, 1992; Moore & Stephens, 1991fa]; Kelling, 1988). Today, it is not 
uncommon for police agencies to actively promote restraint in the use of force. At 
international level this objective has heen embodied explicitly in the United Nation's 
"Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms hy Law Enforcement Officials", 
to which all Memher States are hound (1990). 4 It has also heen proposed that law 
enforcement ofticers ought to he key role models in developing a general culture of 
disarmament in society. To elaborate: 
3 Critical to the success of community policing. 
4 Although with the limited status of so-called soft law. 
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"lt]he hest strategy toward handgun disarmament may not he to chip 
away at peripheral owners, hut to change the attitudes, values, and 
practices of the core ownership group - the police, other law enforcement 
personnel, and private security forces" (Jacohs, 1986:33). 
The question of whether police ought to he armed with guns at all has received 
relatively scant attention (e.g. Jacohs, 1986; Brown, 1979). But of late, this issue 
has heen intensively dehated in Australia and Britain. The custom of arming the 
Australian police with guns is heing re-evaluated, while in Britain the longstanding 
policy of not arming police with guns is heing re-considered (Sarre, 1993; 
Waddington, 1988; 1986 resp). Interestingly, a recent poll showed that the hulk of 
the British police were opposed to heing routinely armed with guns (The Argus, 16 
May 1995). Generally speaking, however, disarming police of tirearms is viewed as 
an unrealistic ohjective in most contemporary societies. Since lawhreakers are 
considered unlikely to voluntarily desist from arming themselves with guns, it has 
heen argued that removing police firearms would place law ahiding civilians and 
police at greater risk, and would undermine law enforcement (e.g. Zarh, 1986; 
Brown, 1979). In essence, the main concerns that have heen raised ahout the 
possession of guns hy police have heen remarkahly similar to those put forward 
regarding the police use of firearms, namely, the efficacy of law enforcement and 
the safety of the puhlic and police. 
Notahly, the first empirical investigation of police shootings to he puhlished 
concerned the Shanghai (China) police during the thirties and forties (Fairhairn & 
Sykes, 1987 (reprint]). However, the hulk of research on police shootings has heen 
conducted in economically developed nations with the USA, Canada and Australia at 
the forefront.j By comparison, there has heen a paucity of work on the use of 
deadly force hy police in so-called third-world countries. 6 To date the vast 
preponderance of the accumulated writing on police use of deadly force pertains to 
North America; in no other country in the world has this issue attracted anywhere 
near as much research attention. By contrast, there has heen relatively little 
investigation of police deadly force in countries in which the police have not heen 
routinely armed with guns; Britain heing the most renowned in this regard. The 
British have a long-standing tradition of arming only specialist police squads with 
guns, and providing the rank-and-tile with firearms only when demonstrahly 
5 See The British Columhia Police Commission ( 1990), Chappell and Graham 
(1985), Janssen and Hackler (1985) and Whittingham (1984) on Canada, Sarre 
(193), Swanton and Psaila (1986) and Elliot (1979) on Australia, The New 
York Times (19 July 1991) on Israel, Kruize and Wijmer (1991), Roest 
(1989(a], 1989(h]) and Boek (1987) on the Netherlands, Burton (1990) and 
McKenzie and Gallagher (1989) on Britain, Waddington (1993fa], 1991, 
1990), Spyut ( 1986) and Hadden (1985) on the military police and other 
security forces in Northern Ireland, Uildriks and Van Mastright ( 1991) on 
Scotland, and Plate and Schneider (1989) on West Germany. 
6 Although there is some work on Argentina, Brazil and Jamaica, see Chevigny 
( 1990). 
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necessary (Wolfenden, 1989; Greenwood, 1969). This country also has very 
stringent legal restrictions on the police use of deadly force (Burton, 1990; 
McKenzie & Gallagher, 1989). Indeed, the low incidence of police shootings and 
associated puhlic protest in the UK have heen noted as the main reasons for the 
limited research on this topic. But as firearms have come to he used more frequently 
in British law enforcement in recent years, there has heen a corresponding increase 
in popular and academic interest in this field and additional emphasis on restraint in 
the use of deadly force hy police (e.g. Waddington, 1993ra], 1991, 1988, 1986; 
Harper, 1992; Woollons, 1992; Poole & Sampson, 1991). 
Throughout the world puhlic order policing, which is arguahly the most visible 
form of contemporary police activity, has tended to draw major puhlic attention and 
criticism. This constitutes one of the most politically volatile issues in the 
contemporary policing arena and there has heen a marked growth in discourse on the 
suhject of the police use of force in puhlic protests. 7 Even in countries like Britain 
where there has heen relatively little work on the use of deadly force hy police, there 
has heen a signiticant amount of writing on the use of force in public order policing 
(Waddington, 1991 ). Although this is a hroader suhject than the use of deadly force 
and firearms hy police, it is heing recognised increasingly that, to effectively control 
deadly force usage, the entire continuum of force must he taken into account: from 
no force, to less-than-lethal forms, to lethal force (e.g. Alpert & Fridell, 1992; 
Scharf & Binder, 1983). It is thus considered preferable to treat the use of guns hy 
police as an integral aspect of police conduct. 
As the bulk of the research on police use of deadly force including guns has 
heen conducted in the North American context, most of the literature reviewed in 
this chapter concerns the USA. Nevertheless, where availahle and relevant, tindings 
relating to other countries have heen included and work on South Africa has heen 
presented in Chapter Five. 
A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF CENTRAL ISSUES 
The Impetus for Research in the USA 
It is informative to hegin hy addressing the question of why North American studies 
have dominated research on the police use of guns over the past 35 years. In short, 
this appears to he the product of politics. Since the sixties many incidents in which 
excessive force has allegedly heen used hy police have heen followed hy active and 
frequently violent puhlic protests. 8 Furthermore, it is perceived racial 
discrimination in the use of force hy police that has been the most potent precipitant 
of civilian rioting in the USA (Geller & Scott, 1992). The riot-; that followed the 
acquittal in 1992 of the four white police otlicers who severely heat Rodney King, a 
7 See Kruize and Wijmer (1991) on the Netherlands, and Waddington (1991) on 
Britain. 
8 See Scharf and Binder (1983) and Geller and Scott ( 1992) on US protests. 
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hlack man, are perhaps the most recent reminder of the current explosive potential of 
this issue (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). However, it is the police use of guns that has 
most regularly drawn puhlic criticism in the USA. Indeed, puhlic outcries ahout this 
matter hegan to surface in the mid-1850s, shortly after North American police were 
first issued firearms on a routine hasis (Sherman, I980[a]). Certainly during this 
century the State has consistently acknowledged that the use of guns hy police is a 
matter of critical import. Perhaps the first formal statement in which police 
shootings were identified as a core precipitant of urhan riots was made in I 967 hy 
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice 
(Sparger & Giacopassi, I 992). One of the key recommendations made hy this 
Commission was the need for policy-oriented research on police use of deadly force. 
The government responded hy making large amounts of funding availahle for such 
work. The State's prioritising of the issue, comhined with the availahility of 
research funding, provided the initial impetus for the development of this research 
tield in the USA. It is noteworthy that neither the political importance of, nor the 
research funding for, work in this arena have waned significantly over time. In I 978 
the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice named police deadly 
force as a national priority in terms of research; second only to community studies 
(Triplett, 1979).9 From the mid-sixties to the late eighties calls for further 
investigation of this issue have heen one of the most regular recommendations made 
hy government riot commissions (The Washington Post, 4 May 1992).10 Most 
recently the Rodney King case has spurred interest in this tield and in response the 
United States (US) Department of Justice has funded a multifaceted inquiry into the 
use of force hy and against police in the USA today (The National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ), 1991 ). In view of these enahling forces, it is not difficult to understand why 
work on police deadly force in North America has developed into a major 
contemporary tield of research, hoth inside and out-;ide academia. 
Core Research Objectives 
Incident-; in which police have used deadly force, and particularly tirearms, have 
heen counted, descrihed, and explained, and interventions aimed at controlling such 
force have heen proposed and their impact evaluated. In short, these have heen the 
key ohjectives of research in this field to date (Geller & Scott, 1992). Studies aimed 
at counting have tended to address the question of how many police killings and 
shootings take place in particular areas over certain time periods, as well as temporal 
and spatial trends. Since police shootings have heen constructed as a specific social 
prohlem, the ohjective of some of the quantitative work has heen to provide 
measures to assist policy-makers and politicians in deciding what level of police 
9 Part of the US Department of Justice, now the National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ). 
10 See Geller and Scott ( 1992) on riot commissions. 
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shooting is to he deemed acceptahle, and thus what degree of change is required. 
Researchers whose goals have heen descriptive and/or explanatory have 
investigated a wide range of variahles including, inter alia, the characteristics of 
victims and police (perpetrators), and the circumstances and consequences of police 
shootings. Although a lot of studies have addressed the question of whether there is 
racial discrimination in police decisions to shoot, most of the research has sought to 
identify factors that affect the likelihood of police shootings, so as to hetter inform 
strategies for the reduction of death and injury. Not surprisingly, there has heen a 
considerahle amount of work on the suhject of controlling police gun use, the 
purpose heing to explore and assess the efficacy of mechanisms designed to achieve 
goals like: decreasing deaths caused hy police, reducing incident~ in which oftlcers 
fire shots, increasing survival rates of victims shot hy police, and improving officers' 
safety. 
Key Methods 
The examination of existing sources of information, 11 the generation of new data hy 
asking people questions, 12 or hy ohserving phenomena either in the field or under 
experimental conditions, are the three hasic methods hy which data are generally 
collected in social studies, although there are many potential permutations and 
comhinations of these techniques. The secondary analysis of information has heen 
the most favoured method of data collection in research on police use of guns. 
Indeed there have heen relatively few ohservational studies of police shootings in 
real-life situations. This has mainly heen due to restricted access, as police 
managers have generally refused to permit civilian researchers to accompany officers 
and ohserve their hehaviour in the field. Although the political sensitivity of the 
issue has clearly heen a prime motivation for decisions to disallow so-called tide-
along research, concerns ahout researchers heing harmed or impeding police-work 
have also heen proffered as reasons. Nonetheless, some ohservational studies have 
heen conducted (e.g. Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Fyfe, 1989[a], 1988[c]; Cruse & 
Rohin, 1972; Reiss, 1971[a], 1971[h]). Whilst providing valuahle insights into 
police hehaviour, these investigations have generated very small samples which have 
seriously diminished the reliahility and external validity of the tindings. However, 
the fact that few shooting incidents took place during relatively lengthy periods of 
ohservation constituted a significant tinding in itself, namely, that police tend to 
shoot in only a small proportion of their interactions with civilians (e.g. Fyfe, 
19811 h]). Jt has heen estimated that it would take an average of two weeks of 
ohservation in order to witness one incident in which an ofticer even drew his/her 
tirearm (Sherman, 1980[a]). 
11 Secondary or archival analysis. 
I 2 Generally using interviews, questionnaires or self reports. 
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ln view of the impediments to field ohservation and the ethical constraints that 
inhihit experimental manipulation in actual situations, some researchers have chosen 
to investigate police hehaviour under artificial or simulated conditions (e.g. Doerner, 
1991). Securing access to police officers for this kind of research has heen easier 
than ohtaining permission to conduct field ohservations. Perhaps the most common 
experimental technique used to date has heen to present officers with written or 
filmed scenarios in which shooting is either depicted or a realistic option. Officers 
have then heen required to critically evaluate the conduct with which they have heen 
presented and/or to comment on how they would have hehaved under similar 
circumstances. Researchers have also employed self reports, interviews and 
questionnaires to elicit police officers' views on particular shootings, as well as their 
attitudes to deadly force in general (e.g. The Portland Oregonian, 26 & 27 April 
1992; Tercek, 1992). The main shortcoming of this type of study is the artificiality 
of the experimental circumstances which tend to limit the reliahility and validity of 
the findings. Results hased on officers' attitudes to deadly force and self reports 
ahout how they helieve they would hehave in particular situations are also of duhious 
validity, hecause attitudes do not reliahly predict hehaviour. When people are asked 
to respond to value-laden issues, they tend to provide socially acceptahle responses 
and their hehaviour often differs from their heliefs ahout how they will hehave. 
More recently, development~ in simulated conditions have hoosted the potential 
for conducting more reliahle experimental studies of police gun use. A numher of 
simulated environment~ -- designed to increase restraint and improve officer safety in 
potentially violent situations -- have heen developed as part of state-of-the-art police 
training programmes. These comprise life-like environments and sophisticated 
simulations of real life occurrences in which officers must make decisions ahout 
whether and when to use their firearms. For instance, the Tampa Police Training 
Academy have constructed an entire city hlock for training puJlloses (Korzeniowski, 
1990). The availahility of such facilities has hegun to encourage ohservational work 
on police gun use and ought to improve the quality of future findings (e.g. Doerner, 
1991). Furthermore, the investigation of all aspect~ of policing has heen fuelled hy 
changes in the attitude of police management toward research, which has 
accompanied the adoption of a community style of policing. The nineties have seen 
many police managers allowing researchers greater access to police records and 
actively encouraging operational research hy out~ide agencies, as well as initiating 
in-house studies. 
Nevertheless, for many decades hlocked access enhanced the popularity of 
secondary analysis in the investigation of police shootings. The first ohstacle to 
secondary analysis is of course finding a suitahle source of primary data. Although 
highly prohlematic, newspaper reports of police shootings have heen used for this 
purpose (e.g. The Puhlic Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, 1979, 1975; Kohler, 
1975[h]). The major weakness inherent in this data source is that incidents that are 
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puhlished are not representative of police shootings m general. Hence, samples 
drawn from news reports are inevitahly skewed which undermines the validity of the 
resultant tindings. 
It is information routinely collected hy government agencies over lengthy 
periods that has heen employed in the majority of secondary analyses. In the USA 
there are three main sources of primary data pertaining to police use of deadly force. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 13 and the National Center for Health 
Statistics (NCHS), 14 have heen compiling statistics on police justifiahle homicides 
for many decades. Individual police agencies are the third source of primary data; 
many agencies now regularly collect information on the use of force hy their 
otlicers. Although quality and content vary across police agencies, the following 
types of information have commonly been recorded: incidents in which officers have 
used force; have killed or injured civilians; police shootings; public complaint-; 
against officers and outcomes of investigations into allegations of misconduct. 
The limits of the original data are a fundamental disadvantage inherent to 
secondary analysis. The primary data available on US police shootings is 
problematic in many respect-;. The FBI and NCHS statistics on police justifiable 
homicides are not only unreliable, hut lack richn ss of detail. Because these data 
pertain to lawful and intentional police killings, they do not retlect all shootings or 
deadly force incident-;. Unintentional and unlawful killings are excluded, as are 
cases in which deadly force has not been fatal. The use of police justifiable 
homicides as the dependent variable in studies of police shootings and deadly force 
has been criticised vehemently (e.g. Fridell, 1989; Binder & Fridell, 1984). 
Information collected hy individual police agencies has generally been more 
comprehensive and reliahle than the FBI and NCHS data, and hence, a preferred 
source of data for secondary analyses of US police shootings. But, while police 
agencies have denied researchers access to their records, those endeavouring to 
conduct secondary analyses have had little choice hut to use the available, yet 
deficient, alternatives. In recent years, with increased openness to scholarly 
investigation on the part of the police, researchers have begun to enjoy greater access 
to police records. As the issue of police accountability has gained increasing 
political purchase, there has heen a trend toward improving the information collected 
hy police agencies, especially in relation to the use of tirearms. Many contemporary 
North American police department<; routinely record a wide range of detailed 
information that is highly relevant for research purposes. To illustrate: the New 
York City Police Department (NYPD) puhlishes a detailed annual report on all 
shootings in which the police have been involved; the South Carolina Police 
Department records all incidents in which their officers point tirearms; and a number 
of Canadian police agencies have hegun to log instances in which their officers avoid 
13 As part of the FBis Uniform Crime Reporting System, running since 1940. 
14 Extracted from death records. 
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killing hy employing less-than-lethal tactics (Geller & Scott, 1992; Greenherg, 1990; 
Jamieson et al, 1990 resp). Although police records constitute a valuahle alternate 
source of primary data for research, which is certainly a hoon to contemporary 
studies of police deadly force and gun use, the limitations of this information should 
not he disregarded. In particular, reliahility is prohahly low hecause the main 
purpose for collecting these data is to decide culpahility, hence officers are motivated 
to present their actions and those of their colleagues in the hest possihle light to 
avoid censure. 15 Despite these shortcomings, departmental records are the hest 
availahle source of primary data on the use of guns hy the police in the USA . 16 
Research Aimed at Quantifying 
Introductory Comment 
Counting is a common starting point m many research fields as it facilitates 
comparisons over time and space. The initial step is usually to estahlish a haseline 
measure for a specific locale and period, and use this to monitor temporal changes in 
the area and different jurisdictions over the same time. Baselines are also essential 
for assessing the impact of interventions and identifYing relevant variahies. Hence, 
counting the frequency of police shootings has heen a primary ohjective of much 
work in this field. In view of the relative infrequency of police shootings and the 
ahovementioned difficulties associated with other research methods, the secondary 
analysis of existing data has long been the most feasible method of data collection for 
such quantitative studies. 
National Counts 
There have heen relatively few investigations of the frequency of police shootings 
and deadly force incident~ in the USA as a whole, 17 especially when contrasted with 
the large amount of work conducted in relation to smaller jurisdictions such as cities 
and states. This has mainly heen due to the lack of reliahle primary data on police 
deadly force nationwide. Until relatively recently the flawed FBI and NCHS annual 
figures on police justifiahle homicides were the only such national statistics 
availahle. 
According to the NCHS hetween 250 and 300 justifiable homicides were 
committed hy the US police p.a, hut the FBI estimate was hetween 300 and 500 
(Geller & Scott, 1992:59). 18 Besides not accurately reflecting all police shootings or 
deadly force incidents, these data grossly underestimate the numher of police 
15 See Crank et al (1993) and Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) on the police code of 
loyalty. 
16 As at 1992. 
17 See Geller and Scott (1992), Fyfe (l988fh]), Sherman and Langworthy (1979), 
Harring et al (1977), Sherman (1977), Kohler (l975[aj, 1975[h]), Takagi 
(1974) and Rohin (1963). 
18 See Geller and Scott (1992:503-4) for FBI tigures from 1950 to 1990. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
99 
justitiahle homicides: 19 the NCHS tigures hy as much as 50%, and the FBI statistics 
hy up to 54% (Geller & Scott 1992; Blumherg, 1989; The New York State 
Commission on Criminal Justice (NYSCCJ), 1987; Sherman & Cohn, 1986; 
Matulia, 1985: Sherman & Langworthy, 1979). As an alternative, Fyfe (19881h]) 
calculated a national estimate of 1000 police justitiahle homicides p.a. using the FBI 
figures for large cities, which are allegedly more reliahle than the national statistics 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). However, since the frequency of police justifiahle 
homicides is helieved to he significantly higher in large cities than in smaller urhan 
and non-urhan areas, this national estimate is considered to he somewhat intlated 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). 
Reliahle statistics on the national frequency of police shootings as opposed to 
justifiahle homicides have also heen scarce. Geller's annual estimate of 600 fatal 
police sh<x>tings in the USA is one of the few availahle national figures (1986:2). 20 
Interestingly, this author also calculated the following range of related 
approximations: 3600 shots fired at suspect'\, 1800 of which miss people and 1800 of 
which strike people, 1200 causing injury and 600 causing death. 21 These kinds of 
data serve to highlight the fact that studies of police shootings, and deadly force 
more generally, in which fatalities are employed as the dependent variahle deal only 
with the tip of the iceherg. There has heen much critical dehate over the most 
appropriate core dependent variahle for the investigation of police shootings. The 
popular use of fatal shootings as the key variahle has drawn particularly severe 
criticism. The essence of the critique is that there is a range of possihle outcomes 
when a shot is fired (see Tahle 4.1 ). Research focused exclusively on deaths -- the 
most serious outcome of shooting -- has at hest produced a partial, and at worst a 
distorted, understanding of police shootings. A similar line of criticism has heen 
raised in relation to studies that have heen limited to intentional or lawful shootings. 
Monitoring shots that are fired unintentionally is of importance hecause these may 
harm innocent third parties or damage property. The value of identifying factors 
contrihuting to unlawful police shootings would seem self evident. The analysis of 
outcomes of shots fired hy police facilitates a more precise identification of prohlems 
than frequency count~ of fatal shootings. Analysed together, measures like strike 
and fatality rates provide valuahle insight~. 
The strike rate retlects the proportion of shots tired that hit intended targets, 
whilst the fatality rate indicates the proportion of shot~ fired that result in death. To 
illustrate further: estahlishing that there is a relatively low strike rate along with a 
high numher of shots fired intentionally suggest~ at least two prohlems: (I) the police 
may he firing their guns too frequently and this may indicate the need for training in 
19 Local and/or state data were aggregated and compared to national tigures to 
calculate the percentage error. See Blumherg (1989), the NYSCCJ (1987) and 
Sherman and Cohn (1986) on reliahility. 
20 Derived from accumulated research findings. 
21 Also see Binder and Fridell (1984: 161 ). 
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the use of less-than-lethal tactics, and (2) a low strike rate shows that a high 
prcportion of shot~ fired miss the intended targets. Such conduct may result in a 
deflated fatality rate, hut it poses an increased threat to innocent bystanders and 
property, in which case training in shooting proficiency may he required. 
Figure 4.1: 
Potential Outcomes of a Shot. 
Shot tired 
Hit Miss 
Property 
Intended Unintended 
Injury Death 
Fatality rates are not only positively related to the number of shots fired, but are 
affected by a range of other factors such as the types of firearms and ammunition 
used, shooters' marksmanship, the location and number of gunshot wounds and, of 
course, the availability of prompt and efficient medical assistance (The Portland 
Oregonian, 22 April 1992; Doerner 1988, 1983; Doerner & Speir 1986).22 
Therefore it cannot be assumed that a higher rate of fatal shooting is due to an 
increase in shots fired. It may, for example, he the result of improved bullet 
placement by officers. So the fatality rate may vary even when the number of shots 
fired stays constant. In short, if the objective is to reduce the fatality rate there are 
many point~ of intervention, and better data can enable the selection of the most 
appropriate. 
Today police justifiable homicides are not generally used as anything more 
than a panial indicator of the frequency of fatal shootings and sometimes as an 
extremely crude gauge of the incidence of police deadly force. It is now widely 
accepted that, if police shootings are to he properly understood and controlled, all 
shots fired by officers irrespective of intention, lawfulness or outcome, must be 
taken into account (e.g. Alpert & Fridell, 1992; Geller & Scott, 1992; Fridell, 
1989). Although data on shots fired are not currently available for North America as 
a whole, this information is now being regularly recorded by many individual police 
agencies. 
22 Also see The NYPD (1990, 1989, 1988), The Chicago Tribune (4 September 
1988, 22 July 1988) and Geller (1988). 
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Overall, it must he concluded with some dismay that, despite the substantial 
amount of research that has heen conducted over the past thirty-five years, the hasic 
frequency of police deadly force incidents and shootings in the USA has not even 
heen established and there is no certainty ahout temporal changes in rates of police 
deadly force use and shootings. Perhaps more alarming is the fact that: " ... the US 
still does not have a reliable datahase that reports precisely how many people are 
killed, let alone wounded or shot at hut missed, hy police nationwide" (Geller & 
Scott, 1992:46) Scholars and practitioners across a range of disciplines have made 
earnest pleas for the establishment of a national standardised reporting system and a 
centralised repository for data on the use of deadly force hy police, specifically gun 
use. 
Smaller Jurisdictions 
In contrast to limited work on national count~, there has heen a plethora of studies on 
police shootings in a wide range of smaller jurisdictions and over various periods. 
The majority of these investigations have focused on single large cities or have 
compared shootings across urhan areas. 23 There has heen less research on districts 
and neighbourhoods, and counties and states. 24 Sherman and Cohn ( 1986) and 
Geller and Scott ( 1992) aggregated FBI data on police justifiable homicides in 50 
large US cities hetween 1970 and 1989. Although underestimates, these have heen 
widely recognised among the most comprehensive and reliahle figures availahle. 
Table 4.2: 
Police Justifiable Homicides in 50 US Cities, 1970-1989. 
Years 
1970- 1974 
1975- 1979 
1980- 1984 
1985- 1989 
Source: Geller and Scott (1992: 118). 
Averages 
300 
244 
197 
251 
According to Tahle 4.2 the average numher of intentional, lawful killings perpetrated 
hy police in large cities decreased consistently from 1970 through to 1984 and then 
rose hetween 1985 and 1989. However, the authors have warned that it is too soon 
to consider any change a trend, and that the latest tigure should he treated with 
caution as it was adjusted for the estimated under-count.u Nevertheless, the police 
23 See Geller and Scott (1992) on city-hased research. 
24 See Nowicki and Stahl ( 1978) on police districts. 
25 From 142. 
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are responsihle for only a small proportion of homicides in North America (Geller & 
Scott, 1992). A numher of relative measures also suggest a decrease in police 
justitiahle homicides hetween 1970 and 1984. For instance, in 1970 police 
justitiahle homicides comprised tive per cent of homicides, hut hy 1984 this tigure 
had dropped to two per cent (Sherman & Cohn, 1986:3). Moreover the rate of 
lawful killing hy hig-city police in the USA was reduced in the face of increasing 
community violence (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
While smaller scale quantitative investigations have provided useful data on 
specific areas and periods, the low temporal and spatial generalisahility of most of 
these tindings has limited their utility. More specitically, the aggregation and 
comparison of result~ has heen inhihited hy inconsistencies in the operational 
definitions of the main dependent variahles. Whilst shootings have heen treated as 
the only form of deadly force in some studies, others have included, inter alia, high 
speed vehicular pursuits, chokeholds and attacks hy police dogs, and incendiary 
devices (Nugent et al, 1989; The Washington Post, 7 May 1992; The New York 
Times, 20 Septemher, 1992 resp). 26 Thus, despite the large volume of research data 
on police shootings in North American cities, most of the results cannot he compared 
to reveal differences and similarities, nor can many he amalgamated to provide 
information on larger areas. The importance of standardising dependent variahles is 
one of the key realisations that has emerged from unsuccessful attempt-; at distilling 
conclusions from such research. The preferred hasic variahle for contemporary 
research is all shot-; fired hy police. Fatal shootings were the most common variable 
employed in earlier studies hut researchers now have hetter access to shot~-tired 
data. More recently a wider range of factors have been included such as firearm 
hits, misses, injuries, deaths, and unintentional and intentional shootings (e.g. The 
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), 1992; The San Diego Police Department, 
1992; Cerar, 1991; The Kansas City Police Department (KCPD), 1991; The Santa 
Ana Police Department, 1991 ; The Philadelphia Police Department, 1990). 
Frequency counts -- the most hasic quantitative huilding hlocks -- are 
generally used to calculate more meaningful relative measures. Indeed rates are 
essential for valid spatial and temporal comparisons. At the very least, differences 
in the sizes of the populations and police forces concerned must he considered when 
comparing police shootings in different places and times (e.g. Sparger & Giacopassi 
1992). It is also critical to consider levels of police hazard as indicated by factors 
such as the frequency of arrest~ in which suspects are armed with firearms; arrest~ 
for violent offences; reported homicides and gunshot injuries and deaths (Geller & 
Scott, 1992). Such rates are now routinely calculated hy a numher of hig-city police 
department~ including: Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Kansas City, New York 
City, Metro-Dade County, Philadelphia, StLouis and San Diego. 
26 Findings from deadly force research have heen incomparahle for a similar 
reason. 
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Bearing in mind the non-comparability of most findings, it is still interesting to 
note that various comparisons have indicated consistent and substantial spatial and 
temporal differencesY Geller and Scotts' (1992) comparison of shooting rates in 12 
large US cities has been selected to 111ustrate these points further. 2s Although the 
authors caution that the data are not strictly comparable, this work is arguably one of 
the best comparative studies available. The research demonstrated a wide variation 
in rates of shooting across cities after relevant differences had been taken into 
account. To illustrate: in the early eighties rates of shooting ranged from four per 
I 00 people in Los Angeles to 18 in St Louis, whilst in the early nineties the rates 
ranged from three per 100 in Dallas to 22 in San Diego (Geller & Scott 1992:573).29 
Similarly, a wide range of strike and fatality rates have been reported for different 
cities. 3° For example, in 1991 shooting fatality rates ranged from a high of 88% for 
the Milwaukee Police Department to a low of 18% for the Baltimore Police 
Department, while strike rates ranged from 100% for the San Francisco Police 
Department to 25% for the Memphis Police Department (The Dallas Police 
Department, 1992(al). 
Temporal differences were also apparent when shooting rates in the early 
eighties were compared to those in the early nineti s. Rates had increased in Kansas 
City, Los Angeles and San Diego; but had decreased in Chicago, Dallas, Metro-
Dade, St Louis, New York City and Philadelphia, and had remained constant in 
Houston and Atlanta (Geller & Scott 1992:573). These, and other indications of 
recent increases in police shooting rates in certain cities, have been noted as a 
potential cause for concern considering the long term downward trend that 
characterised most US cities from the seventies to the mid-eighties (Geller & Scott 
1992). 
Despite the methodological tlaws inherent to such comparisons, the consistent 
direction and sizable nature of the variations suggest that significant spatial and 
temporal differences do exist (e.g. Geller & Scott 1992; Sherman & Cohn 1986). 
Wide variations in rates of shots tired, strikes and fatalities also highlight the 
importance of understanding problems in context. All to often ineffective 
interventions have been instituted before the nature of a particular problem has been 
sufficiently understood. One of the most important lessons learned from attempt~ to 
quantify police shootings and deadly force use is that these phenomena are complex 
and multifaceted. There is no single problem associated with police gun use but 
rather a range of issues that vary across time and place, hence requiring the mapping 
of each constellation of problems so that appropriate interventions can be tailored 
27 See Horvath (1987), Horvath and Donahue ( 1982) on cities, Geller (1989, 
1988), Geller and Karales (l981(a]), Nowicki and Stahl (1978) on district<; and 
neighbourhoods. 
28 Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Metro-Dade, 
New York City, Philadelphia, StLouis, San Diego and Santa Ana. 
29 See Geller and Scott (1992: 121) for the tive-year average rates on all 12 cities. 
30 See Geller and Scott (1992:97-9) for examples. 
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and realistic ohjectives set. 
Significantly, and desrite variations, police shootings are nor as common as 
might he expected, particularly when viewed in relation to rolice-civilian 
interactions in general (e.g. The New York Times, 4 Septemher 1990; Scharf & 
Binder, 1983; Fyfe, 1981[h]; Sherman, 1980[a]; Reiss, 1971[a]). It is informative 
to note that the average North American officer has to work hetween 139 and 7692 
years het(>re s/he is likely to fatally shoot a civilian (Sherman & Cohn, 1986:i).31 
The vast majority of interactions hetween police and civilians in the US are not 
violent and shootings are not a routine part of everyday policing (Bayley & Garofalo 
1989). 
Deadly Force against Police 
It has heen customary to study the use of deadly force hy police against civilians. 
fncreasingly, however, it has heen argued that the police use of guns, and indeed any 
kind of force, cannot he understood fully without also examining the use of force hy 
civilians against police. The premise here is that police use force mainly in response 
to the threat of violence hy civilians. In other words, police and civilian conduct are 
dynamically inter-related rather than separate phenomena. Hence, it is likely that 
higher levels of police shooting occur in areas where officers are frequently 
confronted with violence. For this reason research has heen expanded to the use of 
deadly force hy and against police and, more specifically, to police-involved 
shootings (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
It is now generally agreed that police hazard is a highly significant factor 
affecting officers' decisions to use their firearms. However, there has heen much 
controversy over how hest to measure the potential danger with which police are 
confronted or, more specifically, how to predict the likelihood of civilians 
employing violence against police (e.g. Bayley & Garofalo 1989; Fyfe 1988[c]; 
Bayley 1986; Mciver & Parks 1983; Sykes & Brent 1983). To date a range of 
potential indices have heen suggested such as: homicides in the hackground 
population, tirearm homicides, civilians injured and killed hy guntire, deaths and 
injuries suffered hy police ofticers, arrest<.; made for violent offences, and arrests 
involving armed suspect"' (Geller & Scott, 1992). Some researchers have insisted on 
much wider operational measures of police hazard, like the frequency of interactions 
hetween police and civilians in which there are disputes or in which the police 
question suspicious persons (e.g. Bayley & Garofalo, 1989). 
fn contrast to the lack of dependahle int(>rmation on the use of deadly force hy 
US police, there is a wealth of reliahle, longitudinal data availahle on the use of 
deadly force against police.JZ Since 1960 the FBI has puhlished data on the numher 
31 Jacksonville and Honolulu resp. 
32 See Margarita (1980[a]), The Chicago Trihune (16 May 1992), Van Raalte 
( 1990) on longitudinal studies. 
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of police killed in the line-of-duty each year at national, state and city levels. From 
the late seventies the annual statistics included ofticers assaulted in the line-of-duty 
(e.g. The FBI, 1992[il; Garner & Clemmer, 1986). In addition, detailed records on 
the outcome of assaults on police have heen kept hy the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police (IACP) in collaboration with the Du Pont-Kevlar Survivors' Cluh --
an affiliate of the manufacturers of soft hody armour (SBA) -- since SBA was 
introduced among North American police in 1972 (The IACP/Du Pont-Kevlar, 
1992). 
Significantly, and irrespective of the measures used, the data show that US 
police are less likely to he killed in the line-of-duty today than they have heen at any 
other time in the past thirty years (Geller & Scott, 1992). 33 Furthermore, the 
prohahility of police heing killed has diminished constantly since 1975, as has the 
likelihood of officers heing shot fatally. Indeed hy 1990 US police and civilians 
faced the same risk of homicide (Geller & Scott, 1992). Attempts to explain these 
trends have given rise to further noteworthy findings. From 1978 to 1984 the rate of 
assaults on police with deadly weapons decreased, as did rates of police fatalities and 
injuries, hut from the mid-eighties the injury rate among police hegan to increase. 
This pattern has heen attributed mainly to the wearing of SBA hy police: a person 
who is shot in the torso when wearing SBA is bruised but generally survives. It has 
thus heen hypothesised that the increased survival rate of officers who are shot has 
heen due to the wearing of SBA, as has the elevated injury rate which reflect~ the 
increased incidence of contusions. It is generally agreed that the wearing of SBA hy 
police is a major contributory factor to the lowered contemporary police fatality rate. 
However, there are other factors in operation for it has heen estimated that: 
" ... if soft hody armour were not available, the chances of American 
police officers dying in 1991 at the hands of assailants still would have 
been lower than at most other times in the past 20 years" (Geller & Scott, 
1992: 134). 
Although US ofticers are now at less risk of heing killed than previously, this is not 
the perception among police. To the contrary, most officers are of the opinion that 
their joh has become more dangerous (The Portland Oregonian, 26 April 1992; 
Tercek, 1992). Police commonly believe that there is greater violence on North 
American streets today due to crack cocaine dealing and an increased prevalence of 
assault firearms (e.g. Geller & Scott, 1992). Because these views influence officers' 
behaviour in the tield, it is crucial that police perceptions of potential hazard, and 
not just the actual level of danger, he taken into account when attempting to 
understand and modify their use of guns and other types of force (e.g. The Portland 
Oregonian, 27 April 1992; Tercek, 1992; Sparrow et al, 1990). 
33 See Geller and Scott ( 1992: 125-6) for tigures. 
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Of course. officers may also he killed or injured unintentionally. This issue 
began to attract attention in tPI! mid-eighties when, for the first time since 1962, the 
number of US police who died in accidents surpassed the number who were killed 
intentionally (Garner & Clemmer, 1986). 34 Interestingly, however, this pattern has 
not characterised fatal shootings of police: the proportion of unintentional lethal 
shootings has been relatively insignificant, e.g. about eight per cent of police 
homicides in 1990 (Behm, 1992; The FBI, 199l(i]). The statistical picture painted 
applies to the USA as a whole and hence to the average police officer. It should he 
emphasised that there are major variations in rates of police killings and assault~ 
across different jurisdictions (The St Louis Metropolitan Police Department, 1992) .Js 
In short, some areas are more dangerous for police than others. 
Deadly Force and Private Law Enforcement 
In the USA policing has been increasingly privatised, particularly over the past 
decade (Cunningham et al, 1991; McCrie, 1988; Cunningham & Taylor, 1985). By 
1990 approximately 1.5 million people were employed as private security personnel 
(Cunningham et al, 1991:1 ). The conduct of private security officers (PSOs) has 
been identified as a critical, hut generally neglected, factor in the deadly force 
equation. Since many PSOs are armed with firearms, gun use by this group has 
probably had a significant impact on levels of deadly force by and against the police. 
For instance, the downward trend that has been noted in police justifiable homicides 
in large cities over the past two decades could be a result of the use of deadly force 
by PSOs (Geller & Scott, 1992; Sherman & Cohen, 1986). Unfortunately, 
however, systematic data have not been kept on the frequency or outcomes of shot~ 
fired by PSOs and, hence, the nature and extent of the hypothesised effect has yet to 
he established (Geller & Scott 1992). It is gradually being acknowledged that the 
impact of PSOs, and particularly their use of guns, must he taken into account in the 
explanation of police-involved shootings in the USA today. It has also been 
proposed that, like the public police, private law enforcement agencies ought to he 
required to record and report on the use of force by PSOs (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
Descriptive and Explanatory Research 
Introductory Comment 
Because deadly force use by police is a sociopolitically important issue, there has 
been a substantial amount of policy-oriented research in this field. Much of the 
work has focused on identifying and explaining factors affecting police gun use and, 
more specitically, characteristics of the circumstances and people in police-involved 
shootings, and the broader context in which force is employed, including aspects of 
the communities involved and macro-level structural variables. 
34 This pattern prevailed until 1991, see The FBI (1992(i] to 19891i]). 
35 The larger the population the higher the risk, see The FBI (1991 [i], 1989[i]). 
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Characteristics of Civilians Killed hy Police 36 
The research data demonstrates unequivocally that the victims most commonly killed 
hy police in the USA are younger hlack males aged hetween 17 and 30 (e.g. 
Sorensen er al, 1993; Geller & Scott, 1992; Geller & Karales, 1982, 1981Ja]; 
1981[h]; NYCCJ, 1987; Fyfe, 1978; Milton er al, 1977).37 lt has also heen shown 
consistently that in most countries the majority of those killed hy police are younger 
males hut that hlack people are not over-represented in all nations.3s 
As might he expected given the current North American law on the use of 
deadly force hy police, threatening hehaviour hy victims is the most common 
precipitant of police homicides. In other words, according to police the majority of 
their homicide victims are killed hecause they are considered to he dangerous. It has 
heen shown more specifically that signiticantly more police homicide victims are: ( 1) 
armed, especially with tirearms (2) demonstrate violent intentions, generally hy 
threatening to use a weapon; (3) confront ofticers; and (4) have previous convictions 
for serious offences or have heen suspected of such offences (Sorensen er al, 1993; 
Donahue & Horvath, 1991; Dwyer er al, 1990 resp). Similarly, the only puhlished 
national data for the USA indicate that in 1989 the top three precipitators of police 
justifiahle homicides were: attacks on ofticers and civilians, the perpetration of 
serious offences, and resisting pol ice arrest (The FBI 1989[ i]). 
The Controversy over Police Racism 39 
The fact that hlack people are more likely to he killed hy police than whites, and the 
claim that police kill mainly in response to the threat of violence, have hecome core 
elements in a politically loaded dispute over whether there is racial discrimination in 
the use of deadly force hy US police. This issue has attracted a great deal of 
research attention and constitutes an ongoing controversy in North America (Geller 
& Scott, 1992; Blumherg, 1986). 40 Many studies have hegun hy examining the race 
of victims and there is currently a wealth of accumulated data indicating that hlack 
people are over-represented as victims of police homicides and shootings in North 
America. 41 This tinding reinforces the helief widely held among racial and ethnic 
36 Some tindings on police homicides have heen included hecause much of the US 
data does not pertain only to fatal shootings. 
37 Also most vulnerahle to homicide hy civilians, hut police victims were 
younger, see Sorensen et al ( 1993). 
38 See Kruize and Wij mer ( 1991) on Holland, and Chappell and Graham ( 1985) 
on Canada. 
39 Black refers to all people of colour. 
40 See Jefferson ( 1988) on the UK. 
41 See: The St Louis Metropolitan Police Department ( 1992), The Dallas Police 
Department (1990), Alpert (l989]h]), Geller (1989), Horvath (1987), The 
NYSCCJ (1987), Blumherg (1983), Binder et al (1982), Horvath and Donahue 
(1982), Fyfe (1981]a]), Geller and Karales (1981Jh]), Meyer (1980[a], 
1980Jh]), Sultan and Cooper (1979), The National Minority Advisory Council 
(1978), Milton et al (1977), Kohler (1975[a]), and Rohin (1963). Also see 
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minority groups that police discriminate against hlack people generally, and in their 
use of deadly force (e.g. Browning & Cao, 1993; Cordon, 1985; Peirson, 1978; The 
New York Times, 17 Septemher 1974; Jenkins & Faison, 1974; Takagi, 1974). 
A range of related tindings have heen forwarded to support the hroader 
hypothesis that racial higotry systematically shapes police practice. Numerous 
authors have maintained that racism affects hasic decisions ahout whether police 
engage with civilians (e.g. Hinds, 1979; Takagi, 1974; Forslund, 1972; Sutherland 
& Cressey, 1970). A few experimental studies have demonstrated racial 
discrimination in police decisions to arrest people suspected of tratlic violations, so-
called domestic disturhances, puhlic intoxication and disorderly conduct (e.g. LaFree 
et al, 1992; PoweH, 1990, 1981 ). There is also some evidence that police employ 
more forceful tactics when arresting hlack suspects, even when this is not strictly 
necessary. It has heen estahlished that some white officers use racist language; 
unacceptahle hehaviour which is often condoned hy police managers (The 
Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991). This was 
one of the provocative tindings made hy the Christopher Commission which 
investigated the LAPD after the heating of Rodney King in 1991. Today, there are 
few who would seriously argue that racism does not exist at an attitudinal level 
among white police in North America. The contentious issue is whether racist 
opinions routinely affect police conduct. 
The topic of police decision-making on the use of force has attracted 
suhstantial research attention (e.g. Dwyer et al, 1990; Scharf & Binder, 1983; 
Binder et al, 1982; Geller, 1982(h]; Hayden, 1981). The investigation of police 
racism has progressed hy examining the perceptual processes affecting officers' 
decisions to use deadly force. This approach shifts the focus to the more covert 
mechanisms hy which racist attitudes shape police use of force. One of the main 
theories developed in this sphere has heen hased on Schank and Ahelson 's (1977) 
notion of scripts: cognitive structures that facilitate the comprehension of 
stereotypical situations and allow inferences ahout prohable outcomes to he made 
quickly. The hasic rationale is that, in order to protect themselves and others, police 
must learn to rapidly assess the potential danger in any given situation. They thus 
use mental scripts comprising sets of stereotyped cues which provide early warning 
of potential threat (e.g. Waegel, 1984[a]; Bittner, 1975, 1973; Skolnick & Gray, 
1975; Van Maanen, 1974). It should he emphasised, however, that these danger-
cues are not necessarily accurate predictors of potential threat which means that an 
officer may perceive a harmless suspect to he dangerous. The information 
comprising police cognitive scripts is learned from experience, hoth direct and 
vicarious, and from the police occupational suhculture, that is, a discourse 
comprising a language of understandings, heliefs and practices which is shared to 
varying extent~ hy police officers (Waegel, 1984( a]). 
Geller and Scott (1992:216-7) for recent FBI tigures on the USA. 
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A number of studies, particularly those conducted hy Vrij and his colleagues in 
the Netherlands, have examined the scripted cues that police commonly use in 
assessing the potential threat posed hy suspects of ditl'erent races (e.g. Vrij, 1993; 
Vrij & Winkel, 1992). The following tindings, while interesting, should he 
considered with caution because they are the product of a relatively small number of 
experimental studies. Nevertheless, it has been found that suspect-;' non-verbal 
behaviour provides the most important cues for officers' assessment'i of potential 
hazard and there are signiticant difterences between the non-verbal behaviour of 
black and white people.42 White police also tend to find black people's non-verbal 
behaviour suspicious (Vrij, 1993; Vrij & Winkel, 1992).43 Together these tindings 
have been used to hypothesise that a heightened su~-picion of black people on the part 
of white ofticers may increase the likelihood of police intervention. This could 
explain the elevated arrest rate among black people: white officers' interpretations of 
the potential threat posed hy black suspect'i may he inaccurate and this may prompt 
ofticers to use force when it is unnecessary, or to employ more force than required 
to resolve a given situation. As Scharf and Binder put it: "[a] violent expectation on 
the part of the otlicer produces a general aura of danger that motivates the opponent 
towards violence" {1983:78). Investigating the role played hy racial stereotypes in 
police decision-making appears to he a valuable avenue for future research on racial 
discrimination in police use of force. When the supportive evidence on police 
racism is evaluated it suggests that there is racial discrimination in sectors of the 
North American police force. It does not, however, constitute sufficient academic 
proof of systematic racial discrimination in the use of force hy police, particularly 
when alternate interpretations for racial patterns are taken into account (Geller & 
Scott, 1992). 
Numerous scholars have argued that the disproportionate number of black 
people arrested and killed hy police does not necessarily indicate racist police 
conduct (e.g. Alpert, 1989(h]; Matulia, 1985; Fyfe, 198l[a], 1978). Police may kill 
more black suspects because they more often threaten people. Under such 
circumstances the use of deadly force is not only legally justitied hut also an 
appropriate response (e.g. Blumberg, 1981; Fyfe, 1981(a], 1978; Milton et al, 
1977; Harding & Fahey, 1973). Hence, police may he responding to the legally 
relevant factor of potential danger and not to the legally irrelevant factor of race. 
There is some evidence showing that the high rate of arrest among black people is 
due to a higher rate of offending, and that the higher number of black suspects killed 
hy the police is attributable to a higher rate of violent offending hy this group (e.g. 
Hindelang, 1978). It has been found that the percentage of black people arrested for 
violent offences closely mirrors the proportion who are shot by police (e.g. The St 
Louis Police Department, 1992; The Dallas Police Department, 1990; Alpert, 
42 And people of different cultures. 
43 Also see Hansson (1992) re South Africa. 
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19891h]; Blumherg, 1983; Fyfe, l9811a); Geller & Karales, 19811al & 198\lh)). 
Overall the collective evidence in respect of the 'dangerousness hypothesis' is 
somewhat mixed. The only source of relevant national data availahle shows two 
particularly interesting racial differences: ( l) a higher percentage of white suspects 
were killed hy police hecause they attacked somehody; and (2) a higher proportion 
of hlack suspect~ were killed hy police hecause they committed serious offences or 
tled from arrest (The FBI, 1989[ii)). These data seem to contradict the postulate that 
hlack suspect~ are killed hy police more frequently than white suspects hecause they 
are more likely to engage in threatening hehaviour. It could he argued that actively 
attacking someone poses a greater and more direct threat than perpetrating a crime or 
tleeing from police. If this is the case, then a higher proportion of hlack suspect~ 
have heen killed hy the police for engaging in ostensihly less threatening hehaviour 
than white suspects! In view of the temporal specificity and the duhious reliahility of 
the data from which this interence derives, however, more rigorous testing is 
required for a detinitive conclusion (Geller & Scott, 1992). Nevertheless there is 
additional support for the premise. After the killing of non-dangerous, tleeing 
suspect~ hy police in the USA was outlawed in 1985, the percentage of hlack people 
killed dropped signiticantly (e.g. Sparger & Giacopassi, 1992). The most likely 
interpretation here is that prior to legal reform the police killed a disproportionately 
higher numher of non-dangerous hlack suspect~. 
A range of other findings relating to the difterential dangerousness of hlack and 
white suspect~ has emerged from experimental studies and the secondary analysis of 
police deadly force report~. The examination of self reports hy officers has shown 
that race is not a significant factor in decisions to shoot at suspects (e.g. Dwyer er at, 
1990; Hayden, 1981 ). Instead the hest predictors of police decisions to shoot are: 
suspects heing armed, perceived as intending to harm, and perpetrating serious 
oftences (Dwyer er at, 1990). Needless to say, result~ from this kind of research 
enahle only the most tentative of extrapolations to he made to police hehaviour in 
real-life situations and should he considered with added caution given the likely 
confounding effect of social desirahility. 
Numerous researchers have investigated police report~ on shooting decisions in 
various cities. 44 A suhstantial amount of this work has supported the claim that a 
higher likelihood of threatening hehaviour on the part of hlack suspect~ is the reason 
for police killing more hlack people. To illustrate, it has heen shown that: more 
hlacks killed hy police have heen armed, especially with firearms; have used or 
threatened to use a gun; or have perpetrated armed offences, particularly rohhery 
(Fyfe, 1981[a]; Geller, 1989; Meyer, 1980[al resp). Such findings have heen used 
to conclude that there is no .\y.nemaric racial discrimination in police shootings. 
44 See Blumherg ( 1983, 1981) on Atlanta and Kansas City, Geller (1989), Geller 
and Karales (1981(a]) on Chicago, Alpert and Fridell (1992), and Meyer 
(1980raJ, 1980[h]) on Los Angeles, Fyfe (1982) on Memphis, The NYSCCJ 
(1987), Blumherg (1983, 1981) and Fyfe (1981[a]) on New York City. 
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Some scholars, however, maintain that this type of research has not negated the 
existence of racism, hut has ohscured racial discrimination hy employing variahles 
that contlate active resistance hy suspects with indirect or potential threat. Stark 
( 1990) for example, maintained that when active resistance hy suspects was treated 
as a separate variahle, hlack suspects were found to he no more likely than whites to 
engage in violent resistance against the police. 
For over a decade the methodological inadequacy of the designs used to 
research police racism has heen noted as a key impediment to the resolution of the 
issue (e.g. Blumherg, 1986; Geller, 1985[a]; Sherman 1980[h]). In response, 
researchers have recommended the examination of hlack and white suspect<; killed hy 
police under similar circumstances (e.g. Blumherg, 1981). If it could he 
demonstrated that police use deadly force against hlack suspects more often than they 
do against whites under the same circumstances, this would constitute rohust 
evidence of racial discrimination. Result<; from studies incorporating this design, 
conducted in New York City, Kansas City and Atlanta, have contradicted the police 
racism hypothesis (NYSCC, 1987; Blumherg, 1981 resp). It has also heen suggested 
that samples include incident<; in which officers have fired shots and those in which 
they have chosen not to shoot although legally justitied (e.g. Geller, l985[al). The 
reasoning here is that police racial discrimination would he evident if it could he 
shown that police choose not to shoot significantly more white suspect<;. It is not 
surprising, given the limited availahility of data on avened deadly force incident<;, 
that there have heen few studies of this nature. The work of Fridell and Binder is an 
exception ( 1989, 1988). These researchers used aggregated data for four North 
American cities and compared the relative proportions of hlack and white suspect<; 
involved in averted and actual police shootings. 4s Although their result<; did not 
support racial hias in police decisions to shoot or to refrain from shooting, the 
authors acknowledged that the use of aggregated data could have masked significant 
trends in individual cities. More research of this nature has heen called for and may 
well he forthcoming now that some police agencies have hegun to routinely collect 
data on averted force. Indeed investigating averted force from the angle of restraint 
employed hy officers is likely to enlighten our understanding of the police racism 
issue, that is, hy exploring the extent to which police employ less-than-lethal means 
in relation to suspect<; of different races in similar potentially violent situations. 
Whilst the hulk of the availahle findings have not supported the existence of 
systematic police racism, a few results have demonstrated that in certain 
circumstances police use of deadly force may he racially discriminatory. For 
instance: studies of the Los Angeles and Memphis police have shown that prior to 
1985 a higher proportion of unarmed suspect<; shot hy police while tleeing from 
arrest were hlack (Alpert & Fridell, 1992; Fyfe, 1982; Meyer, 1980[a]). Similarly, 
a higher percentage of hlack suspects were shot hy police in the erroneous helief that 
45 Originally collected hy Binder et al (1982). 
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they were reaching for concealed weapons. This could he the product of racist 
stereotypes that lead ofticers to believe that hlack suspects are more dangerous than 
whites. It could also result from police attempting to cover-up less acceptable 
motivations f<>r shooting. Either way, hoth of these tindings suggest some level of 
racial discrimination hy police that requires further exploration. 
Although it may seem trite to note that it is not just the race of victims that is 
relevant in assessing the issue of racial discrimination hy police, hut the race of 
police officers who use deadly force against suspect'\, many a study has considered 
only one side of this equation. Work on the race of officers who kill has established 
that: 
"fwJith hardly any exception, the only officers who shoot any appreciable 
numher of white suspect<; are white officers. This has heen true from 
city to city and nationally over the past three decades" (Geller & Scott, 
1992: 159).46 
This means that hlack police seldom kill white suspects whereas white officers kill 
hoth hlack and white suspect<;. This pattern is in keeping with the hypothesis of 
racial discrimination hy police, hut there is a persuasive alternate explanation that 
contradict<.; this postulate. It is feasible that hlack officers kill more hlack suspect<; 
because they are more often deployed to, and live in, hlack residential areas that are 
characterised by high rates of violence (e.g. Fyfe, 198lfa]; 198lfd]; 1979[a]; 1978). 
This reasoning marries well with the findings that hlack officers are more likely to 
shoot and to be killed than white officers (e.g. Geller & Karales, 198lfa], 198lfh]; 
Fyfe, 1979fa], 1978; Nowicki & Stahl, 1978; Kobler, 1975fh]; The FBI, 1991(i], 
1989(i]; Konstantin, 1984; Geller & Karales, 1982, 198lfa]; Fyfe, 1979fa] resp). 
Such paradoxical interpretations underscore the necessity of detailed contextual 
information in ascertaining the meaning of racial disproportions in police homicides 
and deadly force usage (e.g. Alpert, 1989fhJ). 
It is now widely accepted that much of the research on police racism has heen 
overly simplistic because too often the behaviour of officers and civilians has heen 
treated as somewhat discrete and static phenomena. The importance of investigating 
the dynamics of interactions between police and civilians has now been recognised 
not only in relation to work on racism hut also for research into police conduct in 
general (e.g. Binder eta/, 1982). Most notably, it has been shown that an officer's 
behaviour early in an encounter with a civilian is a critical factor determining the 
likelihood of subsequent violence (Fridell & Binder, 1992; Binder eta/, 1982). It 
has also heen found that, under experimental conditions when either pany to an 
inter-racial interaction displays aggressive behaviour, the probability of the encounter 
escalating into violence is increased significantly (The Chicago Tribune, 13 May 
46 See Behm (1992), The KCPD (1991), The Dallas Police Department (1992, 
1990), The FBI (1991 fi]), Bratton (1990), Sherman and Cohn (1986), Geller 
and Karales (1981(a], 1981fh]), Meyer (1980fa]), and Fyfe (1978). 
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1992). Considering these and other findings on racist stereotyping m police 
decision-making it is feasihle that white officers' initial responses to hlack suspects 
may he unnecessarily aggressive hecause they perceive hlack people to he potentially 
dangerous. Such hehaviour is likely to antagonise hlack suspects making them more 
inclined to actively resist the police. If this is the case, the prohahility of violent 
confrontation in interactions hetween white police and hlack suspects would he 
increased. Whilst speculation at this stage, the further exploration of such racial 
dynamics hetween police and civilians would seem worthwhile. 
After critically reviewing the accumulated literature on this topic, eminent 
experts in the field have concluded that: 
"... most studies have failed to tind evidence that police ofticers 
systematically discriminate against minorities in their decisions to use 
deadly force .... In general, the existing research on deadly force seems 
to indicate that police officers typically respond more to race-neutral 
indicators of danger (such as whether the opponent is armed, has used or 
threatened to use a weapon, the type of crime reportedly committed, etc.) 
than to such inappropriate considerations as the opponent-; race" (Geller 
& Scott, 1992:200 & 208). 
But it has heen acknowledged that the question of police racism has not heen 
adequately investigated and that the availahle tindings do not enahle the resolution of 
the issue (Geller & Scott, 1992). Many scholars contend that simply hecause 
research has failed to demonstrate racially discriminatory practices hy police does not 
disprove the existence of police racism. In fact, it may he "methodologically 
impossihle" to verify racial discrimination separately from legally relevant factors 
hecause " ... 'legally relevant' variahles [which would justify different treatment of 
different persons] are themselves connected to race" (Reiner, 1992:479). The 
controversy over police racism thus rages on and remains one of the key issues in 
contemporary policing in most developed countries today. 
Characteristics of Police who Kill 
The capacity to reliahly predict a propensity to violence would he an invaluahle aid 
to police recruitment and deployment decisions. Although many researchers have 
investigated whether there are characteristics distinguishing officers who are more 
prone to using force, the tindings have heen inconclusive. Over the years those who 
have critically evaluated the research have consistently concluded that no dependahle 
predictors of violent hehaviour among police have heen identified (e.g. Toch, 1993; 
Fyfe, 1989[c]; Blumherg, 1986; Friedrich, 1980; Sherman, 1980fh]). In fact it has 
heen noted more generally that "... there is virtually no empirical support for 
assertions that individual ofticer characteristics are measurahly related to any type of 
performance in oftice" (Fyfe, l989fc]:478). This also seems to he the position in 
the hroader tield of the prediction of violent hehaviour and dangerousness. Perhaps 
the only factor that has heen shown to predict the likelihood of future violent 
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hehaviour, at least to some degree, is previous violent hehaviour (The Independent 
Commission on the LAPD, 1991). This underscores the importance of 
systematically monitoring the conduct of individual police ofticers over their entire 
careers; an intervention which is heing adopted increasingly hy North American 
police agencies today. It is hoped that this new source of information will enahle the 
more successful prediction of the use of force hy police, for it has heen pointed out 
that: 
insufticient research exists to lay to rest some of the intuitively 
plausihle relationships hetween officer characteristics and the outcomes of 
potentially lethal confrontations hetween police and adversaries" (Geller 
& Scott, 1992: 157). 
Despite the current inahility to predict with confidence precisely who will he likely 
to use force unnecessarily, many studies have identified variahles that are correlated 
with greater firearm use. As already noted, there seems to he a higher rate of 
shooting hy hlack police (e.g. Geller & Karales, 198l[a], 198l[h]; Fyfe, 1979[a], 
1978; Nowicki & Stahl, 1978; Kohler, 1975[h]). Black officers have also heen 
found to have poorer timing in drawing their guns than white police (Doerner, 
1991 ). 
Policing has traditionally heen a male dominated occupation, not only in the 
USA hut internationally. Jt has also heen a long-standing practice for women in the 
force to he assigned to office-hased positions (e.g. Martin, 1990). Until recently the 
sex of police was not a popular relevant variahle. Over the past decade, however, 
the composition of police forces and deployment practices have hegun to change 
under pressure for equal opportunities (The Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992(a], 
1992[h]). As more women officers have heen assigned to patrol duty and to 
specialised squads, the numher of female police killed in the line-of-duty has also 
hegun to increase (The FBJ, 1989[i]; Martin, 1990). Consequently, sex is rapidly 
hecoming a significant factor in studies of the use of force hy police (Alpert, 
1989[h]; The Chicago Trihune, 5 April 1991 ). There is some evidence from Europe 
and the USA that female officers are less likely than male officers to fire shots (e.g. 
Kruize & Wijmer, 1991;47 Doerner, 1991 resp.). More specifically, Doerner (1991) 
has shown that under simulated conditions female officers tended to draw their 
firearms too late and had poorer hit rates than their male colleagues. It is 
noteworthy that the impact of sex and gender on police decisions to use force seems 
to he the product of a complex interplay of various factors. A few studies have 
found that the sex of female officers' partners affects the likelihood of their shooting 
(e.g. Blumherg, 1989, 1983; Grennan, 1987). Female police partnered hy male 
officers tended to tire shots less frequently than those who were paired with females 
(e.g. Goldstein, 1990). It would thus seem that, like race, gender ought to he 
47 For the Hague in the Netherlands. 
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interpreted as part of a complex and dynamic context. 
Interestingly, there is some evidence indicating that restraint in the use of 
tirearms hy police is associated with increased work experience (Geller & Scott, 
1992). For example, Doerner ( 1991) found that under simulated conditions officers 
with fewer years of service drew their guns too early, thus demonstrating a lack of 
restraint when compared to police who had greater experience. Similarly, 
Holzworth and Pipping ( 1985) have shown that under the same circumstances less 
experienced officers were more likely to fire shots than their more seasoned 
colleagues. It is crucial, however, not to loose sight of the critical issue: it is not 
whether restraint is employed that is of concern but whether the police use restraint 
when it is appropriate to do so and when it does not increase the danger posed to 
themselves or others. 
As might be expected, most of the police who kill civilians do so while on duty 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). Nevertheless, of late there has been growing concern about 
the use of deadly force by off-duty officers. It seems that arming and obliging 
officers to engage in law enforcement activities when off duty is a police tradition in 
North America (The Law Enforcement News, 15 April 1992; Matulia, 1985; 1982, 
Hophy, 1978). 48 For some time this practice has been criticised on a number of 
grounds: requiring police to carry their guns outside of working hours is likely to 
increase the chance of weapons heing lost or stolen, and it may boost the probability 
of firearm suicides, accidents and heat-of-the-moment shootings by officers (Geller 
& Karales, 1981 [a]; Fyfe, 1978). Furthermore, obliging police to function as law 
enforcement officials even when off duty has been widely rejected as unfair and 
dangerous (e.g. Fyfe, 1980[b]). It has been argued that off-duty police operate at a 
disadvantage tactically and in terms of legitimacy; being more likely to encounter 
resistance from civilians (e.g. Fyfe, 1980[b]; Reiss, 1971 [a]). They must also 
function without the henefit of background information, equipment or backup which 
are generally available when police are on duty (e.g. Rutledge, 1988). Additionally, 
off-duty officers are generally not uniformed which means that they run the added 
risk that civilians and on-duty police officers may mistake their identities. Finally, 
obliging off-duty police to intervene means that they have no respite from work-
related stress. This must eventually impact negatively on work performance and 
personal well-being. In view of the serious disadvantages of this practice it has been 
proposed that a standard policy of disarming off-duty police and removing their 
obligation to intervene be uniformly adopted by US police (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
It has been suggested further that officers be specifically trained not to intervene 
when off duty, hut rather to ohserve and contact the police as soon as possible (The 
Law Enforcement News, 15 April 1992). 
Most police who kill civilians are uniformed rather than plainclothes officers 
(The FBI, 199l[i], 1989[i]). This simple finding is, however, difficult to interpret 
48 Although not uniformly practised. 
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as the ratio of uniformed to plain clothes police m the USA is not availahle. 
Similarly, little can he concluded from the fact that the majority of police shootings 
are peiTJetrated hy officers on patrol. This is due to the lack of accurate hackground 
information on the proportions of officers who have heen assigned to different types 
of duties at any particular time (e.g. Geller & Karales, 198l[a]; The California 
Department of Justice, 1974). Once again this underscores the importance of 
contextual data for meaningful inteiTJretation. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted 
in this field that the hulk of shootings hy North American police have heen 
perpetrated hy uniformed, white, male officers while on patrol duty, using their 
service handguns to fire more than one shot (Geller & Scott, 1992). It can he safely 
said that many aspect-; of police practice ought to he considered as potentially 
relevant to the use of deadly force, including for example: whether ofticers are 
uniformed, the nature of police assignments, whether officers work alone, whether 
they are assisted hy police hackup, and the length and quality of the relationship 
hetween police partners (e.g. Geller & Scott, 1992; Wilson et al, 1990). 
Situations in which Police Kill Civilians 
A range of situational factors have heen studied with the aim of identifying the types 
of circumstances in which police are likely to kill civilians. It is now well known 
that most police shootings occur in conditions of poor visihility, 49 outdoors in puhlic 
locations,so in high crime areas, after the police have heen called to respond to a 
suspected armed rohhery or a report of "a man with a gun" (Geller & Scott, 
1992: 143). Here again it is not wise to draw firm conclusions from this primary 
data without hackground information with respect to the relative deployment of 
officers to different situations. 
Puhlic visihility and the related issue of accountahility are among the more 
interesting factors to have emerged from this kind of work. Although the research 
tindings are anything hut conclusive, there is some indication that the presence of 
civilian witnesses decreases the likelihood of police employing deadly force (e.g. 
Friedrich, 1980). At least two studies have shown that only a small minority of 
police shootings are ohserved hy third parties despite the fact that the majority occur 
outdoors in puhlic areas (e.g. Fyfe, 1981 [h]; Nowicki & Stahl, 1978)Y This is hy 
no means an estahlished finding, however, as other investigations have produced 
contradictory results, namely, that there is at least one civilian witness to most police 
shootings, and that the presence of hystanders does not significantly affect police 
decisions to shoot (The NYSCCJ, 1987; Holzworth & Pipping, 1985 resp). 
Nevertheless, there is face validity to the hypothesis that increasing puhlic visihility 
49 Also see Cerar (1991) and Kruize & Wijmer (1991). 
50 See Binder et at (1982), Geller and Karales (1981[a]), Fyfe (J981[a]) and 
Kohler (l975[hJ). 
51 See Cerar (1990), The NYPD (1988), The NYSCCJ (1987), Geller and 
Karales (1981 [a J), and Rohin (1963). 
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and accountability for police conduct may reduce the use of deadly force. At least 
some police agencies in the USA seem to he taking this issue seriously, particularly 
since the Rodney King incident in which a bystander videdtaped the police heating a 
civilian. US police managers have subsequently begun introducing car-mounted 
video cameras and wireless microphones for officers, although this is arguably as 
much to protect the police as civilians. 52 
Findings from investigations of situational dynamics have been much more 
promtstng. The tirst variable of this type to he studied has been the immediate 
precipitant: the factor which actually prompts an ofticer to use deadly force. 
Recently published data for the USA shows that the majority of officers killed 
civilians who attacked others (see Table 4.3). 53 
Table 4.3: 
Precipitants of Police Justifiable Homicides in the USA, 1989. 
Reasons 
Attacked someone 
Committed offence 
Resisted arrest 
Fled 
Source: The FBI (l989[ii]). 
Frequencies 
193 
81 
35 
16 
Percentages 
59 
25 
11 
5 
Precipitants have usually been framed in terms of the conditions under which the US 
police are lawfully permitted to kill. The legal change that was made to the 
legislation in the mid-eighties must therefore he taken into account when interpreting 
research findings pertaining to the period before and after this reform. In 1985 the 
US Supreme Court ruled that it would no longer he lawful for police to kill non-
violent suspect-; who were tleeing to avoid arrest (Tennessee v Garner, 1985). Thus, 
while tigures for tleeing suspects killed before 1985 refer both to violent and non-
dangerous suspect-;, data for the post-1985 years should pertain only to violent 
suspect-; who were tleeing from police arrest. 
Research conducted in Canada and in the USA (before 1985) has demonstrated 
substantial spatial variations in police justifiable homicides involving non-dangerous 
tleeing suspects: 49% of those killed hy the Boston police; 43% by police in seven 
North American cities; 38% hy the British Columbia police and none hy the Toronto 
52 Video-cameras have also been introduced to monitor the treatment of suspects 
at many police stations in the USA and Britain. 
53 Also supported by Geller and Scott (1992), Cerar, (1990), Horvath (1987), 
The N YSCCJ (1987), Horvath and Donahue ( 1982) and Geller and Karales 
(1982, 198lla], 198\lh]). 
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police (e.g. The Boston Police Department, 1974; Milton et al, 1977; Chappell & 
Graham, 1985; Abraham, 1981 resp). 54 In the mid-eighties it was concluded that a 
significant proportion of those who were fatally shot hy Canadian and North 
American police were not dangerous, that is, they presented no imminent threat to 
life or limb (e.g. Chappell & Graham, 1985; Geller & Karales, 198qa], I98llh]; 
Meyer, 1980(a]; Milton et al, 1977; The Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, 
1975). It is most noteworthy that despite the legislative change in the USA, the 
national annual percentage of tleeing suspect~ killed hy police remained relatively 
constant throughout the eighties, at about six per cent p.a. (Geller & Scott, 
1992: 192). 
In essence the 1985 US reform limited police use of deadly force to the 
prevention of death and injury. A range of researchers thus developed typologies to 
classify the kinds of hazards that prompt police to employ deadly force (e.g. The 
FBI, 1990(i]; Burke et al, 1988; Fyfe, 1981rcJ; Geller & Karales, 198qa]; Meyer, 
1980raJ. 1980[h]). Until the early eighties it was widely accepted that an officer's 
decision to use deadly force was a ~1Jlit-second response to a sudden threat and hence 
not alterable (Geller & Scott, 1992). Over the last 15 years, however, a conceptual 
breakthrough has been made which has re-oriented thinking in the entire tield and 
has opened the way for a wide range of interventions. The basic assumption of this 
transactional approach is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the final decision to 
use force is the outcome of earlier decisions. The pioneering models of police 
decision-making in the use of deadly force formulated mainly hy Reiss ( 1980) and, 
Scharf and Binder (1983) have shaped development~ in this sphere. 
Reiss applied the basic postulates of sequential decision-making theory to an 
analysis of police decisions to use deadly force (1980). In sum, he maintained that 
this decision was contingent on a number of prior choices. In other words, 
important social judgement~ involve a sequence of decisions, each choice 
determining subsequent options. Good tinal decisions require that a decision-maker 
be aware of the range of options available to her/him at each stage and that s/he has 
the opportunity to choose from these alternatives. Bayley used Reiss's work to 
develop a three-phase model of the stages characterising police-civilian interactions -
- contact, processing and exit -- and explored the tactical choices made in threatening 
situations (1986). Later Bayley and Garofalo (1989) extended this analysis by 
comparing officers judged to be skilled at diffusing potentially violent interactions 
with civilians, and those considered to he of average ability. They found, inter alia, 
that police were relatively accurate judges of their colleagues' skill at handling 
conflict (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989). 
Like Reiss (1980), Scharf and Binder (1983) also adopted the notion of a 
sequence of decisions. However, they developed a more detailed model of 
potentially violent police-civilian encounters hy drawing on symbolic interactionism 
54 Also see Fyfe (l98l[c]), Milton et al (1977) and Robin (1963). 
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and work in the tield of the psychology of social judgements. 55 They argued that 
any encounter between police and civilians has the potential to escalate into violence, 
and that successive decisions and behaviours hy hoth parties determine the likelihood 
that force will he used. From the time an officer is called, or takes the initiative to 
engage in an interaction with civilians, s/he is faced with a series of decision 
opportunities and his/her choices significantly affect whether force will he needed. 
These authors also accepted the notion that individuals, especially those in differing 
social roles, do not necessarily interpret social reality in the same way. Therefore 
police and civilians are likely to respond to disparate cues as indicative of potential 
threat. When studying the likelihood of violence it is thus vital to take account of 
the way in which participants' perceptions shape interactions and the factors each 
party perceives as restricting or enhancing their options. After all, the consequences 
of an officer misjudging the threat posed hy a suspect are unnecessary death or 
InJUry. 
Significantly, it has heen shown that North American police do not always use 
deadly force even when they are legally justitied in doing so, and two key concepts -
- averted force and less-than-lethal force -- have heen linked to this tinding (e.g. 
Scharf & Binder, 1983). While the notion of less-than-lethal force is self 
explanatory, averted deadly force refers to: 
"situations with the potential to escalate into the use of deadly force hy 
police hut that, through officer skill or other circumstances, are resolved 
without the officer(s) tiring a weapon [using deadly force]" (Geller & 
Scott, 1992: 146). 
These conceptual development~ have boosted progress in research and policy in this 
tield. Today operational work on techniques for averting the use of deadly force is 
one of the most rapidly developing and productive areas of research (e.g. Fyfe, 
19881 h l, 1986[h]). 
Scharf and Binder (1983), among others, have stressed that in any encounter 
between police and civilians there are a range of force options available, and also a 
number of outcomes associated with employing each of these: an officer may choose 
to use no force at all, s/he may use only less-than-lethal forms of force, or s/he may 
use deadly force. Of course, various force options may he employed at different 
times during an interaction which means that the sequence and combination of force 
options may vary across situations. The United Nations now promotes the 
incremental use of force hy police. According to this principle, whenever feasible, 
police should refrain from using force; only if this proves unsuccessful should less-
than-lethal forms of force he employed, and deadly force should only he used if less-
than-lethal options fail. When force is used there are a number of possible outcomes 
ranging from no injury, to some injury, to death. Hence, in order to understand the 
55 Also see Geller (19821h]) and Hayden (1981) on the psychology of police 
decisions. 
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factors that affect whether police use force and the type of force, it is imperative to 
examine interactions hetween police and civilians in which the full range of force 
options and outcomes are represented. All types of contact<; hetween police and 
civilians ought to he analysed and not only those resulting in particular outcomes or 
those involving the use of certain kinds of force. 
Scharf and Binder's model comprises five phases: anticipation, initial 
confrontation, information exchange, tinal frame decision, and aftermath. These 
have heen descrihed as regularly occurring periods in certain types of social event<; 
which also signify choice point<; at which activity may continue or he terminated 
( 1983). 56 The first phase, anticipation, hegins with a mobilising event like the police 
heing dispatched to an incident or spontaneously initiating an interaction. The 
information officers have ahout a forthcoming encounter is t.I:te critical factor during 
this stage as it shapes their preconceptions ahout the interactionY Early decisions 
made in this stage affect officers' initial conduct during an interaction and this 
restricts or expands their subsequent options. Furthermore, the probability of deadly 
force heing used hy and against officers is increased when police intervene in 
ambiguous situations (Fridell & Binder, 1992). Spontaneous interventions tend to be 
characterised by greater uncertainty because officers do not have the benefit of the 
information which is made availahle when they are dispatched. However, incidents 
to which officers are dispatched may tum out to be just as confusing, as civilians 
who call for police assistance often exaggerate their predicaments either as a result of 
panic or to ensure that their call receives priority attention. Thus, providing officers 
with accurate and comprehensive information before they even enter a situation is 
critically important in reducing the likelihood of violence in police-civilian 
encounters (e.g. Fridel! & Binder, 1992; Scharf & Binder, 1983). 
Once an officer reaches the scene the second phase of entry and initial contact 
commences. Officers should seek, as quickly as possible, to adopt and maintain a 
safe yet strategic position. Two other critical factors have been identified during this 
stage: (I) an officer's ahility to use the data s/he acquires from the actual situation to 
rectify and enhance his/her preconceptions; and (2) his/her skill at expanding the 
options for dealing with the incident, whilst limiting those available to potential 
opponents. 
The third phase involves the exchange of information between police and 
civilians. Information may he exchanged via verhal and/or non-verbal 
communication. lt has heen found that the most effective police communications are 
those which establish authority and law enforcement status, and inform civilians in 
an unambiguous and assertive manner of police intentions and required behaviour. 
For example, identification as police, oral warning of intentions to shoot, to arrest, 
56 Initially there were four phases, the tifth was added subsequently, see Binder et 
al (1982) and Scharf and Binder ( 1983) resp. 
57 Especially alternate means of dealing with the situation. 
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orders to stop, to lay on the ground and to ratse the hands. Skill at reliably 
interpreting non-verhal cues or hody language has heen found to aid officers in 
rapidly assessing how civilians are responding to a particular approach (Scharf & 
Binder, 1983). 
Phase four is the final frame decision, that is, whether or not to use deadly 
force. Of course, not every interaction hetween police and civilians requires officers 
to confront this dilemma. If police manage to handle the previous three stages 
successfully, an incident is likely to he resolved without escalating into violence. 
Nevertheless, no matter how skilled police officers may he, there will he 
circumstances in which they will he legally justified, and in some instances obliged, 
to use deadly force against those who constitute a significant threat. There is a 
growing tendency within contemporary North American police agencies to reduce 
the use of deadly force hy ofticers, even in situations where it is lawful for the police 
to kill. 
The tifth stage, the aftermath, was long overlooked. It comprises the event<; 
that follow an encounter hetween police and civilians and depends on the nature and 
outcome of the interaction concerned. For instance, if a suspect has heen killed hy 
police, the aftermath will include the investigation and assessment of the officer's 
conduct which may or may not result in sanctions of various kinds and sometimes in 
changes to police policy. Imponantly, there is the loss to loved-ones, the impact of 
killing on the perpetrator and the cost to society of losing a citizen. In some cases 
there may he wider negative ramifications like diminished public trust and anger at 
the police which may erupt as community protests, riot<; and/or attacks on police 
officers. Whilst there are many negative consequences of the use of deadly force by 
police, usually little attention is paid to incident'! in which officers manage to avert 
the use of deadly force. According to a long serving officer: 
"rn]o one knows ahout the hundreds of instances when a policeman !sic] 
decides not to shoot. Perhaps no one cares. After all, people say, we're 
trained to handle such things, as if training somehow removes or dilutes 
our humanity" (Anonymous in: Scharf & Binder, 1983:97). 
If restraint in the police use of force is to be reinforced, then ofticers who exhibit 
such behaviour must he rewarded and the puhlic must he made aware of such 
commendable efforts. Furthermore, incident<; in which force is successfully averted 
ought to he used to inform the development of police policy, training and practice. 
Scharf and Binder's ( 1983) model has proved to he particularly useful in 
hypothesising factors that are likely to contribute to the prohahility of deadly force 
(see Tahle 4.4). 
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Table 4.4: 
Selected Characteristics of High Risk Police-Civilian Encounters. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Officers inaccurately assess the level and/or source of hazard. 
Officers helieve that they have little control because there are 
few options for dealing with the situation. 
There is little time for ofticers to evaluate options and plan 
responses. 
Suspecto; use deadly force to escape from arrest after 
perpetrating serious offences. 
Suspects are highly unpredictahle like youths and the mentally 
ill. 
Suspecto; are stereotyped as being dangerous like young, black 
males. 
Officers are not prepared for engagement such as when off 
duty and when intervening spontaneously. 
A single, unassisted ofticer is confronted by an armed 
suspect. 
More than one officer is present and someone fires a shot. 
There is poor visibility which impedes the accurate 
assessment of hazard. 
Source: Scharf and Binder (1983:68-90). 
To date, empirical research based on averted force incidents has been limited by the 
scarcity of relevant data and the difticulties inherent in forming representative 
samples. Nevertheless, an ex-post-facto study on this topic has been conducted by 
Fridell and Binder ( 1992) which has provided support for a number of Scharf and 
Binder's ( 1983) hypotheses. Most notably, the investigation showed that officers 
who averted shootings were no less likely to have heen attacked by suspecto; than 
those who tired shot'i. Indeed the nature and level of violence with which officers 
were confronted did not significantly affect the probability that they would shoot. 
However, police were found to he more likely to shoot in surprise situations and in 
unpredictable and ambiguous circumstances. By contrast, shootings were more 
frequently averted when suspects were known to the police. Officers reported that 
this helped them to anticipate the risk of violence before entering a situation. 
Another difference that emerged was that officers who fired shots tended to 
formulate fixed strategies at an early stage of an interaction. The information 
exchange phase of an encounter was found to he particularly critical in determining 
whether police tired shot'i. In circumstances in which deadly force was averted, 
officers more often engaged in dialogue with suspect'i which seemed to calm and 
increase their compliance with police request'i. 
Some researchers have adopted a different angle hy applying script theory to 
investigate the sequence of police decisions in potentially violent interactions. For 
instance, Dwyer et al ( 1990) explored ofticers' initial predictions about 
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dangerousness. 58 Such lahoratory studies have provided support for the notion that it 
is the intentions officers attribute to suspects that determine their assessments of 
hazard and suhsequent decisions to use deadly force. It has thus heen postulated that 
improving the accuracy of police attrihutions may provide an effective means of 
reducing the unnecessary use of deadly force hy police. To this end it has heen 
suggested that future studies compare the types of police attributions made hy 
officers and suspect~ in situations in which force is used and in those where it is 
averted. 
Overall, the transactional sequential decision-making approach has served to 
expand the frame in which the use of force hy police is investigated, most 
importantly hy broadening the focus of research from: (1) incident~ in which police 
use deadly force to police-civilian interactions in general; (2) a single outcome to the 
range of potential outcomes; (3) the police to all parties involved in police-civilian 
interactions; (4) the tinal decision to employ deadly force to the entire sequence of 
decisions that characterise encounters hetween police and civilians; (5) actual 
conduct to the perceptions and social judgement~ that motivate hehaviour; and (6) a 
static outcome to the dynamics of social interactions. 59 Significantly, the focus on 
police-civilian encounters instead of police killings facilitates a more realistic 
assessment of the extent to which officers actually use force during police-work. 
Research samples that comprise only the most extreme scenarios in which police 
employ deadly force and actually kill, can produce a hiased picture (Fridell, 1989). 
Analysing the police use of force within the context of all interactions hetween police 
and civilians is an approach that enahles a more ohjective evaluation of the politically 
loaded question of whether police use of force is prohlematic and, if so, which 
specific aspects require intervention. After all, the critical question is not whether 
police use force or even how frequently they employ force, hut the extent to which 
they use force when this could he avoided. It has heen argued convincingly that the 
hest way of identifying factors that are instrumental in reducing the unnecessary use 
of force is to study situations in which it has heen averted and to compare such 
circumstances with those in which various types of force have heen used. 
The notions of elective versus non-elective shootings are useful heuristic 
devices for investigating averted shootings. Situations in which police have tired 
shot~ when they could have refrained fr~m shooting without jeopardising anyone's 
immediate safety have heen defined as elective shootings (Fyfe, 1981(c]). By 
contrast, incident~ in which shooting has heen the only feasihle way of ending an 
imminent threat to life have heen classified as non-elective shootings (Fyfe, 
19811c)). Although these theoretical constructs are useful for evaluating the 
necessity of police shootings after the fact, to he valid and fair. post hoc assessment~ 
58 And cognitive strategies officers' use to assess whether deadly force is legally 
justitied. 
59 Derived from the interactional approach, see Gelles ( 1982) and Lucken hill 
(1977). 
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of police decisions to use deadly force ought to he hased on the information that was 
availahle to an officer at the time s/he made such a decision. In other words, police 
decisions to use deadly force must he judged in terms of their reasonahleness rather 
than their correctness (Geller & Scott, 1992; Scharf & Binder, 1983). 
This kind of analysis has highlighted the need to identify the hazards associated 
with different types of police-civilian encounters (Scharf & Binder, 1983). In order 
to reliahly calculate the relative risks posed hy each kind of situation, a range of 
detailed data must he taken into account including inter alia: the numher of calls for 
police service, spontaneous interventions hy officers, incidents involving suspects 
who engage in armed contlict, incidents in which deadly force is used hy police 
and/or civilians, and resulting non-injuries, injuries and deaths. However, such 
haseline figures have heen scarce. 
Characteristics of Police who are Killed 60 
It seems that hlack police are more likely than white to he killed; a pattern that has 
heen attrihuted to the fact that more hlack officers are assigned to and live in 
dangerous areas. The vast majority of officers who have heen killed in the line-of-
duty have heen male (e.g. The FBI, 199tri], 1989ri]; Cerar, 1990; Geller & 
Karaies, 198l[al). While this is to expected hecause men have traditionally 
constituted the hulk of most police forces, there is some evidence to suggest that the 
rate of death for male officers is higher than for female officers. To illustrate: 
although females comprised nine per cent of the police force in 1989, they accounted 
for only three per cent of police deaths (The FBI, 1989PJ; Martin, 1990 resp). At 
this stage meaningful conclusions ahout the effects of officers' sex on their 
vulnerahility to injury and death are not feasihle, as hackground data regarding the 
proportional deployment of male and female officers to potentially dangerous 
situations has not hee  availahle. 
Nonh American police officers in the age-group 31 to 40, and more 
experienced officers with nine to ten years service have heen most likely to be killed 
hy civilians (The FBI, l991[i], 1989(i]). Although most police have heen killed 
while on duty, of late there have heen a sizable numher of homicides among off-duty 
officers, e.g. in 1990 23% of police were killed when off duty (Geller & Scott, 
1992; The FBI, 1991 [ i]). As yet the reasons for this relatively high rate of homicide 
among off-duty police have not heen ascertained. However, police policy requiring 
officers to carry their service firearms and intervene in suspected offences when off 
duty have heen investigated as likely contrihutory factors. Funhermore, variahles 
such as the wearing of uniforms, the type of assignment and whether officers work 
alone, are partnered or assisted hy hackup units, have all heen considered in the 
quest to identify factors that may heighten the risk of officers heing killed or injured. 
Unfortunately, it has not heen possihle to accurately interpret the tindings from this 
60 Relevant information on PSOs was scarce. 
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work in the ahsence of hackground data on the proponions of officers involved in 
different scenarios (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
Characteristics of Civilians who Kill Police 
Police tend to he killed hy men; most commonly younger white males hetween 18 
and 29 (The FBI, 199l(i]; 1989(i]). Although it is widely helieved that there has 
heen an upsurge in violent crime among youths in the USA over the last 20 years, 
this appears to he something of an urhan myth. Cenainly the proponion of youths 
who kill officers has not changed significantly. But there is some indication that the 
offences committed hy young people today have hecome more violent, especially 
those that are drug/gang-related (The New York Times, 13 Septemher 1992). This 
is one of the reasons why urhan street gangs have heen targeted for intensive 
intervention hy most hig-city police agencies in contemporary North America (The 
StLouis Post-Dispatch, 6 August 1992). 
lt has also heen found consistently that civilians who kill police tend to have 
previous experience of the criminal justice system. For instance, national data for 
the last decade show that the vast majority of civilians who perpetrated police 
homicides had prior arrest~ and convictions, panicularly for crimes of violence and 
weapons violations (The FBI, 199l(i]).6' Those who kill ofticers face a very high 
chance of heing arrested, prosecuted and convicted for their offences. To illustrate: 
hetween 1979 and 1988 83% of the alleged perpetrators of police homicides were 
arrested and charged, 85% of these accused were convicted; 72% for murder (The 
FBI, 1991[i]:22). This pattern stands in stark contrast to the characteristically low 
rates of prosecution and conviction for police officers who kill. 
Situalions in which Police are Killed 
More studies have heen conducted with the aim of identifying the types of 
encounters in which civilians are likely to endanger police than vice versa. 62 
Notably, this work has not yet estahlished the relative risks of different types of 
civilian-police encounters.63 However, a range of figures has been produced 
penaining to the use of force against the police generally, including fatal and non-
fatal assaults, shootings, as well as the use of other types of force hy civilians against 
officers. 64 Over 90% of police killed by civilians have died from gunshots (Behm, 
1992; The FBI 199l[i]). Although the rate of armed assaults on US police has 
61 See Geller and Scott (1992:181) for FBI figures. 
62 See: the annual reports of the FBI on officers who are killed and assaulted 
nationally particularly since 1972, Geller and Scott (1992), Garner and 
Clemmer (1986), Vaughn and Kappeler (1986), Little (1984), Moorman and 
Wemmer (1983), Geller and Karales (l98l(a], 198lfh]), Meyer et al (1979, 
1978), Fyfe (1978), Lester (l978fa], 1978(hJ), Kieselhorst (1974), Morrison 
and Meyer (1974), Regens et al (1974), Cardarelli (1968), Cramer and Rohin 
(1968) and Chapman (1964). 
63 Taking into account the frequency of police involvement in different situations. 
64 See Geller and Scott (1992:231) for a summary of findings. 
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remained relatively constant, the rate of police homicides has heen declining since 
the late seventies (Geller & Scott, 1992). The improved survival rate among officers 
has heen attrihuted largely to the routine wearing of protective SBA. Thus, 
understanding rates of police death and injury requires taking into account levels of 
assaults on police and the extent to which officers take safety precautions. It seems 
that engagements initiated hy officers pose the greatest dangers for police, and that 
officers are most commonly killed during arrests (Konstantin, 1984, Tahle 4.5 resp). 
Notahly, empirical findings have contradicted the popular he lief that so-called 
domestic disturhances are particularly hazardous situations for police (e.g. 
Margarita, 1980[h]; Bard, 1977; Muir, 1977; Stephens, 1977; Vandall, 1976, 
Auten, 1972). It has heen demonstrated that the danger to police associated with 
investigating 'domestic disputes' has heen overestimated. In fact, officers face 
greater risk dealing with rohheries (e.g. The FBI, 1989[i]; Garner & Clemmer, 
1986; Swanton, 1985; Konstantin, 1984; Geller & Karales, 198I[a]; Margarita, 
1980[a]; Fyfe, 1978). Indeed police are significantly less likely to he assaulted when 
responding to 'domestic' than other types of disputes (Stanford & Mowry, 1990). 
Table 4.5: 
Percentages of Police Killed and Assaulted in Different Circumstances in 
the USA, 1986-1990. 65 
Circumstances 
Arrest situations 
Disturhance calls 
Suspicious circumstances 
Traffic pursuit~/ stops 
Amhush situations 
Prisoners 
Mentally ill 
Civil disorders 
Source: The FBI (l99l[i]). 
Killed(%) 
40 
16 
16 
11 
9 
6 
2 
0 
-Assaulted (%) 
27 
36 
10 
1 1 
.I 
13 
2 
1 
While the mohilising event~ and the kinds of circumstances in which officers have 
heen killed and assaulted have heen studied consistently, the reasons civilians use 
deadly force against police have heen relatively neglected. One of the few 
investigations of this topic -- which comprised the analysis of the NYPDs records 
hetween 1844 and 1978, some 134 years -- revealed that the main reason civilians 
killed police was to avoid arrest (Margarita, 1980[a]). Planned assassinations or 
revenge killings of police and attacks hy mentally ill suspect'i were rare. 66 ft has 
65 Percentages have heen rounded. 
66 Also see Gates and Shah (1992). 
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heen concluded more generally that: 
". . . the research findings from various studies over the past several 
decades suggest that hoth police officers and civilians shoot each other 
more because they feel they must than because they want to" (Geller & 
Scott, 1992:224). 
Police ofticers are not only vulnerable to being killed hy civilians, they are prone to 
suicide and accidental death. It is alarming to note that in recent times US police 
have heen more likely to die hy their own hand or to he killed accidentally hy a 
colleague than to he killed hy a suspect (e.g. Cerar, 1991; The NYPD, 1989, 1988; 
Geller, 1988; Geller & Karales, 1982, 198l[h]; Fyfe, 1978). ln the early nineties 
suicide was the most signiticant cause of non-natural death among US police: 45% 
suicides, 30% intentional homicides and 26% accidents between 1990 and 1991 .67 
For this reason a substantial amount of research has been conducted on suicides 
among North American police (e.g. David, 1991; Rutledge, 1988; Volanti et al, 
1986; Kroes, 1985, 1976; Russo et al, 1983; Volanti, 1983; Wagner & Brzeczek, 
1983; Bedian, 1982; Lester & Gallagher, 1980). lt has heen consistently concluded 
that the high risk of suicide is a product of the intense stress inherent to police-work. 
For some time it has heen claimed that the suicide rate among police ofticers has 
been signiticantly higher than the civilian rate. An examination of the national 
statistics for the USA, however, reveals that this notion is rather shaky. Studies 
have failed to compare civilians and police ofticers of equivalent ages; a particularly 
signiticant factor in suicide. To illustrate: while the national police suicide rate of 
17 per 100000 was higher than the suicide rate of 13 for civilians of all ages, it was 
lower than the suicide rate of 20 for males between 18 and 34 (Geller & Scott, 
1992:234). So it is not certain whether the rate of suicide among police is 
signiticantly higher or lower than that of comparably aged civilians in the USA. 
Nevertheless, actuarial expert~ tend to agree that relative to other occupations, public 
law enforcement is characterised hy one of the top tive suicide rates (The Chicago 
Free Weekly, 22 November 1991; Kroes, 1985; Terry, 1985). Whatever the actual 
levels of police suicide, this issue is now generally treated hy police managers as a 
matter requiring serious attention, and a range of preventative measures aimed at 
alleviating work-related stress and identifying ofticers at risk have been implemented 
in police agencies across North America. Particular attention has heen directed at 
investigating the psychological effects on police of being involved in violent 
confrontations, hoth as perpetrators and victims (Geller & Scott, 1992). Post 
traumatic stress has been identitied as one of the potential consequences and the 
impact on police conduct of this well documented syndrome is now widely 
recognised. 
67 Calculated using FBI data in Geller and Scott (1992). 
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The ratio of police who die accidentally compared to those killed intentionally 
has varied considerahly over time and place (Geller & Scott, 1992).68 Throughout 
the eighties concern over unintentional police deaths escalated as the proportion of 
ofticers killed accidentally kept rising. Notahly, in 1984 and 1989 the proportion of 
accidental deaths exceeded intentional homicides (Garner & Clemmer, 1986; The 
FBI, 19891i] resp). Police agencies suhsequently took steps to reduce unacceptably 
high levels of accidental death, and tigures for 1990 and 1991 showed a decrease in 
unintentional killings of US police (e.g. Fyfe, 1989[c]; Behm, 1992; The FBI, 
199lli] resp). Although guns have heen responsihle for a relatively small percentage 
of accidental deaths among ofticers,69 specific interventions have heen made to 
reduce the numher of police-related unintentional tirearm discharges, to lower the 
incidence of accidental shootings of plain clothes officers as a result of mistaken 
identity, and to limit the danger posed hy stray or ticocheting hullet~ fired hy police 
(e.g. The Crime Control Digest, II May 1992; The Law Enforcement News, 31 
March 1992; Burke et al, 1988). 
Characteristics of the Broader Context 70 
Empirical research has revealed that rates of police killings and deaths in the USA 
vary suhstantially across areas and over time (Geller & Scott, 1992). Despite the 
·Jack of comparability among many of the tindings, the magnitude and consistency of 
the differences reported suggest that the variations are not spurious (Sherman & 
Cohn, 1986; Fyfe, l981(h]). Hence, researchers have set out to explain why it is 
thar at certain times some jurisdictions have heen characterised hy low rates and 
others hy high rates of police deadly force usage. Whilst the importance of 
investigating interactions hetween police and civilians is now widely recognised, the 
hroader context must also he taken into account if spatial and temporal variations in 
the use of deadly force are to he adequately explained. 
There are two particular approaches in which the perspective has heen 
expanded away from the micro-level of interactions hetween police and civilians to 
the meso-level of the community and the macro-level of society. The community 
violence model is hased on the premise that police deadly force is a function of 
violence in the community at large, and more specifically, that police are more likely 
to resort to deadly force when they perceive an environment to he dangerous (e.g. 
Matulia, 1985; Sherman & Langworthy, 1979; Rohins, 1963). It is part of the 
working knowledge of officers in every department that certain 'heat~' are 
particularly dangerous. Wolfgang and Ferracuti's (1967) venerahle notion of 
subcultures qf violence has commonly heen used to explain why certain areas are 
more dangerous than others. A suhculture of violence is said to exist when a group 
68 See Geller and Scott (1992:500-1) for national US tigures from 1960 to 1991. 
69 Only nine per cent in 1990, see The FBI (l99l(i]). 
70 See Geller and Scott ( 1992:25-29) on necessary contextual information. 
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of people adopt attitudes that condone and encourage the use of force as a preferred 
means of dealing with interpersonal and intergroup interactions (Wolfgang & Zahn, 
!983; Wolfgang & Ferracuti; 1978). 
Some authors have maintained further that actual police hazard and community 
violence ought to be considered (Matulia, 1985; Binder & Fridell, 1984; Fyfe, 
198l[dj). Although levels of civilian violence in particular communities are likely to 
shape police perceptions of hazard, it is as important to take into account the extent 
to which violence is actually directed at police. This is particularly relevant 
considering that the level of non-elective police shootings in some areas may be as 
high as 75% (Binder & Fridell, 1984). There has been much debate over which 
indicators of community violence and police hazard ought to be used for research 
purposesr Nevertheless, the rate of civilian homicides, gun density, and the arrest 
rate for violent crimes, have been favoured as dependent variables. 71 
A variety of early studies demonstrated a significant positive correlation 
between rates of civilian homicide and policejustitiable homicide (e.g. Lester, 1993; 
Langworthy, 1986; Fyfe, l980[h]; Jacobs & Britt, 1979; Sherman & Langworthy, 
1979; Kania & Mackey, 1977). The most popular conclusion reached from such 
findings was that officers are more likely to use deadly force in areas they perceive 
to he dangerous and this could become a self-fultilling prophecy. It was also 
concluded that a high rate of killing hy police could produce more defensive violence 
hy civilians toward officers and a higher rate of homicide if the police function as 
role models for the legitimate use of deadly force in society (Langworthy, 1986). 
However, correlational studies do not enable reliable conclusions about 
causality. Indeed, Langworthy ( 1986) has demonstrated that although there may he 
a spatial association between police and civilian homicide rates, the temporal 
relationship between these two variables is not signiticant. Furthermore, Fyfe 
( 1988{hJ) has shown that in many North American cities -- including Chicago, 
Dallas, St Louis and Metro-Dade -- rising rates of violent crime have not heen 
associated with increases in police justifiable homicide rates. In fact, in New York 
City the rate of police shootings has decreased as the violent crime rate has risen 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). The available evidence supports neither of the 
abovementioned causal interpretations and it has heen concluded that the positive 
correlation is the result of mediating variables that have yet to be identified (e.g. 
Geller & Scott, 1992; Fyfe, 1988[b]; Langworthy, 1986). But leaders in the tield 
have acknowledged that: 
71 See F yfe (1980 [ h D, J acohs and Britt ( !979), Sherman and Langworthy (1979), 
The Washington Star (2 September 1978), Kania and Mackey (1977), Sherman 
and Langworthy (1986), Brill (1977), Fyfe (1982[b], l980[h]) and Kania and 
Mackey (1977) resp. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
130 
it is still possible -- and, indeed, intuitively plausible -- that some 
combination of factors related to general levels of violence in 
communities helps to explain some of the variation in the rates at which 
police shoot or shoot at criminals from city to city and over time. . .. 
IHoweverJ, lt]here are powerful forces, out-;ide the ehh and flow of 
violent crime, that help shape the patterns and numbers of police-
involved shootings" (Geller & Scott, 1992:90 & 62 resp.). 
In the conflict model, the concept of power relations has heen employed to explain 
intergroup violence including spatial variations in the use of deadly force hy and 
against police. Structural theory constitutes the basis of this approach and in 
particular the underlying assumption that the level of violence in a society is 
determined hy "broad-scale social forces such as lack of opportunity, institutional 
racism, persistent poverty, demographic transitions and population density" 
(Wolfgang & Zahn, 1983:854).72 It has heen theorised further that increased 
economic stratitication in contemporary North America has heightened conflict 
between economic classes. Greater coercion has thus heen required to maintain the 
advantaged positions of the middle and upper classes, and it is the police who have 
fulfilled this function on the pan of the dominant classes. This means that higher 
rates of deadly torce have heen employed hy the police against economically 
oppressed groups (Sorensen et al, 1993). Because the majority of the economically 
disadvantaged in the USA are hlack, interactions between the police and black 
people have heen characterised hy mutual suspicion and the probability of contlict 
has heen heightened. Notably, it has heen shown that the rate at which police kill is 
positively correlated with the proportion of black and poor people in an area 
(Chamlin, 1989). It has heen postulated that the disproportional use of deadly force 
hy police against black people accounts for much of the spatial variation in police 
deadly force usage in the USA (e.g. Jacobs & Britt, 1979; Knoohuizen et al, 1977; 
Takagi, 1974). Hence, hlack residential areas tend to he characterised hy high rates 
of police deadly force. 
Numerous studies have sought to examine a wide range of structural variables 
and indicators of social cohesion in relation to police deadly force, including for 
example income inequality, the numbers receiving social welfare, rates of divorce, 
unemployment and suicide (Geller & Scott, 1992). Although the findings have not 
heen consistent, reviewers of the collective research data have tended to agree that 
economic inequality and the proportion of black residents have heen the hest 
predictors of spatial patterns of police justitiable homicides since the sixties (e.g. 
Sorensen et al, 1993; Jacobs & Britt, 1979). After comparing the research evidence 
for the community violence and conflict hypotheses, Sorensen et al ( 1993) have 
concluded that there is greater empirical support for structural variables as predictors 
of rates of police justitiahle homicides, and meso-level indicators of community 
72 See Van Den Berghe (1974) and Cloward and Ohlin (1960). 
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violence are at hest mediating factors. 
Although there are mixed findings regarding the hest structural predictors of 
rates of police deaths, the most reliable factors seem to he poveny and geographic 
region (Petersen & Bailey, 1988; The FBr, 199llil resp). Police are killed at a 
signiticantly higher rate in the southern states of the USA hut there has heen little 
agreement ahout the causes (The FBI, 1991[i]). Those who adhere to the contlict 
approach have tended to attribute the regional pattern to widespread poverty, a high 
concentration of hlack resident~, and the history of institutional racism in the South. 
By contrast, police have tended to suggest higher rates of gun ownership in the area, 
and the warmer climate which discourages them from wearing SBA and encourages 
outdoor living which increases contact between police and civilians. But an 
empirically sound explanation for this geographic pattern of police risk has yet to he 
established (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
Police Organisational Factors 
Since the seventies numerous studies have explored the links between rates of police 
deadly force and a wide range of organisational factors (e.g. Alpen & Fridell, 1992; 
Matulia, 1985, 1982; Waegel, 1984[a]; Scharf & Binder, 1983; Binder et al, 1982; 
Fyfe, 1981[hl, 1979; Sherman & Langworthy, 1979; Milton et al, 1977; Uelman, 
1973). A review of the literature in this sphere shows that the following variables 
have commanded significant research attention: restrictive internal deadly force 
policies within police agencies, mechanisms for ensuring the consistent enforcement 
of formal policies and internal accountability among officers, including the role 
played hy police managers and supervisors (e.g. Alpen & Fridell, 1992; Geller & 
Scott, 1992; Weishourd & Uchida, 1992; Nay, 1990; Mathie, 1989; Grennan, 1988; 
Weishourd et al, 1988; The NYSCCJ, 1987; Kleck, 1986; Cordner, 1985; Geller, 
1985[a]; Matulia, 1982; Fyfe, 1988fa); 1988fc], 198I(h], 1979; Milton et al, 
1977).n More recently, the building of external accountability between police 
agencies and communities -- particularly hy means of civilian review boards and 
other police-watching bodies -- has heen stressed as critical to successful policing. 74 
Much work has also heen focused on the topics of weaponry, equipment and 
training. Service tirearms and ammunition have heen re-evaluated, alternatives to 
deadly force, especially less-than-lethal weapons and protective equipment, have 
heen examined,7' and training in violence reduction techniques and ofticer survival 
73 Especially monitoring ofticers' conduct, disciplining violations and rewarding 
compliance. 
74 See Skolnick and Fyfe (1993), Kolt11 et al (1992), Goldstein (1990), Moore 
and Stephens (1991), Petre (199l[a], 1991(h]), Watt (1991), Uildriks and Van 
Mastright ( 1991) and Terrill (1990). 
75 See Pilant (l993[a], 1993[h], 1992), Meyer (1992[al, 1992[b], 1992[c]), 
Connor ( 1991 ), Biggs ( 1990), Geis and Binder ( 1990), Peak (1990), The 
British Columbia Police Commission ( 1990), Trostle (1990) and Geller 
(l985(a]). 
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tactics is heing developed and tested. 76 Since the late eighties occupational stress 
among police has hecome a popular topic and mechanisms for monitoring, dehriefing 
and supporting ofticers have heen examined (e.g. Jones, 1989, 1988; Barendse & 
Van Gernert, 1988; McKenzie, 1988). 
There is widespread agreement that police occupational suhculture is a 
fundamental variahle affecting police deadly force usage and the success of many 
violence reduction interventions. Just as high levels of violence in particular 
communities have heen ascrihed to the operation of suhcultures that condone the use 
of force, a police occupational suhculture has long heen employed to explain 
excessive force and a lack of restraint in police use of deadly force (e.g. Skolnick & 
Fyfe, 1993; Crank et al, 1993; Geis & Binder, 1990; Fyfe, 1988[a], 1988[h]; 
Waegel, 1984(a]; Scharf & Binder, 1983; Westley, 1970, 1951). 
According to Scharf and Binder (1983), police decisions to employ deadly 
force are made within four circles of moral decision-making, each of which must he 
taken into account. The outermost circle is the law: case-law and legislation. 
Within this circle are police regulations, then informal organisational norms or police 
suhculture, and lastly individual officer's heliefs and attitudes. Police suhculture, 
popularly known as cop culture, is said to comprise a set of understandings that are 
shared hy ofticers as to when, against whom, and why police ought to use deadly 
force, as well as ways officers can justify their conduct retrospectively (Waegel, 
1984[a]). New officers are socialised into this suhculture and various informal social 
mechanisms such as negative and positive reinforcement operate to maintain 
compliance (Scharf & Binder, 1983). It has heen postulated further that North 
American police suhculture has traditionally condoned and even encouraged a lack of 
restraint in deadly force usage, that police agencies have not tended to reward 
restraint, and that negative peer group pressure has commonly heen applied to those 
who have practised restraint (Scharf & Binder, 1983). 77 
Over the years numerous aspects of cop culture have heen identitied. For 
instance, it has heen shown consistently that one of the core attitudes of police 
suhculture is a helief in street justice over formal criminal justice and an aversion to 
due process protections. In other words, officers prefer to settle cases on the streets 
without considering the legal right'i of suspects (e.g. Crank et al, 1993; Uildriks & 
Van Mastright, 1991; Peak, 1990; Shemock, 1990; Sykes, 1990; Waegel, I984(a]; 
Wilson & Kelling, 1982; Goldstein, 1977; Walker, 1977; Reiss, 1971[a]; Wilson, 
1970). A second key feature is the code of secrecy: the occupation of policing 
operates as a 'closed shop' in which officers 'stick together', 'don't rat on one 
76 See Geller and Scott (1992), Cheatwood (1991), Kruize and Wijmer (1991), 
Poole and Sampson (1991), Geis and Binder (1990), McCauley and Edwards 
( 1990), The British Columhia Police Commission (1990), Fyfe (1989[ a]), 
Wolfenden (1989), Schrader (1988), Geller (1985fa]) and Meadows and 
Trostle ( 1985). 
77 However, restraint is fundamental to police suhculture in Honolulu where it is 
considered unmanly to resort to deadly force, see Scharf and Binder ( 1983). 
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another' and are resistant to 'outo;iders' particularly those who are not police. 7s 
Some authors have noted that the code of secrecy also fosters a 'siege mentality' in 
which ofticers view the world from a defensive and antagonistic position of 'us 
against them' (e.g. Uildriks & Van Mastright, 1991: Peak, 1990; Shernock, 1990). 
These attitudes are said to constitute part of a broader policing ideology known as 
crafto;manship, the overall aim of which is to maintain public order rather than to 
enforce the law (Wilson, 1970). This ideology is based on a number of additional 
premises including inter alia: the opinion that on-the-job experience is the optimal 
mode of training for police-work and that formal education is ineffective; the belief 
that policing requires independence and discretion rather than deference to authority; 
and the view that record keeping and other administrative-type tasks are a waste of 
time (Crank er al, 1993 ). 
The link between this kind of occupational subculture and high rates of deadly 
force usage among officers has generally been explained in terms of Sykes and 
Matza's ( 1957) techniques of neutralisation which permit police to overcome the 
taboos against killing, and vocabularies of motives which enable them to later justify 
their actions in ways that avoid censure (e.g. Waegel, 1984[a]; VanMaanen, 1980). 
The following three prospective neutralisations have been noted as key element-; of 
police subculture: (l) it was not wrong to kill because there were special 
circumstances; (2) the suspect deserved to die; and (3) the killing served a higher 
purpose (Waegel, 1984[a]). These beliefs are strengthened when there is a loss of 
public confidence in the criminal justice system and widespread support for a tougher 
approach to law and order (e.g. Kruize & Wijmer, 1991; Waegel, 1984[a]). 
Furthermore, in racially polarised and economically divided societies cop culture is 
said to include racist stereotypes about the moral inferiority of black people, which 
serve to legitimate the abusive treatment of black suspect-; hy police (e.g. Skolnick, 
1986; Waegel, 1984faJ, 1981; Scharf & Binder, 1983; VanMaanen, 1978; Bittner, 
197 5' 1973). 
The unrestrained use of deadly force hy police is further reinforced hy the fact 
that negative sanctions against such conduct are highly improbable. Generally 
speaking, the formal control mechanisms within police agencies are known to he 
'cop-friendly' and officers who violate police force regulations rarely receive more 
than a reprimand (e.g. Waegel, 1984[a]; Milton er al, 1977). In addition, the 
vagaries of legal standards governing the use of deadly force hy police enable 
officers to justify most incident-; as legitimate (e.g. Kobler, 1975faJ; Harding & 
Fahey, 1973). It is now widely accepted that even when there is prima face 
evidence of unlawful killing hy police, the probability of criminal prosecution and 
conviction is extremely low (e.g. Chappell & Graham, 1985; Milton er al, 1977). 
78 See Crank er al (1993), Skolnick and Fyfe (1993), Pollock-Byrne (1988), 
Shernock ( 1987), Barker (1986), Blumberg (l985faJ), Goldstein ( 1977), and 
Westley (1970). 
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Hence: 
Ia police officer! uses violence illegitimately because such usage is 
seen as justitiahle, acceptable and, at times, expected by his colleague 
group and because it constitutes an effective means for solving problems 
in obtaining status and self esteem which policemen as policemen have in 
common" (Westley, 1951:216). 
Since this kind of process undermines the efticacy of laws and regulations designed 
to limit police deadly force, it is futile to simply increase the restrictiveness of 
legislation and formal police regulations (Waegel, I984!a); Sykes & Matza, 1957). 
Instead, it is crucial that the informal mechanisms operating to endorse a lack of 
restraint in deadly force usage among ofticers also he modified, in particular the 
attitudes of police managers and supervisors (e.g. Kruize & Wijmer, 1991; Waegel, 
l984[a]). 
Today changing traditional police subculture is generally considered to he a 
key target of strategies aimed at reducing violence and increasing restraint by police, 
and fundamental to the success community policing (e.g. Payne, 1993; Tafoya et al, 
1992; Trojanowicj, 1991; Shemock, 1990). Consequently, the majority of North 
American police agencies underscore the objective of developing: 
"... a principled organizational culture . . . one that demonstrates in 
meaningful ways to police and community alike that force is exercised 
with restraint and that all people -- police officers, the public at large, 
and criminal suspects are treated hy the agency with the basic respect 
due any human heing" (Geller & Scott, 1992:58). 
It is disturhing to note, however, that the new guiding police ideology of 
professionalism -- with itli emphasis on service, self regulation, formal education, 
professional ethics and referent'i -- does not appear to have successfully dislodged the 
code of secrecy or traditional police attitudes on street justice and due process. 
lnterestingly, it is age and long service among police which seems to produce 
positive attitudes to restraint (Crank et al, 1993; Hall, 1968). 
CONTROL STRATEGIES 
Introductory Comment 
Although macro-level factors that fuel violence in society, like racial and gender 
oppression, unemployment and poveny, are recognised as theoretically relevant in 
understanding the nature and dynamics of social contlict, these variables have 
generally been neglected in effort'i to reduce gun-related violence. This is despite 
the fact that: 
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II r s ]trategies directed at reducing unemployment, poverty and inequality 
have every hit as much potential for producing short-term result-; as 
criminal-justice-system strategies ... [and that] [p]roducing short-term 
decreases in poverty and unemployment is difficult, not impossible" 
(Kieck, 1986:61). 
There has also been little systematic investigation of the impact of reforms aimed at 
modifying macro-variables on the use of deadly force hy and against police. Instead, 
the hulk of research on control strategies has been focused on meso-level police 
organisational variables largely under the control of police management and, hence, 
considered malleable (Geller & Scott, 1992; Geller & Karales, 1981 [a]). To date 
most police agencies that have attempted to reduce the unnecessary use of deadly 
force hy their officers have used interventions comprising combinations of the 
following element-;: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
more restrictive policy governing the use of deadly force; 
mechanisms for the regular monitoring of officers' conduct and for 
assisting police with personal problems atlecting work performance; 
systems for assessing officers' conduct and making recommendations on 
the management of those who exhibit inappropriate behaviour; 
training programmes of various types such as those designed to teach 
officers to apply new policy requirements, to improve police relations 
with racial and ethnic minorities, to increase the use of less-than-lethal 
tactics, to enhance officers' safety and shooting proficiency; and 
the introduction of a wider range of less-than-lethal weapons, equipment 
and tactics. 
Literature abounds on the topic of control strategies involving the modification of 
different aspect-; of police organisations. However, methodologica.lly sound 
evaluations of deadly force reduction initiatives are very scarce and unfounded 
claims abound. The hulk of the information on the impact of such interventions 
comprises experiences reported hy individual police agencies, the majority of which 
fall short of the following basic requirements for sound assessments: the use of a 
range of indicators to measure expected consequences; the thorough examination of 
factors other than control strategies which may have produced change; and the 
comprehensive examination of unintended positive and negative consequences 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). This serious shortcoming underscores the critical 
importance of designing reliable methods for evaluating change prior to intervention. 
Legal Reform, Prosecution and Litigation 
There are two basic circumstances in which the police are legally permitted to use 
deadly force in North America: arrest and private defence (self defence or the 
defence of another) (Alpert & Fridell, 1992). Whilst the defensive use of deadly 
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force has heen relatively uncontroversial, allowing police to kill during arrests has 
heen a highly contentious issue since as far hack as 1930 (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
Like many British colonies the USA originally adopted the English common law 
any-tleeing-t"elon rule which permitted police to kill anyone who attempted to tlee 
from arrest (Geller & Scott. 1992). In response to the report of the Wickersham 
Commission on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement in 1934, the American Law 
Institute (AU) made the tirst formal recommendation to restrict North American 
police to using deadly force only against persons suspected of dangerous offences 
(Kelling & Stewart, 1991; LaFave, 1965 resp). In 1962 the ALI coditied this 
proposition in the Model Penal Code, which hecame law over 20 years later. In 
1985, after almost tive decades of puhlic pressure for this legal change, the US 
Supreme Court finally introduced the first national minimum standard for the use of 
deadly force hy police in arrest situations in the now famous case of Tennessee v 
Garner (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
This standard, more commonly referred to as the protection-of-life standard, 
limits police use of deadly force to arrest situations in which: ( l) the person is 
suspected or has heen convicted of a felony in which s/he has threatened or actually 
used deadly force; (2) there is a suhstantial risk that a suspect or offender will kill or 
seriously injure someone if s/he is not apprehended immediately; and (3) the use of 
deadly force does not create signiticant risk of injury to innocent parties (Alpert & 
Fridell, 1992). In short, this standard ostensihly prohihits the killing hy police of 
suspects deemed to he non-dangerous. However, a person's dangerousness is 
predicted, inter alia, from the nature of his/her suspected offence/s and not from 
immediate hehaviour. In other words, if a person is suspected of a violent offence, 
s/he is presumed to he dang rous even if s/he displays no immediate evidence to this 
effect. Thus, although the Tennessee v Garner ruling has often heen hailed for 
aholishing the killing of unarmed, non-violent, fleeing suspects, this is not strictly 
true hecause police are still permitted to kill a person who is not currently violent, if 
s/he is suspected of an offence in which s/he threatened to use violence (Geller & 
Scott, 1992). 
Although the majority of contemporary legal scholars agree that the any-
fleeing-felon rule was ohsolete and rightfully aholished, there is contention over 
whether the protection-of-life standard is optimal. Many consider the more 
restrictive defence-of-life standard, used hy the FBI since the forties, to he preferahle 
(Alpert & Fridell, 1992). The main ohjection to the minimum legal standard is that 
the nature of a suspected offence is an unreliahie predictor of a person's propensity 
for suhsequent violent hehaviour (e.g. Petersilia et al, 1985; Monahan, 198l(a], 
198llh]). Indeed it has heen concluded that: 
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" nohody -- forensic psychologists. psychiatrists, parole hoards, 
seasoned police officers -- has yet demonstrated an ahility to predict a 
given individual's foture dangerousness with anything approaching even 
50 percent accuracy" (Geller & Scott, 1992:255). 
By contrast, the defence-of-life standard permits police to employ deadly force 
against a suspect or offender only if s/he directly threatens life. Proponent'\ of this 
standard have argued that it is more just to hase assessment'\ of dangerousness on the 
immediate threat posed hy a suspect (Geller & Scott, 1992). There are also some 
scholars who believe that even the restrictive defence-of-life standard ought to he 
enhanced hy placing an onus on police to actively avoid using deadly force (Alpert & 
Fridel!, 1992). This postulate derives from the Scharf-Binder approach which 
emphasises planning and using less-than-lethal alternatives to decrease the need for 
deadly force. Notahly, the proposal has generated a legal dispute over whether 
police could he held criminally liahle for failing to avoid or creating the need to use 
deadly force (Alpert & Fridell, 1992; The Michigan Law Review, 1988). Civil 
liability and the standard of gross negligence have heen proposed as alternatives hut 
the question does not appear to have heen resolved (Alpert & Fridell, 1992). 
At this stage it is generally agreed that law reform to adopt defence-of-life as 
the minimum legal standard in the USA is improhahle in the foreseeable future 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). This should not be viewed as cause for pessimism, nor 
should the envisaged impact he exaggerated. Such legal change could have the 
positive effect of requiring all police agencies to adopt more restrictive regulations 
on the use of deadly force. But it has heen empirically established that the criminal 
prosecution of police who violate legal standards is uncommon (e.g. Alpert & 
Fridell, 1992; Geller & Scott, 1992; The LA Times, 8 Septemher 1991; The San 
Diego Union, 21 Decemher 1990; Blumherg, 19891h]; Fyfe & Blumherg, 1985; 
Waegel, 19841a]; Knoohuizen et al, 1977; Kohler, 1975[a]; Uelman, 1973). To 
illustrate, during the tirst half of the seventies only one in every 500 fatal shootings 
by US police resulted in a criminal prosecution and recent evidence suggest'\ that this 
pattern holds for the nineties ((Kohler, 19751a]; Geller & Scott, 1992 resp). 
Furthermore, addressing this issue would seem to he a complex task considering the 
factors which undergird the low prosecution rate among police. For example: the 
evidence police provide to prosecutors is often distorted in favour of accused 
ofticers; 79 prosecutors tend to he positively hiased toward police hecause 
prosecutorial and policing functions are interdependent; and many prosecutors don't 
hring ofticers to trial hecause juries are unlikely to convict those who are seen to he 
acting against criminals in the interests of law ahiding citizens (e.g. The LA Times, 
20 Septemher 1991, The New York Newsday, 15 Novemher 1991; Blumherg, 
79 Mainly hecause police investigate their own cases and have a strict code of 
loyalty. 
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1989[hJ). 
The USA has a government policy which permit'i dual prosecution. This 
means that police can he prosecuted for criminal offences at the state level and for 
civil right'i violations at the federal level. However, federal civil rights cases against 
police are even more infrequent than ordinary criminal prosecutions; only five cases 
were hrought hetween Octoher 1988 and May 1992 (The Chicago Trihune, 15 May 
1992). Whilst some scholars consider this to he douhle jeopardy, others have noted 
that the additional level of adjudication can diffuse public protest when the outcome 
of a state trial is perceived to he unjust (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
Research attention has heen directed at the impact of criminal prosecutions on 
the use of deadly force hy police hut few studies have considered the effect'i of civil 
litigation, an important topic for investigation (Alpert & Fridell, 1992; Geller & 
Scott, 1992). Indeed civil proceedings enahle a more textured and hetter evaluation 
of police conduct than criminal trials. In civil litigation the ohjective is to decide 
whether individuals and/or their organisations have heen negligent or reckless, and 
this facilitates a more effective assessment of " ... police efforts to carry out their 
responsihilities with the minimum harm and maximum efficiency and effectiveness" 
(Klockars, 1993:295). It is also generally agreed that the threat of civilliahility has 
some deterrent effect on officers and prompts police managers to improve restraint in 
the use of deadly force within their agencies (e.g. The Portland Oregonian, 26 April 
1992; Blumherg, 1989[h]). 
Police Regulations and Policy 
Since police regulations on the use of deadly force must he at least as stringent as the 
standards set down in the law, the importance of achieving legal reform is often 
stressed. Interestingly, however, it has heen found that police policy development 
often precedes legal change (Alpert & Fridell, 1992). To illustrate: hy the time that 
the US law was reformed in 1985, two-thirds of police agencies had already adopted 
deadly force policies that were as strict as, if not more stringent than, the new legal 
standard (Walker & Fridell, 1992, 1989). Furthermore, the law sets only the hroad 
parameters governing the use of deadly force hy police; specific guidelines are the 
province of policy. Hence, it has heen argued that changing police deadly force 
regulations should take priority over efforts to modify the law (Alpert & Ftidell, 
1992). 
Because it is not mandatory for police departments in the USA to have written 
regulations governing the use of deadly force, the existence and content of such 
policies varies greatly across agencies (Alpert & Fridell, 1992). Whilst the 
Tennessee v Gamer ruling did seem to prompt North American police agencies to 
formalise their deadly force policies, some police departments still do not have 
written regulations whereas others have comprehensive formal policies that are more 
stringent than the national minimum standard required by law (Geller & Scott, 
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1992). 
Since the early seventies numerous researchers have sought to examine the 
impact of increasing the restrictiveness of deadly force regulations on police rates of 
shooting. Uelman ( 1973) conducted one of the tirst of these studies in which he 
compared the policies and shooting rates of 50 police department-; in Los Angeles 
County. The result.., showed that department-; which had more stringent regulations 
on the use of deadly force were characterised hy lower rates of shooting than those 
with more permissive policies. More specifically, restrictive regulations were 
associated with significantly lower shooting rates for fleeing suspects although there 
were also notable differences in the rates of defensive shootings (Uelman, 1973). 
This pioneering work was followed hy a number of similar investigations conducted 
in different US cities, and the vast majority demonstrated support for Uelman's 
original finding that police shooting rates, especially in relation to fleeing suspect-;, 
decreased significantly after the introduction of restrictive deadly force policies (e.g. 
Sherman, 1983; Meyer, 1980[h]; Fyfe, 1979). 
Police resistance to more restrictive policies on the use of deadly force has 
frequently heen grounded in the belief that limitations will increase officers' risk of 
injury and death and will impede effective law nforcement (e.g. Geller & Scott, 
1992; Gain, 1971). Research has generated very little evidence to this effect. One 
possible exception which is often cited is the case of the Atlanta Police Department. 
In the mid-seventies this agency implemented a new deadly force policy hased on the 
protection-of-life standard. The use of deadly force was limited to arrest situations 
in which officers had personal knowledge of the dangerousness of fleeing suspect-;, 
warning shot-; were prohibited, as was shooting at moving vehicles and in 
circumstances where bystanders might he endangered (Blumberg, 1989; Sherman, 
1983). Subsequently, although the rate of shots fired hy oft1cers decreased 
significantly, the rate at which police were injured rose and the arrest rate fell 
(Sherman, 1983). Whilst these findings may reflect negative consequences of certain 
restrictive regulations, the design of the study does not preclude the alternate 
explanation that the result-; were caused hy an independent increase in the violent 
crime rate (Blumberg, 1989). To date the empirical evidence demonstrates that rates 
of police injury and death have either remained constant or have fallen following the 
introduction of more stringent regulations on the use of deadly force and, 
furthermore that rates of arrest and escape have not heen negatively affected (e.g. 
Sparger & Giacopassi, 1992; The Dallas Police Department, 1990; Sherman, 1983; 
Meyer, 1980faJ; Fyfe, 1979, 1978; Gains, 1971; Tsimhinos, 1968). After the 
protection-of-life standard became law in 1985 reductions in police rates of shooting 
of fleeing suspects, and particularly black suspects, were consistently reported hy US 
police departments (e.g. Geller & Scott, 1 992; Sparger & Giacopassi, 1992; The 
Dallas Police Department, 1990). Perhaps the most striking change in police 
shooting rates was that reported hy the Memphis Police Department after loosing 
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Tennessee v Garner. As a result this agency introduced a more restrictive deadly 
force policy hased on the standard required hy the new law, as well as a 
comprehensive training programme comprising the simulation of potentially violent 
police-civilian encounters. Prior to 1985 the Memphis police had one of the highest 
rates of shooting tleeing felons in the USA. Thereafter there was a major reduction 
in shot~ fired and rates of shootings at tleeing and hlack suspects without a 
corresponding drop in the arrest rate for violent offences (Sparger & Giacoppassi, 
1992). 
It is important to note, however, that a causal relationship has not heen 
estahlished hetween restrictive deadly force policies and reductions in rates of police 
shootings. Many authors have maintained that the real engine of change is sustained 
puhlic pressure on the police to increase restraint (e.g. Geller & Scott, 1992; Scharf 
& Binder, 1983; Friederich, 1980; Sherman, l9801h]). In most instances it has not 
heen feasih1e to assess the independent effects of specific changes to deadly force 
policies hecause it has heen commonplace to introduce a numher of reforms 
simultaneously such as outlawing shooting at moving vehicles and juveniles, and 
prohihiting warning shots. Even deadly force policies hased on the protection-of-life 
standard have tended to vary in terms of their evidentiary requirements: some 
regulations have required that officers have only a reasonahle suspicion or prohahle 
cause, others have called for direct personal knowledge that a tleeing suspect has 
committed a violent offence hefore permitting shooting to arrest (Geller & Scott, 
1992). 
Nevertheless, the introduction of formal, written regulations is generally 
viewed as a necessary hasic intervention in the management of the use of deadly 
force hy police. Besides the possihility of reducing rates of deadly force usage 
among police, the implementation of clear, simple and realistic regulations serves to 
convey managerial expectations to officers, communicates police standards to the 
puh1ic and reduces amhiguity in the assessment of culpahility (Alpert & Fridell, 
1992; Geller & Scott, 1992). It has thus heen concluded that: 
"[a]lthough estahlishing causation is always a difficult task, the pattern 
seems clear. Adoption of restrictive policies usually has heen followed 
hy marked decreases in shootings hy police, increases in the proportion 
of shootings that are responses to serious criminal activity, greater or 
unchanged officer safety, and no adverse impact on crime levels or arrest 
aggressiveness" (Geller & Scott, 1992:267). 
The post-Garner era has heen characterised hy continued puhlic pressure for restraint 
hy police and the overall trend among North American police agencies has heen 
toward adopting increasingly restrictive deadly force policies (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
However, contemporary police have remained divided over the optimal hasic 
standard, that is, hetween protection-of-life and defence-of-life. Unfortunately, 
research has not estahlished exactly how many police agencies currently operate 
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using each of these standards (Geller & Scott, 1992). But it is common knowledge 
that a substantial proportion of agencies still defend the protection-of-life standard 
and have resisted the uniform introduction of the defence-of-life standard which has 
heen promoted hy intluential police groups like the Commission on Accreditation for 
Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and the National Organisation of Black Law 
Enforcement Executives (NOBLE). Indeed CALEA has even made the defence-of-
life standard a prerequisite for the accreditation of law enforcement agencies. It has 
also heen argued convincingly, hy the president of the Police Foundation among 
others, that standards less rigorous than defence-of-life increase police discretion, the 
prohahility of errors in judgement, and abuses of power as well as enhancing 
opportunities for police cover-ups (e.g. Williams, 1991; The Law Enforcement 
News, July-August 1990). By contrast, permitting police to kill only in order to 
defend people from immediate and substantial threat~ to life, diminishes otlicers' 
need to speculate and may also reduce the impact of racism on police decisions to 
use deadly force (Geller & Scott, 1992). Arrest policies in which ofticers are 
required to assess the chances of subsequently apprehending a suspect when deciding 
whether to use deadly force, have heen highlighted as particularly problematic. 
Racist stereotypes and the actual circumstances in hlack, urhan ghettos feed police 
perceptions that hlack people are more difficult to apprehend, which is likely to 
increase the probability of officers using deadly force against tleeing hlack suspects 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). so 
Opposition to the defence-of-life standard not only exists hut has heen gaining 
ground in recent years. The model policy of the International Association of Chiefs 
of Police ( IACP) promotes the protection-of-life standard and in 1991 the FBI --
which has held to the defence-of-life standard for almost 50 years -- was granted 
legal permission to adopt the less stringent protection-of-life standard, and to re-
introduce warning shot'i that don't foreseeahly endanger bystanders (The LA Times, 
13 June 1990). The hasis of the FBis argument has heen that the defence-of-life 
standard requires "unreasonable restraint" because current circumstances make it 
necessary for agents to use deadly force against " .. . Is] uspects who present a 
continuing threat of violence to the community, regardless of whether or not that 
violence is heing exhibited at the moment agents discharge their weapons" (Geller & 
Scott, 1992:272-3). It is interesting, however, that the FBI have not yet formally 
changed their deadly force standard and the reason may well he the onslaught of 
public criticism, especially since the notorious Waco incident in Texas in which FBI 
agents killed a number of women and children. However, the FBis tum-about has 
boosted the position of state and local police agencies that oppose the defence-of-life 
standard. 81 Despite such obstacles the US campaign for increased restraint in the use 
80 Lower public co-operation with police and increase risks in certain hlack areas. 
81 In 1990 the Florida and Georgia State Police requested exemption from the 
CALEA defence-of-life requirement. 
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of deadly force hy police and improved ofticer safety has not heen deterred. Policy 
reforms hased on the Scharf-Binder approach, which place an onus on ofticers to 
avoid using deadly force whenever feasihle and do not protect police who create the 
need to use deadly force, are currently heing tested in practice, e.g. in the Chicago, 
NYPD and Littlerock Police Departments. 
One of the most positive changes to have taken place in the USA has heen the 
gradual demise of police secrecy ahout deadly force regulations (The Dallas Morning 
News, 19 August 1988). The vast majority of North American police agencies now 
puhlicise their policies having learned the value of fostering this form of external 
accountahility, especially when it comes to managing puhlic protest in the wake of 
controversial killings hy police. In fact many agencies have now adopted specitic 
guidelines for dealing with the public relations aspect-; of police deadly force (Geller 
& Scott, 1992). 
lt is not only the hasic standard which has been debated in terms of decreasing 
the use of deadly force hy police via policy reforms. As far hack as 1977 a survey 
conducted for the Police Foundation highlighted a range of additional policy 
considerations relevant to deadly force and showed that there was great disparity 
across police agencies in these practices (Milton et at, 1977). By the nineties there 
was still a lack of uniformity in policy on issues such as: ( l) the use of deadly force 
by police against juveniles and the mentally ill, (2) shooting at or from a moving 
vehicle and attempting to stop a vehicle hy taking up a position in its path, (3) the 
drawing and pointing of firearms, and (4) the use of warning shots. To expand: it 
has been contended that additional restraint in the use of deadly force ought to be 
required of police when dealing with juvenile and mentally ill suspects. Agencies 
adhering to the defence-of-life standard have tended to reject the need for further 
restrictions on the use of deadly force against such suspects. By contrast, some 
departments employing the protection-of-life standard have required that officers 
apply the more stringent defence-of-life standard in interactions with juveniles and 
mentally ill suspect-;, e.g. the Kansas City and Memphis Police Department-;. 82 
After some dispute, it has now heen generally accepted that police should not 
he permitted to tire shots at or from moving vehicles; the main rationale heing that 
shot-; tired under such circumstances rarely hit their intended targets and, hence, 
endanger innocent hystanders (e.g. Alpert & Fridell, 1992; The New York Times, 
25 August 1992; The lACP, 1989; Matulia, 1985). Furthermore, if a driver is shot 
s/he may I{X)Se control of a moving vehicle, thus jeopardising passengers and other 
road users. A few agencies have seen tit to explicitly prohihit the police tactic of 
stepping out in front of a moving vehicle in order to bring it to a halt, e.g. the Dallas 
Police Department. The reasoning hehind this regulation is that it places officers at 
undue risk and almost inevitahly necessitates the defensive use of deadly force. 
Indeed it is hecoming increasingly common for police agencies to han in principle all 
82 Also see the NYSCCJ (1987) tactical guidelines on mentally ill suspects. 
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tactics that create the need for police to use deadly force. This is part of the Scharf-
Binder approach to the management of police deadly force. More recently the 
related topic of high speed vehicular pursuit'i hy police has hegun to receive attention 
in the tield of deadly force. Proposals have heen made for restricting the use of this 
common police tactic on the grounds that high speed vehicular chases constitute a 
significant threat to the lives of hystanders. Interestingly, it has heen claimed that 
when used in high speed chases, police vehicles constitute a form of deadly force 
which must he controlled (Alpert & Fridel!, 1992). 
It is noteworthy that although police deadly force policies contain detailed 
restrictions on the firing of guns, very few have specifically limited the 
circumstances under which officers may draw and point their tirearms (Geller & 
Scott, 1992; Milton er al, 1977). This seems to he a serious oversight as the mere 
drawing of a firearm may affect the prohahility of violence in a police-civilian 
interaction: it may frighten or anger a suspect so increasing the chance of force heing 
used, or alternatively, it may suhdue a suspect making the use of force unnecessary. 
There is also the heightened risk of an unintentional shooting taking place once a gun 
is drawn. It has heen suggested therefore that the restrictions on the tiring of guns 
hy police also he applied to the drawing of firearms. In other words, officers should 
not draw their firearms unless shooting is justitied, necessary and unavoidahle (e.g. 
Milton er al, 1977). 
Generally speaking, US police agencies consider warning shots to he 
ineffective and dangerous (e.g. Bentley, 1990; Burke, 1990; The LA Times, 13 June 
1990). Allowing warning shots is also said to open the door for police to justify 
unintentional and even unlawful shootings (e.g. Milton et al, 1977). The CALEA 
and IACP deadly force policies prohihit the firing of warning shot'i hy police, as do 
the majority of contemporary police regulations (Geller & Scott, 1992). It is thus 
surprising that the FBI have recently sought to re-introduce the use of warning shot'i 
in situations where hystanders are not likely to he endangered (The LA Times, 13 
June 1990). The legal position on warning shots is not as clear as the policy position 
and there is ongoing controversy among scholars over whether the Tennessee v 
Gamer ruling allows warning shots (Burke, 1990). 83 At the crux of this dispute is 
the question of whether warning shots constitute deadly force. If this is the case it 
would seem contradictory to argue: " ... that one can use a form of deadly force 
(warning shot'i) in order to create the justification for employing deadly force in the 
tirst instance" (Geller & Scott, 1992:271 ). 
The following provisions have also heen proposed for inclusion in police 
deadly force policies: (I) a prohihition on the carrying of service tirearms hy off-
duty ofticers (2) a statement explicitly terminating the requirement that off-duty 
officers actively intervene in suspected lawhreaking; and (3) a han on officers having 
more than one approved handgun while on duty. Police carrying so-called hack-up 
83 Also see Geller and Scott (1992). 
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guns has heen associated with greater risk taking, less control over their weapons, 
and officers planting guns to justify illegitimate shootings. The presence of 
additional firearms has often confused investigations into police shootings (e.g. 
Leslie, 1992; Fyfe, 1980lal, 1978; Milton et al, 1977). Instead of police toting 
more guns, training in marksmanship and weapon retention should he improved (e.g 
The New York Times, 4 Septemher 1990). Lastly, police deadly force policies must 
of course include the specific departmental procedures that ofticers are to follow in 
the wake of reportahle incidents. 
Policy Implementation and Enforcement 
The key to the success of restrictive deadly force policies is effective implementation 
and enforcement. Indeed: 
"leJnforcement is the ultimate test. What happens to the ofticer who 
indefensihly disoheys a policy? If nothing happens (or nothing very 
dramatic), the policy is just another piece of paper among many. If such 
an officer is tired, suspended, demoted, or otherwise seriously 
disciplined, the disciplinary action is an important indication that the 
policy is in fact a policy" (Milton et al, 1977:65). 
Whilst punishment is a necessary aspect, it is not a sufficient means of successfully 
enforcing policy (Zacharias, 1991 ). In fact it is crucial not to punish officers for 
inconsequential errors as this simply encourages them to distort the way in which 
they report deadly force incident-; (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Changing estahlished 
police practices and resistant suhcultural norms takes time and requires a 
comhination of interventions including inter alia: incentives, systems for supervising, 
monitoring and assessing officers' conduct, supportive mechanisms for stress 
management, as well as retraining and re-equipping officers and, at hase, strong 
police leadership (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Alpert & Fridell, 1992; Geller & Scott, 
1992). Without police executives who are honestly committed to reducing the 
unnecessary use of deadly force hy their officers, there is little hope of change 
among the rank-and-tile (Sherman, 1983). Furthermore, hecause new policy 
requirements are usually discordant with entrenched practices, the higgest hurdle is 
getting police to accept and apply them. Experience has shown that policy reforms 
imposed hy management without consultation tend to he resisted. Perhaps the most 
common example of this is the announcement of changes hy way of written 
memoranda. The most effective method of implementing directives is to involve 
officers in the development of policy from the out-;et. After all, they are well 
equipped to assess the practical advantages and disadvantages of proposed changes 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). 
Since the seventies there has heen a move away from traditional chain-of-
command investigations into police deadly force incidents. Most police agencies 
have introduced permanent internal review hoards, although these vary greatly in 
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their composition and functioning (Geller & Scott. 1992). Review hoards are 
designed to facilitate internal accountahility within police departments. In general, 
officers are required to report specitied incident~ like firearms discharges, injuries 
and/or deaths. The hoards then assess the legitimacy of police conduct and make 
recommendations for further action where internal policy and/or the law has heen 
violated. The availahle literature indicates that certain features of police review 
hoards have generally proven advantageous. To elahorate: it is preferahle that these 
hoards consider all incidents in which police fire shot~ rather than just those 
involving injuries or deaths (e.g. The NYPD, 1988; Matulia, 1985; Meyer, 1980[a]; 
Fyfe, 1979[h]). It is also worthwhile for hoards to examine incidents in which the 
use of deadly force has heen avened as this provides valuahle insights for the 
development of preventative measures (e.g. Geller & Scott, 1992; Geller, 1985[a]). 
Furthermore, it appears hetter for review hoards to he empowered and required to 
hand down detailed recommendations on the management of the officers involved 
and departmental changes to strategy, weaponry, equipment and training (Geller & 
Scott, 1992; Geller & Karales, 1981 [a]). This is a relatively novel view of the 
purpose of review hoards in which the emphasis has heen shifted from discipline to 
prevention; the ohjective heing to identify factors contrihuting to the unnecessary use 
of deadly force and to propose appropriate interventions. Overall, it has heen shown 
to he imperative for review hoards to consistently reward those who uphold 
regulations, punish officers for serious violations, and give those who make errors in 
good faith the opportunity to improve via training and support (e.g. Geller & Scott, 
1992; Muir, 1977). For example, the Charleston Police Department's approach has 
improved rates of reporting and compliance with policy requirement~: under this 
system officers who fail to report deadly force incident~ in which policy has not heen 
violated are disciplined, hut those who report honest mistakes are re-trained rather 
than negatively sanctioned (Geller & Scott, 1992). In this respect, Fyfe (l989[c]) 
has emphasised the importance of review hoards distinguishing hetween the willful 
unrestrained use of deadly force hy police -- hrutality -- and the unnecessary use of 
deadly force as a result of incompetence and/or ignorance. 
"In short, it occurs when well-meaning police officers lack -- or fail to 
apply -- the expertise required to resolve as hloodlessly as possihle the 
problems their work requires them to confront [ :] when police lack the 
eloquence to persuade temporarily disturhed persons to give up their 
weapons, hut shoot them instead. It occurs when, instead of pausing to 
consider and apply less drastic alternatives, officers hlindly confront 
armed criminals in the midst of groups of innocent people. It occurs 
when officers called to quell noisy hut non-violent disputes act in a way 
that provokes disputants to violence to which the police must respond in 
kind." (Fyfe, 1989[c):467). 
Review hoards have made use of a range of punitive measures and rewards like 
temporary suspension from duty, undesirahle re-assignment, demotion, favourahle 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
146 
re-assignment, commendation and promotion (Geller & Scott, 1992). Some of the 
more sapient hoards have also recommended techniques aimed at assisting ofticers to 
change their conduct, such as retraining and counselling (Matulia, 1985). The 
importance of establishing internal reward systems for positively reinforcing 
commendable restraint among ofticers has been underscored as a key means of 
counter-balancing the established tradition of rewarding police for involvement in 
violence, and of creating alternative police role models (e.g. Fyfe, 1981 [hj). The 
overall aim is to introduce among police ofticers the concept of bravery in restraint. 
Finally, it has long been advised that police review hoards comprise a mix of 
officers of different ranks from the agency being served and from other police 
departments, as well as civilians, particularly representatives from community 
organisations (Geller & Scott, 1992; The San Diego Union, 21 December 1990; 
Kerstetter, 1985). The inclusion of civilians has been largely a response to the 
criticism that police forces lack external accountability and ca not impartially 
evaluate their own conduct. Whilst many authors claim that civilian representation 
on review hoards has not significantly improved objectivity, some agree that this 
form of oversight has increased public contidence in the police, at least to some 
extent (e.g. The San Diego Union, 21 December 1990). Indeed the eighties have 
seen a proliferation of mechanisms involving the civilian review of police-work in 
the USA (Walker & Bumphus, 1992, 1991). However, the general view of the 
efficacy of such endeavours seems to be somewhat pessimistic (e.g. Perez, 1992; 
The American Civil Liberties Union, 1992; Terrill, 1990; Kerstetter, 1985). In sum 
it has been concluded that civilians who are involved in these structures are either 
gradually 'tamed' or are simply 'toothless watchdogs' in a police dominated 
environment. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that the building and maintenance 
of external accountability to the public is crucial to the success of a community style 
of policing. 
Recruitment and Personnel Practises 
Psychological screening test~ have proven ineffectual in identifying officers who are 
prone to perpetrating violence (e.g. Hargrave & Kohls, 1984; Saxe & Fabricatore, 
1982; Nowicki & Stahl, 1978; Milton et al, 1977; Eisenberg & Kent, 1972). 
Similarly, empirical research has generally failed to identify individual officer 
characteristics which reliably predict a proclivity to use force (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
In particular, support has not been forthcoming for the widely held belief that lower 
levels of formal education among officers are associated with higher rates of deadly 
force usage (e.g. Geller & Scott, 1992; Sherman & Blumberg; 1981). There is, 
however, some evidence that older, more experienced officers and female police, 
tend to use deadly force less frequently (e.g. Martin, 1990; Grennan, 1987; Croft, 
1986; Blumberg, 1983, 1981; Binder et al, 1982; Sherman & Blumberg, 1981). 
Although it would he unwise to base recruitment or assignment practices on these 
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tentative tindings, further investigation would seem worthwhile. 
One particular variahle which has proven useful in predicting the future 
hehaviour of officers is past conduct (e.g. The Independent Commission on the 
LAPD, 1991). This has heen used as the hasic rationale for setting up systems for 
monitoring officers' conduct (e.g. The Independent Commission on the LAPD, 
1991; Alpert, 1989[h]; Geller & Karales, 1981[a]). The long term systematic 
tracking of police conduct provides early warning of tendencies to use force 
inappropriately, as well as other prohlematic hehaviours, hence facilitating corrective 
intervention. It has thus heen proposed that certain information pertaining to each 
officer he regularly recorded including inter alia: civilian complaints; charges against 
suspects for resisting arrest, assaulting police and disorderly conduct; all shots tired; 
involvement in incidents in which civilians have heen injured; particulars of 
assignment.;;, partners and supervisors; and performance evaluations, disciplinary and 
commendatory records (Geller & Scott, 1992). Monitoring officers' hehaviour is 
also useful for distinguishing police who engage in racist practices. In this respect 
special attention should to he paid to officers' memhership or support of 
organisations on the far-right of the political continuum such as the Ku Klux Klan 
and Neo-Nazi groups. The advice to police management in the US in this regard has 
heen clear: " ... [officers] whose views contlict with the hasic tenets of a free society 
should he weeded out of the organization lawfully hut hastily" (Geller & Scott, 
1992:302). 
It has heen demonstrated that police tend to experience high rates of suhstance 
dependence and divorce (e.g. The US News & World Report, 3 Decemher 1990). 
Officers involved in deadly force incidents commonly suffer post traumatic stress, 
which in the longer term leads many to resign from the force (e.g. The LA Times, 4 
June 1992; Russell & Beigel, 1990; Baruth, 1986). The major impact of joh-related 
stress on police performance has heen recognised, and particularly the effect.;; on 
police decisions to use deadly force (e.g. Bihhins, 1986; Madamahe, 1986; 
Pendergrass & Ostrove, 1986; Stratton & Stratton, 1982; Stratton & Wroe, 1980). 
Numerous services have heen made availahle to assist US police and their families in 
dealing with a wide range of prohlems. For example, there are support groups for 
officers with similar difficulties and for the families of those killed or injured in the 
line-of-duty (e.g. The FBI, 1992[ii]; Sawyer, 1989; Concerns of Police Survivors, 
1988). The Seatield-911 Programme in Flmida, which caters for officers suffering 
from stress, drug and alcohol ahuse, has received much acclaim (Geller & Scott, 
1992). The peer review group, aimed at retraining officers who have demonstrated 
undue aggression, is one of the most promising forms of assistance (The KCPD, 
1991; Toch & Grant, 1991). Some success has also heen achieved in overcoming 
the effect of macho police suhculture which has tended to deter ofticers from seeking 
assistance with personal prohlems. For instance, police supervisors have heen 
trained to identify hehavioural symptoms and refer officers for professional 
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assistance. Numerous agencies have enforced a recuperative period of paid leave 
from duty and trauma counselling for officers involved in deadly force incidents 
(McMurray, 1990). 
Training 
Since the late eighties in particular there has heen a veritahle hoom in the tield of 
police training, especially in the four main areas of: deadly force policy 
interpretation, conflict management tactics, human relations and cultural awareness, 
and the use of weapons and equipment. The overall ohjectives of these forms of 
training have heen to reduce the unnecessary use of force hy police and to improve 
officer safety (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
Training officers to put a new restrictive deadly force policy into practice 
involves overcoming established methods and the norms of police suhculture. 
Usually the greater the disparity hetween new and existing practices, the higher the 
resistance to change and, hence, the more thorough and comprehensive is the re-
training necessary to achieve the desired results. Clear wording, the avoidance of 
ahstract terminology, and the use of practical examples, can make new deadly force 
policy 'user-friendly'. However, application in real situations will always involve 
some degree of interpretation hy officers. The main purpose of training police in 
new policy requirement~ is to ensure that they learn to apply these in the manner 
intended. The realistic simulation of the kinds of circumstances in which officers are 
likely to he faced with the decision of whether to employ deadly force has proven to 
he the most etlective means of training police to apply new deadly force policy 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). Whilst there is ohviously a need to re-train officers when 
new policy is introduced, regular refresher training on deadly force is also 
imperative (e.g. Geller & Scott, 1992; Geller & Karales, 1981[a]). 
Conflict management is really the essence of police-work, for it is they who 
are required to intervene when civilians fail to resolve conflicts. It is logical 
therefore, that teaching officers skills for managing interpersonal conflict constitutes 
the hasis of Violence Reduction Training (VRT). 84 Numerous such programmes 
have heen developed, some involving sophisticated realistic settings in which deadly 
force incidents can he safely simulated, for example: Survival City at the Tampa 
Police Training Academy; Laser Village at the Los Angeles County Sheriffs 
Department; The Apartment of the NYPD; and Hogan's Alley at the FBl Academy 
in Virginia (Korzeniowski, 1990; The LA Times, 8 Septemher 1991; Geller & 
Karales, 1981[a]; Slahor, 1992; Pledger, 1988 resp). Additionally, several more 
hasic, yet effective, violence reduction role-playing programmes have heen 
developed hy various police agencies like the New York City, Chicago and Dade 
County Police Departments. Along with role-playing, videotape-recording is heing 
84 See Fyfe (1989[c], 1988[c]), The Police Foundation (1988), Geller (1985ra]), 
and Geller and Karales (1981[a]) for literature reviews. 
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used increasingly in police VRT, hoth to impart information and to provide feedhack 
to ofticers during training (Schrader. 1988). Contemporary police trainers tend to 
agree that the use of role-playing and realistic simulations of likely situations have 
proven to he the most effective techniques for VRT (e.g. Korzeniowski, 1990; 
Goddard, 1988). Indeed it has been stressed that training officers in unrealistic 
circumstances can actually he dangerous as this encourages the learning of 
inappropriate and ineffective tactics (e.g. Geiger et at, 1990; Korzeniowski, 1990). 
Although VRT programmes vary in many ways, they tend to share the 
following two basic aims: a new approach to contlict, and a wide range of less-than-
lethal tactics for dealing with potentially violent situations (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
In order to signiticantly reduce police use of deadly force, and particularly guns, it is 
vital to provide officers with a range of alternate means of achieving their law 
enforcement objectives; to expand the effective force continuum. Whilst the 
relevance of the second goal is somewhat obvious, the importance of the first 
objective is often underestimated. It should thus he emphasised that if an officer's 
approach to managing contlict is not changed, s/he is unlikely to employ alternatives 
to deadly force even if s/he has the necessary skills and equipment. ln essence then, 
the key to VRT is to teach officers to prioritise the use of non-violent over violent 
tactics and less-than-lethal force over deadly force. In other words, police must 
come to accept that their ideal role is to defuse potentially violent situations without 
having to resort to force; to prevent rather than win a tight (Rutledge, 1988). Police 
must be trained to uphold in practice the principles of restraint, minimum force, 
incremental use and proportionality. 
Because the body of literature on less-than-lethal control tactics for police· is 
voluminous, only a brief overview of some of the central issues has been included 
here. ss According to police weapons and tactics experts the following comprise the 
repertoire of less-than-lethal police control tactics which are generally divided into 
unarmed tactics and strategies involving the use of less-than-lethal weapons (Clede & 
Parsons, 1987:6-8): 
( 1) body language; 
( 2) verbal communication; 
( 3) unarmed restraintli and come-along holds; 
( 4) neck restraints; 
( 5) the controlled use of short sticks and batons; 
( 6) handcuffing methods; 
( 7) knife-combat techniques; 
( 8) mechanical devices like capture nets and physical impact weapons; 
( 9) electronic devices; 
( 10) chemical devices. 
The comprehensive use-of-force-options model, which has been summarised in the 
85 See Graves and Connor (1992), Connor (1991, 1990), Schultz (1990), Connor 
and Summers (1988) and Clede and Parsons (1987). 
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Table 4.6, undergirds a substantial proportion of contemporary US police VRT 
programmes (Geller & Scott, 1992). 86 The force-options listed on the right hand 
side of Table 4.6 comprise a continuum of force and are grouped into three 
categories defined by Connor and Summers ( 1988:1) as follows: (I) no force 
options; (2) ordinary force options involving the use of physical force not likely or 
intended to cause death or serious injury; and (3) extra-ordinary force options 
requiring the use of force likely to result in severe injury or death. The authors have 
emphasised, however, that if ordinary force is abused, the effect'i may he those of 
extra-ordinary force. To illustrate, there has been much negative criticism of the 
police use of certain forms of neck restraint like the arm-bar technique which has 
been associated with an unacceptably high fatality rate (Geller & Scott, 1992). 87 
The model also includes the following tive types of civilian conduct in relation 
to police intervention: (1) the most common civilian response is co-operation with 
police (the remaining four all involve various levels of non-complia ce); (2) Level I 
Resistance generally refers to verbal opposition to officers' instructions;ss (3) Level 
II Resistance includes physical expressions of opposition to police requests that do 
not involve force, like holding onto the steering wheel when instructed to step out of 
a vehicle, and walking away from an officer after being told to stand still; ( 4) Level 
I Assault refers to physical attacks by suspect'i on officers which are not likely to 
cause serious injury; and (5) Level II Assault'i are attacks that are likely to severely 
harm or even kill officers. 
Table 4.6: 
Basic Components of tbe Use-of-Force-Options Model. 
Levels of Threat 
by Civilians 
Co-operation 
Level I Resistance 
Appropriate Levels of Force 
by Police 
NO FORCE OPTIONS: 
controlled confrontation 
body language 
verbal persuasion 
NO FORCE OPTIONS: 
body language 
verbal persuasion 
ORDINARY FORCE OPTIONS: 
contact controls 89 
joint restraints oo 
86 The tirst version was proposed by Connor and Summers in 1988. A more 
recent revision was put forward by Graves and Connor in 1992. 
87 In 1982 the LAPD banned the use of neck restraint'i by police. 
88 Otherwise termed "preliminary cues of resistance" (Connor, 1991 :31-2). 
89 Like the escort position, come-along and blanket holds. 
90 Like handcufting and ankle-cuffing techniques. 
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Level I Assault 
Level II Assault 
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weapon"assisted leverage 
techniques 91 
nerve centre controls 92 
NO FORCE OPTIONS: 
body language 
verbal persuasion 
ORDINARY FORCE OPTIONS: 
contact controls 
joint restraint~ 
weapon"assisted leverage 
techniques 
nerve centre controls 
weapon"assisted pain 
compliance techniques 93 
chemical irritants 94 
electrical devices 95 
intimate impact weapons 96 
NO FORCE OPTIONS: 
body language 
verbal persuasion 
ORDINARY FORCE OPTIONS: 
contact controls 
joint restraints 
weapon-assisted leverage 
techniques 
nerve centre controls 
weapon-assisted pain 
compliance techniques 
chemical irritants 
electrical devices 
intimate impact weapons 
EXTRA-ORDINARY FORCE OPTIONS: 
extended impact weapons 97 
NO FORCE OPTIONS: 
body language 
verbal persuasion 
ORDINARY FORCE OPTIONS: 
contact controls 
joint restraints 
weapon-assisted leverage 
techniques 
nerve centre controls 
weapon-assisted pain 
compliance techniques 
chemical irritants 
91 Like stun grenades to distract suspect~, capture net~ ·and water canons. 
92 Like pressure"point controls and neck restraint~. 
93 Like jabbing or applying pressure to point~ below the neck using batons or 
short sticks. 
94 Like teargas and oleoresin capsicum. 
95 Like stun guns and Tasers. 
96 Like short sticks and batons. 
97 Like the pneumatic piston impact weapon, less-than-lethal projectiles like bean 
hags and sting-rags. 
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electrical devices 
intimate impact weapons 
EXTRA-ORDINARY FORCE OPTIONS: 
extended impact weapons 
weaponless techniques with 
dehilitating potential 9B 
weapon techniques with 
dehilitating potential 99 
service firearm 
supplemental firearm Ioo 
Sources: Graves and Connor (1992), Connor (1991) and, Connor and Summers 
(1988). 
Two of the key advantages of using the use-of-force-options model in police VRT 
are that it enahles the teaching of a range of explicit tactical options rather than 
ahstract notions, and that the use of restraint is emphasised in all types of interactions 
hetween police and civilians. Thus ofticers are trained to consider the use of less-
than-lethal tactics even in the most dangerous of circumstances. One of the most 
productive development~ in VRT has heen the integration of the use-of-force-options 
model and the sequential decision-Qlaking approach. Connor's work has heen 
applied to the five-phase Scharf-Binder model (1983) hy adding the stage of "less-
than-lethal physical control tactics" (Geller & Scott, 1992:326). This now 
constitutes a fourth and rather vital phase prior to the final frame decision of whether 
to use deadly force. The sequential decision-making model has heen particularly 
intluential in shifting the estahlished view among ofticers that decisions to use deadly 
force are spilt-second phenomena and hence not amenahle to modification hy training 
(e.g. Kolts et at, 1992; Fyte, 1989[cl). VRT hased on this approach teaches officers 
that, from the time they hecome aware of an imminent encounter with civilians, their 
decisions and actions affect the likelihood of suhsequent violence. Because officers 
are likely to suffer tunnel-vision once they are actually confronted with a life-
threatening situation, training in decision-making has tended to focus on improving 
the way in which officers' approach an interaction and particularly the importance of 
maintaining a strategic yet protected position and using communication to contain 
suspects (e.g. McCarthy, 1992; Moriany, 1990; Smith, 1990; Wade, 1990). It is 
now widely acknowledged that officers who have poor communication skills are less 
successful at diffusing violence (e.g. Toch & Grant, 1991; Toch, 1969). As a 
consequence the programme known as Verhal Judo or Tactical Communications has 
hecome popular among North American police agencies (The Crime Control Digest, 
18 May 1992; The LA Times, 3 May 1992; Jamieson et at, 1990; The LA Times, 8 
98 Like martial arts techniques. 
99 Like knife tighting techniques. 
100 A controversial option now widely rejected. 
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May 1990). The stated objective of this training is to teach ofticers " ... how to stay 
calm and professional under verbal assault, and how to generate voluntary 
compliance from the most difticult people" (Geller & Scott, 1992:314-5). It has also 
heen proposed that ofticers he taught about the ways in which they unintentionally 
frighten civilians into using defensive force (e.g. Toch & Grant, 1991; G1iftin, 
1990). This is particularly important considering the wide~;pread belief in minority 
groups that the police are more likely to use violence against them. 
Intervention training (IT) is one of the most interesting new development<~ in 
VRT. Prompted hy the Rodney King case, IT focuses on teaching officers how to 
calm and control police colleagues who become overly angry or inappropriately 
violent, so as to avoid the escalation of contlict. This type of training has already 
heen introduced into the California Police Ofticers Standards and Training 
programme, as well as the programmes of the Dallas and Sacramento Police 
Department<~ (Geller & Scott, 1992). The success of such initiatives may well he 
enhanced hy the fact that under US law any police officer who fails to attempt to 
prevent a constitutional violation may he held civilly and/or criminally liable 
(Spector, 1992). IT seems to present a way of working with the police subculture of 
secrecy and loyalty which has tended to prevent officers from divulging information 
to supervisors about colleagues who use force with a lack of restraint (The Portland 
Oregonian, 26 April 1992). 
Officer Survival Training (OST) is usually integral to contemporary VRT 
programmes as the overall aim is to minimise the violence used hy police while 
maximising their safety. It has heen customary to school officers in the following 
so-called "ten deadly errors" derived from actual cases in which police have heen 
killed unnecessarily: ( 1) failing to adequately care for and remain proticient in the 
use of weapons and equipment; (2) using improper search and hand-cufting 
techniques; (3) being sleepy or falling asleep while on duty; (4) becoming 
complacent, especially when engaging in apparently routine activities; (5) not paying 
attention to the danger signs; (6) adopting an unprotected position; (7) failing to 
watch a suspect's hands; (8) not waiting tor backup; (9) being preoccupied; and ( 10) 
becoming apathetic (Albrecht, 1992: 199). Originally, OST included only those 
tactics designed to decrease the risk of injury and death for officers in encounters 
with civilians, for example, the value of taking cover, the use of protective clothing 
and equipment, the importance of backup and temporary disengagement when 
necessary. A wider conception of OST has now heen developed, the aim of which is 
to improve the overall legal, psychological and physical well-being of police 
ofticers. The teaching of life-skills designed to prevent suicide, divorce, alcohol and 
drug dependence among police, as well as general stress management techniques, 
now frequently comprise aspect<; of OST (The Chicago Free Weekly, 22 November 
1991 ). In contemporary OST there has also heen a specitic focus on teaching police 
to deal productively with their own fear in violent confrontations and on providing 
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post-shooting trauma counselling (e.g. Solomon, 1990; Geller, 1986, !985jaj; 
Matulia, 1985). 
Considering the glut of descriptive literature on VRT and OST, it is 
disappointing to tind that there has heen limited empirical evaluation of their impact. 
However, a suhstantial numher of police departments have attrihuted a range of 
positive effecL~ to VRT initiatives (Geller & Scott, 1992). One of the most thorough 
assessments has heen conducted by the Metro-Dade Police Department. Following 
VRT and the introduction of a more restrictive deadly force policy this agency 
documented a long term decrease in the rate of shots tired hy police, in the rates of 
injuries and deaths of officers, as well as improvements in crime control and puhlic 
relations (Torres, 1992; Alpert, 19891h]; Fyfe, 19891a], 1988[c], 19861h]; The 
Police Foundation, 1988). In addition, the Memphis Police Department has reported 
a signiticant decrease in the shooting rate after the implementation of a more 
restrictive deadly force policy in combination with an OST programme (Sparger & 
Giacopassi, 1992). The Chicago Police Department has heen recognised for 
developing one of the hest deadly force decision-making training programmes hased 
on the Scharf-Binder approach. This training is said to have produced a signiticant 
long term reduction in the police shooting rate (Geller & Scott, 1992). However, it 
should also he noted that the Chicago and San Diego Police Departments have 
reported shon term increases in the rate of police shootings consequent to OST 
(Geller & Scott, 1992; The Crime Control Digest, 3 June 1991 ). This has been 
attrihuted to the use of programmes that overemphasise the danger confronting 
officers, thus making police fearful and trigger happy (Geller & Scott, 1992). Such 
negative outcomes have spurred calls for the systematic investigation of the impact of 
different training programmes on ofticers' attitudes and conduct. 
Nevertheless, the availahle evidence seems to indicate that VRT and OST have 
the potential to reduce violence hy and against police officers, especially when 
comhined with other interventions like policy changes. This heing said, it must he 
home in mind that no matter how effective the training, like any skill, some ofticers 
will he more proficient than others. It is thus crucial that managers and trainers 
monitor officers' conduct and utilise this information to inform decisions ahout 
assignments. To illustrate: it may he wise to avoid assigning officers who 
demonstrate little proticiency at diffusing violence to high risk duties. It has also 
heen stressed that managers should not hesitate to re-assign to administrative duties 
or dismiss ofticers who, after intensive training, continue to display a lack of 
restraint in the use of force (Schotield, 1990). 
VRT is generally complemented hy Shooting Proticiency Training (SPT). 
Although ofticers must he trained in restraint, when necessary they must also he ahle 
to use their tirearms proticiently. SPT is one of the oldest and most hasic aspects of 
rolice training (Geller & Karales, 198l!a]). Although the frequency of SPT for 
police has heen increased over time, it is still argued that the usual once or twice 
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yearly training is insufficient and that more regular training is required in order for 
officers to develop and maintain contidence and prowess in the use of their guns 
(Rutledge, 1988). It might he surprising to note that the average US police officer is 
not a particularly accurate marksman in real-life circumstances (e.g. The New York 
Times, 29 August 1992; Matulia 1985, Geller & Karales l98l[a], l98lfh]). 101 In 
fact it is: 
" ... a Hollywood-generated myth that officers can shoot a handgun 
under comhat conditions accurately enough to 'wing' rather than kill a 
suspect ... and can invariahly accomplish their tactical ohjectives with a 
single shot" (Geller & Scott 1992: 104). 
The police have heen repeatedly criticised for having to tire too many shots hefore 
striking their intended targets; this spray-and-pray method of shooting increases the 
risk to hystanders and property (Geller & Scott, 1992). Hence, one of the main 
goals of SPT programmes is to reduce the numher of shots tired hy improving police 
marksmanship (Pilant, 1992; McCarthy, 1992). Signiticantly, police leaders are 
now heginning to accept that stopping power can he more successfully improved hy 
enhancing ofticers' skill at hullet placement, than hy arming them with more lethal 
tirearms and ammunition (e.g. Cerar, 1991; The IACP, l990[hl). Firearm training 
expert-; agree that target shooting under artificial circumstances is an ineffective 
means of improving marksmanship under real conditions, and should only he used 
for teaching the safe-handling of firearms (e.g. Fairbairn & Sykes, 1987). Instead, 
it is deemed vital to train officers to use their guns in circumstances as close as 
possihle to those they are likely to experience (Morgan, 1992), such as: 
" ... at night with dim or variahle lighting, after running several hlocks, 
with multiple opponents to think ahout, with other ofticers and 
hystanders on the scene, and while wearing on-duty clothing (Geller & 
Scott, 1992:341). 
The current trend is to conduct SPT using realistic simulations of actual conditions 
like the Replicative Outdoor Training Range of the Provo Police, the Replicative 
Firing Range of the Anaheim Police, and the programmes of the FBI Academy in 
Virginia and Training Centre in Georgia (Nielsen, 1990; Schrader, 1988; Geller & 
Scott, 1992 resp). The hetter SPT programmes do not only address hullet 
placement, hut also cover the safe-keeping, retention and safe-handling of firearms 
and ammunition. In view of the substantial numher of ofticers who have heen shot 
with their own guns, weapons retention tactics have hecome an important aspect of 
SPT (Geller & Scott, 1992). Since ofticers are likely to handle guns other than their 
own, for instance when disarming suspect-; or conducting search and seizure 
initiatives, it is also crucial that police he trained to safely handle the kinds of guns 
101 The civilian strike rate against police is even poorer, see The New York City 
Transit Police Department (1991) and Cerar (1990). 
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they are most likely to encounter (Carteret al, 1990). 
Training police in human relations and cultural awareness has hecome 
increasingly popular since community policing has heen widely adopted. These 
topics now constitute important aspect~ of training programmes aimed at violence 
reduction. The rationale undergirding human relations training is that hy treating 
civilians with more respect, ofticers can diffuse potential violence and serve as 
positive role models (The New York Times, 20 July 1992). 102 "[D]isrespect is a 
vicious cycle and police initiatives, taken day hy day and heat hy heat across the 
nation, can intluence whether mutual recrimination and hostility rise and fall" 
(Geller & Scott, 1992:302). Overall, it is envisaged that bettering police human 
relations skills will improve rapport with civilians, thus reducing unnecessary 
violence and enhancing public co-operation with the police (Pratt, 1990). 
Initiatives to reduce police racism and improve inter-racial relations between 
officers and civilians have hecome a core aspect of contemporary police human 
relations training programmes. Although ethnic or race relations training (RRT) 
programmes are many and varied, the following general guidelines developed hy the 
British police have heen widely applied hy police forces throughout the world:. (I) 
undergird RRT with organisational policy and other interventions aimed at 
eliminating racism and promoting equal opportunity within the police force; (2) 
conduct RRT as part of other key training programmes rather than as a separate 
course; (3) design RRT to target knowledge, attitudes and behaviour simultaneously; 
(4) frame RRT as a means of improving police professionalism in the context of a 
multicultural society, and not as an exercise in personal criticism; (5) deal with 
racism and ethnicity directly, as well as within the more general context of equal 
opportunity and community relations; (6) use a range of training techniques, 
particularly those which utilise officers' personal experiences and enable controlled 
learning from tirst-hand experience; and (7) involve civilian experts in design and 
delivery (Oakley, 1990). 
Cultural Awareness Training (CAT) has hecome a particularly popular 
component of police training in race-relations. The main aim of CAT is to develop 
officers' understanding of different cultures so as to decrease the chances of police 
misconstruing non-threatening conduct as dangerous, and to reduce the prohahility of 
officers' inadvertently threatening suspect~, so causing defensive behaviour which 
may escalate into violence (e.g. The LA Times, 31 January 1992; Weaver, 1992; 
Littleton, 1990; The IACP, 1990[a]; Geller, 1986; Geller & Karales, l98l[a]; 
Kochman, 1981 ). Reducing ethnocentrism among police also improves their 
capacity to distinguish among persons who belong to groups different from their own 
(Goldstein, 1991). 
I 02 Civilians, especially youths, are also heing targeted for such training, e.g. the 
Washington Centre for the Prevention of Handgun Violence and the New York 
City Programme for Resolving Contlict Creatively. See The Chicago Tribune 
(22 May !992) and Miedzian (1991) resp. 
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Less-than-Lethal Weapons and Equipment 
There is ongoing dehate over the detinition, hut for heuristic purposes it is generally 
accepted that less-than-lethal weapons are those which, when used as designed, do 
not usually cause death, "serious or permanent injuries except possihly to persons 
with unusual susceptibility" (Geller & Scott, 1992:358-9). It has heen argued 
persuasively that tirearms are not the optimal weapon for law enforcement purposes, 
hecause they are designed to kill and the objective of police is to temporarily 
incapacitate resistant suspects. Indeed the hopes of many who would reduce the 
police use of deadly force have been pinned on substituting the police gun with a 
less-than-lethal weapon which "nonviolently and instantly immobilizes adversaries" 
(Geller & Scott, 1992:358). "rTJhe ideal nonlethal weapon would he hand-held, 
operated hy one officer who would carry it on the equipment helt, allowing 
appropriate distance hetween the ofticer and the suspect, temporarily yet harmlessly 
incapacitating only to the intended target, and easy to use and maintain" (Meyer in: 
The Crime Control Digest, 8 June 1992). Regular demands have heen made for the 
development of more effective less-than-lethal weapons for policing, at least since 
1969. It seems, however, that the ideal replacement weapon has yet to he produced. 
Today the police still use less-than-lethal weapons as supplements to tirearms. 
Nevertheless, a wide range of useful and promising tools are availahle like: hatons 
and short sticks, teargas, electrical stun devices, less-than-lethal projectiles, capture 
net11, extended-reach grabhing devices and a range of protective equipment. 103 Work 
in this field. is also hooming, literature is ahundant and many less-than-lethal 
weapons have heen thoroughly evaluated: the assessment of less-than-lethal tactics in 
the LAPD hetween 1981 and 1991 is a good example (see Tahle 4.7). On the hasis 
of these findings it was concluded that Tasers and teargas are effective less-than-
lethal weapons which resulted in: 
"fewer and less severe injuries than conventional force types (haton, 
karate kick, flashlight, swarm, and miscellaneous hodily force)". . .. The 
Taser has saved lives. Major injuries have heen averted. There should 
he a Taser in every squad car in this country, and they should he used as 
the weapon of choice over more injurious tactics such as hatons and 
kicks" (Meyer 199lfaJ :44). 
103 See Geller and Scott (1992:364-398), data collected hy the Institute for Law 
and Justice, Meyer (l992(a], 1992(hl, 1992(c], 199l!al, 199lfh]), The KCPD 
(1991), The IACP (199llc], 1989(aJ), Jamieson et al (1990), The Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice (1990) and the NIJ-datahase. 
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Table 4. 7: 
Efficacy and Injury Rates for Less-than-lethal Weapons and Tactics, the 
LAPD 1981-1991. 
Less-than-Lethal 
Tactics 
Flashlights 
Miscellaneous Force 
Swarm technique 
Kicking 
Batons · 
Teargas 
Taser 
Punching 
Efticacy 
Rates(%) 
96 
94 
92 
87 
85 
85 
85 
75 
·Sources: Meyer (1992fa], !99lfal). 
Police Injury 
Rates(%) 
4 
15 
16 
I I 
16 
0 
0 
36 
Suspect Injury 
Rates ( %) 
80 
46 
24 
26 
61 
0 
0 
64 
It is thus important that p{)Jice agencies do not reject less-than-lethal devices without 
thorough empirical assessment of their impact in the ti ld. In choosing to introduce 
a particular less-than-lethal device or tactic for police use, many factors ought to he 
taken into account such as the purpose to he served, reliahility and efficacy, safety 
for users, recipients and hystanders, acceptahility among ofticers and the puhlic, 
training requirements, and the cost of purchase and maintenance (Geller & Scott, 
1992). Notahly, adverse puhlic opinion can prevent police from using of the hest 
availahle less-than-lethal equipment. This underscores the importance of the police 
actively providing comprehensive information and consulting with the puhlic ahout 
less-than-lethal tools and tactics. 
Soft hody armour (SBA) has heen hailed as a hreakthrough in the field of 
ofticer safety. Although SBA only protects the torso against standard types of 
ammunition, it is a major improvement on the old heavy tlack jacket in terms of 
protective efticacy and comfort (The IACP, !990(cJ). In the two decades since SBA 
was tirst introduced among North American police there have heen no reported 
failures of this equipment and it has saved the lives of 1448 officers (The IACP, 
1989(aJ), Slavin, !992(aj resp). However, hy 1990 only 24% of local police 
departments in the USA provided and required their officers to wear SBA (The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992( aj; 1992(h D. Cost appears to have heen the main 
ohstacle preventing the widespread use of SBA among police, for it has heen shown 
that when SBA is provided, ofticers tend to wear it (The Law Enforcement News, 31 
March 1991) .104 In view of its impressive track record, there is a growing trend 
among police agencies to provide and mandate the wearing of SBA hy ofticers 
104 The Chicago Police have tinanced SBA from drug asset forfeitures, see Brown 
( 1992). 
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(Brown, 1992; Cerar, 1990; The CALEA, 1988). SBA fah1ic is currently being 
used to line shields and helmets, and a textile which is resistant to knives as well as 
hullet11 is in production. This kind of equipment is likely to further enhance the 
protective capacity of standard plastic shields and helmets which have been 
effectively used in riot management (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
At present an optimism has begun to infuse those working in the field of less-
than-lethal weapons, as many believe that the development of an effective and safe 
substitute for the gun is imminent (e.g. Geis & Binder, 1990). It has been claimed 
that the US military are already testing various incapacitating, less-than-lethal 
chemical substances, some of which are designed to he administered via darting 
guns. Certainly the US government has been making substantial resources available 
to achieve this objective (Geller & Scott, 1992). On the pessimistic side, however, 
there has been a consistent trend toward arming US police with more powerful 
firearms. Despite a lack of conclusive evidence and a great deal of disagreement 
among experts in the field, there has been a tendency to replace revolvers with semi-
automatic pistols as standard issue firearms. 105 This could indicate a so-called arms 
race between the police and criminal suspects, or as one police expert has explained: 
"[i)f a criminal out there has an AK-47, does that mean we lthe police] 
have to have AK-47's with at least the same capacity of rounds? Is that 
how we out-gun? If someone throws a hand grenade at an officer, does 
that mean we throw two hack? Where do you stop? Are we [the police] 
protectors of life and property, or are we military unitli?" (Pilant, 
1992:35). 
Those who support this position maintain that arming the police with more powerful 
firearms is a dangerous and ineffective strategy. The fact that semi-automatic pistols 
hold more ammunition is not particularly advantageous to ofticers since most 
shootings betwee  police and civilians are over within three shotli. The critical 
factor is accurate bullet placement rather than the quantity of available ammunition 
(The New York Times, 4 September 1990). Thus, priority ought to be afforded 
training in shooting proficiency to improve police marksmanship and officer survival 
tactics, including the wearing of SBA (Newsweek, 19 November 1990). 
Nevertheless, as long as the police are armed with guns and the munitions industry 
continues to he a multi-billion dollar enterprise, debates over the optimal type of gun 
and ammunition for routine police-work are likely to continue. 
105 See Geller and Scott (1992:343-357), Kindrick (1992), Markman (1992), 
Bratton (1991, 1990) and Edwards (1991[a], 1991[h]) on the debate over semi-
automatics. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LITERATURE REVIEW PART IV: 
Guns and the Former South African Police Force 
INTRODUCTION 
Today the South African Police force (SAP), which was investigated as part of this 
study, no longer exists. It has heen replaced hy the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) estahlished in terms of Act 68 of 1995. The changes involved have heen 
dramatic and some are still in progress. Indeed the entire police organisation, from 
the level of government to local agencies, has heen restructured and a new 
philosophy of policing adopted (Van Wyk, 1995). Because the empirical research 
conducted for this thesis pertains to the period from 1984 to 1991, it is imperative 
that the findings he interpreted in relation to the former SAP and the sociopolitical 
conditions that characterised this earlier time span. Hence, literature pertaining to 
the SAP constitutes the focus of this review, and reforms made to the police force 
since 1992 have heen discussed in relation to the proposed tirearm strategy in the 
tinal chapter. 
DATA SOURCES 
It is important to note from the outset that access to information on the SAP and it's 
activities was restricted to a degree that surpassed most modem police forces. 
Whilst it was common practice, at least until the late eighties, for police 
organisations worldwide to strictly limit puhlic access to police data, the SAP 
operated like the military in this respect, particularly during the peak civil war years. 
Furthermore, this police secrecy was actually reinforced hy law. In terms of the 
former Police Act 7 of 1958 as amended, anyone who puhlished information ahout 
the police administration or practices could he prosecuted (Slahhert, 1985). More 
specifically, this legislation prohihited the puhlication of information pertaining to 
the constitution, methods, movements, deployment or actions of any officer involved 
in comhatting or preventing so-called terrorist activities, and those against whom 
police action was directed. 1 Contravention of this provision carried a penalty of a -
tine up to 15000 rand and/or up to eight years imprisonment. A further provision 
outlawed the puhlication of any "untrue" information ahout the SAP and the onus 
was placed on an accused to prove that s/he had reasonahle grounds for helieving the 
veracity of information concerned. The penalty here was a tine up to 10000 rand 
and/or up to tive years imprisonment. Drawing or photographing anyone in or 
escaped from custody, and accused and witnesses in criminal trials, was also 
Detined under the Terrorism Act 84 of 1967 as amended. 
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prohihited. Contravention carried a penalty of a fine and/or up to one year 
imprisonment. 
This legislation comhined with vanous emergency regulations made data 
collection hy means of ohservation increasingly hazardous after 1984. Since the 
hulk of police action during this period was hy detinition anti-terrorist, anyone 
reporting on the SAP was at risk of prosecution. Despite the hazards, however, 
during the civil war in South Africa community-hased (CBOs) and non-governmental 
(NGOs) organisations -- particularly Advice Oftices -- monitored police activities 
throughout the country and the liheral press played a key role in hringing police 
ahuses to puhlic attention. Much of our knowledge ahout the SAP over this period 
has heen derived from these sources and to a lesser extent from commissions of 
inquiry and evidence led in court cases involving police. 
Direct access to information ahout the SAP was severely curtailed and police 
puhlic relations mechanisms were used to carefully filter what was released to the 
puhlic. To illustrate: hetween Fehruary 1987 and 1988, most (74%) of the 
applications the press made to the SAP for permission to puhlish police-related 
information were refused (Hansard, 27 April 1988: 1209). Researchers were also 
denied access to data collected hy the police and were generally not permitted to 
interview officers. By 1988 it was noted that: 
"... the government is systematically restricting all sources of 
information, particularly those pertaining to the security forces. 2 This is 
a matter for serious concern in that it deprives the puhlic of the 
information it ought to have in order to assess the state of affairs in the 
country and the activities of the security forces" (Hansson, 1988:495). 
Thus, although the SAP themselves routinely recorded data with respect to shots 
tired hy officers, complaints made against police, and deaths and injuries caused hy 
police, this valuahle information was rendered inaccessihle to civilians. 3 In stark 
contrast, the SAP regularly made information on the use of force against the police 
availahle. 
Alternate data sources on the use of force hy the SAP were extremely limited, 
hoth in quantity and quality. Whilst some relevant statistics were puhlished in 
annual reports of the Commissioner of Police, many of these figures were of 
questionahle reliahi1ity and could not he used to track temporal trends as the 
variahles and the time periods f{)r which data were provided were frequently 
changed. 4 Although questions posed to parliament yielded some interesting 
information ahout the SAP, the usefulness of these data were limited: tirstly hy the 
2 The Nationalist government's term for the comhined forces of the police and 
the military. 
3 The SAP Standing Orders required the collection of shots-tired data. 
4 The numher of police killings and woundings reported hy the SAP was 
consistently lower than those recorded hy civil monitoring groups, see Howe 
(1989). 
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inconsistency of the questions that were posed and secondly hy the increasing 
regularity with which the Minister refused to answer many of these questions on the 
grounds that this was not in the puhlic interest (Hansson, 1988). 
At this time, puhlic health information was one of the few accessihle sources of 
data on the police use of force in South Africa. For many years the Central 
Statistical Service (CSS) had collated and puhlished annual, national mortality 
statistics on deaths resulting from firearm accidents, suicides and homicides.s 
Unfortunately, however, these figures did not show the relative numhers of police 
and civilian victims and excluded information on perpetrators. Nevertheless, 
national mortality statistics were compiled from information recorded in the death 
registers of local state mortuaries nationwide, and these records did include data on 
victims and alleged perpetrators. Furthermore, the death registers contained an 
unusually complete sample of fatal shootings hecause the law required that an 
autopsy he performed at a state mortuary in all cases in which death was not due to 
natural causes (The Inquest Act 58 of 1959 as amended). Regrettahly, however, 
death registers were relatively inaccessihle to independent researchers as the SAP 
managed state mortuaries and hence controlled access. But after autopsy, every 
firearm death had to he examined hy an inquest or a criminal court,6 and hecause 
these document-; were deemed to he puhlic records, they constituted one of the tew 
accessihle sources of relevant information for firearms research. Notahly though, 
few researchers utilised court records in the investigation of gun-related issues. It 
seems that most considered it non-viahle to wade through scores of inquest-; and 
criminal cases pertaining to other issues in order to extract a meaningful sample of 
shootings. 
In addition to the Jack of access to hasic data on the SAP, there was little 
impetus for research on the police use of deadly force. Unlike various US 
administrations, the Nationalist government -- formally in power from 1948 to mid-
1994 -- did not prioritise the use of guns hy the SAP as a prohlem requiring 
attention. Furthermore, puhlic concern was focused on SAP hrutality and 
misconduct in general rather than specifically on gun use. It should not he surprising 
therefore that funding for research in this tield was limited and that empirical 
investigations on tirearm use hy the SAP were scarce. Even hy the mid-nineties 
there were only a handful of studies on the use of deadly force hy police in South 
Africa; nothing like the vast tield of research characteristic of North America.7 
Indeed, "fujntil recently the institution of the SAP has remained somewhat ohscured 
from the inquiring thrust of academia" (VanDer Spuy, 1990:85). 
5 See Chapter Three. 
6 And hoth in rare instances. 
7 But work on the police in South Africa has increased suhstantially since 1990. 
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Reliahle, longitudinal national statistics on the frequency with which the SAP tired 
shots and used force in general were not availahle to independent researchers and 
information on the avened use of force hy the SAP was non-existent. Nevertheless, 
over the years some figures were puhlished on the use of force hy and against police. 
Considering the overall paucity of information in this tield, these somewhat 
fragmented data have heen collated to provide an admittedly crude quantitative 
picture. As the reliahility of these data have not heen estahlished, the propositions 
made here should he treated as tentative hypotheses. 8 
Composition of the SAP 
Tahle 5. I shows the size of the permanent police force in South Africa since 1983, 
as officially reported hy the Commissioner of Police. The rates indicate a suhstantial 
increase in the size of the police force relative to the hackground population since the 
early eighties: from two police in every 1000 people in 1983 to three hy 1989. 
Despite this growth, in 1991 the ratio of police to civilians in this country was still 
only half that of most Western European countries (Jeffery, 1991). 
Table 5.1: 
Official Size of SAP. 
Years 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Totals 
42740 
44696 
45559 
48921 
60390 
60878 
81582 
90945 
96947 
113380 
111482 
NA 
140000 
Rates per 1 000 9 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
NA 
3 
Sources: The Commissioner of the SAP (1990 to 1985), Hansard (21 March 1990, 
19 Fehruary 1991, 17 Fehruary 1992, 16 March 1993), Van Wyk (1995) and 
population data in The CSS ( 19941 i J). 
8 Where feasihle raw frequencies were converted into rates to enhance relevance 
and comparahility. Figures have heen consistently rounded to the nearest whole 
numher or when applicahle to the tirst decimal place. 
9 Of the hackground population. 
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From 1947 onwards the SAP was consistently deemed understaffed and over the 
years many efforts were made to increase the effective size of the force (Van Der 
Spuy, 1990, 1988). For instance, in 1961 a civi \ian unit known as the Reserve 
Police was estahlished to assist the SAP in conducting routine activities (Dippenaar, 
\988). In 1973 the Police Reserve -- comprising ex-police ofticers -- was introduced 
to supplement SAP personnel (The Commissioner of the SAP, \99\). The SAP also 
included those who elected to do their compulsory national service within the police 
force; the South African Railway Police (SARP) which operated until 1986; and the 
Municipal Police and Special Constahles, hlack officers introduced from the mid-
eighties to assist in policing African areas (The Commissioner of the SAP, \991 ). 
In composition the SAP was dominated hy males and whites. It was not until 
1972 that women were permitted to join the force (Van Der Spuy, \990). The 
proportion of female ofticers was never suhstantial and women police were generally 
limited to office-hased positions (Rauch, 1994). Between 1983 and 1990 whites 
constituted ahout 51% of the police force (The South African Institute of Race 
Relations (SAIRR), \991 to \985). Notahly, whites remained grossly over-
represented within the SAP even after large numhers of hlack officers were 
employed in the mid-eighties (Hansard, 20 May 1991, 29 June I988).1o Police 
management was also kept in white hands and hlack officers tended to remain m 
positions of lower status and authority (Van Wyk, 1995). 
Violence against Police 
The SAP routinely collected and puhlished data on violence perpetrated against the 
police. National tigures for police deaths in the line-of-duty were made availahle 
annually in the reports of the Commissioner of Police, and a selection of these 
statistics have heen presented in Tahle 5 .2, showing that hetween 1990 and 1993 the 
rate at which on-duty police were killed trehled. From the mid-eighties police 
managers expressed concern ahout heightened violence against police which they 
attrihuted to the ANCs campaign to undermine the SAP. It is now widely 
acknowledged that the SAP were viewed as defenders of the hated Apartheid regime 
and were treated as political target~ hy the Anti-Apartheid Movement (e.g. Jeffery, 
1991). In \993 the SAP Commissioner released detailed figures that showed an 
alarming increase in the numher of police homicides: more SAP were killed hetween 
\991 and \992 than in the 18 years from 1973 to \990 (The Commissioner of the 
SAP, \993:58). Two other worrying tendencies also emerged during the nineties: an 
increase in the proportion of police who were killed with AK-47 ritles, 11 and in the 
percentage who were shot in the head. 12 
\0 As Municipal Police and Special Constahles. 
II From \7% in \991 to 43% in 1992, see The Commissioner of the SAP (1993). 
12 A 38% increase from \993 to \994, see Hansard (\0 May 1995). 
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Although details of the numher, types and outcomes of assaults on the SAP 
were not puhlished consistently, the availahle data indicate that the risk of homicidal 
death among police increased markedly during the nineties. Indeed the rate of on-
duty police deaths in South Africa was suhstantially higher than the rate in the USA: 
158 and 26 per 100000 ofticers in 1991 resp. (Keller in: the New York Times, 28 
June 1992). 
Regrettahly, the SAP puhlished little information on unintentional deaths and 
injuries among police, panicularly those resulting from guns. But data on the 
frequency of police suicides were made availahle. Notahly, there was a 33% 
increase in the SAP suicide rate hetween 1991 and 1992, 13 and the following year 
the Commissioner drew specitic attention to this issue, stating that: 
"lwJhen the suicide statistics of the South African Police are examined, 
they are cause for concern and demand speedy action. As early as 1989, 
it appeared that the South African Police suicide rate compared with that 
of the general puhlic, was exceedingly high .... It is for this reason that 
Psychological Suppon Services are at present very deeply involved with 
pro-active as well as reactive steps to address suicide and stress among 
memhers of the Force" (The Commissioner of the SAP, 1993:27). 
At this time, the suicide rate for the SAP w s considerahly higher than the rate for 
the Nonh American police: 83 and 17 per I 00000 officers in 1992 resp. (Geller & 
Scott, 1992:234). 
Table 5.2: 
SAP Killed in tbe Line-of- Duty. 
Years 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Totals 
48 
39 
68 
67 
80 
71 
107 
137 
175 
279 
Deaths per 1000 SAP 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
Sources: The Commissioner of the SAP (1993 to 1984), Cilliers and Van Zyl Smit 
( 1995) and Tahle 5.1. 
13 From 60 to 80 per 100000 officers, see The Commissioner of the SAP (1993). 
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Deaths and Injuries by SAP 
The data in Tahle 5.3 pertain to the period before the civil war which hegan in late 
1984 (Howe, 1989). According to these tigures the average rate of killing hy the 
SAP doubled hetween the early and the late seventies, and then remained relatively 
constant into the mid-eighties. Furthermore, "the annual rate of deaths due to police 
action increased at a greater rate than either the population or the police force" over 
this period (Foster & Luyt, 1986:304). 
Table 5.3: 
Civilians Killed by SAP before the Civil War. 
Periods Averages Killings per 100000 
1970-1974 
1975-1979 
1980-1984 
84 
170 
210 
0.4 
1 
1 
Sources: Foster and Luyt ( 1986) and population data in The CSS (19941 il). 
Table 5.4 shows that the rate of killing and injuring by the SAP rose sharply from 
1983 to 1985, reached a peak during the intense political conflict of 1985 and 1986, 
and then returned to the average pre-war rate in 1987. However, unlike the death 
rate which dropped and remained relatively low, the injury rate sky-rocketed in 1990 
and exceeded the 1985 level. 
Table 5.4: 
Deaths and Injuries by SAP. 
Years Killings KilJings Killings per Injuries Injuries 
per 100000 100000 SAP per 100000 
1983 211 1 NA 368 1 
1984 287 1 640 937 4 
1985 798 3 1750 2571 9 
1986 716 3 1460 2088 8 
1987 400 1 660 623 2 
1990 270 1 300 2892 10 
Sources: Foster and Luyt (1986), The SAIRR (1985); Hansard (24 March 1988), 
Jeffery ( 1991 ), and population data in The CSS ( 19941 i J) and Table 5. 1. 
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The elevated rates of killing and injuring hy the SAP were commonly explained as a 
response to increased civilian violence (e.g. Jeffery, 1991; The Commissioner of the 
SAP, 1991 to 1985). However, hefore the nationwide outhreak of political contlict, 
the SAP rate of killing was already douhle that of the North American police and 
seven times higher than the Canadian police (Foster & Luyt, 1986:302). Indeed it 
has heen argued that the use of excessive force was an SAP tradition (e.g. Van Der 
Spuy 1990; Haysom. l987[a]). 
Table 5.5: 
Deatbs in Political Conflict. 
Years 
1985 
1986 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Killings 
hy Civs. 
610 
406 
2352 
3056 
3434 
4243 
Killings 
per 100000 
2 
2 
10 
10 
10 
10 
Killings 
hy SAP 
240 
191 
323 
92 
161 
121 
Killings per 
100000 SAP 
530 
390 
360 
90 
140 
110 
Sources: Hansard (25 April 1986, 4 June 1987), The Human Rights Commission 
( 1993 to 1991 ), and population data in The CSS (1994( i]) and Tahle 5 .I. 
The numher of people who were killed hy the SAP during political contlict 
comprised only ahout a third of the total who were killed hy the police at this time 
(see Tahles 5.4 & 5.5). A comparison hetween total rates of killing hy the SAP 
(Tahle 5.4) and those during political contlict (Tahles 5.5 & 5.6) reveal a similar 
pattern, that is, a peak during 1985 and 1986 and a decline during the early nineties. 
Interestingly, civilian rates of killing were comparatively low during the crisis civil 
war years and increased markedly during the transition phase of the nineties. This is 
opposite to the pattern that characterised killings hy the SAP. 
Overall, the quantitative data presented thus far suggests that, prior to the civil 
war, the SAP used relatively high levels of force in policing and this tendency was 
exacerhated during the contlict. In other words, a heightened use of force seems to 
have permeated SAP practice (Hansson, 1990[a], 1989; Foster & Luyt, 1986). But 
hecause the hulk of scholarly and puhlic attention in this country was directed at SAP 
conduct in political contlict, the police use of force in general law enforcement was 
somewhat neglected (Hansson, l990[aJ). 
_,. 
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Table 5.6: 
Deaths and Injuries by SAP in Political Conflict. 
Years 
1985 
1986 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Killings Killings 
per 100000 
240 90 
191 70 
323 110 
92 30 
161 50 
121 40 
Injuries 
NA 
NA 
3390 
607 
1716 
2219 
Injuries 
per 100000 
NA 
NA 
1110 
190 
540 
680 
Sources: Hansard (27 Fehruary 1986, 24 June 1987), The Human Rights 
Commission ( 1993-1991 ), and population data in The CSS ( 19941 i]) and Tahle 5 .I. 
However, the shortcomings of these statistics must he home in mind: not only are 
they of uncertain reliability, relevant tigures for crucial time periods are missing and 
separate counts are not available for unintentional and intentional killings, unlawful 
and justifiable deaths, and shootings as opposed to killings hy alternate methods. 
Nevertheless, other kinds of information on police misconduct also support the 
notion that excessive force was common within the SAP (see Tahles 5.7 & 5.8). 
Table 5. 7: 
SAP Convictions for Violent Offences. 
Years 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1989 
1990 
Convictions 
for Violence 
230 
214 
205 
183 
206 
193 
236 
250 
263 
229 
245 
246 
251 
282 
546 
418 
Rates per 
l()(X) SAP 
7 
8 
8 
7 
8 
7 
9 
10 
10 
9 
7 
7 
7 
8 
7 
5 
Averages 
8 
9 
7 
6 
Sources: Foster and Luyt (1986), Hansard (7 May 1991, 22 March 1991) and Table 
5.1. 
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Tahle 5. 7 shows that the average rate at which members of the SAP were convicted 
for violent offences decreased from the seventies to the eighties, despite the higher 
rate at which police killed and injured civilians from 1985 onwards. Since it has 
heen demonstrated that only a negligible proportion of complaints against the SAP 
resulted in criminal prosecutions, police convictions for excessive force must he 
viewed as the tip of the iceberg and, hence, indicative of a relatively high incidence 
of excessive force usage among the SAP (e.g. Weitzer & Repetti, 1991 ; Hansson, 
19901a], 1989; Foster & Luyt, 1986). According to Foster and Luyt the conviction 
statistics for the SAP "paint a grim picture of pol.ice violence in the ordinary 
business of policing criminal activities" (1986:305). 
Table 5.8: 
Damages and Settlements due to Inappropriate Use of Force by SAP. 
Years Amounts in Rands Averages 
1969 5845 
1970 990 
1971 10500 5778 
1972 23076 
1973 2505 
1974 21973 15851 
1975 30888 
1976 33667 
1977 87184 50580 
1978 178725 
1979 252626 
1980 201193 210848 
1981 409503 
1982 418914 
1983 4492234 1773550 
1984 451120 
1985 1124974 
1986 1209780 928625 
1991 954515 
1992 1129975 1042245 
Sources: Foster and Luyt (1986), The SAIRR (1988), The Minister of Law and 
Order in: The Sunday Trihune (29 March 1987), and Hansard (26 Fehruary 1992, 
16 March 1993). 
Damages and out-of-court settlements paid out hy the Minister due to inappropriate 
use of force hy police also indicate the extent to which the SAP used excessive force. 
In fact, during the years of political contlict it became commonplace for civil claims 
against the SAP to he settled out of court, so as to avoid the additional cost and 
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negative puhlicity associated w1th litigation. and these payments were treated as 
routine costs of policing (e.g. Weitzer & Repetti, 1991 ). According to Tahle 5.8 the 
average amounts paid out on hehalf of the SAP (due to inappropriate use of force) 
increased suhstantially hetween the late sixties and the early nineties. 14 To conclude, 
the availahle information is supportive of the postulate that the SAP tended to use 
excessive force in dealing with political contlict and in general law enforcement. 
OTHER EVIDENCE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE BY SAP 
Importantly, evidence for the former proposition is not limited to the somewhat 
indirect statistics cited in the previous section. Over time a numher of empirical 
studies have demonstrated that SAP practice was characterised hy excessive force 
and a generalised lack of restraint. In general the Nationalist government's response 
to allegations of extreme misconduct on the part of the SAP was denial, usually 
accompanied hy the rationale that such claims were attempt<; hy the Anti-Apartheid 
Movement to discredit the SAP and the State (Van Der Spuy, 1990). 
In 1985 a pioneering investigation hy Foster and Sandler revealed convincing 
evidence that political detainees were routinely tortured hy the SAP . 1 ~ This 
conclusion was hased on a wealth of information drawn from in-depth interviews 
with ex-detainees, medical documentation, and records kept hy CBOs and NGOs that 
monitored the political contlict. In 1986 Foster and Luyt puhlished a ground 
hreaking article in which they concluded that the excessive use of force was not only 
prevalent, hut also condoned within the SAP. In support of their claim the authors 
critically analysed a numher of court cases involving allegations of torture hy the 
SAP, and presented a range of statistics on killings and injuries caused hy the police, 
convictions for violence, and legal settlements. Their conclusion was: 
"I in J general the record of police conduct over recent decades in South 
Africa has heen ahysmal. There is no denying the numerous deaths in 
detention, evidence of torture and ahuses, and many instances of 
indiscriminate shootings. . .. The death toll attrihuted to security force 
action makes for chilling reading. The image of the police hoth in the 
townships and the international arena is -- with considerahle justification 
-- quite appalling (in: The Cape Times, I August 1987). 
This work was followed in 1991 hy another important piece of research which 
demonstrated that the SAP routinely used torture techniques in the interrogation of 
suspects arrested in connection with non-political offences (Fernandez, 1991) . 16 
Since mid-1994 the new government has made concerted efforts to clean up all 
state departments and particularly the police force. The process has uncovered 
14 The average for 1981 to 1983 was inllated hy one unusually large amount. 
15 Suhsequently puhlished as a hook, see Davis et al (1987). 
16 And in late 1996 "torture was still heing widely used hy specialist police teams 
as part of normal investigative procedure", see The Weekly Mail and Guardian 
- Internet ( 18 Octoher 1996). 
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indisputahle evidence of widespread ahuses of power hy the SAP, including the 
existence of death squads within the force. This came to light in the trial of Eugene 
De Kock, an SAP colonel who was charged with 121 counts of murder, fraud and 
unlawful possession of tirearms and ammunition. Signiticantly, the testimony in this 
case has heen cast as: 
II ••• the single most important collection of material ahout human rights 
violations committed hy memhers of the security forces during the 1980s 
and early 1990sll (The Mail & Guardian, 26 Jan to I Feh 1996:5). 
It has now heen estahlished, heyond a reasonahle douht, that specialised covert unit-; 
of the SAP carried out planned assassinations of political opponents, and that a 
clandestine alliance existed hetween the Apartheid State and the IFP which was 
aimed at destahilising the growing political power of the ANC. It was revealed in 
the De Kock case that covert SAP units supplied the IFP with illicit weapons of war 
and trained their paramilitary unit-; (The Mail & Guardian, 26 Jan to 1 Feh 1996). 
SAP practice was not only characterised hy extreme ahuses of power, like 
torture and assassination. A numher of studies puhlished in the late eighties showed 
that hrutality hy the SAP was a generalised phenomenon at this time. A hook 
puhlished hy the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) in 1987 is of 
particular note as it provides comprehensive coverage of the violent policing 
practices that were employed in African areas. More specifically this work 
highlighted the role played hy the Special Constahles and Municipal Police: African 
officers who were deployed to police African areas, especially those considered 
perilous for whites. Armed Municipal Police, known hy the derogatory name of 
greentlies, were introduced mainly to guard local authorities and to protect 
community councillors, the officials elected to these hodies (The Black Sash, 1988). 
This form of local government was introduced in African areas in 1983 as part of the 
Nationalist government's process of constitutional reform. 17 Under this system: 
II ... [A]fricans were represented on Black Local Authorities (BLAs) only, 
the lowest level of government. . . . Coloureds and Asians were granted 
representation at all three levels of government, although at the central 
level this was still not equal to that enjoyed hy whites, the ratio heing 
four whites, to two coloureds to one Asian II (Hansson, 1990[h]:38-9). 
Black Local Authorities were violently rejected hy the majority of the African 
population, and the property and councillors involved in these structures hecame 
target-; for Anti-Apartheid protest. In fact hy March 1985 only three of the original 
34 local authorities were still functioning (The Rand Daily Mail, 16 March 1985). 
In this context it is not surprising that an adversarial relationship developed hetween 
Municipal Police and African residents, and there is suhstantial evidence of routine 
17 See Hansson ( 19901 hI) on State strategy. 
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brutality hy these officers (e.g. Fine & Hansson 1990; Hansson & Fine, 1990; The 
Black Sash, 1988). 
Together the work of the CIIR ( 1987), Fine ( 1989) and Fine and Hansson 
( 1990), provide an in-depth view of the way in which the Special Constables 
operated, particularly with regard to the unnecessary and excessive use of force. 
These officers, popularly known as instant constables, were afforded an extremely 
truncated training, armed with shotguns and sent into African residential areas to 
deal with violent political conflict. By the time the Special Constables were 
deployed, animosity toward the SAP was widespread within African townships. 
"Serious abuses of power hy kitskonstahels 1 instant constables] occurred in many 
areas from the first weeks of their deployment I in late 1986], ranging from fatal 
shootings, arbitrary assaults, and sexual abuse, to verbal abuse and harassment" 
(Fine, 1989:58). What followed was a spiral of police brutality and violent attacks 
on Special Constables, who rapidly became symbols of the hated Apartheid regime 
(e.g. Fine, 1989). There were many reports of Special Constables being murdered 
hy the so-called necklacing method in which a ruhher tyre was placed around the 
arms and trunk of a hound victim, who was then dous d in petrol and ignited (e.g. 
Knobel, 1986). Indeed, so intense was the threat to Special Constables in some 
areas, they were forced to live in harhed-wire enclosed barracks. In a period of less 
than three years, between February 1987 and August 1989, this 5000 strong group of 
police officers killed 49 African residents and was served with five Supreme Court 
interdict-; restraining them from unlawful conduct (Hansard, 29 April 1989:6383; 
Fine, 1989 resp). 
Because the civil war was characterised hy widespread and frequent public 
protests, it is understandable that much of the work on policing during this period, 
pertained to the SAPs public order activities (Hansson, l990[a)). The Nationalist 
government "extensively eroded" the right to gather, and effectively outlawed public 
gathering as a means of political protest against the Apartheid State (Haysom, 
1987[ a] :23). From 1976 onwards all outdoor gatherings, except sporting and 
religious meetings, were prohibited, and by 1982, a range of indoor gatherings had 
also been banned (Government Notice, 27 March 1986; The Internal Security Act 74 
of 1982 resp). Whilst it was technically feasible to obtain special magisterial 
permission to hold such gatherings, this discretion was applied in an inequitable 
manner against the Anti-Apartheid Movement and illegal gatherings were selectively 
policed (e.g. The Kannemeyer Commission, 1985). 
Much of what is known about the SAPs crowd dispersal practices during this 
period, emerged in evidence led before commissions of inquiry that were held in the 
wake of controversial incidents. The Kannemeyer Commission, which investigated 
the Uitenhage case in March 1985, is of particular note because it was the first 
inquiry into the conduct of the riot police during the civil war that negatively 
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criticised the action taken hy the SAP in crowd dispersal. The incident involved a 
group of African mourners who were marching from Langa to KwaNohuhle in the 
Eastern Cape to attend a funeral for which magisterial permission had heen denied. 
Although the evidence was extremely contradictory, the Commission accepted that 
the SAP, who were present in armoured vehicles, had fired SSG shot into the 
approaching crowd hecause one of the participant<; had attempted to throw a petrol-
homh at the police (The Kannemeyer Commission, 1985). As a result 20 people 
were killed and 27 others were seriously injured hy the police. The commanding 
ofticer claimed that a warning shot had heen fired hut this seemed unlikely and, even 
if such a warning had heen given, it would have heen of little henetit as the crowd 
was not afforded sufficient time to comply (Haysom, 1987[aJ:4). The pivotal issue 
raised hy this inquiry was why the police had not used less-than-lethal methods to 
disperse the crowd hefore they resorted to deadly force. The Commission found that 
the riot police had heen ordered not to carry less-than-lethal weapons on this 
occasion, and had heen armed with only shotguns and heavy-calihre SSG huckshot 
(that spreads one in every thirty metres and is capahle of penetrating a sheet of heavy 
metal at seven paces). This was descrihed as "cause for grave concern" and the SAP 
approach to crowd dispersal in which the stated ohjective was to "eliminate suspects" 
rather to dishand illegal gatherings was deemed "disturhing" (The Kannemeyer 
Commission, 1985:164-5, 95, 108-112 resp.). The Commissioner commented 
further that: 
" ... surely when one has to deal with a large moh of rioters, the aim 
should he to cause the crowd to disperse and not to render the memhers 
thereof incapahle hy shooting them with ammunition such as SSG" (The 
Kannemeyer Commission, 1985: 112). 
By comparison, the conclusion reached on the question of why most of the victims 
had heen shot in the hack or side, was strikingly less trenchant. Although this 
evidence seemed to indicate clearly that the police had continued to shoot at people 
who were attempting to disperse, the Commissioner found that those who were 
struck posteriorly or laterally, must have heen shot in the time that it took for the 
commanding officer to realise that the crowd was tleeing and to call for a cease fire! 
This is simply unacceptahle: 
"[a]s with the Sharpeville inquiry, this does not explain how well-armed 
men could discharge volleys of lethal huckshot into the hacks of an 
unarmed crowd of men, women and children while awaiting an order to 
cease tire" (Haysom, l9871a]:26). 
Despite the puhlic criticism levelled at the SAP hy this Commission, and assurances 
from the police that their crowd control methods had heen re-evaluated, less than 
four months later the riot police opened tire on a group of elderly women at 
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Mamelodi outside Pretoria (The Weekly Mail, 29 Novemher 1985). Indeed this was 
a pattern that persisted until at least 1991, and Tahle 5. 9 retlects the toll of deaths 
and injuries attributed to the riot SAP in a selection of crowd dispersal incidentli. 
Table 5.9: 
Deaths and Injuries by SA Riot Police in Selected Incidents. 
Years 
1985 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1991 
Source: Jeffery ( 1991 ) . 
Incidents 
Uitenhage 
Sehokeng 
Johannesburg Is 
Daveyton 
V entersdorp 
Killings 
20 
5 
2 
12 
3 
Injuries 
23 
161 
10 
27 
42 
Although numerous authors have addressed the topic of SAP conduct in relation to 
political protest, Haysom (19871 a]) and Jeffery ( 1991) provided two of the most 
systematic, empirically-based investigations of the use of force hy the police in 
crowd dispersal during the civil war. Haysom critically evaluated the way in which 
the SAP handled a sample of political protests that occurred hetween 1985 and 
1986, 19 and concluded that: 
"liln the execution of their duties South African police use firearms and 
intlict deadly force too readily and in unacceptable circumstances .... The 
unnecessary or reckless use of firearms hy the police -- is not the result 
of 'rogue policemen' or reckless individuals. It is a widespread 
systematic use of lethal and violent weapons principally on South 
Africa's hlack citizens" (1987(aJ:3 & 27). 
The author also maintained that the SAP had a shoot-to-kill policy in dealing with 
political protest and used maximum rather than minimum force. A notorious 
example of this practice was the so-called Trojan Horse incident, which occurred in 
-
a suhurb of Cape Town in 1985. zo In this case police were concealed in containers 
on the hack of a lorry which was then driven through an area where people had heen 
stoning passing vehicles. As soon as stones were thrown at the lorry, the officers 
started shooting. As a result four people were killed, including the occupant of a 
nearhy house. Although these killings amounted to murder, they were deemed 
18 The CAST March. 
19 Reported in the Human Rights Index of the South African Journal on Human 
Rightli. 
20 See Steytler (1987(a]) and the South African Journal on Human Rights (1984 
to 1986). 
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justifiable in terms of the emergency regulations (Haysom, 1987faJ; Steytler, 
1987[a)). 
Overall, Haysom highlighted the following as evidence of the reckless use of 
lethal force hy the SAP in dealing with political protest: (I) the high proportion of 
children and youths who were shot; (2) the frequency with which bystanders were 
shot; (3) the fact that the majority of people shot during crowd dispersal were struck 
in the hack or side (which indicates that they were prohahly in the process of 
dispersing); and (4) the large number of youths killed hy police solely on the 
grounds of suspected stone-throwing (l987faJ). Although this work was an 
important contribution to the tield at a time when scholarly research on the use of 
force hy the SAP was scarce, the study was methodologically tlawed hy the use of a 
non-representative sample that was skewed in favour of problematic cases: it 
comprised only cases that had heen reported because they involved human rights 
violations. Whilst these data provide support for the claim that the SAP used 
excessive force in a relatively large number of crowd dispersal incidents, the 
tindings do not constitute conclusive evidence of the systerrw.tic use of excessive 
force hy police in crowd dispersal. Hence, this research does not enable a 
convincing rejection of the counter-claim that the overwhelming majority of illegal 
gatherings were dispersed hy the SAP "without substantial death or injury to 
protesters" (Jeffery, 1991 :2). 
Jeffery's investigation was largely a response to the introduction of a Set of 
Requirements and Code of Conduct for the SAP under the 1991 National Peace 
Accord. The main objective was to assess the accuracy of the prevailing perception 
that the SAP were playing "a major role in promoting violence" ( 1991 :9). 
Unfortunately, the evaluation was neither balanced nor sufficiently critical. Instead, 
it was a rather conservative analysis of claims and counter-claims with respect to the 
use of excessive force hy the riot police, derived from interviews, press reports and 
reported statistics. Only cursory attention was paid to findings from academic 
research and human rights monitoring groups, and the overwhelming evidence of 
SAP abuses of power that has emerged since 1994 certainly underscores the 
limitations of Jeffery's inquiry (1991). Nevertheless, the work was important 
because it was one of the few hroad overviews of issues pertaining to the riot police 
at this time. The factors noted as indicative of excessive SAP force are of particular 
relevance to this discussion: ( 1) claims hy legal scholars that the SAP had "a 
deliberate policy of using maximum force to suppress dissent"; (2) the finding that 
the "mere presence of the police at gatherings increase[ d] the subsequent rate of 
collective action hy 68% and that any use of tire-power hy the police increase[ dl it 
hy I 07% "; (3) 1350 SAP resignations in early 1990 in protest against brutality in the 
force: (4) the unacceptably high number of deaths and injuries caused hy the SAP; 
(5) a prevalence of criminal convictions among police; and (6) the large amounts of 
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compensation paid out for damages, injuries and deaths caused hy the riot police 
(Jeffery, 1991 :2). However, the author concluded that excessive force hy police 
during crowd dispersal was nm typical and that the SAP dispersed the majority of 
illegal gatherings without undue loss of life or injury. She claimed furthermore, that 
the SAP were specifically trained to uphold the principles of incremental use and 
minimum force during riot control, and to use deadly weapons only in self defence. 
Although conceding that the police had over-reacted on occasion, Jeffery maintained 
that much of the criticism levelled at the SAP had heen unjustified (1991). 
In a recent investigation of police conduct in South Africa hetween 1990 and 
1995, the following conclusion was reached: 
" ... since the country's first democratic election ... the police have made 
few attempts to curtail the serious human rights violations within their 
own ranks. Indeed, to date, there has heen no admission from the police 
that there is a real or possihle prohlem, in this regard. However, cases 
and allegations of torture, assaults and unlawful shootings continue to 
remain features of policing under the new dispensation. . .. Human rights 
violations are a systemic and nationwide prohlem within the police" (The 
Network of Independent Monitors et al, 1995:Preface). 
This work highlighted extrajudicial executions and unlawful shootings hy police, 21 
and the incidence of deaths in custody resulting from police hrutality, 22 as evidence 
of the ongoing use of excessive force hy police in this country. Although important, 
these findings must he considered with caution hecause the sample comprised 
allegations of human rights violations hy the police in only three of the country's 
nine provinces. 23 Nevertheless the evidence is weighty and consistent with previous 
claims. To conclude: the accumulated data seem to indicate that it was common 
practice for the SAP to use excessive force and to employ force without due 
restraint. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS FOR CAPE TOWN 
Thus far an attempt has heen made to paint a national picture of the use of force hy 
and against police in the South African context. Because the research conducted for 
this dissertation comprised an investigation of fatal shootings in metropolitan Cape 
Town, relevant tindings from research on this urhan area have heen included. 
In mid-1986 the tirst empirical study to address firearm deaths in Cape Town 
was puhlished hy the then Chief Forensic Pathologist for this area (Knohel, 1986). 
The work was hased on a complete sample of gun fatalities drawn from the death 
registers. The analysis focused on the impact of political contlict and demonstrated a 
21 First reported hy the Natal Investigation Unit to the Goldstone Commission in 
1993. 
22 Dramatically hrought to puhlic attention when a forensic pathologist released 
information to the press in July 1992. 
23 Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. 
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sharp rise in the frequency of non-natural deaths, particularly homicides, in this city 
during 1985. 24 More specifically, the results showed that the hulk (78%) of the fatal 
shootings in this area were homicides and that the SAP were responsihle for the vast 
majority (70%) of these killings, most (74%) of which were perpetrated during 
political conflict (Knohel, 1986:84). This author noted further that: (I) the mohile 
nature of the crowds heing dispersed resulted in many people heing shot in the hack; 
(2) numerous people sustained multiple wounds hecause the SAP tired volleys of 
non-live ammunition into crowds; and (3) the fatality rate was elevated hy the police 
tiring hirdshot at close-range and hy the ahsence of prompt medical treatment. In 
concluding, Knohel emphasised that hirdshot and auto-repeat rilles were contra-
indicated for crowd dispersal and proposed that the SAP use less-lethal methods for 
riot control ( 1986). 
Duflou ( 1986), also a Cape Town forensic pathologist, puhlished a companion 
article in the same journal. This work comprised an in-depth analysis of Knohel 's 
( 1986) sample of police firearm homicide cases. It is disturhing to note, however, 
that there is a significant discrepancy hetween the numher of fatal shootings reported 
hy these two authors: according to Knohel there were 112 police gun homicides in 
Cape Town during 1985, 83 of which were perpetrated during political contlict and 
29 during general law enforcement ( 1986:84). By contrast, Duflou reported a total 
of 93 fatal police shootings, 87 in response to political contlict and only six during 
general law enforcement ( 1986:88). Since neither author commented on this 
inconsistency it has remained unexplained. Despite this uncertainty, Dutlou 's (1986) 
investigation yielded a range of valuahle descriptive data on gunshot victims and 
their injuries. More significantly, the following differences were revealed hetween 
fatal police shootings in political contlict and those perpetrated during general law 
enforcement:n ( 1) on average those killed in political contlict were younger than the 
victims of general law enforcement; (2) a higher percentage of children under 15 
were killed during political conflict; (3) the majority of those killed in political 
conflict were African whereas most people killed in general law enforcement were 
coloured; (4) shotguns were more frequently used to kill in political conflict and 
handguns were more common weapons in general law enforcement; (5) a higher 
proportion of those killed during political conflict were shot more than once; and (6) 
a higher percentage of the victims who were shot during general law enforcement 
had alcohol in their hloodstreams. Interestingly, two similarities were also reported: 
the overwhelming majority of the victims were males and the hulk were shot in the 
hack (Duflou, 1986). It is also noteworthy that over a third of the fatalities were 
caused hy so-called non-Lethal hirdshot. Duflou ( 1986), like Knohel ( 1986), 
emphasised the need f(>r rapid medical treatment in relation to gunshot injuries, 
24 The first state of emergency was declared in the Western Cape on 26 Octoher 
1985. 
25 Statistical significance was not estahlished. 
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noting that most of those who were shot died from a comhination of shock and hlood 
loss. 
In hoth studies fatal shootings hy the SAP during the intense political violence 
in Cape Town in 1985 were examined. In 1989 another empirical investigation of 
police tirearm homicides in this area was puhlished, this time pertaining to the 
longer period 1984 to 1986 (Hansson, 1989).26 This research was an advance on 
previous work. Not only was a larger sample employed, hut the very hasic data 
from death registers was supplemented with more detailed information from inquests 
and criminal trials. In addition, this was the first empirical examination of the 
question of restraint in the use of guns hy police in a South African context: a test of 
Haysom 's earlier claim that the SAP used tirearms "to intlict deadly force too 
readily and in unacceptahle circumstances" (l9871aJ:3). Unfortunately, however, 
the sample used was admittedly incomplete; only 48% of the fatal shootings 
perpetrated hy on-duty police were included. The sample may also have heen 
systematically hiased hy the exclusion of arguahly less severe Regional Magistrates' 
criminal cases. Nevertheless, this study yielded a range of interesting findings which 
should, of course, he considered with due caution considering the methodological 
shortcomings and the ahsence of significance test'i. With respect to the more 
descriptive data, the following results from Hansson's ( 1989) analysis concurred 
with those of Dutlou ( 1986): the majority of the victims were young adult African 
males, and shotguns were commonly used in these killings. By contrast, however, 
Hansson (1989) did not tlnd that those killed during political contlict were younger, 
or that most of those killed in general law enforcement were coloured. In addition, 
this author showed that the police shooters were all males, predominantly white and 
most commonly constahles. 
"IButl lt]he most striking tinding in this study is that the police used 
deadly force with a marked lack of restraint. For, irrespective of their 
purpose or situation, this sample of the SAP implemented disturhingly 
few of the internationally accepted controls when using tirearms with 
deadly effect. Notahly it was 'Blacks' who fell victim to fatal shootings 
hy predominantly 'White' police oftlcers" (Hansson, 1989: 133). 
These results indicated that in the majority of fatal shootings, police violated the 
principles of minimum force and proportionality. Whilst this lack of restraint in the 
lethal use of guns hy the SAP was found to permeate police practice, officers were 
shown to have employed even less restraint in dealing with political contlict than in 
general law enforcement (Hansson, 1989). Perhaps even more alarming was the 
tinding that, despite an extreme lack of restraint on the part of the SAP, the 
overwhelming majority of these firearm 
26 Hansson ( 19901a]) included this police sample and a comparative civilian 
sample. 
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homicides were legally justitied hy inquest courts and none of the ofticers concerned 
were held criminally liable. Fatal shootings perpetrated during political contlict 
were most commonly justified in terms of the common law of private defence, hut 
those that occurred during general Jaw enforcement were sanctioned primarily under 
statutory law as arrests or the prevention of escapes (Hansson, 1989). 
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO EXCESSIVE FORCE BY SAP 
SAP Subculture 
Occupational subculture has been most consistently named as a key factor in 
explaining the excessive use of force by the SAP, as well as other abuses of power. 
The nineties have seen subcultural explanations of police conduct modified hy the 
concept of discourse. In short, discourses of police-work have been described as 
"ways of seeing" and associated "ways of doing" that are characteristic of police 
culture, hut are neither "monolithic nor static" in nature (Rauch, 1991:4 & 3 resp). 
But it has been emphasised that so-called cop culture ought not to be treated as an 
insular phenomenon. 
"For cop culture to he an adequate and useful analytical tool, it must also 
account for the norms created by, mediated through, and protected by, 
'the Jaw, formal organizational policy [and] senior officers'" (Steytler, 
1990: 107). 
It has generally been acknowledged that the dominant norms and values of society 
are reflected within police subcultures (e.g. Reiner, 1985). It is thus crucial to 
understand SAP subculture within the sociopolitical and legal context in which it 
developed. The SAP was a racially and politically partisan force, the primary 
objective of which was to enforce and defend the system of Apartheid (e.g. Van Der 
Spuy, 1988; Steytler, 1987[h]; Sachs, 1975). After the Nationalist government 
came to power in 1948, "the State, government and police merged effortlessly into 
one ethnocentric universe"; that of the white Afrikaner (Van Der Spuy, 1990:92). 
Racism was inherent to the subculture of the SAP, and crime was politicised and 
political protest was criminalised under the Apartheid State (Rauch, 1991 ). The hulk 
of policing was public order policing of black people, rather than crime control as 
generally conceived: it was not criminals hut black people whom the SAP viewed as 
the 'crime-problem' (Rauch, 1991). 
It has been argued that militarism along with the political ideologies of 
Apartheid and Counter-Revolutionary Warfare, are the key to understanding the 
subculture of the SAP. Numerous authors have highlighted the militaristic nature of 
the subculture and structure of the SAP (e.g. Rauch, 1991; Steytler, 1990; VanDer 
Spuy, 1990, 1988). The origin of this militarism has been traced to the colonial 
Defence Act of 1912, which was subsequently incorporated into the Republic's 
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Police Act of 1958. 27 This legislation permitted the police force to he placed under 
military command and accorded the police additional powers and duties for the 
purpose of national defence (The Commissioner of the SAP, 1991[h]). The SAP 
was granted further extra-ordinary legal powers to maintain law and order under the 
Security Emergency Regulations of 1989, and militaristic ways of seeing and doing 
were consistently reinforced hy: 
"... emphasis on military discipline at trammg depots; the actual 
experience of soldiering, gained through the participation of the police in 
hoth World Wars, the confrontational thrust of puhlic order policing 
during this century; and, from the seventies onwards. the shift toward 
extensive paramilitary training in riot control and counter-insurgency in 
response to armed insurgency and political resistance" (Van Der Spuy, 
1990:87). 
Throughout the eighties the SAP and the defence force worked hand-in-hand: the 
police were routinely assisted hy the army in puhlic order policing and many police 
officers were deployed to perform military duties, especially patrolling the horders. 
During the civil war, executive control of the SAP was effectively shifted from the 
Cahinet to the State Security Council which had a strong military leadership (e.g. 
Hansson, 1990[al). An extreme lack of legal and civil accountahility hy the police is 
another noteworthy aspect of the militaristic ethos that dominated the SAP. This is 
clearly evident from factors such as: the police policy of extreme secrecy, the 
ahsence of independent mechanisms for the investigation of complaints against the 
police, their extra-ordinary legal powers, and their routine use of covert extra-legal 
methods (e.g. Van Der Spuy, 1990; Hansson, 1989; Omar, 1990; Steytler, 1987[a]; 
The Mail & Guardian, 26 Jan to 1 Feh 1996; Steytler, 1990 resp). In effect the SAP 
operated as a highly insular force, characterised hy a zealous code of internal loyalty 
and a siege mentality, this heing reinforced as the police were increasingly targeted 
(Van Der Spuy, 1990; Hansson, 1989). 
Particularly from 1984 onwards SAP suhculture was infused with the then 
dominant political discourse of the Nationalist State; political protest was cast as a 
third-world revolutionary attack and the State's response justified as counter 
revolutionary warfare (e.g. Hansson, 19901h]; Seegers, 1988). 28 From this 
perspective it was war; hlack people were viewed as "the enemy" and it hecame the 
duty of the SAP to "stave off onslaught in any way possible" and specifically to 
"eliminate the enemy" (Hansson, 1989:119; S v Villet and Another, 1987 resp). 
The use of maximum force and a readiness to kill hy police were corollaries of this 
ideology (e.g. Rauch, 1991; Haysom, 1990; VanDer Spuy, 1990; Hansson, 1989). 
It is also important to note that SAP suhculture was huttressed hy the 
composition of the police force. Like the State in general, the SAP was dominated 
27 See Dippennaar ( 1988) tor a history of the SAP. 
28 See Hansson ( 19901 h]) on counter-revolutionary strategy. 
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hy white, male, Afrikaners who were generally supporters of right-wing politics 
(e.g. Jeffery, 1991 ). 29 Furthermore, the SAP was organised according to a military 
rank system, ofticers were clothed in military-style uniforms. armed increasingly 
with weapons of war like assault ritles and hand-grenades, and sent to patrol hlack 
townships in armoured vehicles. 
The period of civil resistance and state repression in South Africa from 1984 
has heen cast as a war, given the extent of military dominance within the State and 
civil society (e.g. Cock & Nathan, 1989). Notahly the SAP were at the frontline of 
this civil contlict (Rauch, 1991 ). However, the transition to democracy and the 
suhsequent dismantling of Apartheid, formally initiated in Fehruary 1990, were 
accompanied hy a striking turnahout in the State's political ideology: from counter-
revolutionary warfare to non-violent political negotiation. Political protest was 
suddenly permissihle and extra-parliamentary political organisations were unhanned. 
The overnight "demise of a coherent ideological framework" for the SAP had a 
disorienting effect on well-estahlished ways of seeing and doing within the force 
(Rauch, 1991:19). The transition period since 1990 has heen marked hy widespread 
violence, mainly hetween political factions within civil society and not as previously, 
hetween the State and the Anti-Apartheid Movement. It has heen argued 
convincingly that the old SAP suhculture did not enahle the police to deal effectively 
with new forms of social contlict and that: 
"[t]he difficulties of redefining policing for the 'new South Africa', 
comhined with rapid organizational reforms to the SAP necessitated hy 
De Klerk's political initiative, [have] resulted in a certain level of inertia 
in relation to the policing of the violence" (Rauch, 1991: 18). 
Indeed, the SAP response was "amhiguous and incoherent"; characterised hy 
deliherate inaction, police collusion with selected political groupings, and apparent 
impotence in the face of extreme violence (Rauch, 1991: 18). In 1991, at the time of 
the National Peace Accord, the SAP were recognised as key contributors to the 
ongoing violence. 
To conclude, SAP suhcultural norms supportive of the use of excessive force 
did not exist in a vacuum (Steytler, 1990). These police ways of seeing and doing 
were shaped and reinforced hy a comhination of supportive processes including 
formal police policy, management practices, the law governing the use of force hy 
police, and a police-friendly legal system. It has thus heen postulated that the SAP 
was a "wholly unaccountahle force, whose officers [were ahle] to ahuse power with 
virtual impunity" (Weitzer & Repetti, 1991: 1). 
29 From 1948 there was a deliherate policy of recruiting Afrikaners to the SAP 
and Afrikaans was adopted as the official language for police administration. 
By 1991 two-thirds of the SAP were supporters of extreme right-wing politics. 
See Jeffery (1991 :4). 
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SAP Regulations 
The SAP Commissioner was empowered to issue orders and instructions pertaining 
to the police force: 30 when of a permanent nature these were termed Standing Orders 
and were hinding on memhers of the SAP, although not carrying the weight of law. 
Hence, these orders were part of the context of rules in which police officers had to 
conduct themselves in general and, more specifically, when using force. For many 
years the SAP Standing Orders were not made puhlic, hut the 1986 version was 
revealed perchance as evidence in a court case. Notahly, these regulations were in 
operation during much of the period that constitutes the focus of this research.JI 
The SAP formal policies on the use of deadly force were widely criticised (e.g. 
The Network of Independent Monitors et al, 1995; Jeffery, 1991; Hansson, 1990fa), 
1989; Haysom, 1987fh]). Overall, the following key shortcomings were raised 
repeatedly: the policy was lenient and lacked specificity; restraint in the use of force 
and the principles of incremental use, minimum force and proportionality were not 
sufficiently emphasised; the policy was not adequately enforced; and was not open to 
puhlic scrutiny. Haysom ( 19871 h]) noted that the SAP regulations were seriously 
lacking even when compared to the controversial deadly force policy of the security 
forces in Northern Ireland. 
Gun use hy the SAP was covered in section 202 of the Standing Orders ( 1986). 
The hulk of this section comprised a summary of the law pertaining to the legal use 
of firearms, prefaced hy the rationale that police ofticers must have a thorough 
knowledge of the relevant law hecause they are "often required to act on their own 
initiative". Although the principles of minimum force and proportionality were 
mentioned, detailed guidelines on the use of deadly force were not provided, nor 
were examples of restraint and less-than-lethal means specified. lnstead the principle 
of police discretion in gun use was promoted as follows: " ... [i]t is impossihle to 
make fixed rules with reference to all circumstances in which firearms may legally 
he used". Overall these regulations did not retlect the necessary halance hetween 
ofticer safety and restraint in the use of force hy police. To the contrary, it was 
clearly stated from the outset that a police officer must he adequately armed in order 
to do his/her duty and that s/he must "not hesitate" to use his/her firearm, when 
seeking to protect life or even property. 
lt is offensive to note that the only additional precaution that was stressed in 
the SAP orders was plainly racially discriminatory and related to the issuing of 
tirearms to African police. Commanding Officers were cautioned to: " ... determine 
that the non-white I sic I memher in question is reliahle, has common sense and good 
30 Commanders could also issue orders if consistent with Standing Orders and 
legislation. 
31 Until late 1991 when another set were puhlished under the National Peace 
Accord. 
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judgement. can handle a firearm and is familiar with the circumstances in which 
lshel he may use it"; and to issue clear instructions for the return of weapons. No 
such precautions were specitied for the issuing of guns to white police. 
The remainder of these orders pertained to the administrative procedure to he 
followed whenever an ofticer tired a gun. More specitically, on every occasion that 
pol ice tired a shot, whether intentionally or unintentionally, s/he was required to 
report the incident to a relevant senior ofticer so that a prompt and thorough 
investigation of the circumstances could he initiated. A comprehensive and factual 
report of the shooting had to he compiled and sent to the Divisional Commissioner of 
Police in charge of the ofticer concerned.l2 Such reports had to include the 
following basic information: the date, time, place and circumstances of the shooting; 
the officer's particulars; whether anyone had been killed or injured in the incident 
and their details; whether any property had been damaged by guntire and the extent 
of the damage; the number of cartridges/shells issued to the police concerned and the 
number returned after the shooting; whether the officer/s had acted within the limits 
of section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act (if applicable); whether a criminal case, 
judicial postmortem or departmental action was required; and whether the 
circumstances of the incident necessitated the suspension of the police involved. The 
Divisional Commissioner also had to send a copy of this report, with comments, to 
Head Oftice when anyone was killed or injured, when property was seriously 
damaged, when there was evidence of the illegal, reckless or negligent use of a 
tirearm, or when the events provoked "exceptional public interest". If an ofticer 
was considered to have handled a tlrearm recklessly or negligently, to have fired 
without justification, or to have ordered such conduct, the Divisional Commissioner 
concerned was required to "give thorough consideration to whether or not a hoard of 
enquiry should he convened". Hence, on paper the investigation of police shootings 
appeared rigorous. But the process was internal to the SAP and shrouded in secrecy, 
so the actual efficacy of this mechanism could not he independently assessed. 
Neither were the outcomes of internal disciplinary inquiries into excessive force 
routinely made public (Weitzer & Repetti, 1991; Foster & Luyt, 1986). 
A new SAP Code of Conduct was established under the 1991 National Peace 
Accord. 33 Unfortunately, this was not a significant improvement: most importantly 
the Code did not enhance the restraint required of police in using force and imposed 
tew absolute obligations on the SAP (Jeffery, 1991). It was concluded that the 
requirements were not "designed to protect civilians from the excessive use of force 
by members of the SAP" (The Network of Independent Monitors et al, 1995:33). 
Rather predictably therefore, the laxity of these regulations has been highlighted as 
32 And sometimes the Divisional Commissioner of the area where the shooting 
occurred. 
33 See Section G251. The Accord also included a Code of Conduct for Political 
Parties. 
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one of the key factors contrihuting to the ongoing use of excessive force hy the 
police in recent years. 
SAP Managerial Climate 
In view of the extreme secrecy which concealed the internal functioning of the SAP, 
it is not surprising to tind that independent research was not conducted on police 
managerial practices in relation to the use of force. Certain indications have 
emerged, however, which suggest that the managerial climate within the SAP 
condoned and even actively encouraged the use of excessive force (e.g. Weitzer & 
Repetti, 1991; Foster & Luyt, 1986). Perhaps the most compelling evidence to this 
effect was the admission by senior ofticers that they ordered police in their command 
to "eliminate" suspects during political contlict (e.g. S v Villet and Another, 1987; 
The Kannemeyer Commission, 1985). In a similar vein, commanding officers have 
testitied that on certain occasions they ordered their units not to carry less-than-lethal 
weapons for crowd control (e.g. The Kannemeyer Commission, 1985). 34 
Furthermore, it was not routine practice within the SAP for officers facing serious 
criminal charges to he suspended from duty, or for those convicted of violent 
offences to he discharged (Weitzer & Repetti, 1991; Foster & Luyt, 1986). To the 
contrary: "raJ review of the case law demonstrates that officers who have ill-treated 
detainees have not only escaped punishment, but have heen promoted in spite of their 
records" (Foster & Luyt, 1986:311 ). It thus seems that the excessive use of force hy 
police was widely condoned hy the leadership of the SAP, and even the Minister 
himself was "seen to approve boastfully of police brutality" (Foster & Luyt, 
1986:311). 
Lethality of SAP Weapons 
Whilst the use of certain kinds of firearms and ammunition hy the SAP in puhlic 
order policing was criticised, there was little contention over the types of weapons 
used in routine police-work.35 Removing guns from the SAP was never seriously 
debated, nor was much effort invested in improving less-than-lethal weaponry and 
equipment for law enforcement. The SAP were generally armed with 9mm semi-
automatic pistols and plastic batons, although the 0.38 inch revolver was not 
uncommon. The standard haton was 50cm in length and 30mm in diameter with a 
steel core, and ofticers were trained not to use hatons ahove the neck (Jeffery, 
1991). Special Constahles were routinely equipped with 12-gauge shotguns and 2 to 
3mm calihre hirdshot. Such ammunition was fired in plastic cartridges each 
containing ahout 280 pellets, and the tiring range was hetween 30 and 50m. This 
small calihre hirdshot had almost no penetrative capacity when fired from more than 
34 A numher of police accused of murder were acquitted on the grounds of 
ohedience to the orders of superior officers, see Hansson (l990ra]). 
35 Except re the arming of Special Constahles. 
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40m, unless it struck someone's eyes, hut it was frequently lethal at close range 
especially at distances closer than lOrn (The Kanne meyer Commission, 1985). 
By contrast, a relatively wide range of weapons and equipment was made 
availahle for use hy the riot police. It was also their stated policy that less-than-
lethal weapons were routinely used to disperse gatherings and that lethal weapons 
were employed only to defend lives and prevent serious damage to property (Jeffery, 
1991; The Kannemeyer Commission, 1985). But in practice lethal weapons were 
frequently used hy the SAP in crowd situations. The police use, in riot control, of 
firearms designed for military comhat was justified largely as a counter-measure to 
the alleged increase in illegal firearms among protestors, and the large size and 
violent nature of the crowds (Jeffery, 1991 ). According to the riot police, R l and 
R5 assault rifles were employed hy SAP sharpshooters to "take out" crowd memhers 
who were armed with explosives or firearms, so as to prevent the escalation of 
violence (Jeffery, 1991; Nathan & Phillips, 1991). The Rl assault rifle had optional 
automatic firing capacity and an effective firing range of 200m. It was used to tire 
7.62 hy 51 mm sharp ammunition that could penetrate concrete and retained lethal 
capacity after passing through a human hody. In fact the high risk to hystanders led 
to the R l rifle heing replaced with the R5 combat rifle and hyper-velocity 
ammunition. This tirearm had optional automatic firing capacity, an effective tiring 
range of 150m, and was used to tire smaller 5.56 hy 45mm hyper-velocity sharp 
ammunition that was designed not to pass through flesh. Nevertheless a hullet-
wound from an R l or R5 rifle, even to the leg or arm, was usually fatal (The 
Winterveld Commission, 1986).36 
The 12-gauge pump-action shotgun was standard police equipment for crowd 
control. This is a lethal weapon when used to tire heavy calihre pellets like huckshot 
(e.g. The Kannemeyer Commission, 1985). The riot police maintained that 
huckshot was only used in response to gunfire, the throwing of stones or petrol 
homhs (Jeffery, 1991). AAA and SSG buckshot were the two main types of 
huckshot generally employed in crowd dispersal (The Kannemeyer Commission, 
l985)Y AAA comprised 18.5 hy 70mm cartridges each containing 44 5.16mm 
pellet-;, which had an effective firing range hetween 75 and lOOm. The cartridge 
itself was potential.ly lethal when fired from closer than tive metres and the pellets 
were likely to kill if tired from less than 25m (Jeffery, 1991). Larger calihre SSG 
comprised 18.5 hy 70mm cartridges each containing 18 6.83mm pellets, with an 
effective tiring range hetween 75 and lOOm. The cartridge was potentially lethal 
when tired from closer than tive metres and the pellets usually caused death when 
tired from less than 75m (Jeffery, 1991 ). 
The SAP policy of using lethal weapons in response to crowd violence may 
36 Although the light machine gun was availahle to SAP, it was allegedly used in 
crowd dispersal only once hetween 1984 and 1990, see Jeffery (1991). 
37 The use of LG huckshot was unusual, see Hansson (19901 a]). 
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appear to have heen reasonable under the circumstances. The problem was that the 
riot police treated the vast majority of gatherings as violent, so the use of lethal 
firearms and ammunition in crowd dispersal became routine. Some commanding 
ofticers even prevented their riot units from carrying less-than-lethal weapons, 
maintaining that these weapons were " ... not sufficiently effective in 'immobilizing' 
trouble-makers" (Jeffery, 1991 : 126). The unacceptably high levels of death and 
severe injuries associated with the police use of SSG buckshot were brought to the 
fore during the Kannemeyer Commission of 1985, and the extreme lethality of 
assault ritles and sharp ammunition was emphasised during the Winterveld 
Commission of 1986. 38 Indeed, from the mid-eighties the lethal nature of the 
weapons commonly employed hy the SAP in crowd dispersal was consistently named 
as a key aspect of the problem of excessive force (e.g. Jeffery, 1991; Hansson, 
1990fa], 1989; Haysom, 1987fa], 1987fh]; The Winterveld Commission, 1986; The 
Kannemeyer Commission, 1985). It was generally argued that combat ritles and 
shotguns loaded with buckshot ought not to he used either in riot control or routine 
law enforcement. 
Concerns over SAP weaponry were not limited to lethal weapons hut extended 
to some of the so-called less-than-lethal weapons that were used in public order 
policing. Teargas, ruhher bullets and hirdshot were the principal less-than-lethal 
weapons employed hy the riot police during the civil war (Jeffery, 1991 ).39 Teargas 
was either sprayed from aerosol cannisters or fired from a weapon known as a 
stopper. When propelled hy aerosol this substance was capable of affecting two to 
eight people within a range of five to lOrn. However, when shot from a stopper as a 
37mm gas round, the effective range was increased to 50m and the impact was 
expanded to between 10 and 20 people. Ruhher bullets were either shot from a 
stopper or a shotgun. The 37mm rounds fired from a stopper had a range of ahout 
50m, whilst the 18.5 hy 70mm cartridges that were fired from a shotgun and 
contained two 12mm ruhher bullets had an effective range of between 30 and 50m. 
Evidence accumulated internationally has demonstrated that if used without the 
necessary caution, less-than-lethal weapons become lethal in effect; otherwise termed 
the "lethal use of non-lethal weapons" (Haysom, 1987fh]:216). To elaborate: 
teargas can he deadly if fired into enclosed spaces or otherwise used in high 
concentrations (e.g. The Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, 1984). 
Certain calibres of birdshot are likely to kill if they strike the upper hody or head 
(e.g. Dutlou, 1986; Hill & Peart, 1986).40 Ruhher and plastic bullets are usually 
lethal when tired at close range, particularly if they strike the head (e.g. Cohen, 
38 The Boputhatliwana police killed 13 people while dispersing a crowd using 
combat ritles and 5.56mm live bullets, see The Winterveld Commission 
(1986). 
39 Although they sometimes used other weapons like water canons and quirts. 
40 Contrary to established opinion, see Spitz (1980) and Fatteh (1976). 
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1985). ln 1973 ruhher hullets were withdrawn from use hy the security forces in 
Northern Ireland, due to unacceptahly high rates of death and injury (Haysom, 
1987(hl). Lighter plastic hullel~ were introduced that enahled hetter hullet 
placement. Nevertheless, plastic hullets proved to he just as dangerous as their 
ruhher counter-parts and in 1982 the European Parliament voted in favour of 
hanning the use of plastic hullets within the European Economic Community (The 
International Lawyers' Inquiry in Northern Ireland, 1985). But the SAP did not 
heed this warning and continued to use ruhher hullets in riot control throughout the 
civil war. 41 Moreover, they did so without due caution and with highly damaging 
effects (Haysom, 1987(b]). For instance, it was common for the riot police to tire· 
volleys of ruhher hullets without aiming at suspects' lower hodies and to use teargas 
in enclosed spaces and against children and elderly people (Haysom, l987[h ]). 42 In 
addition, medical research showed that the SAP tended to fire hirdshot at close range 
which resulted in numerous fatalities (e.g. Dutlou, 1986; Hill & Peart, 1986). The 
Kannemeyer Commission exposed the high incidence of death and serious injury 
caused hy the SAP use of ostensihly less-than-lethal weapons, a finding that was 
suhsequently supported hy a range of studies (e.g. Duflou, 1986; Hill & Peart, 
1986; Cohen, 1985). Overall it may he concluded that the SAP used less-than-lethal 
weapons in a reckless and indiscriminate manner in puhlic order policing (Haysom, 
l987fh]). 
Unlike the North American police, the SAP made little effort to assess the 
actual impact of the weapons they used or to expand the range and safety of less-
than-lethal weapons and protective equipment for police-work. Indeed the haton 
appears to have heen the only less-than-lethal weapon routinely available to the SAP 
for general law enforcement, and it seems that they did not regularly wear protective 
hody armour (The Commissioner of the SAP, 1993; Jeffery, 1991).43 Basic 
protective riot gear, like shields and helmets, were not widely used hy the riot police 
in South Africa, who instead appeared to rely on the protection of armoured vehicles 
known as casspirs. 44 
To conclude: the evidence indicates an almost complete reliance on tirearms 
for general law enforcement and puhlic order policing, and a lack of restraint in the 
use of less-than-lethal weapons in crowd control. In addition, the SAP leadership 
seems to have paid too little attention to improving less-than-lethal weapons and 
protective gear in the service of violence reduction and enhanced ofticer safety. 
41 And to a lesser extent plastic hullets, see Haysom ( 1987(b]). 
42 One of the most notorious examples of the misuse of tear gas hy the SAP was 
at Ashley Kriel's funeral in Cape Town in 1987, see The Cape Times (20 July 
1987). 
43 Large quantities of protective hody armour were only acquired hy the SAP 
from 1993 and their policy on wearing was not made puhlic. 
44 The haton charge typical of riot control in most countries was not employed hy 
the SAP. It was considered too dangerous given the low ratio of police to 
protesters and the high levels of violence, see Jeffery ( 1991 ) . 
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No Independent Oversight 
Until late 1991 there was no external hody for monitoring police conduct and 
investigating complaints against the SAP. Instead the SAP were policed hy the SAP 
(Foster & Luyt, 1986). Under this system complaints had to he made to the police 
themselves and in general their response was negative, ranging from outright refusals 
to accept complaints to violent revenge (e.g. Fine & Hansson, 1990; Haysom, 
1990). Numerous cases were documented of police intimidating, assaulting and 
killing people who dared to complain, hut usually the SAP simply did not investigate 
complaints (e.g. Weitzer & Repetti, 1991 ). The alternatives-- written complaints to 
the Commissioner or Minister and/or questions in parliament-- tended to he no more 
effective than lodging complaint~ with the SAP themselves (Weitzer & Repetti, 
199 I). Not surprisingly these complaint~ mechanisms were not widely used hy the 
public. 
Additionally, police investigations of deaths and injuries caused hy SAP were 
often of poor quality. There is evidence indicating that: crime scenes were 
inadequately managed which led to the destruction of evidence; officers failed to 
reconstruct scenarios in order to test the feasibility of statements; they omitted to test 
alleged shooters for residual gunpowder and have relevant ballistics tests conducted 
and; they made little etlon to take statement~ from available material witnesses or to 
trace witnesses (The Network of Independent Monitors et al, I 995). ln shon, the 
SAP had a reputation for compromising such investigations, hy omission and 
commission. It is now widely accepted that the system whereby the SAP 
investigated deadly force incident~ perpetrated hy their colleagues was untenable 
(The Network of Independent Monitors et al, I 995; Foster & Luyt, I 986). 
There were also internal disciplinary mechanisms within the SAP. Under the 
Police Act 7 of I 958 as amended, in cases of alleged misconduct involving 
constables, sergeants and warrant officers, a depanmental hearing could he 
conducted hy a lieutenant (or higher officer), who was empowered to punish by 
means of reprimands and fines. Alleged misconduct among higher ranking officers 
was handled hy a police hoard of inquiry appointed hy the Commissioner or Minister 
to make recommendations directly to the Minister. The actual operation of these 
internal SAP disciplinary mechanisms was kept secret. But a few studies revealed 
that the discipline dispensed to officers who used excessive force was generally 
rather lenient. Funhermore, it was SAP policy not to conduct departmental 
enquiries in cases where officers were acquitted of criminal charges, even if they had 
violated police regulations, and those who were convicted of criminal violence were 
not automatically dismissed (e. g. Weitzer & Repetti, I 991 ; Foster & Luyt, 1986). 
At this time, the judicial commission of inquiry was the only type of 
investigation into controversial SAP conduct that was ostensihly independent and 
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puhlicly transparent. However, these commissions were considered to he somewhat 
inetfective mechanisms, having II... no appreciahle corrective impact on police 
practices II and, hetween 1985 and 1989, only one commission was appointed 
concerning the SAP (Weitzer & Repetti, 1991 :3). 4s 
From the late eighties pressure mounted for the introduction of some form of 
independent oversight of the SAP (e.g. Scharf, 1994[ a), \992; Weitzer & Repetti, 
1991; Hansson, 1990[a), 1989). Such proposals were, however, adamantly opposed 
hy the police and the official opinion expressed was that, "it would he a sad day in 
any country when you have to have a hody to police the police" (SAP Spokesman in: 
Weitzer & Repetti, 1991 :2). Nevertheless, in 1991 the National Peace Accord 
provided for the estahlishment of new police investigatory units mandated to 
investigate crimes of political violence, allegations of SAP hias and serious 
misconduct. The civilian oversight component of this new system comprised Police 
Reporting Officers whose task it was to receive and oversee the investigation of 
complaints against the SAP, and to provide feedback to the National Peace 
Committee. 46 
The Law and It's Shortcomings 
Introductory Comment 
Until recently much of the academic writing published on the use of deadly force hy 
the SAP comprised critiques of the law, particularly section 49 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended. This legislation permitted both the police 
and civilians to use deadly force to effect an arrest or prevent an escape, under 
certain conditions. 47 Similarly, the common law sanctioned killing in self defence, 
in defence of another, in defence of property, and out of necessity. Police officers 
were also permitted to use deadly force in the dispersal of illegal gatherings, in 
ohedience to the orders of a superior officer, and to maintain law and order. What 
follows, is a critical examination of the legal powers that were accorded the SAP, 
with the exception of private defence and necessity which have already heen 
discussed in Chapter Three. 
Effecting an Arrest and Preventing an Escape 4s 
In terms of section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended, it 
was lawful to kill to effect the arrest or prevent the escape from custody of anyone: 
45 The Kannemeyer Commission of 1985. But from 1990 an increasing number 
were appointed to investigate police conduct; starting with the Harms 
Commission which examined allegations of SAP deaths squads and the 
Goldstone Commission which assessed the Sehokeng puhlic order incident. 
46 Police Reporting Officers could not he police, hut ex-police were eligihle, see 
Jeffery ( 1991). 
4 7 Also see the Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959 as amended. 
48 See Louw and De Jager ( 1988) on historical development. 
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( 1) who was reasonably suspected of a Schedule One offence; (2) who tled or 
otherwise resisted arrest; and (3) who could not he arrested or prevented from 
tleeing hy means other than killing. The offences listed under Schedule One 
included serious violent crimes, offences against the State, as well as crimes that 
were less serious hy comparison and not necessarily violent like breaking and 
entering, theft, and receiving stolen property. 49 This defence had the most stringent 
set of requirements of all the grounds of justification: the suspect had to he on the 
point of being arrested; s/he had to be made aware that an attempt was heing made 
to arrest her/him; and had to tlee with this knowledge and the intention of avoiding 
arrest (S v Salvier, 1993; S v Barnard, 1986; Macu v Du Toit, 1983). 
The importance of the latter requirement was first emphasised in the minority 
judgement of Botha in Macu v Du To it ( 1983). In this case, a farmer and his sons 
claimed they discovered a number of suspects stealing fresh produce from their farm. 
When the suspects tled, the farmer and his sons gave chase and shot one of the 
suspects in an attempt to effect an arrest. After the shooting, the uninjured suspects 
bolted. In the minority judgement it was argued that, the intention of the suspect~\ 
who tled after the shooting may not have been to evade arrest hut to avoid heing 
shot. It was reasoned that the suspects might not have been aware that their pursuers 
intended merely to effect their arrest. Indeed, as they had already seen their 
accomplice shot, it was likely they feared their pursuers also intended to shoot them. 
Hence, the minority judgement emphasised that anyone intending to make an arrest 
must take reasonable steps to ensure a suspect is made aware of this intention. 
Minimum force was also required for this defence and it was recommended 
that less-than-lethal alternatives he used prior to deadly force (Matlou v Makhubedu, 
1978). The Courts ruled further that it was not legally justitiahle to use deadly force 
to effect an arrest or prevent an escape if an innocent third party was joreseeably 
endangered (Geor~e NO v the Minister of Law and Order, 1987; Prince & Another 
v the Minister of Law and Order & Others, 1987).50 
The procedural question of who ought to hear the burden of proof when section 
49(2) was invoked as a justitication for killing was a contentious issue. It is a 
fundamental principle of criminal law that the State should prove all aspects of an 
accused's guilt and rebut all defences raised. The traditional test applied in criminal 
cases is that of reasonable douht. In S v Swanepoel ( 1985), however, the Appellate 
Division (AD) confirmed the earlier decision of R v Britz (1949) that, for the 
purposes of section 49(2) the burden of proof was to rest upon the accused, hut that 
the Court was to apply the less stringent test of a balance of probabilities in such 
cases. A number of legal scholars opposed this unusual requirement, maintaining 
that the State should hear the onus of proof when this defence was employed (e.g. 
49 See Schedule 1 of The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended. 
50 Although this referred to section 49( 1 ), it was also applicable to 49(2), see 
Dendy (1988) and Knobel (1988). 
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Visser. 1987; Kotze, 1980). It was argued in particular that it was unfair to require 
that an accused hear the burden of proof if s/he relied on section 49(2), hut not if 
s/he invoked necessity or private defence. The counter-argument was that this 
deviation from the legal norm served to limit abuse of the wide protection provided 
hy section 49(2). Indeed, inS v Swanepoel (1985) the AD decided that because this 
provision did nor require proportionality, the additional constraint of placing the 
onus of proof on the accused was essential. In support of this position the AD cited 
Justice Schreiner's rationale in the early case of R v Britz (1949): 
"I h ]earing in mind the great risk that tirearms may, if the protection is 
too easily obtainable, he lightly used upon occasion to prevent the escape 
of someone suspected, reasonably hut perhaps wrongly, of some possibly 
not very serious crime, and hearing in mind also that emphasis which our 
law and customs have in general laid upon the sanctity of human life, I 
am satisfied that the Legislature must have intended it that a person who 
has killed another and seeks the very special protection afforded hy s44 
!of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 3 I of 1917] should have to 
prove, hy a balance of probabilities, the circumstances specified in this 
section, as pre-requisite to immunity. . . . The form of the section itself 
suggests that the protection is only available when the circumstances are 
all shown to he present, and that it is not available where their presence 
has only not been negatived" (InS v Swanepoel, 1985:585 G-1 & C-D). 
In the USA there has heen a great deal of debate over the circumstances under which 
it ought to he lawful to use deadly force to effect an arrest. Although the same 
cannot he said with respect to South Africa, in the eighties this issue did draw more 
scholarly attention than many other topics in this tield (Cockrell, 1986). Section 
49(2) was heavily criticised hy legal scholars and there were repeated calls for 
reform (e.g. Hansson, 19901al; Louw & De Jager, 1988; Osbourne, 1987; Cockrell, 
1986). Two main objections were raised: the inclusion of civilians, and the 
exclusion of proportionality as a requirement. It was argued that the protection of 
this provision should he limited to peace ofticers because it is their duty to effect 
arrests and they are arguably less likely to exercise the privilege irresponsibly (e.g. 
Cockrell, 1986). Furthermore, section 49(2) was said to violate proportionality hy 
permitting the killing of those suspected of relatively minor and non-violent 
offences, and this legislative provision was characterised as anachronistic and 
anomalous (Cockrell, 1986). It was said to he a remnant of the early rule in English 
common law which permitted the killing of tleeing felons at a time when all felonies 
carried the death sentence. It was deemed anomalous because it was in effect a 
legalised circumvention of due process: it enabled the killing of a suspect without 
trial or conviction (Louw· & De Jager, 1988; Cockrell, 1986). A renowned legal 
scholar went so far as to characterise section 49(2) as a "state-authorised lynch law" 
(Milton in: The Sunday Times, 24 March 1996). Indeed, considering that the object 
of arrest is to ensure the presence of an accused at trial, killing to effect an arrest is a 
contradiction in terms (Cockrell, 1986). 
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South African law pertaining to arrest was also out of kilter with relevant legal 
developments in other Western countries. For instance: in Canada and North 
America the lawful use of deadly force to arrest was limited to peace ofticers 
(Section 25(4) of the Criminal code of Canada; Tennessee v Garner, 1985 resp). In 
the UK the seriousness of the suspected offence and the force used to arrest had to he 
proportional (Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act of 1967 as amended). And in the 
USA, deadly force was restricted to arrests in which suspects were considered 
dangerous (Tennessee v Garner, 1985). Accordingly some legal scholars 
recommended that section 49(2) he reformed to permit only peace ofticers to employ 
deadly force in the arrest of dangerous tleeing suspects (e.g. Hansson, 19901a]; 
Louw & De Jager, 1988; Oshourne, 1987; Cockrell, 1986). However, this 
protection-of-life standard has heen heavily criticised and many contemporary 
scholars prefer the more restrictive defence-of-life standard (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
The key argument here has heen that suspected offences are unreliable predictors of 
future dangerousness. Therefore a suspect's actual hehaviour during an arrest ought 
to he the deciding factor (e.g. Petersilia et al, 1985). In other words, deadly force 
should he used only against suspects who directly threaten life while resisting or 
tleeing from arrest. 
Table 5.10: 
Summary of Restraints for Arrests and Preventing Escapes, 1991. 
* 
* 
* 
The minimum force necessary to arrest or prevent escape. 
Not foreseeahly endangering an innocent third party. 
Whenever feasihle: 
ensure th  person to he arrested is aware of this intention; 
employ less-than-lethal means hefore resorting to deadly force 
(recommended). 
Dispersing Public Gatherings 
Puhlic gatherings were officially hanned in South Africa until March 199l.s1 The 
Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 as amended, which has now heen repealed,s2 
permitted memhers of the SAP to use deadly force to disperse gatherings classified 
as riotous or prohihited. Gatherings at which anyone was likely to he seriously 
injured or property damaged were deemed riotous, and prohihited gatherings were 
51 Although meetings were increasingly permitted after late 1989, see Jeffery 
(1991 ). 
52 Specifically sections 46 to 53 and 57. Three other Acts also governed puhlic 
demonstrations: The Gatherings and Demonstrations in the Vicinity of 
Parliament Act 52 of 1973 as amended, the Gatherings and Demonstrations in 
or near Court Buildings Prohihition Act 71 of 1982 as amended, and the 
Gatherings and Demonstrations in or near Union Buildings Act 103 of 1992 as 
amended. All of these have heen repealed. 
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those hanned or restricted hy the Minister. Generally, legal texts did not include this 
defence as a separate ground of justitication, and it was not frequently employed hy 
officers who killed when dispersing crowds. Instead, private defence and effecting 
an arrest were more popular defences. Nevertheless, the dispersing of a riotous or 
prohihited gathering has heen treated as a distinct defence here hecause it was 
included in the SAP Standing Orders ( 1986) as a separate condition under which 
police could use deadly force, and the legislation contained certain rather specitic 
restraints on the use of force under these circumstances. 
To elahorate, hefore resorting to deadly force to disperse an illegal gathering, 
police were required when feasihle to give an audihle oral warning in hoth official 
languages, and to allow sufticient time for people to comply .53 Less-than-lethal 
weapons had to he employed hefore tirearms were used, and when force was 
employed it had to he the minimum necessary to disperse the gathering concerned 
(The Internal Security Act 74 of 1982). This defence was not availahle to civilians 
and when raised as a justitication for killing, the onus was on the State to prove 
heyond a reasonable douht that the accused concerned had not acted in this capacity 
(Snyman, 1989). 
Table 5.11: 
Summary of Restraints for Dispersing Illegal Gatherings under the 
Former Internal Security Act. 
* 
* 
The minimum force necessary to disperse the gathering. 
Whenever feasihle: 
give audihle orders to disperse in hoth official languages; 
allow sufficient time to comply with orders to disperse; 
employ less-than-lethal weapons hefore using lethal force. 
The main prohlem with this aspect of the law was the fact that it violated the hasic 
right to assemhle freely and placed the SAP in the position where they were required 
to disperse the vast majority of gatherings (e.g. Todd, 1994; Jeffery, 1991). It was 
argued that outlawing puhlic gatherings actually increased the prohahility of death, 
injury and property damage hy preventing co-ordinated planning and organisation by 
police, organisers, and traffic authorities and medical services. At a more technical 
level, the law governing crowd dispersal hy the police was criticised for violating the 
principle of proportionality and placing insufficient emphasis on the incremental use 
of force (e.g. Hansson, 19901a]; Haysom, 1987[a]). By the early nineties it was 
widely agreed that an entirely new legal framework for puhlic protest was 
imperative, and after the transition was announced, even the SAP underscored the 
53 English and Afrikaans. Oral warnings and orders to use force had to come 
from a Warrant Officer (or higher ranking officer). 
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need for such legislative change (Jeffery, 1991). 
Obedience to Orders 
For members of the SAP, the common law sanctioned killing in obedience to the 
orders of a superior officer, when not manifestly unlawful (Burchill & Milton, 1994; 
Snyman, 1993). This principle has been explained as follows: 
"ft]hey will therefore he excused from obeying any order which is in 
fact illegal, provided that it is not blatantly so ... 1 For] looked at from 
the point of view of the individual soldier or police 1 officer] it is 
unfair to train a jwoJ man in automatic obedience, and then penalize 
him jherj for acting in the way the State itself has trained him [herj to 
act" (Gordan in: Snyman, 1993: 130). 
The defence required that the minimum force necessary he used to execute an order, 
and that the force be proportional to the lawful purpose to he achieved.s4 When this 
justification was raised for killing, the onus was on the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused concerned had not acted in this capacity (Snyman, 
1993). 
Killing in obedience to the orders of a superior ofticer was rarely employed as 
a defence outside of war situations and did not draw much scholarly attention.ss But 
it was used hy the SAP on a number of occasions during the civil war. The main 
criticism levelled at this defence was that it did not hold superior officers accountable 
for issuing orders to employ excessive force, and this is contrary to the requirements 
of the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers (e.g. The 
Network of Independent Monitors et al, 1995). 
Table 5.12: 
Summary of Restraints for Obedience to Orders, 1991. 
* 
* 
The minimum force necessary to carry out an order. 
Proportionality between the force used and the objective to he achieved 
hy the application of force. 
Extra-ordinary Legal Powers 
The grounds of justification documented thus far are ordinary legal powers, hut the 
Security Emergency Regulations ( 1989) provided members of the SAP with extra-
ordinary legal powers (Dugard, 1977). 56 In particular, Regulation 2 gave police 
ofticers the power to use force against anyone whom they "thought" was a danger to 
54 Proportionality was assumed because it is a fundamental principle of SA 
common law. 
55 However, seeR v Smith (1900), R v Cilliers (1903), and S v Werner (1947). 
56 Promulgated under the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 as amended. 
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"public safety" or a threat to "puolic order". Before shooting in such emergency 
situations, police were required to give oral warning of their intention to shoot, and 
to tire only when shooting was the least amount of force necessary to overcome the 
threat in question. But the force used did not need to he proportional to the danger 
to he averted. No objective test was required for this defence and under these 
regulations the SAP were indemnified against criminal prosecution for actions taken 
in "good faith". Furthermore, it was the challenger and not the accused, who had to 
hear the onus of disproving the presumption. Section 103 of the Defence Act 44 of 
1957 as amended, also indemnified the SAP against prosecution for any act 
"advised, commanded, ordered, directed or done in good faith ... in connection with 
the prevention of terrorism in any operational area". 
These wide legal powers drew extreme criticism and repeated demands were 
made for their abolition (e.g. Jeffery, 1991; Hansson, 1990[a], 1989; Omar, 1990; 
Haysom, 1987[al; Steytler, 1987[a)). It was argued that this indemnity placed the 
SAP above the law and negated other legal constraints on the use of force which 
amounted to: 
" ... a broad discretion to kill or injure without legal consequences. The 
onus on the victim to show that a policeman acted in bad faith when he 
tired recklessly into a crowd, or failed to fire a warning shot, or 
neglected to use less drastic forms of 'coercion', is nearly insuperable" 
(Haysom, 1987[a]:6). 
It is noteworthy, however, that few police officers invoked the legal protection 
afforded them by this defence during the civil war years. This has been attributed to 
a combination of factors such as: the indemnity provisions deterring criminal charges 
against the SAP; police accused not needing to rely on these provisions as the Courts 
were extremely lenient in according them the legal protection of other defences; and 
deliberate avoidance due to the highly controversial nature of the provisions (Jeffery, 
1991 ; Weitzer & Repetti, 1991 ; Hansson, 1990[ a] resp). 
Table 5.13: 
Summary of Restraints under Former Emergency Regulations. 
* 
* 
The minimum force necessary to avert a threat to public safety or order. 
Oral warning of the intention to shoot. 
Interim Sumi1Ulry Conclusion 
The indemnity provisions were an obvious violation of internationally accepted 
principles on the use of force by police, but the basic tenet of proportionality was 
also transgressed in the ordinary legal powers that were accorded the SAP to use 
deadly force to arrest, prevent escape and disperse illegal gatherings. Furthermore, 
the incremental use of force was not explicitly or consistently required for these 
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defences and restraint in the use of deadly force was not sufficiently emphasised. 
Finally, officers who foreseeahly created the need to use deadly force were still 
protected under these legal provisions. Succinctly put, "South African criminal law 
allow! ed] police greater latitude in the use of force than that sanctioned hy 
international standards" (Weitzer & Repetti, 1991 :6). 
The Law in Practice 
It was not only the law that was problematic, hut the way in which it was interpreted 
hy the Courts. A number of authors have maintained -that the South African Courts 
were generally lenient in their application to the SAP, of the law governing the use 
of deadly force (e.g. Weitzer & Repetti, 1991; Hansson, 19901a]; Haysom, l9871h]; 
Foster & Luyt, 1986). A critical examination of the relevant case-law showed that 
the Courts failed to accord adequate weight to the right to life in deciding the 
lawfulness of killings hy the SAP (Haysom, 19871h]). And the tollowing more 
detailed conclusion was based on an empirical study of t1rearm fatalities: 
"I i]n practice, the legal system is failing to apply controls on the use of 
deadly torce strictly and consistently in determining !criminal] liability. 
In et'fect this means that a high level of restraint is nill required on the 
part of those who use deadly tbrce in order tor their actions to he deemed 
lawful and hence, for such persons to avoid legal sanction" (Hansson, 
1990(a]: 120). 
This work also demonstrated that the lawfulness of most tirearm homicides was 
effectively decided at closed informal inquests, without the benefit of oral evidence 
tested by cross-examination. lt was thus proposed that formal inquest proceedings 
he conducted in all firearm homicide cases (Hansson, 19901 a]). 
Although Weitzer and Repetti's ( J99t) investigation into SAP accountability 
for criminal conduct was based on a small non-random sample of criminal homicides 
hy police, they made the following notable observations: ( 1) there had to he 
overwhelming evidence against officers for the Courts to actually convict police 
accused; (2) the Courts held police accused, who killed during political contlict, to 
lower standards of accountability than those who were tried for killing in the process 
of general law enforcement; (3) the Courts accorded considerable weight to senior 
officers' opinions on appropriate police conduct; ( 4) the Courts tended to favour 
police versions of events over those of civilian eye-witnesses in cases involving 
killings hy police during political contlict; and (5) when police were convicted it was 
frequently tor lesser offences than the initial charges and the sentences were often 
lenient. Taken together these findings suggest a pattern of undue leniency in the 
application of the law to police officers accused of unlawful gun homicides. 
It should not he surprising to tind therefore that only a fraction of complaints 
made against the SAP resulted in criminal prosecutions, and that a relatively small 
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proportion of officers were convictedY Indeed the numher of police who were 
convicted and discharged from the SAP as a result of misconduct remained rather 
constant throughout the eighties -- hetween 200 and 250 convicted and 10% 
discharged p.a. -- despite the increased rate at which the SAP killed and injured 
people after 1985 (Weitzer & Repetti, 1991 :3; Foster & Luyt, 1986). It seems that 
the SAP were seldom held accountahle for misconduct, particularly the excessive use 
of force. All factors considered, the view of the SAP as a " ... wholly unaccountahle 
force, whose officers !could] ahuse power with virtual impunity", appears to he 
justitied (Weitzer & Repetti, 1991 :1). 
CONCLUDING COMMENT 
A I though a range of factors contrihuting to the excessive use of force hy the SAP 
have heen examined separately, it is important to consider these variables as inter-
related and potentially cumulative in effect. To recap: a police suhculture supportive 
of the use of excessive force; a managerial climate in which excessive force was 
condoned and prohahly encouraged; an inetTective complaints mechanism controlled 
hy the SAP; an understandahle puhlic reticence to lodge complaintli against the 
police; prosecutors who were inhihited in charging police due to their close working 
relationship and their reliance on police to provide the necessary evidence; less than 
optimal legal restrictions on the use of force hy the SAP; and leniency in the 
treatment of police accused hy the Courts. Other contrihutory factors have heen 
proposed in relation to the excessive use of force by the SAP. Jeffery (1991) noted 
the following additional relevant variahles with respect to public order policing: the 
deployment of inadequate numhers of police officers to manage extremely large 
crowds; 58 the use of young and inexperienced officers who had received very limited 
training in riot control techniques; an overemphasis on the use of force in police 
training for riot control; a hot climate that discouraged police from wearing 
protective gear and decreased the efficacy of teargas and water canons; and volatile 
crowds that were antagonistic toward the SAP and prone to extreme violence. 
More recently the Network of Independent Monitors et al ( 1995) identified a 
number of key variahles hy examining pol ice activities hetween 1990 and 1995. One 
of the most notahle factors revealed was the "climate of fear" that has permeated the 
police force in this country and heen reinforced hy increased attacks on police and 
heightened violence in civil society (1995:32). Shortcomings in police methods of 
arrest and less-than-lethal tactics were a second important category of factors to 
emerge from this investigation: police practices that increase the prohahility of 
escape attempts or resistance to arrest -- like failing to hand-cuff suspects promptly 
57 In 1986 two out of 338 complaints resulted in criminal trials, see Weitzer and 
Repetti ( 1991 ) . 
58 Only 20 to 30 riot police for crowds over 50000 strong, see Jeffery (1991). 
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or securely, and neglecting to search suspects for weapons -- increase the need for 
police to use force. 
The literature availahle on the use of deadly force hy the SAP is paltry when 
compared to work in this tield in North America. In particular there has heen a 
glaring sparsity of empirical research on the police and guns in South Africa. For 
ohvious reasons much of the writing has heen focused on the use of force in puhlic 
order policing, with a relative neglect of this issue in general law enforcement. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the USA, there has heen more concern over SAP force 
than their use of guns. 
Despite the extreme differences hetween these societies, some similar issues 
have emerged in this arena; most notahly the emphasis on the way in which police 
use force in dealing with political protest, and the fact that police tend to kill and 
severely injure disproportionately more hlack than white people. To conclude, the 
accumulated evidence indicates a routine use of excessive force and a general lack of 
restraint in the use of force hy the SAP. Signiticantly, this conduct was not only 
common during the peak civil war years, hut has heen reflected in recent police 
practice (e.g. The Express on Sunday, 3 August 1997; The Network of Independent 
Monitors er al, 1995). 
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RESEARCH PROCEDURE 
A BRIEF JUSTIFICATION 
A study of firearm fatalities may seem ill-advised considering the criticism raised 
against research that neglects non-use, missed shots and injuries. A numher of 
factors particular to the South African context weighed heavily in the decision to 
pursue this investigation including, inter alia, the extremely limited numher of 
accessihle and reliahle sources of data on tirearms, the relative quality of the 
information availahle on fatal and non-fatal shootings, and the pressing need for 
empirical research in this tield. 
To elahorate further: in terms of the classiticatory system used to record causes 
of death, tirearm fatalities were deemed non-natural deaths and lahelled as accidents, 
suicides, assaults, or deaths resulting from legal intervention. Because the Inquest 
Act required that an autopsy he performed in all non-natural fatalities, mortuary 
registers contained unusually complete samples of gun deaths. The categories of 
information recorded were also relatively consistent across cases and included 
variahles relevant to research. Furthermore, according to the law there had to he an 
inquest or a criminal trial for every gun death and this enahled cases to he traced 
through the legal process.' 
By contrast, there were no comparahle sources of data on non-fatal shootings. 
Whilst hospital records were an ohvious source of information on gunshot injuries, 
these would not have yielded a representative sample. In South Africa at this time, 
not everyone who was shot received medical treatment as health services were 
limited and disrupted hy political contlict. Also, hecause hospital records pertain 
primarily to victims' injuries rather than shooters' characteristics and circumstances 
of shootings, these data were of limited relevance to research on gun use. Records 
of criminal trials -- for instance, attempted murders and assault~ with tirearms --
constituted another source of information on non-fatal shootings. However, details 
of the weapons used in each incident were not specified in court registers, hence, 
extracting firearm cases would have involved examining transcripts for all violent 
offences. Even if a random sample of these non-fatal shootings were to have heen 
selected hy such time-consuming means, it would not have heen representative of 
non-fatal shootings hecause only a proportion of these cases are heard as criminal 
matters. 
Police records on shots tired were arguahly the most valuahle source of 
information on non-fatal shootings in existence at the time. These comprised data on 
Using inquest and criminal case registers. 
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incidents in which officers had fired their guns no matter the outcomes. Although 
this information would have heen invaluahle for research purposes, independent 
researchers were denied access. Furthermore, unlike the North American police, the 
SAP did not routinely record averted shootings and as recently as 1995 there was no 
known source of data on this topic in South Africa. 
Considering the limited nature of the information availahle on non-fatal 
shootings and the comparahly high quality of data on fatal shootings, a study of 
firearm fatalities was deemed preferahle. Nevertheless, the fact that this research 
elucidates only the most extreme of the potential outcomes of gun possession must he 
hourne in mind. 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Given the dearth of scholarly work on tirearms in this country, the general purpose 
of this study was to contribute to the development of the tield hy expanding the 
empirical hase and improving the conceptual foundation, hence the strong 
exploratory and descriptive component (see Tahle 6.1 ). Overall, it was hoped that 
the work would inform theory and policy on tirearms and help to shape 
contemporary discourse on guns as a social prohlem in South Africa. This required 
something of a 'stock-taking' exercise; searching for and compiling relevant 
information that was fragmented across many sources and, where feasihle, 
transforming it into a more useful form. It was also envisaged that the computerised 
database constructed for this stud  might he useful in the development of a 
permanent national datahase on gun-related issues. In particular the research data 
were seen as a useful haseline for monitoring temporal changes and evaluating the 
impact of future interventions. 
The first of the specitic aims was to provide a comprehensive description of a 
representative sample of fatal shootings including: the demographic and behavioural 
characteristics of the victims and the shooters, the circumstances surrounding the 
shootings, the nature of the weapons, the injuries sustained and the legal process that 
followed each incident. The second aim was to examine the nature and extent to 
which shooters employed restraint hefore they resorted to deadly force. The central 
purpose hehind developing a comprehensive 'picture' of fatal gun use was to enable 
critical examination, particularly the identification and prioritising of prohlems. This 
differs markedly from the traditional approach in which guns have heen assumed to 
constitute a prohlem, and private possession has heen posited as rhe issue. But these 
assumptions lack sound empirical support and many gun controls have proven 
relatively ineffective at reducing violence. Hence, an alternate approach was 
adopted in this study; here the starting point was whether gun-related prohlems 
existed. The last of the specific aims was to inform recommendations for gun-
related interventions in contemporary South Africa hy utilising the tindings from this 
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investigation and the accumulated research in the tield. 
Table 6.1: 
Core Research Questions. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
What ·tessons' may he derived from pertinent work conducted in other 
countries? 
What characterised the victims, the shooters and the circumstances 
surrounding fatal shootings that occurred in metropolitan Cape Town 
hetween 1984 and 1991 '! 
What forms of restraint including less-than-lethal means did the shooters 
employ het<>re resorting to deadly force? 
How were these shooting incidents processed within the legal system'! 
Were any gun-related prohlems indicated? 
If so, what was/were the nature of this/these prohlems? 
What policy recommendations may he derived tor contemporary South 
Africa? 
RESEARCH SAMPLE 
Sample Parameters 
A numher of parameters were set in order to select a manageahle sample of sufficient 
magnitude to holster the reliahility and validity of the findings. The first criterion 
was that only fatal shootings were to he included. The second parameter was the 
time span and the eight year period 1984 to 1991 (inclusive) was selected. The 
choice of these limit~ was hased on sociological relevance and practical concerns. 
The sample period included the outhreak and duration of the civil war over 
Apartheid and the first years of the formal transition to democracy. The sample thus 
includes tirearm fatalities that occurred under a wide range of interesting and 
changing sociopolitical circumstances. The lower limit of 1984 was unalterahle 
hecause most of the pre-1984 court transcripts had heen destroyed when the data 
collection tbr this study was hegun in 1992.2 Furthermore, at this time it took 
hetween two and three years for criminal cases to he completed and their outcomes 
made availahle in official records. Since intormation regarding the outcomes of 
criminal cases was imperative to this work and the plan was to complete data 
collection hy the end of 1994, the upper time limit t<>r the sample was set three years 
earlier at the end of 1991. The third parameter was the geographic area to he 
included and metropolitan Cape Town was chosen. It was hoped that Cape Town's 
ofticial status as a metropolitan urhan area might increase comparahility hetween 
current and future studies. Tt also meant that certain useful hackground 
demographics were availahle. Finally, all of the fatal shootings that went to criminal 
trial were included: those in the Regional Magistrates' Courts and the Cape Division 
of the Supreme Court. To reiterate, this is a notah1e improvement on the pilot 
2 This was ofticial State policy. 
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sample in which fatal shootings heard as criminal cases m Regional Magistrates' 
Courts were excluded (Hansson. 19901a]). 
Sample Selection 
At the time this research was conducted, the Salt River and Tygerherg Hospital 
mortuaries served the metropolitan Cape Town area. The first step in selecting the 
research sample was examination of the relevant death registers at these two 
mortuaries. The case details for each firearm fatality that met the abovementioned 
sample parameters were extracted from the registers along with data on victims' 
demographic characteristics and injuries. This process yielded a research sample of 
1555 fatal shootings for the period 1984 to 1991. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Data Collection Device 
The paper-and-pencil data collection instrument, constructed and tested hy Hansson 
(l990f a]), was critically assessed and amended for the purposes of this study. Since 
one of the objectives was to develop a comprehensive database on the topic of gun-
related issues, the decision was made to collect data for a wide range of variables. A 
selection of inquest and criminal trial records were thus examined to ascertain 
whether the range of variables could he usefully expanded. The following criteria 
were employed in selecting additional variables: there had to be research evidence 
demonstrating relevance and there had to he an accessible source from which to 
collect the necessary information. A number of new variables were subsequently 
added and some of the operational definitions were modified to enhance reliability .3 
A full list of the relevant variables and their operational definitions follows in the 
next section. The revised data collection device was then tested hy application to a 
pilot sample of cases and further retined before it was employed to extract data for 
the full research sample. As the instrument was a paper-and-pencil device, it was 
designed with accuracy, economy of effort, and ease of use in mind. Where 
feasible, precoded options were provided to facilitate recording and a brief 
description of each shooting incident was also required in which noteworthy 
characteristics, contradictory issues and confusing aspects were highlighted. 
Relevant Variables 
Introductory Comment 
The sample included accidents, suicides and homicides. One of the central foci of 
this study was the degree to which shooters employed restraint before using deadly 
force against others. Therefore, many of the relevant variables pertain to the 
interpersonal use of guns, and hence to homicides and not to suicides or other self-
3 See Appendix A. 
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intlicted shootings. 4 Therefore, soflle of the variahles that were examined in relation 
to homicides necessarily differed from those that were assessed t{)r suicides. 
Furthermore, in suicides only one set of data had to he collected for hoth victims and 
shooters, these heing the same person. Not surprisingly then, a reduced numher of 
variahles were examined in relation to suicide cases. The first two variahles used to 
classify gun deaths in this sample were the highest court's ruling on whether each 
shooting had heen: (l) suicidal or homicidal, and (2) intentional or unintentional. 
The variahles examined in relation to homicidal shootings have heen explained in 
some detail: an ahhreviated title and a summary of the operational definition have 
heen given. Considering the overlap, the variahles pertaining to suicidal shootings 
have heen summarised in Tahle 6.2. 
Details of Variables in Homicides 
Year: the year in which the victim was shot, as distinct from the year in which s/he 
actually died. The range was 1984 to 1991 inclusive. 
Political motivation: whether the shooting was politically motivated, that is, did a 
shooting take place as part of oyert political contlict or was it known to have 
heen politically motivated as in the case of an assassination. 
Area: the racial classification of the majority of residents in the area in which the 
homicide occurred. The Group Areas Act 36 of 1966, which was in force until 
1991, legislated that people classified as helonging to different race-groups 
(under the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950) had to live in separate and 
specified areas. Nonetheless, racially mixed residential areas did exist. 
Homicides that occurred in non-residential areas like industrial zones and 
pastoral land were recorded as such. 
Place: the place in which the homicide was perpetrated, like a victim's home or 
work-place. 
Whether shooter knew victim: whether the shooter knew the victim. When 
availahle the nature of relationships hetween shooters and their victims was 
also recorded. 
Number of shooters: the numher of shooters who allegedly tired potentially fatal 
shot<; at the victim. For ease of reading the singular has heen used throughout 
although some cases allegedly involved more than one shooter. 
Victim's sex: the victim's hiological sex. 
Victim's race-group: the victim's racial classification. The categories African, 
Asian, coloured and white were used for this variahle. Within the Anti-
Apartheid Movement these terms were politically preferahle to the official 
nomenclature set down in the Population Registration Act. 
4 For example, whether shooters fired warning shots and whether victims were 
tleeing when shot. 
I 
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Victim's age: the victim's chronological age rounded to the nearest complete year. 
Victim's age-group: the victim's age-group. After consulting a range of social 
demographics the following four age-categories were selected as sociologically 
meaningful: (1) children aged under 13, (2) adolescents aged hetween 13 and 
18, (3) adults aged hetween 19 and 59, and (4) older adults over 59 years. 
Victim's employment status: whether the victim was gainfully employed. 
Although the actual types of employment were also recorded when availahle, 
this variahle was marred hy a high level of missing data and the categories used 
in the case records were not mutually exclusive. Whether victims were 
gainfully employed was thus selected as a more reliahle way of operationalising 
this variahle. The category 'not gainfully employed' included all of those who 
were not economically active such as retired people, scholars and pre-school 
children. 
Victim's police status: whether the victim was employed as a police officer. 
Victim's police rank: the police rank held hy the victim. 
Victim's private security officer status: whether the victim was employed as a 
PSO. 
Victim's duty status: whether the victim, if a police officer or PSO, was on duty at 
the time of the homicide. 
Victim's blood-alcohol level: the concentration of alcohol in the victim's 
hloodstream. An additional aspect was whether the victim's hlood-alcohol 
level was ahove or helow the legal limit for drivers, that is, less than 0.08 
grams (g) per 100 millilitres (ml). This also enahled suhsequent classification 
into high and low levels of hlood-alcohol. 
Shooter's: 5 
Sex - the shooter's hiological sex. 
Race-group - the shooter's racial classification. 
Age - the shooter's chronological age in years. 
Age-group - the shooter's age-group. 
Employment status - whether the shooter was gainfully employed. 
Police status - whether the shooter was employed as a police officer. 
Police rank - the police rank held hy the shooter. 
PSO status- whether the shooter was employed as a PSO. 
Law enforcer's duty status -whether the shooter, if a police officer or PSO, 
was on duty at the time of the shooting 
Blood-alcohol level - the concentration of alcohol in the shooter's 
hloodstream. 
Motive - the shooter's motive for shooting, as distinct from the Court's 
tinding. 
5 This information was collected for every alleged shooter. 
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Characteristics of Shooter's Firearm: 
Handguns - whether the shooter's tirearm was a handgun or a long-gun. 
Automatic status - whether the shooter's gun was fully/semi-automatic. 
Gun type - the type of firearm used hy the shooter. 
Calibre - the calihre of the shooter's tirearm. 
Ammunition type - the type of ammunition used hy the shooter. 
Gun license status - whether the shooter was in legal possession of his/her 
tirearm. 
Operationalising Minimum Force and Proportionality 
The principles of minimum force and proportionality inform South African legal 
controls on the use of deadly force including tirearms. These principles are elements 
of the hroader concept of restraint in the use of force. To recap more specitically: 
minimum force is the notion that the least possihle force should always he employed. 
When applied to the use of guns, it means that tirearms should only he used when 
shooting constitutes the least possihle force necessary to achieve a lawful goaL 
Proportionality has heen a somewhat more contentious construct and there has heen 
ongoing dehate ahout how it should he detined. There are many ways in which to 
assess proportionality in the use of deadly force; numerous permutations are possihle 
in the comhination of factors and the weight that each can he afforded. 
Internationally, two of the principal standards in this arena have heen hased on 
different yardsticks. According to the defence-of-life standard, deadly force is 
considered proportional when used against a person who is directly endangering 
someone's life. In terms of the protection-of-life standard, deadly force is deemed 
proportional when used against a person who presents an immediate or future threat 
to life. In legal practice, the South African Courts have tended to weigh up varying 
comhinations of factors when assessing proportionality in different cases, and deadly 
force has heen condoned even in the protection of property (Snyman, 1993).6 
Because minimum force and proportionality are theoretical constructs, it was 
necessary to operationalise these for the purposes of data collection. To this end, a 
set of variahles were selected to indicate the level of force used, the kinds of 
restraints employed and the proportionality of deadly force in the sample shootings. 
These indicators were derived from South African case-law, academic literature, the 
internationally accepted codes and principles of the United Nations and the data 
comprising this research sample. 7 The following seven indicators were used to 
measure the extent to which shooters upheld the hasic principle of minimum force: 8 
6 See Chapter Three. 
7 See the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials 
( 1979), the Report on Restraint~ on the .Use of Force (1984) and the Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms hy Law Enforcement Officials 
(1990). 
8 Whenever circumstances permitted. 
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( 1) firing only one potentially fatal shot at the victim:9 (2) making the victim aware 
the shooter was a police ofticer: (3) informing the victim the shooter's intention was 
to arrest; (4) issuing an oral warning of the intention to fire; (5) firing a warning 
shot; (6) aiming at the victim's legs; and (7) employing at least one other less-than-
lethal means. Each of these variables retlects a form of restraint in the use of deadly 
force. The first shows whether the shooter employed the minimum amount of 
potentially lethal force feasible under the circumstances and the remaining six 
represent a range of non-lethal tactics. The standard of minimum force was 
considered to have heen violated unless such feasible alternatives were employed 
hefore potentially fatal shot~ were tired. Although it could he convincingly argued 
that shooters ought to he required to employ restraints like these whenever 
circumstances permit, a less exacting criterion was used as the expected level of 
application for the purposes of statistical testing in this study. The frequency with 
which each restraint was actually employed was measured against the benchmark of 
chance (50%). 
Due to the diversity of opinion over proportionality, it was evaluated in a 
numher of ways. Three composite measures were devised: the tirst was hased on the 
defence-of-life standard (whether victim endangered life), the second retlected the 
protection-of-life standard (whether victim was dangerous), and the last included the 
additional criterion of whether shooters foreseeahly endangered any third party hy 
tiring at their victims. Since jeopardising the lives of others contradicts the purpose 
of shooting in order to safe-guard life, this is a crucial aspect of proportionality. 
Hence, for the third measure, deadly force was considered proportional when used in 
relation to people who posed an immediate or future threat to life hut only when 
nohody, other than the intended victim, was foreseeahly endangered hy the shooting. 
Data was also collected in relation to a range of other individual factors indicative of 
proportionality including inter alia: whether the victim was armed, the nature of 
his/her weapon, whether s/he was tleeing from the shooter etc. 
Minimum Force 
Number of potentially fatal shots: the numher of shots fired by the shooter which 
were aimed at the victim's hody or head. lf the ammunition was likely to have 
heen lethal no matter what part of the hody it struck, then all shots fired were 
counted as potentially fatal. 
Number of entry-wounds: the numher of hullet entry-wounds sustained hy the 
victim. 
9 lntlicting only one gunshot wound was not used because it was found to be an 
unreliable indicator of restraint: the numher of hullets that actually struck 
victims was often a matter of chance rather than purposeful restraint. 
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Shooter identified as police: whether prior to firing, the victim was made aware 
that the shooter was a police officer. Indirect factors were considered for the 
purposes of this variahle, like heing in uniform or a marked vehicle. 
Victim informed of arrest: whether prior to tiring, the shooter informed the victim 
his/her intention was to arrest (when applicahle). 
Oral warning: whether prior to tiring, the shooter gave the victim oral warning of 
his/her intention to shoot. To he counted in this category a warning had to 
comprise the hasic elements of 'stop, or 1' II shoot', that is, the desired action 
and the consequence. Warnings that did not fit this definition were counted 
separately, as ahhreviated warnings, under other less-than-lethal means. 
Warning shot: whether prior to firing a potentially fatal shot, the shooter tired· a 
warning shot. When availahle the direction of warning shot~ was also noted. 
Aiming at victim's legs: whether the shooter aimed to shoot the victim in his/her 
legis. 
Part of victim's body wounded fatally: the part of the victim's hody in which the 
fatal entry-wound was sustained. 
Other less-than-lethal means: whether prior to tiring, the shooter employed any 
other less-than-lethal means of achieving his/her ohjective (in addition to those 
already specified). If applicahle, what less-than-lethal means were employed, 
e.g. giving chase on foot, engaging in unarmed physical struggle, employing 
verbal persuasion, taking cover, calling for police assistance and so on. 
Proponionality 
Shooter foreseeably endangered others: whether the shooter foreseeahly 
endangered any third party hy tiring. 
Whether victim was armed: whether the victim was armed with any kind of 
weapon. 
Victim's weapon type: the nature of the victim's most lethal weapon (when 
applicable): 
Handguns- whether the victim had a handgun or a long-gun. 
Automatic status- whether the victim's gun was fully/semi-automatic. 
Gun type- the victim's type of firearm. 
Calibre- the calihre of the victim's firearm. 
Ammunition type- the victim's type of ammunition. 
Gun license status - whether the victim was in legal possession of his/her 
tirearm. 
Whether victim threatened anyone: whether the victim actively threatened anyone 
immediately prior to heing shot. If applicahle, the nature of the most serious 
threat s/he made was noted. 
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Whether victim fled: whether the victim was tleeing from the shooter -- on foot or 
by any other means immediately prior to being shot. 
Side of victim's body wounded fatally: the side of the victim's body in which the 
fatal entry-wound was sustained, that is, the front, hack or side of the hody. 
Whether victim was a suspect/convict: whether the shooter had reasonable 
suspicion prior to firing, that the victim had committed a criminal oftence. [f 
applicable, the nature of the most serious offence was recorded. 
Whether victim was dangerous: considering the relevant factors that were known 
to the shooter at the time, if the victim had not heen shot would s/he have been 
likely to endanger anyone's lite immediately or in the future (the protection-of-
life standard). ln other words, would a reasonable person in the shooter's 
position have believed that the victim constituted a significant threat to life. 
Whether victim endangered life: did the victim actually threaten anyone's life 
immediately prior to being shot (the defence-of-life standard). 
Characteristics of Legal Process 
Highest court: the highest court to have ruled on the lawfulness of the shooting, 
that is, an Inquest Court, a Regional Magistrate's Court or the Supreme Court. 
Type of inquest: whether the case was heard at a formal or informal inquest. At a 
formal inquest oral evidence is led and cross-examination is permitted, whereas 
at an informal inquest there is no oral evidence and the Court's findings are 
based solely on documentary evidence. 
Type of criminal court: whether the criminal trial was held in a Regional 
Magistrate's Court or the Supreme Court (if applicable). 
Lawfulness: the highest court's finding on the lawfulness of the shooting, that is, 
lawful, unlawful or undetermined. 
Legal classification: the legal classification made by the highest court to consider 
the incident, e.g. self defence, arrest, necessity, murder. 
Shooter charged: whether criminal charges were brought against the shooter for this 
killing. If applicable, the nature of the most serious criminal charge was 
noted. 
Shooter prosecuted: whether the shooter was prosecuted for this fatal shooting. 
Shooter lega.lly represented: whether the accused shooter was represented hy legal 
counsel at trial (if applicable). If so, it was noted whether detence counsel was 
• 
private or state-appointed. 
Shooter convicted: whether the accused shooter was convicted at trial. £f 
applicable, the most serious otfence was recorded. 
Shooter's sentence: the most severe sentence handed down to the convicted shooter 
(if applicable). When the accused was convicted of murder it was noted 
whether the Court found extenuating circumstances. Prior to the abolition of 
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the death penalty in 1995. if an accused was convicted of a capital offence and 
the Court failed to tind extenuating circumstances, the death sentence was 
mandatory (The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended). Extenuating 
circumstances included factors such as youthfulness, limited intellectual ahility 
and provocation. 
Shooter appealed: where applicahle, whether the convicted shooter applied for 
leave to appeal against his/her conviction or sentence. If the shooter was 
granted leave to appeal, the outcome of his/her appeal was noted, e.g. 
conviction overturned, death sentence commuted to life imprisonment. At the 
time of this study there was no automatic right to appeal. Convicted offenders 
who wished to appeal had tirst to apply for leave to appeal and only if granted 
such leave could they lodge an appeal. Under the new dispensation, however, 
convicted persons now have a right to appeal (Cowling, 1994). 
Table 6.2: 
Variables for Suicides and Homicides. 
SUICIDES 
General Characteristics 
Year 
Area 
Place 
Victim's Characteristics 
Sex 
Race-group 
Age 
Age-group 
Employment status 
Police status 
Police rank 
PSO status 
Duty status 
Blood-alcohol level 
Nature of Victim's Injuries 
Numher of entry-wounds 
Side of victim's hody wounded fatally 
Part of victim's hody wounded fatally 
Characteristics of Victim's Firearm 
Handgun or long-gun 
Automatic status of gun 
Gun type 
Calihre 
Ammunition type 
Gun licence status 
Factors related to Restraint 
Numherof potentially fatal shots 
Shooter foreseeahly endangered others 
/ 
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Characteristics of the Legal Process 
Highest court 
Type of inquest 
HOMICIDES 
General Characteristics 
Year 
Political motivation 
Area 
Place 
Whether shooter knew victim 
Numher of shooters 
Victim's Characteristics 
Sex 
Race-group 
Age 
Age-group 
Employment status 
Police status 
Police rank 
PSO status 
Duty status 
Blood-alcohol level 
Shooter's Characteristics 
Sex 
Race-group 
Age 
Age-group 
Employment status 
Police status 
Police rank 
PSO status 
Duty status 
Blood-alcohol Level 
Motive for shooting 
Characteristics of Shooter's Firearms 
Handgun or long-gun 
Automatic status of gun 
Gun type 
Calihre 
Ammunition type 
Gun license status 
Factors related to Minimum Force 
Numher of potentially fatal shots 
Numher of entry-wounds 
Shooter identified as police 
Victim informed of arrest 
Oral warning 
Warning shot 
Aiming at victim's legs 
Part of victim's hody wounded fatally 
Other less-than-lethal means 
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Factors related to Proportionality 
Shooter foreseeahly endangered others 
Whether victim was armed 
Victims weapon type 
Handgun or long-gun 
Automatic status of gun 
Gun type 
Calibre 
Ammunition type 
Gun licence status 
Whether victim threatened anyone 
Whether victim tled 
Side of victim's body wounded fatally 
Whether victim was a suspect/convict 
Whether victim was dangerous (protection-of-life) 
Whether victim endangered life (defence-of-life) 
Characteristics of the Legal Process 
Highest court 
Type of inquest 
Type of criminal court 
Lawfulness 
Legal c lassi tication 
Shooter charged 
Shooter prosecuted 
Shooter legally represented 
Shooter convicted 
Shooter's sentence 
Shooter appealed 
Tracing Case Records 
An Explanatory Note 
At the time of this study, once an autopsy had been conducted in a non-natural 
death, the Attorney General (AG) had to decide whether the matter was to he tried as 
a criminal case. The AG of each provincial division of the Supreme Court, or 
delegate, was authorised to prosecute any offence in any Court in the area in which 
s/he had jurisdiction, hut in everyday practice this authority was usually delegated to 
senior state prosecutors. If the decision was not to prosecute and a magistrate was 
"satistied hy the police docket that death was not due to natural causes", an inquest 
had to he held (De'Ath substituted hy Tiley v Add. Ma~istrate, 1988:776C-D). 
However, if the AG decided to prosecute, the case was usually brought to criminal 
trial without an inquest; only in rare instances were cases heard hy an inquest and a 
criminal court. When there was to he a prosecution the AG also had to decide 
whether the trial was to he held in the Supreme Court or in a lower Regional 
Magistrates' Court. Generally speaking, this decision was based on an assessment of 
the severity of the alleged offence in question because the maximum sentences that 
could he handed down hy Regional Magistrates were lower than those permitted to 
judges of the Supreme Court. 
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Table 6.3: 
Legal Alternatives in Non-Natural Deaths. 
I Death due to non-natural causes l 
r 
I Autopsy at State Mortuary l 
I 
I AG decides whether to prosecute I 
I 
I Inquest J 
I Formal Informal I 
I Unlawful Lawful Undetermined I 
I Criminal trial I 
Supreme Court Regional Magistrates' Court I 
I Guilty Not guilty I 
Leave to appeal 
Granted Refused 
Appeal Lodged 
I 
Acquittal Sentence reduced No Change I 
There was an important difference hetween a Court's finding in a criminal trial and 
an inquest. In the case of a fatal shooting, a Court had to decide whether the State 
had presented sufficient evidence to find heyond a reasonahle douht that an offence 
had heen committed hy an accused. In contrast, an inquest court was required to 
decide whether a death was legally justified or unlawful. An inquest magistrate was 
not required to tind any specitic party criminally liahle for a death. Additionally, an 
inquest court had to make findings on a halance of prohahilities and not according to 
the more stringent test of proof -- heyond a reasonahle douht -- used in criminal 
trials (The Inquest Act 58 of 1959, as amended). In other words, an inquest 
magistrate could reach one of three findings: lawful, unlawful or no tinding if s/he 
was unahle to reach a decision on the hasis of the availahle evidence. In a criminal 
trial, a magistrate or judge had to decide whether each accused on trial was guilty or 
not guilty of the offences with which s/he had heen charged. And the tinding of a 
criminal court included three element-;: ( 1) guilty or not guilty, (2) the name of the 
accused to whom this finding applied, and (3) the nature of the specific offence/s. 
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Locating Inquests and Trial Records 
The case details extracted from the death registers were used to trace each fatal 
shooting to culmination in an inquest and/or a criminal trial. The tirst step was to 
examine the registers of the AG of the Cape Provincial Division in order to ascertain 
which cases had been prosecuted. The next step was to locate the inquest records of 
cases which the AG had declined to prosecute. using the inquest registers at the 
Regional Magistrates' Courts. At this time metropolitan Cape Town was served by 
six Regional Magistrates' Courts located in Belleville, Goodwood, Cape Town, 
Mitchell's Plain, Simonstown and Wynberg. Finally, the criminal case records of 
shootings in which the AG had decided to prosecute, were tracked via trial registers 
at the Regional Magistrates' Courts and the Supreme Court. 
Extracting and Recording the Data 
The revised data collection device was used to extract the relevant information from 
the inquest and/or criminal case records pertaining to each of the fatal shootings in 
the research sample. In order to avoid systematic bias, the cases were dealt with in 
random order by three trained researchers who collected the data from the records. 
For the majority of the relevant variables -- like sex, race-group, place, gun type --
the data collectors merely had to extract existing information from the case records. 
For the remaining variables, however, they were required to make judgements about 
aspects of behaviour in context. For instance, they had to decide whether a victim 
was likely to have been dangerous and whether each restraint had been feasible under 
the circumstances. Post hoc analyses like this run the risk of being unfair and 
unrealistic armchair critiques. In an effort to address this issue, the data collectors 
were encouraged to visualise themselves in the shooter's position when assessing 
his/her conduct and to consider only what was known to the shooter at the time. 
They were also instructed to give shooters the benetit of the doubt if uncertain. 1o To 
enhance the reliability of the information, the three collectors made their assessmentli 
for each fatal shooting independently and were required to provide rationales for 
their judgements by citing data from the case records. Any discrepancies in the 
information recorded by different collectors were resolved by an independent 
evaluator. Overall, the level of disagreement among the three collectors was 
relatively low (tive per cent). During the tirst stage the data collectors manually 
recorded the information onto preprinted forms designed for this purpose. These 
data were then checked thoroughly and entered into a computer database that had 
been developed for the storage and analysis of this particular information. Notably, 
the program was designed to accept only a certain type of data for a particular 
10 When it was deemed unfeasible for a shooter to have employed a particular 
restraint. this was treated as a positive in the tina! analysis, i.e. as if the 
restraint had been employed. 
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variable so as to limit entry errors. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
In social research a complete data set - a sample equal to the background population -
is something of an abstract concept. Inevitably a certain, usually unknown amount, 
of data are missing. In this study every effort was made to collect a complete sample 
of the gun deaths that occurred in metropolitan Cape Town between 1984 and 1991. 
Nevertheless it is probable that relevant cases were unavoidably excluded from this 
data set. For instance, political mistrust may have prevented anti-Apartheid 
sympathisers from reporting deaths to Apartheid authorities, and the bodies of some 
who died from gun shots may never have been discovered. Furthermore, case 
selection was based on causes of death denoted in hand-written registers, a data source 
subject to classificatory and recording errors. And a higher rate of such errors was 
likely during this period. The sudden increase in deaths resulting from intensified 
political conflict must have placed additional pressure on those administering the 
mortuaries, and associated aspects of the legal system. During data collection it 
became clear from tracking incidents that case records could, and did, disappear 
within the official system. In some instances this may have been purposeful for 
example, politically loaded cases may have been concealed. Of course it is also likely 
that many cases that went astray were simply misfiled or misplaced somewhere in the 
bureaucracy. Hence, although the data set for this study does approximate the 
complete population of fatalities caused by firearms in Cape Town over the specified 
eight year period, it remains a sample which has been treated as such statistically. 
The research being exploratory and descriptive. in orientation, emphasis was 
placed on generating hypotheses, identifying potentially interesting distributions and 
significant relationships among variables. For analysis suicides were separated from 
homicides, and the latter were further sub-divided into intentional and unintentional 
shootings. 11 In view of the extremely large amount of categorical data and the 
exploratory nature of the work, an elementary level of statistical analysis was 
conducted. Basic frequency counts and percentages were calculated, and analysed for 
a selection of single and cross-tabulated variables. Since one of the key aims was to 
explore the characteristics and behaviour of shooters in relation to their victims, the 
bulk of the cross-tabulatory analyses was performed on the homicide cases and only a 
few victim-related variables were cross-tabulated for the suicides. In homicide cases 
the following three key variables were cross-tabulated with most of the other relevant 
variables: (1) the lawfulness of each shooting, (2) whether it was politically 
motivated, and (3) whether shooters were police officers, PSOs or civilians. A small 
selection of victim and shooter characteristics was also cross-tabulated. For 
demographic variables the chi-square goodness-of-fit test was used to compare 
11 Not self-inflicted, so classified as homicides. 
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observed distributions with expected distributions derived from the relevant 
background populations (Noriusis, 1990). Variability and distributions across 
categories within the data set were tested further by analysing the standardised 
residuals for statistically significant chi-square values. 12 
The official records used as the data source for this study were not designed 
with social research in mind. Therefore, the level of missing data for some of the 
variables in the sample was relatively high. The frequency of missing data has been 
reported consistently for each variable as part of the results, and explicit cautions have 
been included to alert readers to instances in which missing data might have distorted 
the observed pattems. 13 Gun homicides were most affected by missing data, 
particularly variables reflecting characteristics of shooters and circumstances of 
shootings. This resulted from two main factors: First, because information in death 
registers pertains mainly to victims and their injuries, cases without inquest or 
criminal case records were characterised by high levels of missing data with respect to 
shooters and circumstances. Secondly, the sample was characterised by a substantial 
number of cases in which the shooters were never identified, and/or in which the 
circumstances of the shooting remained unknown to the authorities. While some such 
cases are inevitable in all systems, it is likely that the elevated quantity in this sample 
was a result of conditions peculiar to South Africa at the time. For instance, it is 
feasible that the police failed to resolve a large number of firearm homicides due to 
the chaotic conditions that accompanied the political conflict, the low level of public 
co-operation, and their own ineptitude and intentional laxity in conducting 
investigations.'• The critical point about the missing data, however, is whether it was 
random, or whether it was patterned in a way that might have influenced the findings. 
To this end, cases that could not be traced beyond the death registers were scrutinised. 
Considering the civil war and the Nationalist state's counter-insurgency strategy, one 
of the first postulates was that the authorities may have removed records for 
politically sensitive cases. However, support for this premise was not forthcoming. 
From the information in the death registers, these cases did not appear to be 
politically significant, and the records for numerous politically explosive cases were 
available. When questioned about the reasons for the absence of court records in 
certain cases, record-keeping officials consistently referred to administrative error. 
And given the rather anachronistic, non-computerised filing system in operation at the 
time, this seemed to be a plausible explanation. Hence, in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, it may be assumed that the missing data in these cases was random. 
12 See Hays (1994:859-861) for details. 
A probability of 1% was consistently used for the statistical analyses. 
13 Missing and contradictory data were noted and excluded from calculations. 
14 Discussed further in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
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Cases with unidentified shooters and unknown circumstances comprise the 
second group of cases with high levels of missing data. These cases should be treated 
with particular caution, because the missing information may well be non-random. 
Closer examination of this group of shootings reveals a preponderance of black 
victims and circumstances directly related to political conflict. Considering the 
limited information that was available with respect to these cases, it is feasible though 
highly speculative, that the shootings were mainly: gun deaths caused by stray police 
fire during crowd management, politically motivated killings perpetrated by so-called 
third-force operatives, murders by drug dealers, and unlawful shootings covered up 
by police officers. Were this to have been the case, the reported findings probably 
under-represent unintentional shootings, politically motivated and criminal gun 
homicides. Furthermore, because restraint was particularly poor in the latter two 
categories, even the low average levels reported as results may be overly optimistic. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the pattern and direction of the findings are 
consistent with what was expected in Cape Town between 1984 and 1991. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESEARCH RESULTS PART 1: Analysis of Single Variables 
OVERALL SAMPLE 
Introductory Comment 
The research sample comprised the 1555 cases of firearm fatalities that were found 
listed in the death registers of the Salt River and Tygerberg state mortuaries for the 
period from 1 January 1984 to 31 December 1991. Eighty-three per cent (1297) of 
these incidents were successfully tracked through subsequent stages of the legal 
process. The remaining 258 (17%) cases could not be traced beyond the death 
registers because neither inquest nor criminal trial records could be found with 
respect to these deaths. 1 These incidents were included in the data set in order to 
avoid undue bias but unfortunately increased the level of missing data for many of 
the relevant variables. 2 
Types of Firearm Fatality 3 
The vast majority, 80% (1237),• of the fatal shootings in this sample were 
homicides;' only 20% (318) were suicides. Also, less than one per cent (13) of the 
cases were unintentional which means that the vast majority, 99% (1542), were 
intentional shootings. 
Table 7.1 : Fatal Shootings by Years, 1984 - 1991 6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Years Frequencies Percentages 1 Rates per 1 ()()()()() 8 
1984 101 7 7 
1985 213 14 14 
1986 180 12 11 
1987 158 10 10 
1988 136 9 8 
1989 197 13 12 
1990 237 15 13 
1991 333 21 17 
What actually became of these cases remains unknown. 
Missing data (M) and contradictory data (C) excluded from calculations. 
M =0. 
Figures were rounded to the nearest whole number or first decimal place. 
Including unintentional shootings (13), none of which were self-inflicted. 
M =0. 
Column totals have been excluded from most of the tables because rounding 
resulted in many not totalling the expected 100. 
Calculated using Knobel's (1986) population statistics for Cape Town and The 
CSS (1994[i]) growth rates. 
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Table 7.2: Firearm Suicides by Years 1984- 1991 
Years 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Areas 10 
Frequencies 
33 
44 
33 
43 
40 
49 
39 
37 
Percentages 
10 
14 
10 
14 
13 
15 
12 
12 
Rates per 100000 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
The vast majority, 79% (250), of suicides took place in residential areas zoned for 
whites, but nine per cent (30) occurred in coloured areas, eight per cent (25) in 
racially mixed areas, three per cent (10) in African areas and one per cent (3) in non-
residential areas like industrial estates or pastoral land. 
Plllce 11 
The vast majority, 84% (267), of suicide victims shot themselves while at home and 
the remainder committed suicide in the following places: five per cent (17) indoors, 
five per cent (16) at work, three per cent (9) in vehicles and three per cent (8) out-
of-doors. 
Victims' Characteristics 
Victinu • Sues 
The vast majority, 84% (266), of suicide victims were male and only 16% (52) were 
female. Considering the sex ratio of the background population, 12 males were 
significantly over-represented and females under-represented as suicide victims in 
this sample (The CSS, 199l[ii]).ll 
9 M = 0. 
10 M = 0. 
11 M = 3% (1). 
12 Males 49% and females 51 %. 
13 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 136.1, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 8.83, -8.83. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
219 
Victims' Race-Groups 
The vast majority, 85% (269), of suicide victims were white, but 11% (34) were 
coloured, four per cent (13) African and one per cent (2) Asian. Considering the 
racial composition of the background population, 14 whites were significantly over-
represented, whereas coloureds and Africans were under-represented as suicide 
victims in this sample (The CSS, 1991[ii)}. 15 
Victinu • Age-Groups 
The suicide victims ranged from 11 to 85 years of age, with a median age of 38, an 
average of 43 and a mode of 33 years. The vast majority, 75% (239), were adults, 
but 21% (68) were older adults, three per cent (9) were adolescents and one per cent 
(2) were children. Considering the age distribution of the background population, 16 
people over 18 were significantly over-represented and those under 19 were under-
represented as suicide victims in this sample (The CSS, 1991 [ii]).t' 
Victinu • Employmelll Status 
The majority, 54% (147), of victims were gainfully employed at the time they 
committed suicide, but 46% (124) were not gainfully employed. Considering the 
employment rate of the background population, 11 gainfully employed persons were 
over-represented as suicide victims in this sample (The Ministry for Welfare and 
Population Development, 1995) .1' 
Victinu' Blood-Alcohol Lnels 
The bulk, 60% (151), of victims had no alcohol in their bloodstreams at the time that 
they committed suicide, but blood-alcohol levels ranged from zero to 0.38g per 
100ml with the average at 0.06g. Thirty-two per cent (79) of victims had blood-
alcohol levels that exceeded the 0. 08g legal limit for driving, whereas eight per cent 
(21) had levels within the legal limit (Snyman, 1993).20 
Victinu • Police Status 
An overwhelming majority, 92% (284), of suicide victims were civilians, but eight 
per cent (24) were police officers. Considering the number of police in the 
14 Coloureds 54%, whites 26%, Africans 19% and Asians one per cent. 
15 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 545.5, df = 3. . 
Fwp < 0,01, z = 20.47, -10.51, -6.08. 
16 Older adults eight per cent, adults 55%, adolescents 18% and children 19%. 
17 M = 9% (3). P < 0.01, X2 = 187.74, df = 3. 
Fwp < 0.01, z = 4.78, 8.45, -6.34, -7.49. 
18 Nationally, 62% not gainfully employed and 38% gainfully employed. 
19 M = 15% (47). P < 0.01, X2 = 35.01, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 4.67. 
Treat with caution, the background statistics were national figures for 1995. 
20 M = 21% (67). 
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background population, 21 police officers were significantly over-represented as 
suicide victims in this sample (The Commissioner of the SAP, 1990). 22 
Police Victims • Ranlcs 
The majority, 59% (13), of police suicide victims held the rank of constable, but 
27% (6) were special constables, five per cent (1) detective constables, five per cent 
(1) warrant officers and five per cent (1) sergeants.n 
Police Victims· Dilly Statru 
The majority, 83% ( 19), of police suicide victims committed suicide while off duty, 
but 17% (4) committed suicide while on duty. 24 
PSO Status tmd Dilly Statru 
One per cent (4) of civilian suicide victims were employed as PSOs and all (4) of 
these victims were off duty at the time they committed suicide.lj 
Nature of Victims' Injuries 
Number of E1111y-WoiUUb 
The vast majority, 95% (303), of suicide victims sustained single entry-wounds, but 
five per cent (15) sustained at least two entry-wounds. 26 
Sides of Victims· Bodies Wounded Fatally 
The majority, 53% (159), of suicide victims shot themselves in the side·, but 46% 
( 139) shot themselves in the front, and one per cent ( 1) in the back of the body. n 
Pans of Victims· Bodies Wounded Fatally 
The vast majority, 89% (283), of suicide victims shot themselves in the head, but 
10% (32) shot themselves in the chest, one per cent (2) in the neck and 0.3% (1) in 
the abdomen. za 
Characteristics of Victims' Firearms 
Victims· Handguns 
The large majority, 92% (292), of victims committed suicide using handguns, but 
21 Police comprised 0.3% of the national population. 
22 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 530.19, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 22. 
Defence force members (10) were excluded. 
23 M = 8% (2). No stats. test due to low expected frequencies. 
24 M = 4% (1). 
25 Total law enforcement= 12% (38). 
26 M = 0. 
27 M = 6% (19). 
28 M = 0. 
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eight per cent (24) used long-guns.z9 
Automatic Status of Victims' Guns 
The bulk, 56% (150), of victims committed suicide using guns that were not 
automatic, but 43% (116) used semi-automatic and one per cent (2) used fully-
automatic firearms.30 
Victims' Gun Types 
Table 7.3 shows that revolvers and pistols were the guns of choice in suicides, with 
revolvers the most common type of handgun and shotguns the most common type of 
long-gun. 31 
Table 7.3: Guns Types in Suicides 
Gun Types 
Revolver 
Pistol 
Unspecified handgun 
Shotgun 
Rifle 
Assault rifle 
Zipgun 
Frequencies 
128 
115 
48 
15 
7 
2 
1 
Table 7.4: Gun Calibres in Suicides 32 
Calibres 
0.38 inch 
9.00mm 
0.22 inch 
6.35 mm 
0.32 inch 
7.65 mm 
0.729 inch 
0.357 inch 
0.44 inch 
0.303 inch 
0.45 inch 
0.410 inch 
3.67 mm 
29 M = 1% (2). 
30 M = 16% (50). 
31 M = 6% (2). 
Frequencies 
57 
45 
32 
29 
28 
22 
15 
10 
4 
3 
3 
1 
1 
Percentages 
41 
36 
15 5 ~ 
2 
1 
0.3 
Percentages 
23 
18 
13 
12 
11 
9 
6 
4 
2 
1 
1 
0.5 
0.5 
32 M = 12% (68). The mix of inches and mm was unavoidable; this was the 
information at source. 
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Victims' Ammunition Type 
The vast majority, 95% (301), of victims used live bullets to commit suicide and 
only five per cent (15) used non-live ammunition.n 
Victims' Gun licence StalUS 
The majority, 63% (99), of suicide victims were in legal possession of the guns they 
used, but 37% (58) were not in legal possession of their firearms.34 
Factors related to Restraint 
Number of Potentially Fatal Shots 
The majority, 80% (219), of suicide victims fired only one potentially fatal shot, but 
20% (56) fired at least two such shots.3' 
Shooters Foreseeably Endllngered Others 
A small minority, five per cent (14), of suicide victims foreseeably endangered 
others by shooting themselves, but the vast majority, 95% (276), did not endanger 
others. 36 
Characteristics of the Legal Process 
Highest Couns 
All of the cases the Courts found to be suicides were lawful by definition, hence 
there were no criminal trials and inquest courts were the highest courts to consider 
these cases. 37 
Types of I1U[Ut!Sts 
The vast majority, 98% (313), of suicide cases were heard as informal inquests, but 
two per cent (5) were heard as formal inquests.3s 
33 Lead pellets between 1.27 and 9 mm fired from shotguns. M = 1% (2). 
34 Treat with caution, M = 51% (161). 
35 M = 14% (43). 
36 M = 9% (28). 
37 Because suicide was lawful. 
38 M = 0. 
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Table 7. 5: Gun Homicides by Years, 1984 - 1991 39 
Years Frequencies Percentages 
1984 68 6 
1985 169 14 
1986 147 12 
1987 115 9 
1988 96 8 
1989 148 12 
1990 198 16 
1991 296 24 
Political Motivation · 
Rates per 100000 40 
5 
11 
9 
7 
6 
9 
11 
15 
The majority, 69% (628), of homicides were not politically motivated. 41 
Areas 
Overall, 45% (551) of homicides occurred in residential areas zoned for Africans, 
35% (434) in coloured areas, 14% (170) in white areas, five per cent (57) in racially 
mixed residential areas, and one per cent (14) in non-residential areas. 42 
Places 
The majority, 62% (501), of homicides were committed outdoors in areas that were 
neither victims' work-places nor their homes. Of the remainder, 13% (108) were 
committed in victims' homes, 13% (107) indoors in areas that were not victims' 
homes or work-places, six per cent (52) in vehicles, and five per cent (44) in 
victims' work-places.43 
Whet~r Shooters Knew Victims 
The large majority, 70% (536), of shooters did not know their victims, but 30% 
(229) knew their victims. 44 
39 M = 0. 
40 Population estimated using Knobel's (1986) base figure and growth rates from 
The CSS (1994[i]). 
41 M = 26% (325). 
42 M = I% (11). 
43 Treat with caution, M = 34% (425). 
44 Treat with caution, M = 45% (624). 
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Table 7.6: Shooter-Victim Relationships 4' 
Relationships 
Acquaintances 
Opposition street gangsters 
Intimate partners 
Friends 
Parents & children 
Work colleagues 
Ex-intimate partners 
Other relatives"' 
Siblings 
Nlllllber of Shooten 
Frequencies 
116 
42 
24 
12 
10 
7 
6 
6 
2 
Percentages 
52 
19 
11 
5 
4 
3 
3 
3 
1 
A total of 1237 victims were killed in this sample of shootings and at least 1389 
shooters were involved in the perpetration of these homicides. In certain cases a 
number of shooters allegedly fired potentially fatal shots at a victim, but the Courts 
never established who bad fired the shot/s that killed the victim. Furthermore, in 
some cases the number of shooters could only be estimated because all that was 
known was that more than one shooter bad fired potentially fatal shots at a particular 
victim. However, the available data indicate that the vast majority of homicide 
victims, 93% (971), were killed by single shooters, and only seven per cent (74) 
were fired at by more than one shooter. 47 
Characteristics of Homicide Victims 
Victims • Sues 
The vast majority, 91% (1123), of homicide victims were male; only nine per cent 
(114) were female. Considering the sex ratio of the background population,48 males 
were significantly over-represented and females were under-represented as homicide 
victims in this sample (The CSS, 199l[ii]).49 
Victims • Race-Groups 
The majority, 51% (626), of homicide victims were African, but 44% (542) were 
coloured, five per cent (59) were white and one per cent (10) were Asian. 
Considering the racial composition of the background population,"' Africans were 
significantly over-represented whereas coloureds and whites were under-represented 
45 M = 2% (4). 
46 Not already included. 
47 M = 1% (5). 
48 Females 51% and males 49%. 
49 M = 0. P < 0.01, x2 = 864.67, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 20.99, -20.99. 
50 Coloureds 54%, whites 26%, Africans 19% and Asians one per cent. 
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as homicide victims in this sample (The CSS, 199l[ii]).s1 
Victims' Age-Groups 
Homicide victims in this sample ranged in age from one to 82 years with the median 
age at 25, the average at 27 and the mode at 22 years. The vast majority, 83% 
(1031), of homicide victims were adults, but 13% (161) were adolescents, two per 
cent (23) were children and two per cent (22) were older adults. Considering the 
age composition of the background population,'2 adults were significantly over-
represented whereas adolescents, children and older adults were under-represented as 
homicide victims in this sample (The CSS, 199l[ii]).'3 
Victims ' Employmelll Stanu 
While the majority, 55% (563), of homicide victims were gainfully employed, a 
substantial 45% (459) were not gainfully employed. Considering the rate of 
employment in the background population, gainfully employed persons were 
significantly over-represented and people not gainfully employed were under-
represented as homicide victims in this sample (The Ministry for Welfare and 
Population Development, 1995).,. 
Victims' Blood-Akohol Levels 
Homicide victims' blood-alcohol levels ranged from zero to 0.45g per lOOml and the 
average concentration was 0.07g. The bulk, 57% (366), of homicide victims had no 
alcohol in their bloodstreams at the time they were killed, but 34% (215) had levels 
that exceeded the legal limit for drivers (0.08g per lOOml), and nine per cent (58) 
were under this limit." 
Victims' Police Stanu 
While the overwhelming majority, 96% (1188), of homicide victims were 
civilians," three per cent (40) were police officers. However, considering the 
number of police in the background population," they were significantly over-
represented as homicide victims in this sample (The Commissioner of the SAP, 
1990)." 
51 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 889.47, df = 3. 
Fwp < 0.01, z = 25.5, -4.87, -14.65. 
52 Adults 55%, children 19%, youths 18% and older adults eight per cent. 
53 M = 3% (31). P < 0.01, X2 = 449.56, df = 3. 
Fwp < 0.01, z = 13.45, -4.13, -13.83, -7.73. 
54 M = 17% (215). P < 0.01, X2 = 143.69, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 9.5, 
-7.29. Treat with caution, the background statistics were national figures for 
1995. 
55 Treat with caution, M = 48% (598). 
56 Including PSOs = 2% (29). 
57 Police comprised 0.3% of the national population. 
58 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 325.06, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 18. Defence 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
Shooters' Characteristics 
Shoot en • Sexes 
226 
The vast majority, 99% (932), of shooters were male; only one per cent (9) were 
female. Considering the sex ratio in the background population, males were 
significantly over-represented and females under-represented as shooters in this 
sample (The CSS, 1991 [ii]). '' 
Shooten • Race-Groups 
More than two-thirds, 36% (301), of shooters were white, but 32% (263) were 
African, 31 % (255) were coloured and two per cent (9) were Asian. Considering 
the racial composition of the background population, whites and Africans were 
significantly over-represented and coloureds under-represented as shooters in this 
sample (The CSS, 199l[ii]).ti0 
Shooten• Age-Groups 
The shooters ranged in age from five to 76 years. The median age was 28, the 
average was 30 and the mode was 22 years. However, these figures should be 
treated with extreme caution as 67% (930) of the data were missing. More 
generally, the vast majority, 96% (875), were adults whereas two per cent (19) were 
adolescents, 0.2% (2) were children and one per cent (12) were older adults. 
Considering the age composition of the background population, adults were 
significantly over-represented; whereas adolescents, children and older adults were 
under-represented as shooters in this sample (The CSS, 1991[ii]).61 
Shooten • Emplayment Status 
The vast majority, 91% (563), of shooters were gainfully employed, but nine per 
cent (55) were not gainfully employed. Considering the employment rate in the 
background population, gainfully employed people were significantly over-
represented as shooters in this sample (The Ministry for Welfare and Population 
Development, 1995).62 
force victims (9) were excluded. See later section on police and PSO homicide 
victims. 
59 P < 0.01, X2 = 943.39, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 21.93, -21.49. Treat with 
caution, M = 32% ( 448). 
60 P < 0.01, x2 = 189.24, df = 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 5.84, 8.43, -9.08. Treat 
with caution, M = 40% (561). 
61 P < 0.01, X2 = 630.53, df = 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 16.81, -11.3, -12.99, 
-7.12. Treat with caution, M = 35% (481). 
62 P < 0.01, x2 = 794.85, df = I. Fwp < 0.01, z = 22.11. Treat with 
extreme caution, M = 55% (761) and the background statistics were national 
figures for 1995. 
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Shooters' Lllw Enforcement Status 
The majority, 54% (447), of shooters were police, but 46% (386) were civilians. 
Considering their representation in the background population, police were 
significantly over-represented and civilians under-represented as shooters in this 
sample (The Commissioner of the SAP, 1990).63 
Because two per cent (26) of civilian shooters were private security officers 
(PSOs), overall 56% (473) of shooters were law enforcement officials. Considering 
the representation of PSOs in the background population," they were significantly 
over-represented as shooters in this sample (The Commissioner of the SAP, 1990).~ 
Shooters ' Police Rllllks 
Table 7. 7 shows that the majority of police shooters held lower ranks; the two most 
common ranks being constable and special constable.~ 
Table 7.7: Police Shooters' Rants 
Ranks Frequencies Percentages 
Constable 132 38 
Special Constable 51 15 
Sergeant 49 14 
Warrant Officer 49 14 
Detective Sergeant 16 5 
Detective Constable 11 3 
Lieutenant 10 3 
Detective Warrant Officer 8 2 
Captain 5 I 
Major 1 1 
Duty Status of Police Shooters 
The vast majority, 85% (378), of police shooters were on duty, but 15% (68) were 
off duty. 67 • 
63 P < 0.01, X2 = 393.97, df = 2. Fwp < 0.01, z = 281.33, -15.75. Treat 
with caution, M = 40% (550). Defence forces shooters (6) were excluded. 
64 PSOs comprised 0.5% of the national population. 
65 P < 0.01, x2 = 9397.2, df = 2. (for police, PSOs and civilians). 
Fwp < 0.01, z = 11. Treat with caution, M = 48% (820) and the 
background statistic was a national figure for 1989. 
66 M = 22% (98). No stats. test because accurate expected frequencies were not 
available. 
67 M = 0.2% (1). 
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Shooters' Blood-Alcohol Levels 
This variable was excluded from further analysis because 91 % ( 1258) of the data 
were missing. 
Table 7. 8: Shooters' Motives 68 
Motives 
Self defence 611 
Arrest 70 
Unlawful reason 11 
Accident 
Lawful reason n 
Public safety 
Dispersing gatherings 
Defence of property 
Obedience to orders 
Necessity 
Characteristics of Shooters' Firearms 
Shooters' Handguns 
Frequencies Percentages 
295 40 
175 24 
109 15 
57 8 
51 7 
16 2 
14 2 
12 2 
2 0.3 
1 0.1 
The vast majority, 75% (854) of homicides were committed with handguns and only 
25% (287) with long-guns.n 
Automatic Status of Shooters' Guns 
The majority, 56% (447), of homicides were committed with guns that were not 
automatic, 43% (354) with semi-automatics and two per cent (18) with fully-
automatic firearms.74 
Shooters' Gun Types 
Table 7. 9 shows the majority of homicides were perpetrated with pistols and 
unspecified handguns. 
68 Treat with caution, M = 47% (655). Two shooters gave no motives as they 
denied involvement. 
69 Including 14 defence of another cases. 
70 Including 25 prevention of escape cases. 
71 Shooter admitted an unspecified unlawful motive for shooting. 
72 Shooter claimed an unspecified legal justification for shooting. 
73 M = 18% (248). 
74 Treat with caution, M = 41% (570). 
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Table 7.9: Shooters' Gun Types n 
Gun Types 
Pistol 
Unspecified handgun 
Shotgun 
Revolver 
Assault rifle 
Rifle 
Zip gun 
Sub-machine rifle 
Shooters· Gun Calibres 
229 
Frequencies 
353 
322 
264 
178 
17 
5 
1 
1 
Percentages 
31 
28 
23 
16 
2 
0.4 
0.1 
0.1 
The calibres of guns used to commit homicides ranged from 0.22 to 0.729 inches. 
Table 7.10 shows the majority of homicides were perpetrated with 9mm firearms and 
12 gauge shotguns. 
Table 7.10: Shooters' Gun Calibres 7' 
Calibres Frequencies Percentages 
9mm 284 35 
0.729 inch 264 32. 
0.38 inch 134 16 
1.65 mm 68 8 
0.32 inch 19 2 
0.22 inch 19 2 
6.35 mm 13 2 
0.45 inch 12 2 
5.56 mm 4 1 
0.44 inch 1 0.1 
Shooters· AlllmlUJition Type 
The vast majority, 81% ( 1125), of homicides were committed with live bullets, but 
19% (264) were perpetrated with non-live ammunition.77 The following types of 
non-live ammunition were used: 56% (148) unspecified pellets,.,. 25% (67) 
birdshot," 18% (48) buckshot,ao and four per cent (1) rubber bullets. 
15 M = 18% (248). 
76 Treat with caution, M = 41% (571). 
77 M = 0. 
78 Lead pellets ranging from 1.27mm birdshot to 9mm buckshot. 
79 At this time the smallest birdshot was 1.27mm and the largest was 4.57mm. 
80 Comprising large lead pellets between 6 and 9mm. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
230 
Shooters' Gun licence Status 
The majority, 77% (559), of shooters were in legal possession of their guns, but 
23% (167) were not in lawful possession of the firearms they used.•1 
Factors related to Minimum Force 
Nlllllber of Potentially Fatal Shots 
The majority, 56% (464), of shooters fired at least two potentially fatal shots at their 
victims, but 44% (369) fired single shots. Ill 
Number of Entry-Wounds 
The majority, 62% (766), of victims sustained single entry-wounds, but 38% (462) 
sustained at least two entry-wounds.83 
Shooters Identified as Police 
The majority, 68% (234), of police shooters made victims aware of their law 
enforcement status prior to firing, but 31% (108) did not ... 
Oral Warnings 
The majority, 82% ( 640), of shooters did not give their victims oral warning of the 
intention to shoot, but 18% (143) did issue such warnings." 
Table 7.11: Direction of Warning Shots• 
Directions 
Upward 
Downward 
Sideward 
Backward 
At a Moving Vehicle 
Frequencies 
42 
17 
5 
1 
1 
Percentages 
54 
22 
6 
1 
1 
The majority, 81% (639), of shooters did not give warning shots before firing at 
their victims, but 19% (151) did fire warnings.81 Furthermore the majority, 83% 
(43), of warning shots did not constitute a foreseeable danger to anyone, but 17% (9) 
81 Treat with caution, M = 48% (663). 
82 Treat with caution, M = 40% (556). 
83 M = 1% (9). 
84 M = 23% (103), C = 0.2% (2). Unfeasibles (UF) have consistently been 
treated as positives. UF = 2. 
85 Treat with caution, M = 43% (602) and C = 1%. UF =nine per cent (70). 
86 M = 15% (12). 
87 Treat with caution, M = 43% (594) and C = 1 (5). UF = nine per cent (73). 
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did endanger others. 88 
Aiming at Victims' ugs 
The majority, 86% (693), of shooters did not aim to shoot their victims in the legs, 
but 14% (109) did aim for the legs. 89 
Parts of Victims' Bodies Wounded Fatally 
Table 7.12 shows the majority of homicide victims sustained fatal entry-wounds in 
the chest and head. 
Table 7.12: Victims' Body Parts Fatally Wounded 90 
Body-Parts Frequencies Percentages 
Chest 397 34 
Head 363 31 
Back 193 16 
Abdomen 100 9 
Neck 59 5 
Leg'• 23 2 
Arm92 15 1 
Buttocks 14 1 
Shoulder 10 1 
Groin 2 0.2 
OtMr uss-tlum-utlull Means 
The majority, 64% (511), of shooters did not employ other less-than-lethal means 
before shooting, but 36% (291) did employ at least one such alternative.'3 Table 
7.13 shows foot chases were the most common alternate less-than-lethal means 
employed by these shooters. 
88 Treat with caution, M = as 33% (26). 
89 Treat with caution, M = 42% (585) and C = 0.1% (2). UF = 11% (84). 
90 M = 5% (61). 
91 Including feet. 
92 Including hands. 
93 M = 42% (586), C = 0.1% (1), UF = 3% (48). 
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Table 7.13: Other Less-than-Lethal Means 94 
Alternatives 
Foot chase 
Abbreviated warning 
Physical struggle 
Car chase 
Took cover 
Signalled 
Fled on foot 
Verbal persuasion 
Fired teargas 
Set up roadblock 
Used police dog 
Rammed car with car 
Factors related to Proportiooality 
Slwoten Foreseeably Endangered Othen 
Frequencies 
131 
55 
40 
29 
20 
11 
7 
6 
6 
2 
1 
1 
Percentages 
42 
18 
12 
9 
6 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
0.5 
0.5 
In the majority, 65% (482), of homicides the shooters foreseeably endangered others 
by firing at their victims, but in 35% (256) they did not foreseeably endanger 
others." 
Whether Victinu were ATIIIed 
The majority, 60% (417), of homicide victims were completely unarmed, whereas 
40% (2,82) were armed with some kind of weapon.96 The majority, 73% (205), of 
armed homicide victims had weapons other than guns, whereas 27% (77) were 
armed with firearms.97 Table 7.14 shows that knives were the most common type of 
weapon among homicide victims. 
94 Treat with caution, M = 42% (520) and C = 0.1% (1). UF = 48. 
Including all other means. 
95 Treated with caution, M = 47% (651). 
96 Treat with caution, M = 34% (525) and C = 2% (13). 
97 M = 0. 
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Table 7.14: Victims' Weapon TypeS9s 
Weapons Frequencies Percentages 
Knife 87 35 
Gun 77 30 
Stones 32 13 
Petrol-bomb 10 4 
Unbroken Bottle 6 2 
Sharp piece of metal 6 2 
Panga 99 5 2 
Screwdriver 5 2 
Axe 4 2 
Pitch fork 4 2 
Length of pipe 4 2 
Hand-grenade 2 1 
Knobkerrie 100 2 1 
Broken bottle 1 0.4 
Hammer 1 0.4 
Pliers 1 0.4 
Garden spade 1 0.4 
Armed VictiiiU • Handgruu 
The majority, 74% (57), of homicide victims who were armed with firearms had 
handguns, but 14% (11) had Iong-guns.tot 
Automatic Stanu of Armed VictiiiU • Gruu 
The majority, 60% (31), of homicide victims who were armed with guns had semi-
automatic firearms, but 38% (20) had guns that were not automatic and two per cent 
( 1) had fully-automatics .urz 
Armed VictiiiU • Gun Types 
Table 7.15 shows pistols were the most common type of firearm among armed 
homicide victims. 
98 Treat with caution, M = 34% (525) and C = 17% (34). 
99 A tool with a curved metal blade generally used for cutting vegetation. 
100 A stick with a solid spherical handle. 
101 Treat with caution, M = 34% (525) and C = 12% (9). 
102 Treat with caution, M = 16% (12) and C = 17% (13). 
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Table 7.15: Victims' Gun Types1m 
Gun Types 
Pistol 
Unspecified handgun 
Revolver 
Shotgun 
Airgun 
Rifle 
Zip gun 
Assault rifle 
Armed Victims' Gun Calibres 
Table 7.16: Victims' Gun Calibres 104 
Calibres 
9mm 
0.729 inch 
0.38 inch 
1.65 mm 
0.22 inch 
6.35 mm 
0.32 inch 
A.nned Victims' Alllmllnition Type 
234 
Frequencies 
30 
15 
10 
9 
1 
1 
I 
1 
Frequencies 
19 
9 
6 
5 
3 
2 
·1 
Percentages 
44 
22 
15 
13 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Percentages 
42 
20 
13 
11 
4 
4. 
2 
The majority, 85% (58), of victims' guns were loaded with live bullets, but 15% 
(1 0) had non-live ammunition. 1m 
Armed Victims' Gun licence Status 
The majority, 53% (26), of armed homicide victims were in legal possession of their 
weapons, but 47% (23) were not in lawful possession of their guns. 106 
Whether Victims Threatened Anyone 
The majority, 58% (389), of homicide victims did not threaten anyone, but 42% 
(286) did threaten others. 
103 Treat with caution, M = 34% (525) and C = 12% (9). 
104 Treat with caution, M = 25% (19) and C = 17% (13). 
105 Treat with caution, M = 34% (525) and C = 12% (9). 
106 Treat with caution, M = 20% (15) and C = 17% (13). 
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Table 7. 17: Victims' Armed Threats107 
Threats Frequencies Percentages 1os 
Threatened with weapon 
Threw stones 
Shot 
Stabbed 
Threw explosive 
Drove recklessly 109 
Hit with weapon 
Drew weapon 
150 
59 
27 
20 
9 
8 
6 
3 
34 
13 
6 
5 
2 
2 
1 
0.5 
Tables 7.17 and 7.18 show the majority, 64% (282), of homicide victims who 
threatened made armed threats.uo 
Table 7.18: Victims' Unarmed Threats 
Threats 
Part of hostile group 
Physical struggle 
Verbal threats 
Sudden movement 
Foot chase 
Cornered 
Pushed from height 
Pushed from moving vehicle 
Frequencies 
80 
47 
14 
7 
6 
2 
1 
1 
Percentages m 
18 
11 
3 
2 
1 
' 0.5 
0.2 
0.2 
Threatening with a weapon and throwing stones were the two most common armed 
threats whereas being part of a hostile group and engaging in physical struggle were 
the two most common unarmed threats.ll2 
WhetMr Victims Fled 
The majority, 68% (489), of homicide victims were not fleeing when shot, but 32% 
(228) were fleeing. 113 
107 Treat with caution, M = 34% (529) and C = 2% (33). 
108 Calculated out of 440. 
109 Alpert & Fridell (1992) have argued that a vehicle can be a deadly weapon. 
110 M = 0. 
111 Calculated out of 440. 
112 Treat with caution, M = 34% (529). 
113 Treat with caution, M = 41% (510) and C = 1% (10). 
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Sides of Victims' Bodies Wounded Fatally 
The majority, 55% (583), of homicide victims sustained fatal entry-wounds in the 
front of the body, but 26% (279) were wounded in the back and 19% (207) in the 
side.u4 
Whether Victims· were Suspects/ Convicts 
The majority, 63% (462), of homicide victims were suspected of at least one 
criminal offence when shot, but 37% (275) were neither suspects nor convicts.m 
Table 7. 19 shows the majority, 54% (248), of homicide victims who were 
suspects/convicts were suspected of violent offences, but 46% (214) were suspected 
of non-violent offences. 116 
Table 7.19: Victims' Most Serious Suspected Offences117 
Types of Offences 111 Frequencies Percentages 
* Assault 99 21 Theft 119 80 17 
* Public violence 72 16 
* Robbery 48 10 
Unspecified offence 42 9 
Burglary 36 8 
Illegal gathering 26 6 
* Attempted murder 13 3 
* Murder 9 2 
Obstructing justice 8 2 
Trespassing 7 2 
* Arson 4 1 
Malicious damage to property 4 1 
Drug dealing 3 1 
Escaping from custody 2 0.4 
Illegal possession of guns 2 0.4 
* Abduction 1 0.2 
* Attempted rape 1 0.2 Selling stolen property 1 0.2 
Fraud 1 0.2 
Illegal possession of drugs 1 0.2 
Reckless driving 1 0.2 
* Terrorism 1 0.2 
Assault, public violence and robbery were the three most common violent offences 
whereas theft, burglary and participating in illegal gatherings were the three most 
114 M = 14% (168). 
115 Treat with caution, M = 39% (483) and C = I% (17). 
116 M = 0. 
117 M = 0. 
118 Asterisks (*) indicate violent offences. 
119 Car theft 35% (28). 
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common non-violent offences. 
WhetMr Victims were Dangerous 
The majority, 67% (512), of homicide victims were not likely to have been 
dangerous to others if they had not been shot, but 33% (247) were likely to have 
been dangerous. 1w 
WlutMr Victilll.f Endangered Ufe 
The majority, 79% (531), of homicide victims did not endanger the lives of others, 
but 21% (244) did pose a significant threat to life.121 
Characteristics of the Legal Process 
HigMst Couns 
The majority, 83% (809), of homicide cases were heard by inquest courts, but 16% 
(159) were tried in criminal courts and one per cent (11) were heard in both inquest 
and criminal courts. 122 This means that in 83% (809) of homicides an inquest court 
was the highest court and in 17% ( 170) a criminal court was the highest court to 
consider each case.tn 
Types of l~Up~ests 
The vast majority, 86% (698), of homicide cases that went no further than inquests 
were heard as informal proceedings and 14% (Ill) as formal proceedings. In other 
words, in 86% (698) of homicide cases the highest court findings were made at 
informal inquests and 14% (Ill) at formal inquests.1tc 
Types of Crimilllll Couns 
The majority, 68% (116), of homicide cases that were brought to criminal trial were 
heard in the Supreme Court and 32% (54) in the lower Regional Magistrates' 
Courts. Overall, 12% (116) of homicide cases were considered in the Supreme 
Court and five per cent (54) in the Regional Magistrates' Courts. 1~ 
120 Treat with caution, M =46% (569) and C = 5%. 
121 Treat with caution, M = 45% (562). 
122 M = 21% (258). 
123 Overall, 66% (820) inquests and 14% (170) criminal trials. 
124 M = 0. 
125 M = 0. 
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Table 7.20: Highest Legal Proceeding 
Proceedings Frequencies Percentages 
Informal inquest 
Supreme Court criminal trial 
Formal inquest 
Regional Court criminal trial 
Lllwfulness 
698 
116 
111 
54 
72 
12 
11 
5 
The Courts found the majority, 54% (389), of homicide cases to be lawful, but 46% 
(334) were ruled unlawful. 126 In addition, the Courts were unable to reach a finding 
on lawfulness in 26% (256) of cases. When this figure is included the relative 
proportions become: 40% (389) . lawful, 34% (334) unlawful and 26% (256) 
undetermined. m 
Legal Cllusi.ficatioru 
GeneraJJy, when an inquest or criminal court finds a homicide lawful, the type of 
legal justification is also specified in the Court's finding, e.g. self defence, effecting 
an arrest. Similarly, when a criminal court finds a homicide unlawful, the type of 
criminal offence and the guilty party is stipulated, e.g. murder by Mr X. By 
contrast, an inquest court must decide only whether a death is lawful or unlawful and 
is not required to find anyone criminalJy liable for a death, or to decide what type of 
criminal offence has been committed (The Inquest Act 58 of 1959, as amended). 
Table 7.21: Classifications for Justifiable Homicides 
Legal Classifications 
Self defence 121 
Arrest 129 
Unspecified lawful 130 
Unintentional shootings 
Public safety 
Defence of property 
Dispersing illegal gathering 
Obedience to orders 
Necessity 
Frequencies 
165 
142 
45 
13 
13 
4 
3 
3 
1 
126 M = 21% (258). Excluding undetermined cases. 
127 M = 21% (258). 
Percentages 
42 
37 
12 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
0.3 
128 Including seven cases of defence of another. 
129 Including 12 cases of preventing escape. 
130 Lawful but no legal justification specified (common for inquest courts). 
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Table 7.21 shows that self defence and arrest were the two most common types of 
justifiable homicide, which together comprised 79% (307) of the lawful homicides in 
this sample.131 
Table 7.22: Classifications for Criminal Homicides 
Legal Classifications Frequencies Percentages 
Unspecified unlawful132 228 68 
Murder 73 22 
Culpable homicide 32 10 
Attempted murder 133 1 0.3 
Table 7.22 indicates the Courts found most, 68% (228), unlawful shootings to be 
unspecified criminal homicides.134 
Shooten Cluuged 
The majority, 80% (880), of shooters were not charged, but criminal charges were 
brought against 20% (221). 1~ The vast majority, 90% (199), of those charged faced 
murder charges and only 10% (22) were charged with culpable homicide. 
Shooten Prosecuted 
The vast majority' 86% (190), of shooters who were charged were also prosecuted, 
but 14% (31) had charges withdrawo. 136 
Shooten Legally Represented 
The vast majority, 97% (185),m of shooters who were prosecuted were legally 
represented at their trials and only one per cent (2) were not legally represented. 138 
Most, 70% (130), were represented by state-appointed defence counsel, but 30% 
(55) were represented by private defence counsel. 139 
131 M = 21% (258). 
132 Unlawful but no offence specified (common for inquest courts). 
133 Here the Court convicted the shooter before the victim died. 
134 M = 21% (258). 
135 M = 21% (286). 
136 M = 21% (286). Reasons for withdrawal of charges were not provided. 
137 Expected given the severity of the charges. 
138 M = 2% (3). Both accused who were not represented were acquitted. 
139 At the time, if an accused was charged with a capital offence and could not 
afford legal counsel, the State was obliged to provide this service (The 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
240 
Shooters Convicted 
The majority, 68% (129), of shooters prosecuted were also convicted of at least one 
criminal offence, but 32% (61) were acquitted of aU charges against them. 140 
Table 7.23: Types of Convictions 
Types of Convictions 
Murder 
Culpable homicide 
Illegal possession 
Unlawful shooting 
Attempted murder 
Frequencies 
82 
34 
8 
4 
1 
Percentages 
64 
26 
6 
3 
1 
Table 7.23 indicates murder was the most common, 64% (82), criminal 
conviction. 141 However, six per cent (8) of accused were not found to be criminally 
liable for killing their victims, but were instead convicted of illegally possessing 
firearms and ammunition. Overall, 63% (121) of shooters who were prosecuted 
were held criminally liable for killing. But this amounts to only nine per cent of the 
total number of shooters involved in these homicides. Furthermore, the majority, 
66% (253), who perpetrated criminal homicides were never brought to justice, 
mainly because they were not identified or traced by the police 91% (230). 141 Nine 
per cent (23) could not be prosecuted because they died during or shortly after the 
shooting. 
Shooters· Sentences 
Table 7.24 shows imprisonment was the most common type of sentence handed 
down to convicted shooters. 143 The effective prison sentences ranged from one year 
to life imprisonment, with the average term being 11 years, the median eight years 
and the mode 15 years.t"" Fines ranged from 100 to 5000 rand, with the average 
being 950 rand, the median 675 rand and the mode 500 rand. 
140 M = 0. 
141 M = 0. 
142 As at December 1995. 
143 M = 0. 
144 M = 18% (14). Prison time after taking into account concurrent and 
consecutive sentences. 
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Table 7.24: Types of Sentences 
Types of Sentences 
Imprisonment 
Suspended sentence 
Death sentence 1"-' 
Fine 
Community service 
Corporal punishment 146 
Financial compensation 
241 
Frequencies 
77 
18 
18 
12 
2 
1 
1 
Percentages 
60 
14 
14 
9 
2 
1 
1 
More specifically, shooters convicted of murder were sentenced as follows: 73% 
( 60) imprisonment, 147 22% ( 18) death and five per cent ( 4) fully suspended 
sentences. Since extenuating circumstances were found for most, 78% (64); of the 
murder convicts, only a minority were sentenced to death. Furthermore, one death 
sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment on appeal, and another 
was overturned resulting in a complete acquittal. 
The shooters convicted of culpable homicide were sentenced as follows: 44% 
(15) imprisonment, 29% (10) fully suspended sentences, 15% (5) fines, six per cent 
(2) community service, three per cent ( 1) corporal punishment and three per cent ( 1) 
were ordered to pay financial compensation to their victims' dependents. One of 
these convicts was subsequently acquitted on appeal. The shooter convicted of 
attempted murder received a prison sentence, and the four convicted of unspecified 
criminal homicides were sentenced as follows: 75% (3) fully suspended sentences 
and 25% ( 1) imprisonment. The eight shooters convicted of illegal possession were 
sentenced as follows: 88% (7) fines and 12% (1) fully suspended sentences. 
Shooters AppetJled 
The majority, 67% (85), of convicted shooters did not apply for leave to appeal 
against their convictions or sentences, but 33% (42) applied for leave to appeal. 148 
AJthough most, 69% (29), applicants were refused leave to appeal, 31% (13) were 
granted leave. In the majority, 67% (6), of appeals no changes were made, but 22% 
(2) who appealed had their convictions overturned and 11% (1) had a death sentence 
commuted to life imprisonment.149 
145 At the time death by hanging was still a lawful form of punishment, but in 
1995 capital punishment was declared unconstitutional. 
146 Whipping. 
147 Usually life. 
148 M = 1% (2). At the time the right to appeal was not automatic, although this 
is now the case. 
149 Treat with caution, M = 31% (4) and the figures may have changed since 
December 1995. 
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SELECTED ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Police Officers as Homicide Victims 
Areas 
The majority, 55% (22), of police homicide victims were shot while in African 
residential areas, but 23% (9) were shot in coloured areas, 13% (5) in white areas, 
five per cent (2) in racially mixed areas and five per cent (2) in non-residential 
areas. 1~ 
PoUtical MotiWllion 
The vast majority, 84% (26), of police victims were killed in shootings that were not 
politically motivated, but 16% (5) were killed in politically motivated shootings.ut 
PoUce Victinu • Sues 
The large majority, 98% (39), of police homicide victims were male; only two per 
cent (1) were female. Considering the composition of the background population, 
males were significantly over-represented and females under-represented among 
police homicide victims in this sample (The CSS, 199l[ii]). 152 This finding was 
expected given the male dominated composition of the police force, and the fact that 
female officers were generally relegated to office-based activities (The 
Commissioner of the SAP, 1991 to 1984 ). 
PoUce Victinu • Race-Groups 
The highest proportion, 48% (19), of police homicide victims were African, but 
28% (ll) were coloured, 22% (9) were white and two per cent (l) were Asian. 
Considering the composition of the background population, Africans were 
significantly over-represented among police homicide victims in this sample (The 
CSS, 199l[ii]).u3 Also, given the composition of the SAP at the time, African and 
coloured officers were over-represented and white officers under-represented as 
homicide victims in this sample (The Commissioner of the SAP, 1991 to 1984). 1S4 
PoUce Victinu • Age-Groups 
All (40) police homicide victims were at least 18 years of age.m 
150 M = 0. 
151 M = 23% (9). 
152 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 36.1, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 4.25, -4.25. 
153 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 20.73, df = 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 3.89. 
154 On average: 51% white, 39% African, 7% coloured and 3% Asian. 
155 M = 0. No stats. tests because all police were expected to be at least 18. 
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Police Victims ' Ranks 
Table 7.25 shows that most police homicide victims held the lowest rank of Special 
Constable. 
Table 7.25: Police Victims' Ranksu6 
Ranks Frequencies Percentages 
Special Constable 22 58 
Constable 11 29 
Sergeant 3 8 
Warrant Officer 1 3 
Detective Constable 1 3 
PoUce Victims • Duty Status 
The majority, 53% (20), of police homicide victims were off duty when killed, but 
47% (18) were on duty.•s1 
Shooters • Sues 
All (33) shooters who killed police officers were male. Considering the composition 
of the background population, males were significantly over-represented and females 
under-represented as shooters of police victims (The CSS, 1991[ii]).m 
Shooters • Rt:Jce-Groups 
The majority, 61% (19), of shooters who killed police officers were African, but 
29% (9) were coloured and 10% (3) were white. Considering the composition of the 
background population, Africans were significantly over-represented as shooters of 
police victims (The CSS, 1991[ii]).l59 
Shooters • Age-Groups 
All (32) shooters who killed police officers were adults. Considering the age 
distribution in the background population, adolescents were significantly under-
represented as shooters of police officers in this sample (The CSS, 1991[ii]).160 
156 M = 5% (2). No stats. test, because expected frequencies could not be 
accurately calculated. 
157 M = 5% (2). 
158 M = 27% (12). P < 0.01, X2 = 35.06, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 4.25, 
-4.12. 
159 P < 0.01, X2 = 35.06, df = 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 5.3. Treat with caution, 
M = 31% (14). 
160 P < 0.01, X2 = 22. 72, df = 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = -3.18. Treat with caution, 
M = 29% (13). 
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Shooters' Police Status 
The majority, 7 4% (17), of shooters who killed police were civilians, but 26% ( 6) 
were police officers. Considering the numbers in the background population, police 
were over-represented as shooters of police victims in this sample (The 
Commissioner of the SAP, 1990). 161 
Lawfulness 
The Courts found the bulk, 61% (17), of homicides involving police victims to be 
unlawful, but in 21% (6) of these cases lawfulness was not determined and 18% (5) 
were found to be lawfu}.l62 
Legal Classifications 
Table 7.26 shows the highest proportion, 55% (12), of homicides involving police 
victims were classified as unspecified criminal homicides. 161 
Table 7.26: Legal Classifications for Homicides involving Police Victims 
Classifications Frequencies 
Unlawful Unspecified 12 
Murder 4 
Self Defence 3 
Culpable Homicide 1 
Arrest 1 
Accident 1 
Private Security Officers as Homicide Victims 
Representation in Sample 
Percentages 
55 
18 
14 
4. 
4 
4 
PSOs comprised only a small minority, two per cent (29), of homicide victims, 
whereas 94% (1159) were civilians who were not employed in law enforcement, 
three per cent ( 40) were police officers and one per cent (9) were members of the 
national defence forces. Considering the estimated number of PSOs in the 
background population, they were significantly over-represented as homicide victims 
in this sample (The Commissioner of the SAP, 1990) .164 
161 Treat with caution, M = 49% (22). 
162 Treat with caution, M = 30% (12). 
163 M = 30% (12). Excluding undetermined homicides. 
164 Treat with caution, M = 48% (820). P < 0.01, X2 = 415.03, df = 2. 
Fwp < 0.01, z = 9.39. 
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Areas 
The highest proportion, 41% (12), of PSO homicide victims were shot while in 
African residential areas, whereas 38% (11) were in coloured areas, 14% (4) in 
white areas, three per cent (1) in racially mixed areas and three per cent in non-
residential areas.165 
Political Motivation 
The majority, 59% (16), of PSO homicides were not politically motivated, but 41% 
( 11) were politically motivated. t66 
PSO Victims· Sues 
All (29) PSO homicide victims were male. Considering the composition of the 
background population, males were significantly over-represented and females 
under-represented among PSO homicide victims in this sample (The CSS, 
1991[ii]).167 Since this appears to have been a male dominated occupation, such a 
finding was not noteworthy. 
PSO Victims' Race-Groups 
The majority, 52% (15), of PSO homicide victims were African, whereas 45% (13) 
were coloured and three per cent ( 1) were white. Considering the composition of the 
background population, Africans were significantly over-represented among PSO 
homicide victims in this sample (The CSS, 1991[ii]).168 
PSO Victims' Age-Groups 
All (29) PSO homicide victims were adults.t69 
PSO Victims' Duty Status 
The majority, 72% (13), of PSO homicide victims were on duty when shot, but 28% 
(5) were off duty.11o 
Cluuacteristics of Shooters: 
Shooters' Sues 
All (21) shooters who killed PSOs were male. Considering the composition of the 
background population, males were significantly over-represented and females 
165 Treat with caution, M = 48% (820) for background variable (bv). 
166 Treat with caution, Mbv = 48% (820) and M = 7% (2). 
167 Treat with caution, Mbv = 48% (820) and M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 31.07, 
df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 3.74, -3.87. 
168 Treat with caution, Mbv = 48% (820) and M = 0. Fwp < 0.01, z = 3.67. 
P < 0.01, X2 = 20.19, df = 3. M = 0. 
169 No stats tests because PSOs were adults by definition. 
170 Treat with extreme caution, Mbv = 48% (820) and M = 38% (11). 
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under-represented as shooters of PSOs in this sample (The CSS 199l[ii]). 111 
Shooters· Race-Groups 
The majority, 58% (11), of shooters who killed PSOs were African, but 32% (6) 
were coloured and 10% (2) were white. Considering the composition of the 
background population, Africans were significantly over-represented as shooters of 
PSOs in this sample (The CSS, 199l[ii]).m 
Shooters • Age-Groups 
All (20) shooters who killed PSOs were adults.m 
Shooters • PoUce Status 
The majority, 79% (15), of shooters who killed PSOs were civilians, but 16% (3) 
were police officers and five per cent ( 1) were members of the defence forces. 174 
Cluuacteristia of the Legal Process: 
Lawfulness 
The highest proportion, 50% (12), of homicides involving PSO victims were found 
to be unlawful, but 42% (10) were not determined and eight per cent (2) were found 
to be lawfuJ.m 
Legal Classifications 
Table 7.27 shows the highest proportion of homicides involving PSO victims were 
classified as undetermined homicides.'76 
Table 7.27: Legal Classifications for Homicides involving PSO Victims 
Classifications Frequencies Percentages 
Undetermined 10 42 
Unlawful Unspecified 6 25 
Murder 4 17 
Culpable Homicide 2 8 
Arrest 2 8 
171 Treat with caution, M = 28% (8). P < 0.01, X2 = 23.1, df = 1. 
Fwp < 0.01, z = 3.48, -3.31. 
172 Treat with caution, M = 34% (10). P < 0.01, X2 = 15.65, df = 3. 
Fwp < 0.01, z = 3.5. 
173 Treat with caution, M = 31% (9). P < 0.01, X2 = 10.77, df = 1, but the 
std. resids. were not significant. 
174 Treat with caution, M = 34% (10). P > 0.01, X2 = 4.22, df = 1 (not 
significant). 
175 M = 17% (5). 
176 M = 17% (5). 
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Table 7.28: Self Defence Cases by Years, 1984- 1991•7• 
Years Frequencies Percentages Est. Rates per 100000 179 
1984 II 7 I 
1985 44 27 3 
1986 25 15 2 
1987 16 10 I 
1988 14 9 I 
1989 18 II I 
1990 23 14 1 
1991 14 9 I 
PoUtical MotiWltion 
The majority, 75% (117), of self defence cases were not politically motivated, but 
25% (40) were politically motivated.•ao 
Aretu 
The highest proportion, 40% (66), of self defence cases occurred in coloured 
residential areas, but 36% (59). occurred in African areas, 16% (27) in white areas, 
six per cent (I 0) in racially mixed areas and one per cent (2) in non-residential 
areas .I•• 
P/Qces 
The majority, 68% (108), of self defence cases occurred out-of-doors, but 23% (37) 
took place indoors, four per cent (7) in vehicles, four per cent (6) in victims' homes 
and one per cent (2) in victims' work-places.l82 
Characteristics of Victinu: 
Victinu • Sa~s 
The vast majority, 99% (164), of self defence victims were male; only one per cent 
(I) were female. Considering the sex ratio of the background population, males 
177 Self defence and defence of another cases combined: 165 cases involving 197 
shooters. 
178 M = 0. 
179 Based on the estimated population of Cape Town. 
180 M = 5% (8). 
181 M = I% (1). 
182 M = 3% (5). 
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were significantly over-represented and females under-represented as victims of self 
defence (The CSS, 199l[ii]).t83 
Victims' Rae~-Groups 
The majority, 53% (88), of self defence victims were coloured, but 45% (74) were 
African, one per cent (2) were Asian and one per cent (1) were white. Considering 
the racial composition of the background population, Africans were significantly 
over-represented and whites under-represented as self defence victims (The CSS, 
199l[ii]).114 
Victims' Ag~-Groups 
The majority, 83% (137), of self defence victims were adults, but 15% (25) were 
adolescents, one per cent (2) were older adults and one per cent (1) were children. 
Considering tbe age distribution in the background population, adults were 
significantly over-represented, whereas children and older adults were under-
represented as self defence victims (The CSS, 199l[ii]).t" 
Victims' Employme111 StlliiiS 
The majority, 60% (68), of self defence victims were not gainfully employed, but 
40% (46) were gainfully employed.t• 
Victims' PoUc~ StlliiiS 
The majority, 98% (162), of self ~efence victims were civilians, but two per cent (3) 
were police officers. Significantly more civilians and fewer police officers than 
expected were self defence victims. 1., 
Charact~ristics of Shoot~n: 
Shoot~n' Sa~s 
In self defence cases the vast majority, 99% (194), of shooters were male; only one 
per cent (3) were female. Considering the sex ratio in the background population, 
males were significantly over-represented and females under-represented as shooters 
in self defence cases (The CSS, 1991 [ ii]) .taa 
183 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 175.47, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 9.56, -9.17. 
184 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 100.68, df = 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 7.72, -6.4. 
185 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 62.43, df = 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 4.82, -5.39, 
-3.05. 
186 M = 31% (51). P > 0.01, x2 = 0.34, df = 1 (not significant). Treat with 
caution, the background statistics were national figures for 1995. 
187 M = 0. P < 0.01, x2 = 152.3, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 8.76, -8.76. Duty 
status not analysed; only three cases. 
188 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 191.09, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 9.85, -9.7. 
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Shooters' Race-Groups 
In self defence cases the highest proportion, 49% (96), of shooters were white, but 
27% (53) were coloured, 21% (41) were African and three per cent (5) were Asian. 
Considering the racial composition of the background population, whites were 
significantly over-represented and coloureds under-represented as shooters in self 
defence cases (The CSS, 1991 [ii]).'89 
Shooters' Age-Groups 
In self defence cases the majority, 99% (194), of shooters were adults, but one per 
cent (2) were older adults. Considering the age composition of the background 
population, adults were significantly over-represented, whereas adolescents, children 
and older adults were under-represented as shooters in self defence cases (The CSS, 
1991 [ii]).190 
Shooters' Employment Status 
In self defence cases the majority, 99% (180), of shooters were gainfully employed, 
but one per cent (2) were not gainfully employed. Considering the rate of 
employment in the background population, gainfully employed people were 
significantly over-represented as shooters in self defence cases (The Ministry for 
Welfare and Population Development, 1995). 191 
Shooters' PoUce SllltlU 
In self defence cases the majority, 66% (131), of shooters were police officers, but 
34% (66) were civilians. 192 There were significantly more police and fewer civilian 
shooters than expected in self defence cases.'93 
Characteristics of Shooters' Firearms: 
Shooters' Handguns 
The majority, 61% (119), of self defence shootings were committed with handguns, 
but 39% (76) were perpetrated with long-guns. 194 
Automatic Stanu of Shooters' Guns 
The majority, 63% (119), of self defence shootings were committed with guns that 
were not automatic, 36% (69) with semi-automatics and one per cent (2) with fully-
189 M = 1% (2). P < 0.01, X2 = 70.39, df = 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 6.3, -5.07. 
190 M = 1% (1). P < 0.01, X2 = 152.73, df = 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 8.28, 
-5.91, -6.09, -3.5. 
191 M = 8% (15). P < 0.01, X2 = 287.6, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 13.36, 
-10.53. Treat with caution, the background statistics were national figures for 
1995. 
192 Including 10 PSOs. 
193 M = 0. P < 0.01, x2 = 21.34, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 3.28, -3.28. 
194 M = 1% (2). 
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automatic ftrearms.l95 
Shooters· Gun licence Status 
In self defence cases the majority, 93% ( 177), of shooters were in legal possession 
of their firearms, but seven per cent ( 13) were not in lawful possession.l96 
Factors relllted to Minimum Force: 
Number of Potentially Fatal Shots 
In self defence cases the majority, 64% ( 118), of shooters fired at least two 
potentially fatal shots at their victims, but 36% (67) fired single shots. 197 
Number of Entry-Wowuls 
In self defence cases the majority, 51% (84) of victims sustained single entry-
wounds, but 49% (81) sustained at least two entry-wounds.'" 
Whether Shooters Identified the111Selves as PoUce Officers 
In self defence cases the majority, 73% (94), of police shooters made their victims 
aware of their law enforcement status before shooting, but 27% (34) did not.'" 
Oral Warnings 
In self defence cases the majority, 75% (144), of shooters did not give their victims 
oral warning of the intention to shoot, but 25% (47) did issue such warnings. 200 
Warning Shots 
In self defence cases the majority, 73% (140), of shooters did not fire warning shots 
before shooting at their victims, but 27% (53) did fire warning shots. 2111 
Aiming at Victi11U • Legs 
In self defence cases the majority, 88% (172), of shooters did not aim to shoot 
victims' in the legs; only 12% (23) did so.202 
Other Less-tlum-Letlull Means 
In self defence cases the majority, 64% (128), of shooters did not employ other less-
than-lethal means before shooting, but 36% (66) did use such alternatives. The three 
most common less-than-lethal alternatives were: foot chases (10% ), taking cover 
195 M = 4% (7). 
196 M = 4% (7). 
197 M = 6% (12). 
198 M = 0. 
199 M = 2% (3). UF = 0. 
200 M = 3% (6), UF = 23. 
201 M = 2% (4), UF = 27. 
202 M = 1% (2), UF = 17. 
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(8%) and physical struggle (7%). 201 
Factors related to Proportionality: 
Shooters Foreseeably Endangered OtMrs 
In the majority, 59% (108), of the self defence cases shooters foreseeably 
endangered others by firing at their victims, but in 41% (76) they did not foreseeably 
endanger others.* 
WhetMr VictiiiU were Armed 
In self defence cases the majority, 87% (141), of victims were armed, but in 13% 
(21) victims were unarmed.205 
Armed Victims • Weapon Types 
In self defence cases the majority, 84% ( 118), of armed victims had weapons other 
than guns; only 16% (23) had firearms.• 
Armed VictiiiU' Htllldgwu 
In self defence cases the majority, 91% (21), of victims' firearms were handguns; 
only nine per cent (2) were long-guns.:~m 
Alllollflltic Statu of Armed VictiiiU • GruJs 
In self defence cases the majority, 59% (10), of victims' firearms were semi-
automatic, but 35% (6) were not automatic and six per cent (1) were fully-
automatic. • 
Armed VictiiiU • Gun Ucence Status 
In self defence cases the majority, 82% (9), of victims were not in legal possession 
of their guns, but 18% (2) were in lawful possession.• 
Wlu!tlu!r VictiiiU Threatenetl Anyone 
In self defence cases the majority, 97% (185), of victims threatened someone, but 
interestingly, three percent (6) did not actually threaten anyone. The three most 
common threats were: threatening with a weapon (41 %), throwing stones (18%) and 
being part of a hostile group (15%) .210 
203 M = 2% (3). UF = 10. 
204 M = 7% (13). 
205 M = 7% (14) and C = 11 % (21). 
206 M = 0. 
207 M = 8% (16) and C = 1% (2). 
208 M = J7% (4) and C = 9% (2). 
209 Treat with extreme caution, M = 43% (10) and C = 9% (2). 
210 M = 2% (4) and C = 1% (2). 
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Whether Victims Fled 
In self defence cases the majority, 80% (146), of victims were not fleeing when 
shot, but a rather substantial 20% (36) were fleeing.2•• 
Sides of Victims' Bodies Woruuled Fatally 
In self defence cases the majority, 61% (99), of victims sustained fatal entry-wounds 
in the front of the body, 20% (33) were wounded in the side and 19% (31) in the 
back.2t2 
Whether Victims were SJUpectsl Convicts 
In self defence cases the majority, 82% (155), of victims were suspected of at least 
one criminal offence, but 18% (35) were neither suspects nor convicts. The three 
most common offences were: assault (31 %) , public violence ( 19%) and robbery 
(19%).213 
Whether Victims were DIJIIgeroiLt 
In self defence cases the majority, 80% ( 132), of victims were likely to have been 
dangerous if they had not been shot, but 20% (32) were not likely to have been 
dangerous. 214 
Whether Victims Endangered Ufe 
In self defence cases the majority, 75% (143), of victims did not endanger the lives 
of others, but 25% (48) did pose a significant threat to life. The three most common 
threats to life were: hostile groups (57%), shootings (20%) and stabbings (12%). 215 
Cluuacteristics of the Legal Process: 
Highest Couns 
The majority, 93% (153), of self defence cases were heard by inquest courts, but 
only seven per cent (14) were tried in criminal courts.2t6 
Types of Inqrusts 
The majority, 75% (115), of self defence cases that went to inquest were beard as 
informal inquests, but only 25% (38) were heard as formal inquests.211 
211 M = 3% (6) and C = 5% (9). 
212 M = 1 % (2). 
213 M = 2% (3) and C = 2% (4). 
214 M = 1% (2) and C = 16% (31). 
215 M = 2% (4) and C = 1% (2). 
216 M = 0. 
217 M = 0. 
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Types of Criminal Couns 
The majority, 54% (7), of self defence cases that went to criminal trial were heard in 
the Supreme Court, but 46% (5) were heard in the lower Regional Magistrates' 
Courts.2ta 
Arrest Casesm 
Table 7.29: Arrests by Years, 1984- 1991 220 
Years Frequencies Percentages Est. Rates per 100000 
1984 14 10 1 
1985 20 14 1 
1986 31 22 2 
1987 10 7 1 
1988 10 7 1 
1989 13 9 1 
1990 26 18 2 
1991 18 13 1 
Political Motivtltion 
The majority, 81% (108), of arrests were not political, but 19% (26) were politically 
motivated. 221 
Areas 
The highest proportion, 36% (51), of arrests occurred in AfriCan residential areas, 
27% (39) in coloured areas, 27% (39) in white areas, six per cent (9) in racially 
mixed areas and three per cent (4) in non-residential areas. 222 
Places 
The majority, 83% (116), of arrests occurred out-of-doors, but 13% (18) took place 
in vehicles, three per cent (5) indoors, and one per cent (I) in victims' homes. 223 
Characteristics of Victims: 
Victims • Sues 
The majority, 99% (141), of arrest victims were male; only one per cent (1) were 
female. Considering the sex ratio of the background population, males were 
significantly over-represented and females under-represented as victims in arrests 
218 M = 0. 
219 Arrest and preventing escape combined: 142 cases involving 163 shooters. 
220 M = 0. 
221 M = 6% (8). 
222 M = 0. 
223 M = 1% (2). 
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(The CSS, 1991[ ii]). 224 
Victims· Race-Groups 
The majority, 51% (73), of arrest victims were African, but 48% (68) were coloured 
and one per cent (1) were white. Considering the racial composition of the 
background population, Africans were over-represented and whites under-
represented as arrest victims (The CSS, 199l[ii]).m 
Victims· Age-Groups 
The majority, 78% (111), of arrest victims were adults, but 22% (31) were 
adolescents. Considering the age distribution in the background population, adults 
were over-represented, whereas children and older adults were under-represented as 
arrest victims (The CSS, 199l[ii]).226 
Victims • Employment StlliUS 
The majority, 59% (61), of arrest victims were not gainfully employed, but 41% 
(38) were.m 
Victims· Police StlliUS 
The majority, 99% (141), of arrest victims were civilians, but one per cent (1) were 
police officers. Significantly more arrest victims than expected were civilians and 
fewer were police officers. m 
Cluuacterima of Shooters: 
Shooters· Sues 
In arrests all (163) shooters were male. Considering the sex ratio of the background 
population, males were significantly over-represented and females under-represented 
as shooters in arrests (The CSS, 199l[ii]).229 
Shooters· Race-Groups 
In arrests the majority, 80% (113), of shooters were white, but 12% (17) were 
coloured and eight per cent (12) were African. Considering the racial composition 
of the background population, whites were significantly over-represented and 
coloureds under-represented as shooters in arrests (The CSS, 199l[ii]).230 
224 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 142.03, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 8.48, -8.36. 
225 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 115.45, df = 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 8.85, -5.92. 
226 M = 0. P < 0.01, x2 = 52.92, df = 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 7.59, -5.19, 
-3.31. 
227 P > 0.01, x2 = 0.54, df = 1 (not significant). Treat with caution, M = 30% 
(43) and the background statistics were national figures for 1995. 
228 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 138.03, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 8.3, -8.3. 
229 M = 0. P < 0.01, x2 = 169.11, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 9.28, -9.11. 
230 M = 13% (21). P < 0.01, x2 = 186.46, df = 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 11.55, 
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Shooters ' A.ge-Grollps 
In arrests all (163) shooters were adults: 99% (162) were aged between 19 and 59 
and one per cent ( 1) were over 59. Considering the age distribution in the 
background population, older adults were significantly under-represented as shooters 
in arrests (The CSS, 1991 [ii]).n• 
Shooters ' Employment StiJIUS 
In arrests the majority, 99% (153), of shooters were gainfully employed; only one 
per cent (2) were nor gainfully employed. Considering the level of employment in 
the background population, gainfully employed people were significantly over-
represented as shooters in arrests (The Ministry for Welfare and Population 
Development, 1995). m 
Shooters' PoUce Status 
In arrests the majority, 89% (141), of shooters were police; only 11% (18) were 
civilians. nl Significantly more arrests than expected involved police and fewer 
involved civilian shooters.234 
ChartlCieristics of Shooters ' FireaTJtU: 
Shooters ' HlllldgiiiU 
Handguns were used _in the majority, 73% (118), of arrests, but 27% (43) involved -
long-guns.ns 
Alllomatic Status of Shooters' Guns 
Semi-automatics were used in the majority, 63% (101), of arrests, but 32% (52) 
involved guns that were not automatic and five per cent (8) fully-automatics. 236 
Shooters' Gull Licence StiJIUS 
The majority, 99% (160), of shooters were in legal possession of the firearms they 
used in arrests, but one per cent (2) were nor in lawful possession of their guns. 237 
-6.63. 
231 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 21.86, df = 1. F~ < 0.01, z = -4.37. 
232 M = 5% (8). P < 0.01, X2 = 241.8, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 12.24, 
-9.59. Treat with caution, the background statistics were national figures for 
1995. 
233 Including three PSOs and excluding two members of the defence forces. 
234 M = 1% (2). < 0.01, X2 = 94.56, df = 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 6.89, -6.89. 
235 M = 1 % (2). 
236 M = 1 % (2). 
237 M = 1% (1). 
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Factors related to Minimum Force: 
Number of Potentially Fatal Shots 
In arrests the majority, 51% (67), of shooters fired at least two potentially fatal shots 
at their victims, but 49% (65) fued single shots.m 
Number of Entry-Wounds 
In arrests the majority, 52% (73), of victims sustained more than one entry-wound, 
but 48% (68) sustained single entry-wounds.239 
Shooten Identified as PoUce 
In arrests the majority, 72% (88), of police shooters made their victims aware of 
their law enforcement status before shooting, but 28% (34) did not.2AO 
Victinu Injof'IUd of A"est 
The majority, 88% ( 11 0), of shooters who claimed their motive for shooting was to 
arrest, did not inform their victims before firing, but 12% (15) did so.2A1 
Oral Warnings 
In arrests the majority, 71 % ( 1 00), of shooters did not give their victims oral 
warning of the intention to shoot, but 29% ( 41) did issue such warnings. 242 
Warning Shots 
In arrests the majority, 78% (Ill), of shooters did not t"U-e warningS before shooting 
at victims, but 22% (31) did fue warnings.2A3 
Aiming at Victinu • Legs 
In arrests the majority, 79% (113), of shooters did not aim for their victims' legs, 
but 21% (30) did aim for the legs. 244 
Other Less-than-Lethal Means 
In arrests the majority, 80% (115), of shooters employed other less-than-lethal 
means before shooting, but 20% (28) did not employ such alternatives. The three 
most common means were: foot cbases (58%), abbreviated oral warnings (23%) and 
vehicular chases ( 17%). 2A' 
238 M = 19% (31). 
239 M = 1 % (1). 
240 M = 14% (19). 
241 M = 16% (24), C = 1% (1) and UF = 1. 
242 M = 13% (21) and C = 1% (1). 
243 M = 12% (20) and C = 1% (1). 
244 M = 12% (19), C = 1% and UF = 16. 
245 M = 12% (19) and C = I% (1). 
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Factors related to Proportionality: 
Shooters Foreseeably Endangered Others 
In arrests the majority, 54% (72), of shooters foreseeably endangered others by 
firing at their victims, but 46% (61) did not foreseeably endanger anyone.146 
Whether VictiiiU were Armed 
In arrests the majority, 59% (85), of victims were unarmed, but 41% (58) were 
armed.147 
Armed Victims' We11pon Types 
In arrests the majority, 66% (38), of armed victims had weapons other than guns, 
whereas 34% (20) had firearms.2AI 
Armed VictiiiU' Hmulgruu 
In arrests the majority, 80% (16), of victims' firearms were handguns, but 20% (4) 
were long-guns.2A9 
Alllolfllllic SIDIUS of Armed VictiiiU' Gluu 
In arrests the majority, 56% (5), of victims' guns were not automatic, but 44% (4) 
were semi-automatic firearms.l50 
Armed Victi11U' Gun Ucence Stanu 
In arrests the majority, 94% (17), of victims were not in legal possession of their 
guns; only six per cent (1) had licensed firearms. 231 
Whether VictiiiU Threatened Anyone 
In arrests the majority, 63% (81), of victims did not threaten anyone, but 37% (47) 
did threaten others. The three most common threats made by arrest victims were: 
shooting (22%), throwing stones (17%) and threatening with a weapon (17%).232 
Whether VictiiiU Fled 
In arrests the majority, 98% (156), of victims were fleeing when shot, but 
interestingly, two per cent (4) of victims were not fleeing. 753 
246 M = 18% (30). 
247 M = 10% (16) and C = 3% (4). 
248 M = 0. 
249 M = 0 and C = 1% (2). 
250 Treat with caution, M = 45% (9) and C = 1% (2). 
251 M = 0 and C = 1% (2). 
252 M = 10% (13) and C = 1% (1). 
253 M = 1% (1) and C = 1% (2). 
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Sides of Victims' Bodies Wounded Fatally 
In arrests the majority, 63% (100), of victims sustained fatal entry-wounds in the 
back, 24% (39) in the side and 13% (21) in the front. 254 
Whether Victims were Suspects/ Convicts 
In arrests the victims were criminal suspects by definition. The three most common 
offences were: theft (40%), robbery (12%) and burglary (11 %).2!1' 
Whether Victims were Dangerous 
In arrests the majority, 78% (111), of victims were not likely to have been 
dangerous if they bad not been shot, but 22% (31) were likely to have been 
dangerous. 2!16 
Whether Victims Endllngered Ufe 
In arrests the majority, 85% (109), of victims did not endanger the lives of others, 
but 15% ( 19) did pose a significant threat to life. 2!17 
Characteristics of the Legal Process: 
Highest Couns 
The majority, 99% (141), of arrests went no further than inquest courts; only one 
per cent (1) were heard in criininal courts.l!ls 
Types of Inquests 
The majority, 85% ( 121), of arrests that went to inquest were heard as infonnal 
proceedings; only 15% (21) were formal inquests.2!19 
254 M = 2% (3). 
255 M = 4% (6) and C = 13% (21). Arrest victims were crime suspects by 
definition. 
256 M = 11% (18) and C = 2% (3). 
257 M = 9% (13) and C = 1% (1). 
258 M = 0. One arrest case was heard in the Supreme Court. 
259 M = 0. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
RESEARCH RESULTS PART ll: Cross-Tabulations for Selected Variables 
SUICIDE CASES 
Victims' Characteristics 
Table 8.1.1: Victims' Sexes x Race-Groups 1 
African victim Coloured Asian victim White 
Female victim 1 (8%) 1 (3%) 0 (00/o) 50 (19%) 
Male victim 12 (92%) 33 (97%) 2 (100%) 219 (81%) 
Table 8.1.2: Victims' Sexes x Age-Groups 
Child victim Adolescent Adult victim Elderly 
Female victim 1 (500/o) 3 (33%) 42 (18%) 6 (9%) 
Male victim 1 (500/o) 6 (67%) 197 (82%) 62 (91%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, adult males were significantly 
over-represented as suicide victims in this_ sample, whereas adult females and under 19 year-
olds of both sexes were under-represented (The CSS, 1991 [ii]). 2 
Table 8.1.3: Victims' Sexes x Employment Status 
Victim employed Victim not employed 
Female victim 14 (100/o) 26 (21%) 
Male victim 133 (900/o) 98 (79%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, males who were not gainfully 
employed were significantly over-represented as suicide victims in this sample, whereas 
females were significantly under-represented irrespective of their employment status (The 
Ministry of Welfare and Population Development, 1995). 3 
1 Unless otherwise stated, tabulated percentages are column-wise and have been rounded 
to the nearest whole number. Decimals have been rounded to the first place. Statistical 
calculations have been excluded in the interests of brevity. 
2 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 531.4, df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 11.6, 16.5, -5.5, -5.1, -4.2, -4.7, -5. 
3 M = 17%(47). P < 0.01, X2 = 167.1, df= 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 3.6, -4.2, -7.4. 
I 
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Table 8.1.4: Victims' Race-Groups x Age-Groups 
Child victim Adolescent Adult victim Elderly 
African victim 1 (500/o) 0 (00/o) 12 (5%) 0 (00/o) 
Coloured victim 1 (500/o) 3 (33%) 29 (12%) 1 (1%) 
Asian victim 0 (00/o) 0 (00/o) 2 (1%) 0 (00/o) 
White victim 0 (00/o) 6 (6?0/o) 196 (82%) 67 (99%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, white adults were significantly 
over-represented as suicide victims in this sample, whereas African adults and coloured 
people under 60 were under-represented (The CSS, 1991 [ii]). 4 
Table 8.1.5: Victims' Race-Groups x Employment Status 
Victim employed Victim not employed 
African victim 10 (?0/o) 2 (2%) 
Coloured victim 23 (16%) 6 (5%) 
Asian victim 2 (1%) 0 (00/o) 
White victim 112 (76%) 116 (93%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, whites were significantly over-
represented and Africans under-represented as suicide victims in this sample irrespective of 
their employment status (The CSS, 199l[ii]). s 
HOMICIDE CASES 6 
Victims' Characteristics 
Table 8.2.1: Victims' Sexes x Race-Groups 
African victim Coloured Asian victim White 
Female victim 53 (8%) 38 (?0/o) 0 (0%) 23 (40%) 
Male victim 573 (92%) 504 (93%) 10 (100%) 36 (60%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, African and coloured males were 
significantly over-represented as homicide victims, whereas whites of both sexes, and 
coloured and African females were under-represented (The CSS, 199l[ii]). 7 
Treat with caution, the background statistic was a national estimate for 1995. 
4 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 852.7, df= 9. Fwp < 0.01, z = 21.4, 15.9, -4.2, -6.4, -5.4, -6. 
Treat with caution, 31% (5) of expected frequencies were below five . 
.5 M = 15% (47). P < 0.01, X2 = 788.4, df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 15.7, 19.2, -10.5, -6.6. 
Treat with caution, the background statistic was a national estimate for 1995. 
6 Cases involving defence force shooters (6) were consistently excluded from the cross-
tabulations, as these gun users were neither civilians nor law enforcement officers. 
7 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 2257.2, df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 40.3, 10.1, -9.9, -10.9, -16.6, -5.5. 
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Table 8.2.2: Victims' Sexes x Age-Groups 
Child victim Adolescent Adult victim Elderly 
Female victim 11 (48%) 20 (12%) 73 (7%) 10 (45%) 
Male victim 12 (52%) 141 (88%) 958 {93%) 12 (55%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, adult males were significantly 
over-represented as homicide victims, whereas females of all ages, male children and older 
adult males were under-represented (The CSS, 199l[ii]). 8 
Table 8.2.3: Victims' Sexes x Employment Status 
Victim employed Victim not employed 
Female victim 27 (5%) 72 (16%) 
Male victim 536 (95%). 387 (84%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, males were significantly over-
represented and females under-represented as homicide victims irrespective of their 
employment status (The CSS, 199l[ii]; The Ministry for Welfare and Population 
Development, 1995). 9 
Table 8.2.4: Victims' Race-Groups x Age-Groups 
Child victim Adolescent Adult victim Elderly 
African victim 12 (52%) 79 (49%) 525 (5lo/o) 10 (45%) 
Coloured victim 6 (26%) 82 (51%) 450 (44%) 4 (18%) 
Asian victim 0 {00/o) 0 (00/o) 9 (1%) 1 (5%) 
White victim 5 (22%) 0 (0%) 47 (4%) 7 (32%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, African and coloured adults were 
significantly over-represented as homicide victims, whereas African children, coloured and 
white youths under 19, and coloureds and whites over 59 were under-represented (The CSS, 
1991 [ii]). 10 
8 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 = 1692.2, df= 3. 
Fwp < 0.01, z = 33 .8, -9.5, -8.6, -14. 7, -6.5, -10, -4.1. 
9 M = 17% (215). P < 0.01, X2 = 805.4, df= 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 19.7, 8.3, -10.2, -15.7. 
Treat with caution, the background statistic was a national estimate for 1995. 
10 M = 0. P < 0.01, X2 =1475.8, df= 9. 
Fwp < 0.01, z = 6.9, 31, 5.6, -5.1, -II. 7, -5.3, -4.6, -7, -5.4, -6. 
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Table 8.2.5: Victims' Race-Groups x Employment Status 
Victim employed Victim not employed 
African victim 278 (490/o) 241 (52%) 
Coloured victim 243 (43%) 200 (43%) 
Asian victim 8 (2%) 1 (1%) 
White victim 34 (6%) 17 (4%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, coloureds were significantly 
over-represented as homicide victims, whereas whites were under-represented irrespective of 
their employment status. Also, Africans and Asians not gainfully employed were under-
represented as homicide victims (The CSS, 1991[ii]; The Ministry for Welfare and 
Population Development, 1995). 11 
Shooten' Characteristics 
Table 8.2.6: Shooters' Sexes x Race-Groups 
African shooter Coloured Asian shooter White 
Male shooter 262 (100%) 251 (98%) 9 (1000/o) 296 (98%1 
Female shooter 0 (0%) 4(2%) 0 (0%) s (2%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, African and white males were 
significantly over-represented as shooters, whereas African, coloured and white females were 
under-represented (The CSS, 1991[ii]). 12 
Table 8.2. 7: Shooters' Sexes x Age-G oups 
Child shooter Adolescent Adult shooter Elderly 
Male shooter · 2 (100%) 18 (95%) 861 (990/o) 12 (100%) 
Female shooter 0 (0%) 1 (5%) 8 (1%) 0 (0%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, adult males were significantly 
over-represented as shooters, whereas males under 19 and females of all ages were under-
represented (The CSS, 1991[ii]). 13 
II M = 17% (215). p < 0.01, X2 =1143.4, df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 26.5, 14.9, -5.4, -9., 
-9.1, -4.4. Treat with caution, the background statistic was a national estimate for 1995. 
12 P < 0.01, X2 = 1125.9, df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 19.7, 18.1, -8.6, -15, -9.9. 
Treat with caution, M = 40% (562) and 25% (2) of expected frequencies below five. 
13 P < 0.01, X2 = 2056.4, df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 38.4, -7, -9.3, -9, -15.4, -6.7. 
Treat with caution, M = 35% (487). 
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Table 8.2.8: Shooters' Sexes x Employment Status 
Shooter employed Shooter not employed 
Male shooter 569 (99"/o) 52 (96%) 
Female shooter 3 (1%) 3 (4%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, gainfully employed males were 
significantly over-represented as shooters, whereas females were under-represented 
irrespective of their employment status (The CSS, 199\[ii]~ The Ministry for Welfare and 
Population Development, 1995). 14 
Table 8.2.9: Shooters' Race-Groups x Age-Groups 
Child shooter Adolescent Adult shooter Elderly 
African shooter 0 (0%) 2 (11%) 230 (30%) 1 (SOA.) 
Coloured shoot. 1 (50%) 17 (89%) 230 (30%) 0 (0%) 
Asian shooter 0 (0%1 0 (0%) 9 (2%) 0 (0%) 
White shooter 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 288 (38%) 11 (92%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, adult Africans and whites were 
significantly over-represented as shooters, whereas Africans, coloureds and whites under 19, 
and coloureds and whites over 59 were under-represented (The CSS, 199l[ii]). 15 
Table 8.2.1 0: Shooters' Race-Groups x Employment Status 
Shooter employed Shooter not employed 
African shooter 105 (22%) 11 (20%) 
Coloured shooter 103 (22%) 27 (50%) 
Asian shooter 8 (2%) () (0%) 
White shooter 261 (54%) 16 (30%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, gainfully employed Africans, 
whites and Asians were significantly over-represented as shooters, whereas Africans, 
coloureds and whites not gainfully employed were under-represented (The CSS, 199l[ii]~ 
The Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, 1995). 16 
14 P < 0.01, X2 = 1638.7, df= I. Fwp < 0.01, z = 35.4, -15, -9.4. Treat with caution, 
M =55% (762) and the background statistic was a national estimate for 1995. 
15 P < 0.01, X2 = 739.9, df = 9. Fwp < 0.01, z = 13.9, 15.5, -4.5, -5.7, -7.5, -9.6, -5.7, -4.7, 
-4.9, -3. 7. Treat with caution, M = 43% (599). 
16 P < 0.01, X2 = 1207.5, df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 10.9, 4.3, 29, -6.6, -11.3, -7.6. Treat with 
extreme caution, M = 62% (858), 25% (2) of expected frequencies were below five and 
the background statistic was a national estimate for 1995. 
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Table 8.2.11: Victims' x Shooters' Sexes 
264 
Male shooter 
Male victim 858 (92%) 
Female victim 74 (8%) 
Female shooter 
7 (78%) 
2 (22%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, significantly more male victims 
than expected were killed by male and fewer by female shooters (The CSS, 1991 [ii]). 17 
Table 8.2.12: Victims' Sexes x Shooters' Race-Groups 
African shooter Coloured Asian shooter White 
Male victim 236 (900/o) 239 (94%) 8 (89%) 272 (900/o) 
Female victim 27 (10%) 16 (6%) 1 (11%) 29 (10%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, significantly more males than 
expected were killed by African and white shooters, whereas fewer females were killed by 
African, coloured and white shooters (The CSS, 1991 [ii]). 18 
Table 8.2.13: Victims' Sexes x Shooters' Age-Groups 
Child shooter Adolescent Aduh shooter Elderly 
Male victim 2 (100%) 18 (96%) 807 (92%) 5 (42%) 
Female victim 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 68 (8%) 7 (58%) 
Considering the composition of th  background population, significantly more males than 
expected were killed by adult shooters, whereas fewer males and females were killed by 
shooters under 19 and over 59 (The CSS, 1991 [ii]). 19 
Table 8.2.14: Victims' Sexes x Shooters' Employment Status 
Shooter employed Shooter not employed 
Male victim 542 (95%) 43 (78%) 
Female victim 31 (5%) 12 (22%) 
17 P < o.o1, X2 = 2339.9, df= 1. Fwp < o.o1, z = 42.1, -14.9. 
Treat with caution, M = 32% (448). 
18 P < o.o1, x2 = sss.2, df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 18.1, 16.1, -5.9, -14., -7.7. 
Treat with caution, M = 40% (561). 
19 P < o.o1, X2 = 1774.5, df= 3. Fwp < o.o1, z = 35.9, -9, -6.9, -5.2, -9.4, -9.1, -4. 9. 
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Considering the composition of the background population, significantly more males were 
killed by gainfully employed shooters than was expected (The CSS, 1991[iiL The Ministry 
for Welfare and Population Development, 1995). 20 
Table 8.2.15: Victims' Sexes x Whether Shooters Knew Victims 21 
Victim known Victim a stranger 
Male victim 181 (800/o) 521 (97%) 
Female victim 44 (200/o) 15 (3%) 
Table 8.2.16: Victims' Race-Groups x Shooters' Sexes 
Male shooter Female shooter 
African victim 470 (50%) 1 (11%) 
Coloured victim 405 (44%) 5 (56%) 
Asian victim 9 (1%) 0 (0%) 
White victim 48 (5%) 3 (33%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, significantly more African 
victims were killed by male shooters than was expected. However, fewer African and 
coloured victims were killed by female shooters, and fewer whites were killed by both sexes 
(The CSS, 199l[ii]).22 
Table 8.2.17: Victims' x Shooters' Race-Groups 
African shooter Coloured Asian shooter White 
African victim 240 (91%) 15 (6%) 1 (11%) 150 (49%1 
Coloured victim 12 (5%) 229 (90%) 6 (67%) 117 (39%) 
Asian victim 3 (1%) 3 (1%) 2 (22%) 1 (1%) 
White victim 8 (3%) 8 (3%) 0 (0%) 33 (11%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, significantly more Africans than 
expected were killed by African and white shooters, and fewer by coloured shooters. Also 
fewer coloured victims were killed by African shooters, and fewer whites were killed by 
African and coloured shooters (The CSS, 199 I [ii]). 21 
Treat with caution, M = 35% (481). 
20 P < o.o1, x2 = 1901, 1, df= 1. Fwp < o.o1, z = 10.1. 
Treat with extreme caution, M =55% (761). 
21 Treat with caution, M = 45% (628). 
22 p < o.o1, x2 = 1250.9, df= 4. Fwp < o.o1, z = 40.7, -9.4, -15.8, -6.6. 
Treat with caution, M = 32% (448). 
n 2 ·h P < 0.01, X = 2035.4, df= 9. Fwp < 0.01, z = 38.3, 17.4, -7.6, -7.9, -5.1, -10.1. Treat wtt 
extra caution, M = 40% ( 561) and 31% ( 5) of expected frequencies were below five. 
I 
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Table 8.2.18: Victims' Race-Groups x Shooters' Age-Groups 
Child shooter Adolescent · Adult shooter Elderly 
African victim 0 (00/0) 2 (II%) 445 (51%) 1 (8%) 
Coloured 1 (500/0) 17 (89%) 379 (43%) 5 (42%) 
Asian victim 0 (00/0) 0 (00/0l 9 (1%) 0 (00/0) 
White victim 1 (500/0) 0 (00/o) 42 (5%) 6 (500/0) 
Considering the composition of the background population, significantly more Africans than 
expected were killed by adult shooters and fewer by shooters under 19 years. Similarly, more 
coloureds were killed by adults and fewer by shooters aged over 59 or under 19 years (The 
CSS, 1991[ii]).24 
Table 8.2.19: Victims' Race-Groups x Shooters' Employment Status 
Shooter employed Shooter not employed 
African victim 305 (53%) 12 (22%) 
Coloured victim 250 (44%) 29 (53%) 
Asian victim 4 (1%) 0 (00/0) 
White victim 14 (2%) 14 (25%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, significantly more African and 
coloured victims than expected were killed by gainfully employed shooters. By contrast, 
fewer whites were killed irrespective of their shooters' employment status (The CSS, 
1991 [ii]~ The Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, 1995). 2' 
Table 8.2.20: Victims' Age-Groups x Shooters' Sexes 
Male shooter Female shooter 
Child victim 22 (2o/C!) 2 (22%) 
Adolescent victim 136 (15%) 0 (00/0) 
Adult victim 761 (82%) 7 (78%) 
Elderly victim 13 (1%) 0 (00/0) 
24 p < o.ot, x2 = 1746.2, df= 9. Fwp < o.ot, z = 35.9, 3.5, -5.8, -5.2, 6.7, -5.5, -7.6, 
-9.5. Treat with caution, M = 35% (351). 
2
' P < 0.01, x2 = 1940.1, df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 38.8, 10.7,-6.1, -8.7. 
Treat with extreme caution, M = 55% (761 ), 25% (2) of expected frequencies were 
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Considering the composition of the background population, significantly more victims aged 
between 13 and 59 than expected were killed by males, and fewer people of all ages were 
killed by female shooters (The CSS, 1991 [ii]). 26 
Table 8.2.21: Victims' Age-Groups x Shooters' Race-Groups 
African shooter Coloured Asian shooter White 
Child victim 7 (3%) 4(2%) 0 (00;0) 13 (4%) 
Adolescent 25 (100;0) 34 (13%) 0 (00;0) 60 (200;0) 
Adult victim 227 (86%) 215 (84%) 9 (100%) 222 (74%) 
Elderly victim 4 (2%) 2(1%) 0 (00;0) 6 (~lo) 
Considering the composition of the background population, significantly more adults and 
fewer children than expected, were killed by African and white shooters. Also, fewer 
children, adolescents and older adults than expected, were killed by coloured shooters (The 
CSS, 199l[ii]). 27 
Table 8.2.22: Victims' x Shooters' Age-Groups 
Child shooter Adolescent Adult shooter Elderly 
Child victim 1 (500/o) 0 (00/o) 23 (3%) 0 (0%) 
Adolescent 0 (00/o) - 3 (16%) 131 (15%) 0 (00/o) 
Adult victim 1 (500/0) 16 (84%) 714 (81%) 8 (67%) 
Elderly victim 0 (00/o) 0 (00/o) 7 (1%) 4 (33%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, significantly more adults than 
expected were killed by adult shooters, and fewer people of all ages were killed by shooters 
under 19 and over 59 (TheCSS, 1991[ii]). 28 
below five and the background statistic was a national estimate for 1995. 
26 P < o.o1, x2 = 1572.1, df= 3. Fwp < o.01, z = 31.8, 5.8, -6.2, -15.8, -9.3, -9.3. 
Treat with caution, M = 32% (448). 
27 P < 0.01, x2 = 527.7, df= 9. Fwp < o.o1, z = 15.1, 9.4, -4.2, -4.3, -8.8, -5.2, -5.7. 
Treat with extreme caution, M = 40% ( 561 }, and 25% ( 4) of expected frequencies 
were below five. 
28 P < 0.01, X2 = 1157.5, df= 9. Fwp < 0.01, z = 26.6, 4.3, -5.6, -5.6, -3.8, -5.6, -4.8, 
-3.6, -3.7, -3.6, -5.2. Treat with caution, M = 35% (481). 
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Table8.2.23: Victims' Age-Groups x Shooters' Employment Status 
Shooter employed Shooter not employed 
Child victim 18 (3%) 3(6%) 
Adolescent victim 105 (18%) 9(16%) 
Adult victim 448 (78%) 38 (690.4) 
Elder1v victim 2 (1%) 5(9%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, significantly more adults than 
expected were killed by gainfully employed shooters, and fewer people of all ages were 
killed by shooters not gainfully employed (The CSS, 199l[ii]; The Ministry for Welfare and 
Population Development, 1995). 29 
Table 8.2.24: Victims' Employment Status x Shooters' Sexes 
Considering the composition of the background population, more people than expected were 
killed by male shooters and fewer by females irrespective of their employment status (The 
Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, 1995; The CSS, 199l[ii]). 10 
Table 8.2.25: Victims' Employment Status x Shooters' Race-Groups 
African shooter 
Considering the composition of the background population, significantly more gainfully 
employed people than expected were killed by African shooters, and fewer people not 
gainfully employed were killed by coloured shooters (The Ministry for Welfare and 
Population Development, 1995; The CSS, 1991 [ii]). 11 
29 P < 0.01, X2 = 1503.2, df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 32, 11.5, -8.7, -7.6, -12.9, -5. 
Treat with extreme caution, M 55% (761) and the background statistics were national 
figures for 1995. 
30 P < 0.01, X2 = 788, df== 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 11.1, 17.2, -16.3, -10.15. 
Treat with extreme caution, M = 47% (653) and the background statistic was a national 
estimate for 1995. 
11 P < 0.01, X2 = 281.5, df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z 13.4, -9.18. 
Treat with extreme caution, M = 54% (754), 25% (2) of expected frequencies were 
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Table 8.2.26: Victims' Employment Status x Shooters' Age-Groups 
Child shooter Adolescent Adult shooter Elderly 
Vemployed 1 (500/o) 9 (69%) 361 (53%) 6 (55%) 
V not employed 1 (500/o) 4 (31%) 322 (47%) 5 (45%) 
Considering the composition of the background population, irrespective of their employment 
status, adults killed significantly more victims than expected, whereas shooters under 19 and 
over 59 years killed fewer people (The Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, 
1995; The CSS, 1991[ii]). 32 
Table 8.2.27: Victims' x Shooters' Employment Status 
Considering the composition of the background population, gainfully employed shooters 
killed significantly more people than expected, whereas shooters not gainfully employed 
killed fewer people (The Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, 1995; The CSS, 
1991[ii]). 33 
Lawfulness and General Characteristics 
Table 8.3.1: Lawfulness x Years - Justifiable, Criminal and Undetermined Firearm 
Homicides, 1984 - 1991 34 
Years Justifiable Justifiable Criminal Criminal Undeter. Und. Per 
Homicide per 100000 Homicide per 100000 Homicide 100000 
1984 30 2 20 1 9 1 
1985 90 6 37 2 27 2 
1986 62 4 33 2 40 3 
1987 31 2 46 3 23 2 
1988 28 2 38 2 15 1 
1989 45 3 45 3 30 2 
1990 57 3 63 4 40 2 
1991 46 3 52 3 72 4 
below five and the background statistic was a national estimate for 1995. 
32 P < 0.01, X2 = 604.3, df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 17.5, 5.1, -7, -5.6, -3.4, -9.1, -8.4, -5.1. 
Treat with extreme caution, M = 49% (680) and the background statistic was a national 
estimate for 1995. 
33 P < 0.01, X2 = 595, df= 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 10.8, 16.4, -11.7, -8.6. 
Treat with extreme caution, M = 65% (907) and the background statistic was a national 
estimate for 1995. 
34 Rates based on the estimated population of Cape Town. 
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Table 8.3.2: Lawfulness x Political Motivation 35 
Politically Motivated Not Political 
Justifiable homicide 100 (44%) 260 (46%) 
Criminal homicide 47 (20%) 209 (37%) 
Undetermined homicide 82 (36%) 97 (170/o) 
Table 8.3.3: Lawfulness x Number of Shooters 36 
Single shooter At least two shooters 
Justifiable homicide 351 (46%) 29 (39%) 
Criminal homicide 251 (33%) 26 (35%) 
Undetermined homicide 159 (21%) 19 (26%) 
Table 8.3.4: Lawfulness x Areas 37 
Black area White area Mixed area Non-residential 
Justifiable hom. 278 (36%) 82 (57%) 21 (41%) 7 (54%) 
Criminal hom. 256 (34%) 50 (35%) 23 (45%) 2 (15%) 
Undetermined 226 (30%) 12 (8%) 7 (14%) 4 (31%) 
Table 8.3.5: Lawfulness x Places 38 
Victim's home Victim's work Indoors Outdoors 
Justifiable hom. l3 (12%) 2 (5%) 73 (46%) 289 (58%1 
Criminal hom. 78 (72%) 34 (77%) 63 (40%) 95 (19%) 
Undetermined 17 (16%) 8 (18%) 23 (14%) 117 (23%) 
Table 8.3.6: Lawfulness x Whether Shooters Knew Victims 39 
Justifiable homicide 
Criminal homicide 
Undetermined homicide 
35 Treat with caution, M = 36% ( 442). 
36 Treat with caution, M = 32% (397). 
37 M = 22% (269). 
38 Treat with caution, M = 34% ( 425). 
39 Treat with caution, M = 45% (630). 
Victim known Victim a stranger 
54 (24%) 388 (73%) 
128 (56%) 75 (14%) 
45 (20%) 69 (13%) 
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Lawfulness and Victims' Characteristics 
Table 8.3.7: Lawfulness x Victims' Sexes 40 
Female victim 
Justifiable homicide 7 (8%) 
Criminal homicide 57 (670/o) 
Undetermined homicide 21 (25%) 
Male victim 
382 (43%) 
277 (31%) 
235 (26%) 
Given the composition of the background population, males were significantly over-
represented and females under-represented as victims of homicides irrespective of lawfulness 
(The CSS, 199l[ii]). 41 
Table 8.3.8: Lawfulness x Victims' Race-Groups 
African victim Coloured Asian victim White 
Justifiable hom. 190 (38%) 190 (46%) 2 (25%) 7 (14%) 
Criminal hom. 142 (28%) 148 (35%) s (63%) 39(76%) 
Undetermined 171 (34%) 79 (19%) 1 (12%) s (10%1 
Given the composition of the background population, Africans were significantly over-
represented and whites under-represented as victims of homicides irrespective of lawfulness 
(The CSS, 199l[ii]). Also, coloureds were significantly under-represented as victims of 
undetermined homicides. 42 
Table 8.3.9: Lawfulness x Victims' Age-Groups 
Child victim Adolescent Adult victim Elderly 
Justifiable hom. 4 (20%) 67 (52%) 315 (39%) 3 (17%) 
Criminal hom. 13 (65%) 33 (26%) 276 (34%) 12 (66%) 
Undetermined 3 (IS%) 28 (22%) 222 (27%) 3 (17%) 
Given the composition of the background population, adults were significantly over-
represented as victims of homicides irrespective of lawfulness. By contrast, older adults and 
children were significantly under-represented as victims of justifiable and undetermined 
homicides, whereas those under 19 were under-represented as victims of criminal homicides 
(The CSS, 199I[ii]). 43 
40 M = 21% (258). 
41 M = 21% (258). P < 0.01, X2 = 717.3, df= 2. Fwp < 0.01, z = 13.8, 9.8, 8.8, -13.6, 
-9.6, -8.7. 
42 M = 21% (258). P < 0.01, X2 = 791.8, df= 6. Fwp < 0.01, z = l3.S, 17.4, 10, -9.4, 
-7.5, -5.1. Treat with caution, 25% (3) of expected counts were below five. 
43 M = 21% (258). P < 0.01, X2 = 356.7, df= 6. Fwp < 0.01, z = 6.9, 6.8, 6.8, S, -8.1, 
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Table 8.3.10: Lawfulness x Victims' Employment Status 
Victim employed Victim not emplo_yed 
Justifiable homicide 126 (300/o) 157 (46%) 
Criminal homicide 168 (39%) 101 (29%) 
Undetermined homicide 131 (31%) 87 (25%) 
Given the employment rate in the background population, gainfully employed people were 
significantly over-represented as victims of criminal and undetermined homicides in this 
sample (The Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, 1995). 44 
Table 8.3.11: Lawfulness x Victims' Police Status 
Civilian victim 
Justifiable homicide 384 (41%) 
Criminal homicide 313 (33%) 
Undetermined homicide 249 (26%) 
Table 8.3.12: Lawfulness x Police Victims' Duty Status 
Victim on-duty 
Justifiable homicide 1 (8%) 
Criminal homicide 7 (58%) 
Undetermined homicide 4 (34%) 
Lawfulness and Characteristics of Shooters 
Table 8.3 .13: Lawfulness x Shooters' Sexes 
Female shooter 
Justifiable homicide 4 (45%) 
Criminal homicide 3 (32%) 
Undetermined homicide 2 (22%) 
Police victim 
5 (18%) 
17 (61%) 
6 (21%) 
Victim off-duty 
4 (27%) 
9 (600/o) 
2 (13%) 
Male shooter 
455 (500/o) 
311 (34%) 
154 (16%}_ 
Given the composition of the background population, males were significantly over-
represented and females under-represented as shooters in homicides irrespective of 
lawfulness (The CSS, 1991[ii]). 45 
-3.8, -6.6, -3.5, -6.3. 
44 M = 21% (258). P < 0.01, X2 = 118.5, df= 2. Fwp < 0.01, z = 6.5, 5.3. 
Treat with caution, the backfound statistic was a national estimate for 1995. 
45 M = 21% (258). P < 0.01, X = 929.4, df= 2. Fwp < 0.01, z = 15.3, 8.9, 12.7, 
-15, -8.7, -12.4. 
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Table 8.3.14: Lawfulness x Shooters' Race-Groups 
African shooter Coloured Asian shooter White 
Justifiable hom. 54 (21%) 88 (35%) 5 (56%) 246 (82%) 
Criminal hom. 135 (51%) 124 (4golo) 3 (33%) 36 (12%) 
Undetermined 74 (28%) 42 (16%) 1 (11%) 18 (6%) 
Given the composition of the background population, Africans were significantly over-
represented as shooters in criminal and undetermined homicides, whereas whites were over-
represented as shooters in justifiable homicides. By contrast, coloureds were significantly 
under-represented as shooters in justifiable and undetermined homicides, whereas whites 
were under-represented as shooters in criminal homicides (The CSS, 199l[ii]).46 
Table 8.3.15: Lawfulness x Shooters' Age-Groups 
Child shooter Adolescent Aduh shooter Elderly 
Justifiable hom. 1 (50%) 4 (21%) 448 (52%) 5 (42%) 
Criminal hom. 1 (50%) IS (7go/o) 267 (31%) 6 (SO%) 
Undetermined 0 (0%) 0 (00/o) 146 (17%) 1 (SOlo) 
Given the composition of the background population, adults were significantly over-
represented and people under 19 were under-represented as shooters in homicides 
irrespective of lawfulness. Also, older adults were significantly under-represented as shooters 
in justifiable and criminal· homicides (The CSS, 1991 [ii]). 47 
Table 8.3.16: Lawfulness x Shooters' Employment Status 
Shooter employed Shooter not employed 
Justifiable homicide 410 (73%) 10 (18%) 
Criminal homicide 74 (13%) 39 (72%) 
Undetermined homicide 79 (14%) 5 (100/o) 
Given the employment rate in the background population, gainfully employed people were 
significantly over-represented as shooters in homicides irrespective of lawfulness (The 
Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, 1995). 48 
46 P < o.ot, X2 = 534.55, df= 6. Fwp < o.ot, z = to.6, 9.4, 14.3, -8.5, -3.6, -4.8. 
Treat with extreme caution, M = 41% (563) and 25% (3) of expected frequencies 
were below five. 
47 P < 0.01, X2 = 620.9, df= 6. Fwp < 0.01, z = 12.4, 8.6, 7.2, -3.5, -5.1, -5.1, -9.2, 
-7.3, -5.3, -5.2, -3.5. Treat with caution, M = 36% (495). 
48 P < 0.01, X2 = 785.2, df= 2. Fwp < 0.01, z = 19.9, 4.7, 8.3. Treat with extreme caution, 
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Table 8.3.17: Lawfulness x Shooters' Police Status 49 
Police shooter 
Justifiable homicide 345 (79"/o) 
Criminal homicide 37 (8%) 
Undetermined homicide 55 (13%) 
Table 8.3.18: Lawfulness x Police Shooters' Duty Status so 
Shooter on duty 
Justifiable homicide 315 (85%) 
Criminal homicide 14 (4%) 
Undetermined homicide 43 (11%) 
Lawfulness and Characteristics of Shooters' Firearms 
Table 8.3.19: Lawfulness x Shooters' Handguns !H 
Handgun 
Justifiable homicide 290 (42%) 
Criminal homicide 254 (37%) 
Undetermined homicide 149 (21%) 
Table 8.3.20: Lawfulness x Automatic Status of Shooters' Guns ' 2 
Automatic guns Semi-automatic guns 
Justifiable homicide 11 (61%) 193 (55%) 
Criminal homicide 5 (28%) 109 (31%) 
Undetermined 2 (11%) 51 (14%) 
Table 8.3.21: Lawfulness x Shooters' Ammunition Type ' 3 
Bullets 
Justifiable homicide 313 (35%) 
Criminal homicide 336 (38%) 
Undetermined homicide 236 (27%) 
Civilian shooter 
109 (29%) 
192 (50%) 
80 (21%) 
Shooter off duty 
53 (61%) 
22 (25%) 
12 (14%) 
Long gun 
161 (60%) 
55 (20%) 
53 (20%) 
Non-automatic guns 
221 (52%) 
138 (32%) 
70 (16%) 
Pellets 
149 (61%) 
46 (19%) 
51 (20%) 
M = 56% (772) and the background statistic was a national estimate for 1995. 
49 Excluding 6 defence force members. Treat with caution, M = 41% (565). 
so M = 3% (12). 
'
1 Treat with caution, M = 31% ( 427). 
'
2 Treat with extreme caution, M = 42% (589). 
SJ M = 19% (258). 
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Table 8.3.22: Lawfulness x Shooters' Gun Licence Status 54 
Shooter's gun licensed Shooters' gun not licensed 
Justifiable homicide 415 (76%) 33 (200/o) 
Criminal homicide 64 (12%) 101 (61%) 
Undetermined homicide 69 (12%) 32 (19%) 
Lawfulness and Indicaton of Restraint 
Table 8.3 .23: Lawfulness x Minimum Force Indicators 55 
Justifiable Homicide Criminal Homicide Undetermined 
One shot 172 (46%) 115 (42%) 80 (52%) X> 
Identified as police 203 (71%) 9 (36%) 9 (27%):,-, 
Informed of arrest 14 (13%) I (33%) 0 (00/o) ' 11 
Oral warning 102 (27%) 27 (9%) 13 (13%) '~ 
Warning shot 98 (26%) 29 (10%) 23 (23%) bU 
Aiming at legs 69 (18%) 25 (8%) 14 (13%) ()I 
Alternatives b:l 210 (54%) 45 (15%) 35 (32%) b-' 
Table 8. 3.24: Lawfulness and Proportionality Indicators 64 
Justifiable Homicide Criminal Homicide Undetermined 
Dangerous victim 177 (50%) 35 (13%) 34 (32%)b' 
V threatened life 92 (25%) 16 (6%) 16 (15%) bb 
Not danger others 146 (39%) 85 (33%) . 25 (25%) b/ 
(1+2) or (1+3) 65 (21%) 10 (5%) II (13%) bll 
54 Treat with caution, M = 48% (663). 
55 Positives only. Percentages not column-wise, see denominators provided. 
56 Denominators (D)= 378, 274, 154 Treat with caution, M = 42% (583). 
57 D = 286, 25, 33. M = 23% (103). 
58 D=lll,3,ll.M=O. 
59 D = 380, 301,98. Treat with caution, M = 44% (606). 
60 D = 383, 304, 99. Treat with caution, M = 43% (598). 
61 D = 387, 302, 109. Treat with caution, M = 42% (590). 
62 The foot chase was the most common less-than-lethal alternative in justifiable and 
undetermined homicides, but the physical struggle was top in criminal homicides. 
63 D = 389, 300, 109. Treat with caution, M = 42% (590). 
64 Positives only. Percentages not column-wise, see denominators provided. 
65 D = 357, 271, 107. Treat with caution, M = 43% (593). 
66 D = 373, 284, 105. Treat with caution, M = 38% (475). 
67 D = 375, 261, 101. Treat with caution, M = 47% (652). 
68 D = 313, 208, 85. Treat with caution, M = 47% (652). 
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Justifiable Homicide Criminal Homicide 
Victims: 
- Adult 318 (82%) 288 (86%) 
- Armed 173 (58%) 47 (18%) 
- Armed with gun 42 (14%) 25 (90/c,) 
• - Threatened 272 (73%) 67 (24%) 
- Not fleeing'" 169 (50%) 226 (890/c,) 
! - Not shot in back 225 (61%) 263 (82%) 
- Crime suspect 346 (96%) 51 (20%) 
- Violent suspect 177 { 490/c,) 37 (15%) 
Lawfulness ud Charaeteristia of the Legal Process 
Table 8.3.25: Lawfulness x Types ofLegal Proceeding 78 
Inquest 
Justifiable homicide 363 (45%) 
Criminal homicide 228 (28%) 
Undetermined homicide 218 (27%) 
Table 8.3.26: Lawfulness x Types oflnquest 79 
Informal inquest 
Justifiable homicide 300 (43%) 
Criminal homicide 208 (30%) 
Undetermined homicide 190 (27%) 
Table 8.3.27: Lawfulness x Types ofTrial Court 80 
I Regional Magistrates' Court 
Justifiable homicide 9 (17%) 
Criminal homicide 34 (63%) 
Undetermined homicide 11 (20%) 
69 D = 389,334,256. M = 21% (258). 
70 D = 297,265, 104. Treat with caution, M = 42% (525). 
71 D = 297,265, 104. Treat with caution, M = 42% (525). 
72 D = 373,284,105. Treat with caution, M = 44% (547). 
Undetermined 
225 (88%) 0~ 
29 (28%) IU 
10 (10%) ll 
50 (48%) f:l. 
94 (78%) 74 
157 (73%) !:> 
58 (53%) f() 
34 (31%) 77 
Criminal trial 
26 (15%) 
106 (62%) 
38 (23%) 
Formal inquest 
63 (57%) 
20 (18%) 
28 (25%) 
Supreme Court 
17 (15%) 
72 {62%) 
27 (23%) 
71 Non-dangerous fleeing suspects in justifiable homicides, 36% (124). 
74 0=341,255, 121. Treatwithcaution,M=41%(510). 
75 D = 367, 322, 214. M = 27% (334). 
76 D = 361, 251, 110. Treat with caution, M = 40% ( 498). 
77 D = 361, 25I, II 0. Treat with caution, M = 40% ( 498). 
78 M = 21% (258). 
79 M=O. 
80 M=O. 
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Lawfulness x Shooters Prosecuted 
The majority, 63% (121), of the prosecuted were found criminally liable for the firearm 
homicides in which they had been involved. But 18% (35) were found to have committed 
justifiable homicides and the Courts were unable to reach a finding on lawfulness in the 
remaining 18% (34) of cases. Notably, 19"/0 (265) of shooters who perpetrated unlawful 
homicides were not charged or prosecuted, mainly because they were not identified or traced. 
Shooten' Motives and Legal Classifications 
The majority, 75% (38), of homicides shooters claimed were unintentional were found to be 
criminal homicides, most commonly unlawful unspecified (30%) and culpable homicides 
(25%)~ only 21% (13) were found to be accidental. The Courts were unable to make a finding 
in both homicides that were denied by the alleged shooters. The majority, 68% (202), of 
homicides shooters claimed were in self defence were ruled to be justifiable homicides, but 
19"/0 per cent (56) were found to be unlawful. The two most common findings were self 
defence (64%) and undetermined (13%). The Court upheld the shooter's motives in the only 
case of necessity. The majority, 83% (10), of homicides shooters claimed were in defence of 
property were found to be justifiable homicides, most commonly self defence (42%) and 
defence of property (33%). However, 17% (2) of these cases were ruled to be unlawful. The 
majority, 91% (159), of homicides shooters claimed .were to effect arrests were found to be 
justifiable homicides~ only two per cent (3) were ruled unlawful. The two most common 
findings were arrest (87%) and undetermined (7%). 
The majority, 64% (9), of shootings police shooters claimed were to disperse illegal 
gatherings were ruled to be justifiable homicides and none were found to be unlawful. Indeed 
only two findings were made in these cases: crowd dispersal (64%) and undetermined (26%). 
Furthermore, the Courts found all (16) homicides police shooters claimed were in the 
interests of public safety to be justifiable homicides and upheld shooters' motives in all cases 
of obedience to orders (2). 
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Shooters' Police Status and General Characteristics 
Table 8.4.1: Shooters' Police Status x Years - Gun Homicides by Civilian and Police 
Shooters, 1984-1991 81 
Years Police Shooters Police shooters Civilian Civilian 
per 100000 Shooters per 100000 
1984 23 2 27 2 
1985 128 8 43 3 
1986 74 6 51 3 
1987 37 2 54 3 
1988 32 2 29 2 
1989 44 3 67 4 
1990 62 4 49 3 
1991 47 3 66 4 
Table 8.4.2: Shooters' Police Status x Political Motivation 82 
Politically motivated shooting Shooting not political 
Police shooter 201 (84%) 217 (41%) 
Civilian shooter 38 (16%) 309 (59DA,) 
Table 8.4.3: Shooters' Police Status x Areas 83 
Black area White area Racially mixed Non-residential 
Police shooter 377 (59DA.) 51 (39%) 12 (25%1 6 (60%) 
Civ.ilian shooter 265 (41%) 79 (61%) 36 (75%) 4 (40%) 
Table 8.4.4: Shooters' Police Status x Places 84 
Victims' home V's workplace Inside Outside 
Police shooter 20 (24%) 4 (10%) 54 (39%) 344 (70%) 
Civilian shooter 64 (76%) 36 (90%) 83 (61%) 145 (30%) 
Table 8.4.5: Shooters' Police Status x Whether Shooter Knew Victims 85 
Victim known 
Police shooter 44 (20%) 
Civilian shooter 179 (80%) 
81 Treat with cautio~ M = 40% (550). 
82 Treat with cautio~ M = 44% (618). 
83 Treat with cautio~ M = 40% (553). 
84 Treat with cautio~ M = 46% (633). 
85 Treat with cautio~ M = 46% (645). 
Victim a stranger 
375 (72%) 
146 (28%) 
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Table 8.4.6: Shooters' Police Status x Number of Shooters 86 
Single shooter 
Police shooter 337 (54%) 
Civilian shooter 305 (46%) 
Sbooten' Police Status and Victims' Characteristics 
Table 8.4. 7: Shooters' Police Status x Victims' Sexes 
Male victim 
Police shooter 428 (56%) 
Civilian shooter 341 (44%) 
At least two shooters 
107 (63%) 
62 (37%) 
Female victim 
19 (300/o) 
45 (700/o) 
Given the composition of the background population, males were significantly over-
represented and females under-represented as victims of gun homicides by police and 
civilians (The CSS, 1991[ii]). 87 
Table 8.4.8: Shooters' Police Status x Victims' Race-Groups 
African victim Coloured victim Asian victim White victim 
Police shooter 268 (700/o) 176 (45%) 1 (12%) 2 (4%) 
Civilian 114 (300/o) 215 (55%) 8 (88%) 49 (96%) 
Given the composition of the background population, Africans were significantly over-
represented and whites under-represented as victims of homicides by police and civilian 
shooters. But coloureds were significantly under-represented as victims of police shooters 
(The CSS, 199l[ii]). 88 
Table 8.4.9: Shooters' Police Status x Victims' Ages-Groups 
Child victim Adolescent Adult victim Elderly 
Police shooter 14 (58%) 94 (71%) 337 (51%) 2 (18%) 
Civilian shooter 10 (42%) 39 (29%) 328 (49%) 9 (82%) 
Given the composition of the background population, those aged between 19 and 59 were 
significantly over-represented, whereas those over 59 were under-represented as victims of 
86 Treat with caution, M = 42% (583). 
87 P < o.o1, X2 = 630.6, df= 1. Fwp < o.o1, z = 11.1, 14.1, -13.8, -1o.s. 
Treat with caution, M = 400/o (550). 
88 P < 0.01, X2 =579.8, df= 3. Not significant for PSOs: P > 0.01, X2 = 7.7, df= 3. 
Fwp < 0.01, z = 4.8, 19.9, -10.6, -5.2, -4.2. Treat with caution, M = 40% (550). 
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homicides by both police and civilians. By contrast, those younger than 19 were significantly 
under-represented as victims of civilian shooters, whereas those younger than 13 were under-
represented as victims of police shooters (The CSS, 199l[ii]). 89 
Table 8.4.10: Shooters' Police Status x Victims' Employment Status 
Police shooter 
Civilian shoot 
Given the rate of employment in the background population, gainfully employed people were 
significantly over-represented as victims of homicides by civilian shooters (The Ministry for 
Welfare and Population Development, 1995). 90 
Table 8.4.11: Shooters' Police Status x Victims' Police Status 91 
Police victim 
Police shooter 6 (26o/o) 
Civilian shooter 17 (74o/o) 
Shooters' Police Status aod Other Characteristics 
Table 8.4.12: Shooters' Police Status x S~es 
Male shooter 
Police shooter 446 (55%) 
Civilian shooter 372 (45%) 
Civilian victim 
441 {55%) 
366 (45%) 
Female shooter 
0 (00/o) 
9 (100%) 
Given the composition of the background population, males were significantly over-
represented and females under-represented as shooters irrespective of their police status (The 
css, 199l[ii]). 92 
89 P < 0.01, X2 =274.7, df= 3. Not significant for PSOs: P>O.Ol, X2 = 2.6, df= 1. 
Fwp < 0.01, z = 8, 5.8, -4, -5.7, -3.7, -7.4, -7.7. Treat with caution, M = 40% (550). 
90 P < o.ot, x2 =60.2, df= 1. Fwp < o.ot, z = 5.8. 
Treat with extreme caution, M =53% (736) and the background statistic was a 
national estimate for 1995. 
91 M = 40% (550). Excluding nine defence force members. 
92 P<O.Ol,X2 =825.9,df= 1. Fwp<0.01,z= 13.5, 15.5,-13.3,-15.1. 
Including PSOs. P< 0.01, X2 = 26, df= 1. Fwp < 0.01, z = 3.6. 
Treat with caution, M = 40% (556). 
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Table 8.4.13: Shooters' Police Status x Race-Groups 
African shooter Coloured Asian shooter White 
Police shooter 85 (48%) 53 (22%) 0 (0%) 213 (72%) 
Civilian shooter 93 (52%) 191 (88%) 9 (100%) 84 (28%) 
Given the composition of the background population, whites were significantly over-
represented and coloureds under-represented among police shooters in this sample (The CSS, 
1991[ii]). 91 
Table 8.4.14: Shooters' Police Status x Age-Groups 
Child shooter Adolescent Adult shooter Elderly 
Police shooter 0 (00/o) 0 (00/o) 447 (57%) 0 (00/o) 
Civilian shooter 2 (1000/o) 19 (1000/o) 337 (43%) 12 (1000/o) 
Given the composition of the background population, adults were significantly over-
represented whereas people over 59 and under 19 were under-represented as shooters 
irrespective of their police status (The CSS, 1991[ii]). 94 
Shooten' Police Status aod Characteristics of Shooters' Firearms 
Table 8. 4.15: Police Status x Handguns 9s 
Handgun 
Police shooter 219 (42%) 
Civilian shooter 306 (58%) 
Table 8.4.16: Shooters' Police Status x Automatic Status of Guns 96 
Police shooter 
Civilian shooter 
Long gun 
210 (88%) 
30 (12%) 
91 P < 0.01, X2 = 285.25, df= 3. Not significant for PSOs: P > 0.01, X2 = 1.1, 
df= 3. Fwp < 0.01, z = 12.8, -9.9. Treat with caution, M = 47% (655). 
94 P < o.o1. X2 = 562.4, df= 3. Fwp< o.o1, z = 12.8, 9.3, -6, -9, -9.2, -5.9, -8.1. 
No tests for PSOs because they were adult by definition. 
Treat with caution, M = 41% (566). 
9s Treat with caution, M = 46% (619). 
96 Treat with caution, M = 500/o (693). 
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Table 8.4.17: Shooters' Police Status x Ammunition Type 97 
Bullets Pellets 
Police shooter 249 (41%) 198 (88%) 
Civilian shooter 360 (59%) 26 (12%) 
Table 8.4.18: Shooters' Police Status x Main Motives 98 
Accident Arrest Self Property Lawful Unlawful 
defence defence 
Police 14 (27'%) 156 (900/o) 170 (58%) 5 (45%) 51 (1000/o) 4 (4%) 
Civilian 38 (73%) 17 (100/o) 121 (42%) 6 (55%) 0(0%) 103 (96%) 
Shooten' Police Status and lndicaton of Restraint 
Table 8.4.19: Shooters' Police Status and Minimum Force Indicators 99 
Police Shooters Civilian shooters PSO shooters 
One shot 153 (47%) 147 (48%) 10 (40%) lUll 
Informed of arrest II (10%) I (6%) 0 (00/o) lUI 
Oral warning 83 (25%) 59 (18%) 8 (35%) lW 
Warning shot 85 (25%) 63 (19%) II (46%) lU.) 
Aiming at legs 58 (17%) 47 (14%) 5 (200/o) lU4 
Alternatives •u::~ 185 (53%) 101 (30%) 9 (36%) lUO 
97 Treat with caution, M = 40% (550). 
98 Treat with caution, M = 48% (669). Defences not applicable to civilians and those where 
N = I was excluded: crowd dispersal (14), maintaining public order (16), obedience to 
orders (2), necessity (1) and denial (1). The leading motive (75%) for PSO shooters was 
self defence. 
99 Positives only. Percentages not column-wise, see denominators provided. 
100 0 = 328,306,25. Treat with caution, M =54% (751). 
101 0= 111, 17,2.M=27%(47). 
102 D = 329, 335, 23. Treat with caution, M =51% (715). 
103 D = 33 5, 334, 24. Treat with caution, M = 51% (709). 
104 D = 346, 337, 25. Treat with caution, M = 50% (699). 
105 The foot chase was the most common less-than-lethal alternate means for police, 
civilian, and PSO shooters. 
106 D = 347, 336, 9. Treat with caution, M = 50% (699). 
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Table 8.4.20: Shooters' Police Status and Proportionality Indicators 107 
Police shooters Civilian shooters PSO shooters 
Dangerous victim 95 (270/o) 149 (II%) }4 (25o/o) lUIS 
V threatened life 89 (30%) 34 (47) 6 (64o/o) IU~ 
Shooting did not Ill (33%) 127 (41%) 8 (62%) llU 
endanger others 
(1+2) or (1+3) 50 (18%) 35 (13%) 3 (12%) Ill 
Victims: 
- Adult 339 (76%) 337 (870/o) 20 (77%) ll:l 
- Armed 166 (53%) 119 (38%) 16 (62%) 113 
- Armed with gun 54 (17%) 46 (15%) 2 (8%) 114 
- Threatened 236 (71%) 147 (46%) 17 (71%) m 
- Not fleeing 150 (42%) 254 (80%) 7 (28%) 116 
- Not shot in back 228 (56%) 297 (80%) NA 111 
- Crime suspect 370 (94%) 138 (42%) 19 (83%) 1115 
- Violent suspect 210 (53%) 81 (25%) 11 (48%) llY 
Shooten' Police Status and tbe Legal Process 
Table 8.4.21: Shooters' Police Status x Types ofLegal Proceeding 120 
Inquest Criminal trial 
Police shooter 412 (66%) 25 (13%) 
Civilian shooter 208 (34%) 173 (870/o) 
107 Positives only. Percentages not column-wise, see denominators provided. 
108 D = 315,320,22. Treat with caution, M =50% (688). 
109 D = 333, 318, 24. Treat with caution, M = 47% (586). 
110 D = 334, 309, 13. Treat with caution, M =53% (740). 
111 D = 272, 264, 26. Treat with caution, M = 53% (740) 
Ill D = 447, 386,26. Treat with caution, M = 41% (566). 
113 D = 316, 317, 26. Treat with caution, M = 50% (700). 
114 D = 316, 317, 26. Treat with caution, M = 505 (700). 
11s D = 333, 318, 24. Treat with caution, M = 50% (692). 
116 D = 356, 317, 25. Treat with caution, M =50% (693). 
117 D = 406, 371. Treat with caution, M = 44% (606). 
118 D = 395, 326, 23. Treat with caution, M = 45% (631). 
119 D = 395, 326, 23. Treat with caution, M = 45% (631). 
120 Treat with caution, M = 41% (565). 
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Table 8.4.22: Shooters' Police Status x Types oflnquest 121 
Informal inquest Formal inquest 
Police shooter 318 (65%) 94 (73%) 
Civilian shooter 173 (35%) 35 (27%) 
Table 8.4.23: Shooters' Police Status x Types of Trial Court 122 
shooter 
Table 8.4.24: Shooters' Police Status x Legal Classifications 123 
Police shooters Civilian shooters 
• Justifiable: 
- Accident 6 (2%) 7 (6%) 
- Arrest 141 (45%) 18 (I ']0/o) 
- Self defence 131 (42%) 66 (61%) 
- Property defence 0 (0%) 4 (4%} 
- Lawful unspecified 36 (llo/o) 13 (12%) 
Criminal: 
- Culpable homicide 5 (14%) 28 (15%) 
- Murder 9 (24%) 71 (370/o) 
- Unlawful unspecified 23 (62%) 92 (48%) 
Table 8.4.25: Shooters' Police Status x Shooters Convicted 124 
Convicted Acquitted 
1 Police shooter 15 (12%) 11 (13%) 
Civilian shooter 109 (8SO/o) 71 (87%) 
Table 8.4.26: Shooters' Police Status x Types of Homicide Conviction 125 
Police convicted 
Civilian convicted 
121 M= 23% (186). 
122M=O. 
Culpable homicide 
5 (15%) 
28 (85%) 
123 Treat with caution, M = 41% (565). 
Murder 
9 (11%} 
71 (89%) 
Defences not available to civilians and those with N = 1 were excluded: 
crowd dispersal (9), maintaining public order (18), obedience to orders ( 4), necessity ( 1 ). 
t24M=O. 
12.5M = 0. 
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Political Motivation and General Characteristics 
Table 8.5.1: Political Motivation x Years- Politically Motivated and Non-Political Firearm 
Homicides, 1984 - 1991 126 
Years Political Political hom. Non-political Non-political 
homicides per 100000 homicides Per 100000 
1984 2 0.1 46 3 
1985 84 5 66 4 
1986 34 2 72 5 
1987 14 1 80 5 
1988 12 1 59 4 
1989 32 2 85 5 
1990 28 2 92 5 
1991 78 4 128 7 
Table 8.5.2: Political Motivation x Number of Shooters 127 
Single shooter 
Politically motivated 189 (25%) 
Not political 574 (75%) 
Table 8.5.3: Political Motivation x Areas 128 
Black areas uY White areas 
Political 280 (400/o) 4 (6%) 
Not political 424 (600/o) 145 (94%) 
Table 8.5.4: Political Motivation x Places 130 
Victim's home 
Politically 13 (14%) 
Not political 83 (86%) 
126 M = 26% (325). 
127 Treat with caution, M = 33% (406). 
128 M = 27% (330). 
V' s workplace 
7 (17%) 
33 (83%) 
At least two shooters 
43 (6SO/o) 
20 (32%) 
Raciallv mixed Non-residential 
0 (00/o) 0(0%) 
42 (1000/o) 12 (1000/o) 
Indoors Outdoors 
10 (7%) 174(39%) 
131 (93%) 271 -(61%) 
129 Comprising African townships (234 political, 142 non-political) and coloured townships 
( 46 political and 282 non-political). 
130 Treat with caution, M == 42% (515). 
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CHAPTER NINE 
DISAGGREGATING ISSUES AND CLARIFYING PROBLEMS 
INTRODUCTORY RATIONALE 
A social problem can be defined in many ways, each formulation has a particular 
emphasis which implies certain kinds of interventions (Majchrzak, 1984). Gun-
related death, injury and crime are the main reasons that firearms have been 
considered socially problematic. Possession and use are the two key dimensions 
around which constructions of guns as a social problem have been framed. Firearms 
can be used in many ways and with various consequences. They can be effective 
weapons without actually being fired and their mere presence does not inevitably 
result in death or injury. For instance, confrontations can be defused and crimes 
committed using only the threat of a firearm to coerce compliance. Many people 
derive a sense of security by keeping guns which they never fire. So whilst the 
presence of a firearm is of course necessary for a shooting, it is not a sufficient 
condition; the crucial factor is whether a gun is fired. 
Nevertheless, it is possession that has prevailed as the focal issue in 
constructions of firearms as a social problem. Since the sixties an increased 
prevalence of guns has been singled out as a central cause of rising rates of crime 
and violence in numerous societies. Despite opposition, this approach has dominated 
policy in countries like the USA, Canada, Australia and South Africa. Policy 
interventions based on this formulation, generically referred to as gun control, have 
been designed to reduce civilian firearm ownership. The most common basic 
approach has been to legally limit private possession to people considered unlikely to 
abuse guns; 1 usually adults with no history of mental illness, criminal or violent 
behaviour, and to criminally sanction those who possess guns illegally and those who 
otherwise abuse firearms. Although a substantial amount of research has been 
conducted on the hypothesised causal link between private gun ownership and 
violence/crime, the knowledge yield has been somewhat effete, both in conceptual 
and operational terms. The accumulated research findings have shown that the mere 
presence of a gun is not necessarily the key determinant of gun-related 
crime/violence, 2 and that decreasing the prevalence of firearms is not a particularly 
effective intervention for reducing violence or serious crime.3 Most interventions 
1 Although the complete prohibition of private gun ownership has become more 
popular. 
2 This is not to say that the availability of guns has no effect on the probabili~ 
of injury and death, but that it plays a significant role only in certain 
circumstances like suicides and bar-room brawls. 
3 See Chapter Two. 
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have failed to diminish and maintain reduced levels of private gun ownership. Even 
when this bas been achieved, it has not significantly lowered rates of homicide, 
robbery or gun accidents. 4 Indeed, research has indicated that increased gun 
prevalence is more likely to be a consequence than a cause of heightened crime and 
violence (e.g. Turner & Leyens, 1992).' Whatever the relationship between these 
variables, it is neither simple nor direct (Wright et al, 1983). A complex interplay 
of individual, situational, organisational, community factors and broader social 
forces determine whether a shot is fired (Fyfe, 1981[c]). 
The conventional gun control approach is still dominant in South Africa in the 
mid-nineties; clearly evident in popular and academic discourse and in current state 
interventions.' Violence bas not abated significantly since the Apartheid State was 
replaced and there bas been an upward trend in the crime rate. An increased 
prevalence of illegal guns bas been cast as a key determinant, and illegal possession 
and firearm crime have been prioritised in the National Crime Prevention Strategy 
(NCPS). Since 1994 a politically powerful prohibitionist organisation bas been 
developing and a public gun-control-controversy has been taking shape. Indeed, the 
nineties have seen the issue of firearms brought to the fore as a leading social 
problem in this country and it is worrying to find that gun prevalence is still being 
cast as the problem in relation to rising crime/violence. For this fundamental 
assumption bas failed to achieve even reasonable empirical support, despite 35 years 
of research effort, and interventions derived from this conception have been notably 
ineffectual at reducing serious forms of violence and crime, like homicide and 
robbery, which are the most common violent offences committed with firearms in 
South Africa. 7 
The current era of reconstruction and development constitutes a critical 
juncture for the refashioning of social problems. Hence, refraining firearms as a 
social problem was embraced as the guiding objective of this work. The research 
was purposely focused on gun use instead of possession or prevalence, and set out to 
examine whether, and in what respects, the use of firearms was problematic. This 
involved a systematic disaggregation of a complex set of issues in order to construct 
an alternate empirically based conception of the problems posed by firearms in the 
context of contemporary South Africa; hopefully one that will inform interventions 
that are effective at reducing gun-related violence. 
4 Although it has decreased the rate of gun suicide and in some cases aggravated 
assaults. 
5 This accounts for the strong positive correlation between the variables. 
6 See Chapter Three. 
7 According to conviction rates. See Table 3.9. 
• 
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FIREARMS AS A CAUSE OF DEATH 
It is important to view the threat posed by firearms in relation to other comparable 
threats. In South Africa, as in the USA, firearms have been one of the leading 
causes of non-natural death for some time. 8 In the local jurisdiction of metropolitan 
Cape Town guns have been one of the top four causes of non-natural deaths, at least 
since the mid-seventies. But transport accidents and sharp injuries have long been 
the two leading causes. In other words, motorised vehicles and sharp objects have 
constituted greater threats to public safety than guns.9 
What is noteworthy is the growing role that firearms have played as a cause of 
non-natural death, particularly since the mid-eighties. Between 1984 and 1994 the 
percentage of non-natural fatalities resulting from firearms increased while the 
proportions due to transport accidents and sharp and blunt injuries declined. 10 Over 
this same period, surpassing blunt injuries, firearm injuries became the third leading 
cause of non-natural death in Cape Town. Furthermore, the annual rate of firearm 
fatalities increased substantially between 1984 and 1991 , rising from seven to 17 
deaths per 100000 people p.a. and reaching 20 per 100000 p.a. by 1994.u The 
upward trend in gun deaths in this area over the 10 y ars since 1984 has been 
produced by a substantial growth in firearm homicides; from five to 15 deaths per 
1 ()()()()() people p. a. 12 
The temporal pattern evident in Cape Town also characterised South Africa as 
a whole, although the growth-gradient for the nation was not quite as steep. The 
annual national rate of firearm fatalities rose from five to 12 per 100000 p.a. 
between 1984 and 1991; with the rate o(gun homicides increasing from three to 10, 
while the firearm suicide rate stayed at around two per 100000 p.a. 13 Notably, 
however, the rate of gun death in Cape Town was consistently higher than the 
national rate at this time, averaging 11 and six fatalities per 100000 p.a. resp. 14 
Interestingly, in 1986, the Cape Town rate of 11 firearm fatalities per 100000 p.a. 
was closer to the North American rate of 14 than it was to the South African rate of 
five.u 
8 About 80% of deaths each year are due to natural causes, see The CSS 
(1993[i]). 
9 See Table 3.5. 
10 See Table 3.5. 
II See Table 7.1. and The MRC (1995) resp. 
12 While the gun suicide rate remained at around two per 100000 p.a, see Tables 
7.5 and 7.2 resp. 
13 See Table 3 .I. 
14 See Tables 7.1 and 3.1. 
15 See Table 7. I, Time Magazine (17 July 1989 :29) and Table 3 .I. resp. 
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UNINTENTIONAL FATAL SHOOTINGS t6 
Prevalence 
Accidental shootings accounted for a tiny proportion (one per cent) of firearm 
fatalities that occurred in Cape Town between 1984 and 1991. Relatively speaking, 
there was one unintentional fatal shooting to every 25 firearm suicides and every 94 
intentional firearm homicides. Indeed there were only 13 fatal gun accidents in this 
area over the entire eight year period, 17 which amounted to an average rate of 0.1 
deaths per 100000 people p.a. -- literally one in a million! The average annual rate 
of death from firearm accidents in Cape Town was lower than the average for South 
Africa over this period; 0.1 and 0.4 per 100000 resp. However, after 1988 the 
annual national mortality rate for unintentional shootings decreased markedly, 
dropping to 0.1 per 100000 in 1990, and remained at this low level throughout 1991 
and 1992. 1• 
During the mid.-eighties fatal firearm accidents seemed to be a more significant 
cause of gun death in South Africa than in the USA .19 However, this apparent 
difference may no longer be present as the rate of fatal gun accidents in this country 
declined between the mid.-eighties and the early nin ties;20 the five year national 
average rate fell from 0.5 to 0.2 per 100000 p.a. and the proportion of firearm 
fatalities due to accidents decreased from nine to three per cent. 21 From the 
available data there was a key difference between the high risk groups in South 
Africa and North America:22 whites were a vulnerable victim-group in South Africa, 
including Cape Town, but not in the USA where black people were at greater risk 
(McDowall & Loftin, 1986). However, a similar age-group was most at risk in both 
of these countries, namely 15 to 29 year olds in the RSA and 15 to 34 year olds in 
the USA (The CSS, 1986[i], 1986 [ii]; McDowall & Loftin, 1986 resp.). 
Furthermore, accidental shootings were responsible for a substantially lower 
proportion of gun deaths among the Cape Town police (0) than among the North 
American police (25%), at least in the early nineties (e.g. Behm, 1992). 
Characteristics 
Whites (42%), males (92%) and adults (92%) were over-represented as perpetrators 
of unintentional fatal shootings in Cape Town between 1984 and 1991. Although 
16 Due to the very limited number of cases the statistical significance of findings 
from unintentional shootings were not established. 
17 Given the very limited sample size a temporal analysis was not conducted. 
18 See Table 3.1. 
19 Accounting for an average of nine per cent of ftrearm fatalities in the RSA 
between 1983 and 1987 and two per cent in the USA in 1986. The 1986 figure 
for the RSA was not used, because in that year the level of firearm accidents 
was unusually high. See Table 3.3, Turner and Leyens (1992) resp. 
20 After a marked peak in the rate in 1987 and 1988. 
21 See Tables 3.1 and 3.3 resp. 
22 At least during the mid-eighties. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
296 
civilians and police were responsible for a similar number of these shootings, 23 
police officers were over-represented as perpetrators of fatal firearm accidents 
considering the relative size of this group in the background population. It was 
predominantly (83%) on-duty officers who were involved in this kind of shooting. 
Handguns were most frequently employed, with semi-automatic pistols typical (83%) 
among police, and revolvers (43%) and pistols (43%) equally common among 
civilians. Licensed firearms were used in all of the unintentional shootings . 
perpetrated by police officers whilst civilians employed similar numbers of 
unlicensed (57%) and licensed (43%) guns. 
Adults (85% ), males (92%) and civilians (92%) were the most likely victims 
of unintentional fatal shootings in this sample. It was particularly encouraging to 
find that children were not at increased risk of such shootings, as this has been the 
case in various countries (e.g. Kopel, 1993). Both the under 13 and under 19 age-
groups were under-represented in this Cape Town sample. Over the eight year 
period there were only two fatal gun accidents involving seven and 11 year old 
victims. Considering their representation in the background population, Africans 
and whites were also over-represented as victims of fatal gun accidents in this 
sample. u Furthermore, Africans were at greater risk from police shooters and 
whites were more likely to fall victim to civilian shooters.2!1 
The profile of victims of unintentional fatal shootings in Cape Town was 
similar to the victim profile for South Africa as a whole in that males and whites 
were high-risk groups in both of these jurisdictions.26 However, the local victim 
profile differed from the national profile in so far as it was Africans not c~loureds, n 
and those aged between 21 and 40 rather than 15 and 29, who were more prone to 
fatal gun accidents in this city. 
Most (57%) of the fatal firearm accidents involving civilian shooters took place 
at victims' homes and involved friends and family as shooters. This was one of the 
ways in which privately owned guns constituted a threat to significant others in the 
home. By contrast, the unintentional shootings perpetrated by police officers 
occurred in various locations and generally involved strangers (67% ). A qualitative 
examination of the circumstances in which these unintentional shootings took place 
revealed three key precipitating scenarios: (1) a gun going off during a physical 
struggle for possession of the weapon (46%); (2) a bystander being shot when police 
fired at a fleeing suspect (23%); and (3) a bystander being shot when a gun went off 
unexpectedly while being handled (23% ). The first type of occurrence was common 
23 That is, seven and six deaths resp. and one by a PSO. 
24 That is, 23% (3) Africans, 46% (6) coloureds and 31% (4) whites. 
25 That is, 50% (3) and 57% (4) resp. 
26 See Table 3.4. 
27 Noteworthy because a particularly high proportion of the coloured popula~on 
were resident in Cape Town due to the coloured labour preference policy 
applied in this area under Apartheid. 
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in unintentional shootings perpetrated by both civilians and police. But the second 
characterised accidental shootings perpetrated by police (50%) and the third by 
civilians (43%). 
However, these lawful unintentional shootings comprised only 25% of the 
incidents that shooters claimed had been unintentional; the Courts found the other 
7 5% to be unlawful. Interestingly, there was some overlap in the main precipitants 
of these two categories of accidental shooting: (1) a bystander shot when a gun being 
handled went off unexpectedly (69%); (2) a bystander shot iri crossfire between two 
other parties (17%); (3) a gun going off during a physical struggle for possession of 
the weapon (7%). A notable difference was that the unlawful gun accidents involved 
a much lower proportion { 13%) of police officers than the lawful accidents ( 46%). 
Problematic Aspects and Suggested Interventions 
In the context of Cape Town between 1984 and 1991, gun accidents were 
insignificant as a cause of death when viewed in relation to intentional firearm 
homicides and suicides. Unintentional shootings accounted for a consistently low 
proportion (one to two per cent) of gun deaths across various groups of victims: 
males and females; adults, youths and children; Africans, coloureds and wbites;:z• 
police and civilians. Similarly, fatal firearm accidents did not constitute a significant 
problem in the country as a whole at this time; the already low annual national rate 
was characterised by a downward trend. However, a finer-grained analysis of fatal 
gun accidents in Cape Town .over this eight year period revealed the following 
problematic issues: (1) on-duty police officers were over-represented as perpetrators 
of unintentional fatal shootings; (2) most police victims were innocent third parties, 
killed during officers' attempts to arrest fleeing suspects; and (3) civilians frequently 
killed others unintentionally by handling their guns in an unsafe manner. 
Any over-representation of police as perpetrators of unintentional fatal 
shootings is an issue worth addressing. The public often view such incidents as 
indicative of a lack of restraint which can lower confidence in the police and reduce 
co-operation by civilians. It has also been argued convincingly that the police ought 
to serve as role models for the proper use of firearms (e.g. Kleck, 1986[a]). It is 
thus felicitous for police managers to ensure that unintentional shootings by officers 
are kept to a minimum. In the USA perceived racism in police practice has had 
highly destructive consequences.29 This sample of fatal gun accidents did nothing to 
dispel the presumption of police racism on the part of the SAP: all victims were 
black and white officers were over-represented as perpetrators. Furthermore, in the 
bulk of the unintentional shootings by police, officers killed innocent bystanders by 
firing at fleeing suspects. These incidents were clear violations of the law,30 not to 
28 None of the victims or perpetrators of these shootings were Asian. 
29 See Chapter Four. 
30 In 1987 it was established in South African case-law that, shooting to effect an 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
298 
mention the underlying principle of proportionality. It is thus alarming to find that 
these shootings were deemed to be lawful! Similarly, despite the fact that it was an 
offence to handle a firearm in an unsafe manner at this time and that this was the 
cause of almost half of the unintentional shootings by civilians in this sample, the 
Courts still justified these incidents as accidental. This seems to indicate some 
leniency in the application of legal requirements for the safe-keeping/handling of 
firearms. 
The period after 1991 was not examined directly in this study. It is, therefore, 
important that unintentional shootings be monitored in the contemporary context. 
After all, the aspects revealed as problematic by this investigation may no longer be 
the key issues. For instance, the victim and perpetrator profiles have probably 
changed as whites no longer constitute a majority in the police force or among 
civilian gun owners. Also gun accidents may have increased in South Africa since 
1991. A lack of training and experience in the safe-handling of gu s was found to 
heighten the risk of gun accidents in the USA and Canada (e.g. McDowall&. Loftin, 
1986; Stenning &. Moyer, 1981). And in this country there has been a sudden 
growth in the number of new gun owners, many of whom lack training and 
experience in handling firearms (e.g. The Sunday Independent, 6 October 1996). 
Under these circumstances the following basic preventative measures would seem 
prudent: compulsory standardised training for gun licence applicants and regular 
refresher courses for licensees. 31 Firearm licensees should be required to renew their 
licences every two to three years and one of the criteria ought to be proof that a 
licensee has completed a minimum period of shooting practice each month at a 
suitable venue. The borrowing of firearms by unlicensed persons should be 
oudawedJ2 and temporary possession of guns by those without gun licences should 
be permitted only for the purposes of training and under the direct supervision of a 
qualified instructor. 
In view of the current community-assisted style of policing in South Africa, 
which depends upon a high level of public support, even a small number of 
controversial unintentional police shootings could undermine working relations 
between police and the communities they serve. This study suggested that the Courts 
had not strictly enforced the legal restriction against police endangering bystanders 
when shooting at suspects. It would therefore seem advisable to include an explicit 
requirement to this effect in the regulations governing the use of deadly force by the 
SAPS and PSOs. The relative threat that crime prevention poses to innocent 
members of the public must also be taken into account in reforming the law 
arrest or prevent an escape was not legally justifiable if a third party was 
foreseeably endangered. See Dendy (988) and Knobel (1988). 
31 See Hansson (1996) for details. 
32 Such temporary possession has been permitted under Section 8 of The Arms & 
Ammunition Act 75 of 1969 as amended. 
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governing arrest and the prevention of escape. To conclude, up-to-date monitoring 
of unintentional shootings in the South African context is imperative. However, it is 
all shots fired unintentionally that ought to be examined and not just those that prove 
fatal, for differences in outcome constitute differences in problems and interventions. 
FIREARM SUICIDES 
Prevalence 
In Cape Town the annual mortality rate due to firearm suicides remained stable 
between 1984 and 1991 at around two deaths per 100000, but the relative 
significance of suicides as a cause of firearm fatalities declined markedly." From 
the mid-eighties the ratio of firearm suicides to homicides decreased from one in one 
to one in four. 34 Although homicides were clearly a more significant cause of gun 
death, suicidal shootings accounted for a substantial 20% of firearm fatalities that 
occurred in this area." Furthermore, guns have long been the key means of suicide 
in Cape Town and in the country as a whole, generally accounting for around a third 
of all suicides. )6 However, firearms played their biggest role in suicides during the 
early nineties: the proportion of suicides perpetrated with guns rose from 26% in 
1989, to 41% and 37% in 1990 and 1991 resp, but by 1992 this percentage had 
returned to the pre-war level of29%.n 
During the period in question, the average annual rate of firearm suicides in 
Cape Town was the same as the average for South Africa, and neither of these rates 
fluctuated greatly .31 Yet suicide seems to have been less significant as a cause of 
firearm fatalities in this city than it was nationally at the time: whilst suicides 
accounted for an average of 32% of firearm fatalities nationwide, the local average 
was only 20%." This difference no longer exists because the proportion of suicides 
attributable to firearms in South Africa dropped by 29% after 1984 and in 1992 
suicides comprised only 12% of gun deaths. 40 It seems that homicide overshadowed 
suicide as a eause of firearm death, both at micro- and macro-levels. In the mid-
eighties the rate of firearm suicide in the USA was the highest in the world, at eight 
per 1()()()()() p.a, while South Africa had a substantially lower rate of two.41 At this 
time suicide was more significant as a cause of firearm fatalities in the 
33 See Table 7.2. 
34 And this was still the case as recently as 1994. See Table 3.6 and The MRC 
(1995). 
35 See Table 7 .2. 
36 See Table 3.2. 
37 See Table 3.2. 
38 That is, two per 100000 p.a. See Table 3.1. 
39 See Table 3.3. 
40 See Table 3.3. 
41 See Table 3.1. and Time Magazine (17 July 1989). 
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USA (55%) than it was in the RSA (37%). 42 By contrast, the rate of suicide among 
the SAP was generally higher than among the North American police (e.g. Behm, 
1992; Geller & Scott, 1992).43 
Characteristics 
Males, whites, adults, police officers and people who were gainfully employed, 44 
were the groups most prone to firearm suicide in Cape Town between 1984 and 
1991. Suicides were responsible for a relatively low proportion of gun deaths among 
all race-groups other than whites for whom suicide was the leading cause of firearm 
fatalities. The comparable figures were: 52% for whites, 17% for Asians, six per 
cent for coloureds and two per cent for Africans. It was promising to find that 
children and adolescents were under-represented as suicide victims in this sample 
(6%) and that suicides were responsible for a lower proportion of gun deaths among 
the youthful than among adults. While adults were over-represented as victims of 
gun suicide, those aged between 26 and 45 were most vulnerable to suicide by this 
method. Notably, older adults were the only age-group in which suicide was the 
leading cause of ftrearm fatalities, and those aged between 63 and 75 were 
particularly prone. 
In Cape Town, as in many jurisdictions, police officers were more likely to 
commit suicide using firearms and suicides accounted for a higher proportion of gun 
deaths among police (37%) than civilians (19%). This also appeared to be the case 
countrywide (The Commissioner of the SAP, 1993). By comparison, the PSOs in 
this study were not characterised by an elevated risk of gun suicide. In fact suicides 
appeared to be a less significant cause of gun death among PSOs ( 12%) than for 
police and civilians in general. 4' 
From the mid-eighties to the early nineties males, whites and police officers 
were high risk groups for gun suicides, both locally and nationally. 46 In South 
Africa as a whole, however, a younger age-group (20 to 39) were vulnerable to this 
kind of suicide (The CSS, 1984[i] to 199l[ii])Y In Cape Town th~re was a higher 
percentage of coloured and a lower percentage of African victims than in the country 
42 See Table 3.3. and Time Magazine (17 July 1989). 
43 At its peak in 1992 the suicide rate for the SAP was 83 per 100000 p.a. as 
compared to 17 for police in the USA (The Commissioner of the SAP, 1993; 
Geller & Scott, 1992 resp). 
44 The fact that these three groups were over-represented increases the plausibility 
of the statistically questionable finding that the gainfully employed were over-
represented as suicide victims. 
45 These deductions should be treated with caution as there were only four PSO 
suicides in the sample. 
46 See Table 3.4 and The Commissioner of the SAP (1993). 
47 And not those aged between 26 and 45, 63 and 75, as was the case in Cape 
Town. 
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as a whole. 41 In addition, the proportion of females who died in gun suicides was 
lower and the proportion of males was higher in Cape Town than it was in South 
Africa.49 
The victims in this sample tended to commit suicide in their homes. This 
included police officers and PSOs, the bulk of whom shot themselves while off 
duty."' Most victims did not drink alcohol before committing suicide but those who 
did tended to consume large quantities. The majority shot themselves once in the 
side or front of the head and did not foreseeably endanger anyone else in doing so. 
Handguns and live ammunition were typical, particularly 0.38 inch revolvers and 
9mm semi-automatic pistols. Fully-automatic firearms were rarely employed in 
suicides and the two victims who used such guns had access because they were 
members of the defence forces. In designing interventions it is crucial to know 
where people obtain the guns they use to commit suicide. Unfortunately this study 
did not enable many dependable conclusions in this respect. Even the most basic 
information - whether victims were in legal possession of the firearms they used --
was missing for 51% of the suicide cases. What did emerge was that a high 
proportion (67%) of the adolescents in this sample committed suicide using guns that 
were licensed to their parents and kept in their homes. 
In some cases reasons for suicide were given mainly in suicide notes or as post-
hoc attributions by significant others. Since the reliability of these data is 
questionable, the following comments are speculative." The top three reasons 
provided for gun suicides in this sample were: (1) depression and/or alcohol 
dependency (37%), (2) serious illness and/or disability (27%), and (3) problems in 
intimate relationships (25%). The key reasons differed across social groups: for 
instance, the leading reason for police suicides was difficulty in intimate 
relationships, but it was depression/alcohol dependency among civilians, serious 
illness/disability among older people, and depression/alcohol dependency among 
adolescents and adults. 
During the mid-eighties in South Africa there was heightened publicity on the 
phenomenon known as family murder; when a perpetrator sets out to kill his/her 
spouse and children and then commits suicide (Graser, 1992, 1987). Only a small 
proportion (6%) of firearm suicides in this study were murders followed by 
suicides, ' 2 and those involving intimate partners rather than whole families were 
more common.'3 Males were the key perpetrators of family murder-suicides (71 %) 
48 That is, 11% and four per cent, four and eight per cent resp. See Table 3.4. 
49 That is, 16% and 20%, 84% and 80% resp. See Table 3.4. 
50 It is logical that most gun suicides occurred in white residential areas because 
the majority of victims were white and committed suicide in their homes. 
51 Particularly, since 4 7% ( 148) of these data were missing. 
52 That is, 19 cases. 
53 That is, 50% involved intimates, 33% families and 17% friends. See Vetten 
( 1995) on intimate homicides in Gauteng. 
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and intimate murder-suicides (100%),s.c and whites were over-represented as victims 
and perpetrators in both of these kinds of shootings." There was also some 
indication that murder-suicides were more significant among police officers, 
accounting for 13% of the police and only five per cent of the civilian suicides. 
Problematic Aspects and Suggested Interventions 
This study revealed two key problematic issues in relation to firearm suicides in 
Cape Town during the latter half of the eighties. Suicides accounted for a sizable 
proportion of gun deaths and many might have been averted by timeous and 
appropriate intervention. Unfortunately, given the high level of method substitution 
in suicide, merely decreasing access to guns is unlikely to substantially reduce the 
overall suicide rate. However, it is likely to lower the rate of gun suicide. In 
particular, firearms in the home appear to increase the risk of gun suicide among 
residents, and especially adolescents (Kellerman et al, 1992, Brent el al, 1991).• 
And although a person without a gun who feels suicidal is likely to resort to alternate 
means, some of the substitutes may be less likely to cause death. With shooting 
there is rarely a second chance.n Hence, while it seems logical to reduce gun 
availability in order to diminish firearm suicides, this should not be the sole or main 
emphasis in suicide prevention. Attention should be directed toward lowering the 
overall rate of suicide. 
In Cape Town firearms are the suicide method of choice and this study 
highlighted the depressed, alcohol dependent and elderly people who were seriously 
ill or disabled as being at particularly high risk of firearm suicide: Some of the 
suicide victims in this sample used their own licensed guns whilst some employed 
firearms that belonged to others, usually those with whom they were living. 
At this time, the kind of legislative provisions that bad proven most effective in 
the USA were already in place in South Africa: our Arms and Ammunition Act 
prohibited gun possession by anyone dependent on alcohol or narcotics or suffering 
from a mental condition. By 1995 those who bad threatened or expressed intention 
to kill themselves or others bad also been excluded from lawful ownership. 
Nevertheless, a number of victims in this sample committed suicide using their own 
licensed firearms, even though they should have been declared unfit to possess these 
weapons. This suggests a laxity in law enforcement and a need to improve the 
rigour of background checks on gun licence applicants. Requiring people to renew 
their gun licences regularly and conducting up-nrdate background checks for this 
purpose could bring to light critical changes in the mental health of gun owners. 
54 Plus eight intimate homicides involving shooters who did not commit suicide. 
55 All of the family murders involved only white shooters and victims, while 86% 
of the intimate murder-suicides involved white shooters and victims. 
56 See Chapter Two. 
51 Similar to jumping from a substantial height. 
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More specifically, routine retesting might also reduce the likelihood of suicide 
among the high-risk group of people over 59, for some older gun owners may 
choose to give up their firearms when confronted with the hassle of regular testing. 
Furthermore, advanced age is often accompanied by a deterioration in physical and 
mental prowess which may also diminish the chances of this group passing 
competency tests. The introduction of such testing indirectly introduces a cooling-
off-period which may avert some impulsive suicides by increasing the time it takes to 
obtain a gun licence. Outlawing the lending of licensed guns could also deter 
suicidal persons from gaining quick access to firearms. For the same reason the 
temporary unlicensed possession of guns should only be permitted under qualified 
supervision during training. 
It is worrying to note that most victims who suffered from depression and 
alcohol dependency in this sample managed to kill themselves despite others being 
aware that they were at high risk.s• Frequently friends and family, rather than 
professionals, are best-placed to avert suicides. Suicidal intent is often transient and 
people usually attempt to kill themselves when they are at their lowest ebb. Timeous 
delays that enable subsequent therapeutic intervention can prevent many suicides. 
Therefore, public education on suicide and the risks associated with guns should be 
afforded some priority in suicide prevention programmes. Mental health workers 
should also be trained to routinely caution people close to high-risk clients to remove 
firearms from their immediate environment, and to advise that the police can be 
called upon to confiscate guns if necessary.B 
The greater stringency that is currently required of licensees in safe-keeping 
their firearms may have lessened illegal access to licensed guns. Considering that 
the bulk of children and adolescents who commit suicide with firearms acquire these 
weapons in their homes, the following additional precautions would seem 
appropriate: when stored, privately owned guns should be unloaded and secured with 
child-proof trigger locks or safety catches, and ammunition should be kept separately 
from firearms. It has been emphasised, however, that it is safest not to have a gun 
in the home because, even when locked away, firearms significantly increase the risk 
of suicide, especially for adolescents (Brent et al, 1991). Of course a more heavy-
handed approach would be to prohibit privately owned guns from being kept in 
homes. 60 This would seem inadvisable in contemporary South Africa considering 
the widespread insecurity and perceived need for self protection which would 
probably lower compliance and render such a prohibition ineffective. 
The police were identified as one of the groups prone to suicide in this study. 
In other countries an elevated suicide risk among police has been attributed to the 
58 
59 
60 
That is, 32% were receiving mental health treatment at the time and 21 % had 
recently threatened or attempted suicide. 
Section 11 of The Arms and Ammunition Act 15 of 1969 as amended. 
Requiring storage at secure venues like gun clubs. 
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accessibility of guns and high level of stress routinely associated with this profession 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). This is certainly a plausible explanation in relation to the 
SAP who were centrally involved in the civil war in South Africa from 1984 
onwards. During this conflict the frequency of suicides increased among police 
countrywide and in 1992 there was a massive 33% hike in the national total (The 
Commissioner of the SAP, 1993). Similarly, by 1994 the suicide rate had risen to 
twice the homicide rate among police in the Western Cape (The Commanding 
Officer W. Cape, 1995). Such trends appear to have galvanised police leadership 
into action and a range of interventions has since been implemented. Today the 
associated problems of stress and suicide are being addressed within the police force 
and preventative measures have been boosted. For instance, in-house counselling 
and psychotherapeutic services have been developed, a policy of routine referral for 
counselling following violent interactions, and training for supervisors in the 
identification and management of officers with stress-related symptoms have been 
introduced. Research is also being undertaken to develop additional techniques for 
the reduction of police suicides. However, one of the main ways of reducing stress 
among police officers appears to have been overlooked. It is vital that officers have 
time when they are completely free from the pressures of police-work. Yet 
traditionally the SAP have been obliged to intervene in suspected lawbreaking even 
when off duty; a policy that must be changed (Bruce, 27 July 1997). Prohibiting 
officers from being armed with service firearms when off duty may also reduce the 
incidence of suicides in this group. 61 
Firearm suicides have remained problematic in contemporary Cape Town; in 
fact the rate is reported to have increased since 1991 (The MRC, 1995). The profile 
of high-risk suicide victims bas also changed in some respects. Although males, 
whites and police officers were still the key groups at risk of gun suicides in this area 
in 1994, 26 to 45 year olds were no longer a high-risk group; instead it was 
coloureds and younger people aged between 15 and 34 (The MRC, 1995; The 
Commanding Officer W. Cape, 1995). Since the election, black people have 
acquired greater legal access to firearms and private gun ownership bas sky-
rocketed, particularly among Africans and PSOs in this country. Changes in the 
groups prone to gun suicide are thus expected in the near future and continued 
monitoring will be crucial in order to keep abreast of developments. 
INTENTIONAL FIREARM HOMICIDES 
Prevalence 
Guns are the second most common weapon used to perpetrate homicides in Cape 
Town. Stabbings have long been the leading cause of homicides and this was still 
61 This has been the policy for Municipal Police for some time, see Wynberg 
Inquest (I 081 /90-1). 
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the case in 1994 when sharp injuries accounted for 52% and shootings 26% of 
homicidal deaths (The MRC, 1995). Nevertheless, intentional homicidal shootings 
were responsible for the vast majority of gun deaths in Cape Town between 1984 
and 1991. One per cent of firearm fatalities were unintentional, 20% were suicides 
and a massive 79% resulted from intentional homicides. On average there were 
nearly five times more gun homicides than suicides and ninety times more firearm 
homicides than accidents: rates of nine, two and 0.1 per 1()()()()() p.a. resp. Before 
the civil war, suicides and homicides accounted for similar proportions of gun 
deaths, but from 1985 onwards homicides became the leading cause of firearm 
fatalities in this city. The incidence of gun homicides grew significantly and by 
1994 homicides were responsible for almost 25% more gun deaths than in 1984.62 
The annual rate of firearm homicides rose from five per 100000 in 1984, to 15 in 
1991, and reached 20 in 1994.s The prevalence of firearm homicide appears to 
have been temporally associated with the vicissitudes of political conflict in the area. 
The rate doubled during the first year of intense struggle and then dropped over the 
next three years when State repression was most zealous. In 1989 the rate began to 
climb and by 1991 it had surpassed the peak reached in 1985. The latest figures for 
1994 indicate that this upward trend has continued (The MRC, 1995). 
In most key respects, the pattern of gun homicides has been similar in Cape 
Town and South Africa since the mid-eighties. Although sharp instruments have 
been the most common weapons in homicides, 64 firearms have played an increasing 
role in homicide since the mid-eighties and there has .been an upward trend in the 
rate of gun homicides,65 with a high in the early nineties~ The role of homicides as 
a cause of firearm fatalities has also grown markedly in South Africa since 1983.67 
However, intentional homicides have played a greater role in gun death locally than 
nationally, accounting for 18% more firearm fatalities in Cape Town.• The average 
annual mortality rate for gun homicides in this city was almost twice the national 
rate.s Interestingly, however, the growth-gradient was similar in both these 
jurisdictions, with a threefold increase in the rate of gun homicide: from five to 15 
per 100000 p.a. locally and from three to 10 nationally.10 
62 See Table 3.6. 
63 See Table 7.5 and The MRC (1995). 
64 See The CSS (1992[i]3 to 1983[i]). 
65 The proportion rose from six per cent in 1983 to 35% in 1992. See Tables 3.2 
and 3.1. resp. 
66 That is, in 1991 and 1992 in the RSA and in 1990 and 1991 in Cape Town. 
See Tables 3.1 and 7.5 resp. 
67 From 52% in 1983 to 87% in 1992. See Table 3.3. 
68 See Table 3.6 and The CSS (199l[i] to 1984[i]). 
69 That is, nine and five per 100000 p.a. See Tables 3.7 and 7.5. 
70 See Tables 3.1 and 7.5. 
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Table 9 .I: Percentages of Gun Deaths by Causes in the USA, RSA and Cape 
Town, Mid-Eighties. 71 
Causes 
Homicides 
Suicides 
Accidents 
USA(%) 
43 
55 
2 
RSA (%) 
53 
38 
9 
Cape Town (%) 
76 
23 
1 
Sources: Calculated from Turner and Leyens (1992), The CSS (1987-1983) and 
Table 3.3. 
Firearm mortality in South Africa bas differed from that in the USA. While 
homicide was the leading cause of gun death in South Africa (and Cape Town) in the 
mid-eighties, in the USA it was suicide. Contemporary South Africa still appears to 
be more violent than the USA: in 1993 the national homicide rate was six times 
higher and in 1994 the Cape Town rate was seven times higher (The Argus, 7 
August 1993).12 
Characteristics 
The following groups were significantly over-represented as perpetrators of firearm 
homicides in Cape Town between 1984 and 1991: males, whi~ and Africans, police 
officers, PSOs, and adults aged between 22 and 36. But it was African and white, 
gainfully employed, 13 adult males who were particularly prone to perpetrating gun 
homicides. A distinct majority (55%) of these shooters were law enforcement 
officers. 74 Although PSOs outnumbered police officers by two to one in the 
background population, in these firearm homicides the SAP predominated with 17 
police officers to every PSO. 
Between the mid-eighties and the early nineties in Cape Town, homicide was 
the leading cause of gun deaths for: both sexes, civilians, police officers and PSOs, 
all age-categories and race-groups with the exception of those aged over 59 and 
whites, for whom suicide was dominant. Homicide victims were generally killed by 
single bullet-wounds to the front of the body, usually the chest or head. Most (57%) 
of these victims had no alcohol in their bloodstreams when shot, but the high level of 
71 In 1986 in the USA and the annual averages between 1983 and 1987 for the 
RSA and Cape Town. 
72 See Table 3.7. 
73 The credibility of this otherwise questionable fmding was enhanced by the fact 
that three other groups with high employment rates -- males, whites and police 
officers -- were also over-represented. 
74 With 53% police, two per cent PSOs, one per cent members of the defence 
forces and 43% civilians. 
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missing data makes this finding extremely tentative. The following specific groups 
were at heightened risk of gun homicide: males, police officers and PSOs, Africans, 
those who were gainfully employed and adults, especially those aged between 20 and 
31. and teenage African boys. The local profile of gun homicide victims 
corresponded with the national profile of homicide victims in the following respects: 
males, Africans and those aged between 20 and 31 were over-represented as victims 
in both jurisdictions.1' 
Although the majority of the homicide victims were civilians, police officers 
and PSOs were significantly over-represented considering their numbers in the 
background population. Intentional homicide was the leading cause of gun death in 
all three groups but it was highest among PSOs (88%) and lowest among police 
(61 %).76 Significantly more (55%) police officers than civilians or PSOs, were 
killed in African residential areas. Statistically equivalent numbers of PSOs and 
police officers were killed while on and off duty. Adults, males and Africans were 
over-represented as homicide victims, but the highest proportion of youths (14%) 
and females (10%) were civilians. Adults, males and Africans were over-
represented as shooters in homicides involving PSOs, police and civilian victims, but 
whites were also over-represented among shooters who killed civilian victims. 
Although police officers were typically killed by civilians, 26% of police who died 
in gun homicides were shot by fellow officers. This constituted an over-
representation considering the number f police in the background population. In 
addition, 17% of PSO and 55% of civilian victims were fatally sho~ by police. The 
Courts found the majority of homicides in which PSOs (50%) and police (61 %) were 
killed to be unlawful shootings, as compared to only 33% of the shootings involving 
civilian victims. The highest proportion (42%) of these homicides were found to be 
justifiable, whereas only 15% of police and eight per cent of PSO homicidal gun 
deaths were deemed lawful. n 
The majority (77%) of shooters who perpetrated homicides were in legal 
possession of their firearms, although this finding is tentative because there was a 
high level of missing data. Handguns were the typical (73%) firearms employed in 
homicidal shootings, particularly 9mm semi-automatic pistols. The use of fully-
automatic firearms was rare (2%) but assault rifles predominated in this category. 
Twelve-gauge shotguns were the most common type of long-gun used.71 
In comparison to shooters, the majority (60%) of homicide victims were 
unarmed. Knives were the preferred weapons and the minority of victims who had 
guns were armed with handguns, particularly 9mm semi-automatic pistols. Fully-
75 See Tables 3.4 and The CSS (1991[i] to 1983[i]) resp. 
76 The figure for civilians was 80%. 
77 Also the level of undetermined PSO cases was particularly high at 42% . 
78 The preponderance of semi-automatic pistols and shotguns among police was 
expected as these were standard issue during this period. I 
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automatic firearms were extremely uncommon; only one victim was thus armed and 
this was because be was a soldier. Interestingly, homicide victims did not appear to 
favour licensed or unlicensed guns. 
The bulk of homicidal shootings were perpetrated out-of-doors, in African and 
coloured residential areas, by single shooters who did not know their victims. 
Considering the political conflict that took place over this period, it is noteworthy 
that most (69%) of the homicidal shootings were not politically motivated; the most 
frequent motives given by perpetrators being self defence (40%), arrest (24%) and 
unlawful reasons ( 15%). 
Restraint in the Use of Deadly Force 
The majority (76%) of shooters who perpetrated homicides in Cape Town between 
1984 and 1991 failed to use the minimum force viable: on average only 24% 
employed such restraints." The repertoire of alternate means was also rather 
limited: in 1224 intentional homicides only 17 kinds of restraint were used.10 
Making victims aware that shooters were police officers was the most common 
(68%) restraint and the only one widely employed by shooters. It was feasible in 
almost all circumstances and generally required no active effort by police shooters, 
most of whom were uniformed and in marked police vebicles.11 The restraint most 
frequently used by both police and civilian shooters was limiting fire to a single 
potentially fatal shot. Even though this finding was not particularly high, it indicates 
that the majority (56%) of s~ooters fired more potentially lethal shots than was 
absolutely necessary. The use of police-dogs was the least common (one per cent) 
alternate means and the other four basic types of restraint fell between these two 
extremes: giving chase on foot (20%),12 warning shots (19%), oral warnings (18%) 
and aiming at victims' legs (14%). It is worrying to note that very few shooters 
used tactics with a demonstrated potential to reduce the probability of deadly force, 
e.g. taking cover and verbal persuasion (Fridell & Binder 1992).13 Overall, these 
restraints were feasible in the vast majority of cases, 14 with aiming at the legs least 
often feasible and informing of the intention to arrest most often feasible. 
The proportionality measures showed that the majority (77%) of shooters who 
perpetrated homicides in Cape Town between 1984 and 1991 did not uphold the 
principle of proportionality. Indeed, 79% of shooters violated the defence-of-life 
standard by using deadly force against people who did not pose an immediate threat 
79 Excluding identification as police. 
80 See Table 7.13. 
81 Only officers in plain clothes or unmarked vehicles would have needed to 
inform their victims that they were police. . 
82 Giving chase, either on foot or in a vehicle,. was the leading restraint (60%) m 
the miscellaneous category of 'other less-than-lethal means'. 
83 Two and one per cent resp. 
84 On average 96%. 
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to life. Two-thirds (67%) violated the protection-of-life standard by employing 
deadly force against people who were neither an immediate threat nor a likely future 
threat to life. Notably, only a minority (14%) used deadly force in the protection-
of-life without foreseeably endangering others." Overall, depending on the 
stringency of the standard used, between 67% and 86% of these shooters failed to 
employ proportional force although this was feasible under the circumstances. 
Several other variables were examined to provide further insight into specific 
factors affecting shooters' judgements of the danger posed by victims and it was 
found that more shooters tended to fire at victims who: were not equivalently armed 
(87%);16 were unarmed (60%); had not threatened anyone (58%); or were not 
suspected of violent crimes (66%). On the side of proportionality, however, fewer 
shooters than expected shot youths (15%) or victims who were fleeing (32%).17 
Age has been viewed by some as a factor that ought to be considered in 
decisions to use deadly force. It has even been contended that, in principle, deadly 
force should not be used against adolescents and children (e.g. The CIIR, 1987). 
This approach accords with the legal premise, common in many systems of criminal 
law, that people with limited judgement should b  treated as less criminally 
responsible; this has generally been applied to people under 18, the mentally ill and 
the intellectually handicapped (Snyman, 1993)... It is in keeping with this 
assumption to require a higher level of restraint in the use of deadly force against 
youths, even when they constitute a significant threat to others. However, there has 
been a strong counter-argument that age _per se should not be a relevant factor, as the 
use of deadly force must be justifiable -against anyone who threatens the life of 
another (e.g. Geller & Scott, 1992; The Commissioner of the SAP, 1986). At the 
time of the South African civil war, the use of deadly force against the young was a 
particularly contentious issue given the central involvement of black youths in the 
political conflict. Not surprisingly, Anti-Apartheid supporters condemned the use of 
deadly force against adolescents and children, while supporters of the Apartheid 
State, including the SAP, endorsed this practice. Interestingly, this study of Cape 
Town between 1984 and 1991 showed that the majority (85%) of shooters did not 
kill children or adolescents; in fact this age-group was under-represented among 
homicide victims. 
85 Overall, 65% of shooters foreseeably endangered bystanders by firing at their 
victims. 
86 They were either unarmed or armed with weapons less deadly than firearms or 
explosives. See Table 7.14. 
87 Only 26% of victims were shot in the back. 
88 All three of these groups have been treated thus in South Africa and children 
under seven have been deemed devoid of criminal responsibility. 
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Legal Process 
The vast majority (83%) of these homicidal shootings never went further than 
inquest courts. Informal inquests were by far the most common kind of legal 
proceeding (72% ), with only one formal inquest in every seven.19 Most of the 
criminal trials were heard in the Supreme Court ( 68%) rather than in the lower 
Regional Magistrates' Courts (32% ). Overall the Courts found the highest 
proportion of homicides to be lawful (40%), with arrests (37%) and self defence 
cases (42%) predominating. The incidence of the other six types of justifiable 
homicide were low: accidents and shootings in the interests of public safety were the 
most common (three per cent resp.), while necessity cases were least common 
(0.3%).90 The grounds of justification were employed with varying rates of success: 
the highest being for necessity, obedience to orders, public safety and crowd 
dispersal (100%), followed by arrest (91 %), defence of property (83%), self defence 
(68%) and least successful of all, accidents (32%). 
Only 34% of the homicidal shootings were deemed to be unlawful, the bulk of 
which were classified as unspecified criminal homicides, although more cases were 
found to be murders (22%) rather than culpable homicides (10%). Notably, the 
Courts did not decide the lawfulness of over a quarter of these homicides. The vast 
majority (80%) of the shooters were not criminally charged but when they were, it 
was generally with murder; the most serious offence. This was common 
prosecutorial practice in South Africa; it enabled leeway for plea bargaining and 
convictions for lesser offences ~e culpable homicide. Those shooters who were 
charged were also generally tried (86%) and convicted of a criminal offence 
(68%):'1 two out of every three convictions were for murder!% Most (60%) of the 
convicts were sentenced to periods of imprisonment, the average being 11 years. 
Only 14% were sentenced to death, the same percentage as received suspended 
sentences." Sentencing alternatives like community service and financial 
compensation were relatively uncommon in these cases. In all, only nine per cent of 
those who committed homicidal shootings were held criminally liable for killing. 
Some of the shooters were not charged, some shootings were found justifiable and 
some shooters died shortly after these incidents. Nevertheless, more than half (57%) 
of the shooters involved in the criminal homicides were never brought to justice. 
89 Or 86% informal and 14% formal. 
90 See Table 7.21. 
91 Most (97%) were also legally-represented, usually by pro-deo defence counsel 
(70% ), which was expected because murder was a capital offence. 
92 See Table 7. 23. 
93 See Table 7.24. 
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JUSTIFIABLE AND CRIMINAL HOMICIDES 
Prevalence 
Of the three categories of homicide, the average annual rate was highest for 
justifiable homicides, at four per I()()()()() p.a, and this was followed by criminal 
homicides at three and undetermined homicides at two. 94 Justifiable homicides 
reached a significant high in 1985 at the start of the civil war: the annual rate tripled 
from two per I()()()()() in 1984 to six in 1985. However, the average rate dropped 
from four to three deaths per I()()()()() p.a. between the mid and late eighties. 
Statistically-speaking, criminal homicides were relatively evenly distributed although 
the average rate did increase from two to three per 100000 p.a. over this period. 
Undetermined homicides remained constant, averaging around two per I()()()()() p.a. 
and then reached a statistical high of four in 1991. 
Characteristics 
Whites and police officers were significantly over-represented as shooters in 
justifiable homicides, whereas in criminal homicides Africans and civilians were 
over-represented as shooters. Adults, males and the gainfully employed were over-
represented in all of the homicidal shootings irrespective of their lawfulness. 
Nevertheless, it was those aged between 21 and 33 who were most likely to 
perpetrate criminal homicides, and those aged between 23 and 37 who were more 
prone to committing justifiable homicides. 
Africans, males and adults were over-represented as victims in all the 
homicidal shootings · and gainfully employed people were over-represented in 
criminal and undetermined homicides. However, those aged between 19 and 28 
were at greatest risk of being killed in justifiable homicides, whereas the slightly 
older age-group 20 to 33 were at particular risk of criminal homicides. 
Handguns were the most common firearms among shooters in all homicides, 
although long-guns were over-represented in justifiable homicides. Licensed guns 
were more common in justifiable homicides, and unlicensed guns in criminal 
homicides. Fully automatic firearms were rarely used in homicides by either 
shooters or victims.~ The majority of the homicide victims were unarmed but fewer 
victims were armed in justifiable homicides than in criminal homicides.96 
More justifiable homicides occurred out-of-doors whilst more criminal 
homicides were perpetrated in victims' work-places.97 More of the undetermined 
homicides took place in African residential areas and were politically motivated 
shootings. More of the homicide cases that went to criminal trial were deemed to be 
94 See Table 8.3.1. 
95 Eleven shooters and one victim in justifiable homicides, five shooters in 
criminal and two in undetermined homicides. 
96 In all homicides weapons other than guns predominated. . 
97 Which reflects the high incidence of robberies and burglaries of busmess 
premises. 
• 
• 
• 
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unlawful and fewer to be lawful. 
Restraint 
Whilst informative, findings that pertain to all of the homicidal shootings combined 
obscure trends particular to different kinds of shootings. For instance, it could be 
argued that the low level of restraint reported thus far was produced by the fact that 
criminal homicides constituted over a third of this sample. It is improbable that 
shooters who used their guns to commit offences employed these weapons with 
proper restraint. By contrast, high levels of restraint were expected in justifiable 
homicides because minimum force and proportionality were legally required in most 
of these cases. Indeed, to a large extent this is what justified such killings. The 
levels of minimum force varied across lawful, unlawful and undetermined homicides 
in a way that supported the abovementioned hypothesis. Shooters employed a higher 
average level of minimum force in justifiable homicides (31 %) and lower average 
levels in criminal (20%) and undetermined homicides (22%). However, even the 
best of these levels was poor; minimum force was not used in over two thirds of the 
justifiable homicides. 
Identification was the leading restraint (71 %) em loyed by police shooters in 
lawful homicides, but firing only one potentially fatal shot was the most common 
(46%) among civilian and police shooters. Whilst informing of the intention to 
arrest was the least frequently employed (13%) basic restraint. • Firing a single 
potentially fatal shot was also the most frequent restraint in criminal ( 42%) and 
undetermined (52%) homicides, whereas aiming at victims' legs was least common 
(eight per cent) in criminal homicides and informing of the intention to arrest 
occurred least (0) in undetermined homicides. However, there were very few 
substantial differences in the extent to which each of the minimum force restraints 
was applied in lawful, unlawful and undetermined homicides. Oral warnings and 
giving chase were the exception; both of these means were employed more 
frequently in justifiable homicides and less frequently in unlawful homicides. 
The levels of proportionality also varied across lawful, unlawful and 
undetermined homicides according to the hypothesised pattern. Shooters employed a 
higher average level of proportionality in justifiable homicides (32%) and lower 
average levels in criminal (8%) and undetermined homicides (20%). Even those 
who perpetrated lawful homicides displayed a marked lack of proportionality in their 
use of firearms; violations occurred in over two-thirds of these cases. Most shooters 
fell short of both the defence and protection-of-life standards and foreseeably 
endangered third parties. In three-quarters of the lawful homicides the defence-of-
life standard was infringed.99 The protection-of-life standard was breached in half of 
98 Levels for the other basic restraints were: oral warnings (27% ), warning shots 
(26%) and aiming at victims' legs (18%). 
99 Undetermined (85%) and criminal (94%). 
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the justifiable homicides, Ioo and only 21 % of the shooters used deadly force to 
protect life without foreseeably endangering others. 101 Notably, justifiable homicides 
were characterised by more victims who were armed, who threatened others, were 
suspected of violent crimes and fled from their shooters. Nevertheless, a sizeable 
36% of the victims were non-dangerous, fleeing suspects. One of the key 
differences between criminal and justifiable homicides was the threat posed by 
victims; those killed in lawful shootings generally constituted a greater threat. The 
following groups were more commonly victims of justifiable homicides, and less 
commonly victims of criminal homicides: those considered dangerous, those who 
were armed, violent crime suspects, victims who threatened others and those who 
endangered lives. The highest level of proportionality exhibited in these three types 
of shootings was the low incidence of child and adolescent victims.1oz 
SELF DEFENCE AND ARRESTS 
Prevalence 
The bulk (79%) of the justifiable homicides were cases of self defence (42%) and 
arrest (37%) .103 Self defence was the most common kind of justifiable homicide and 
the most frequent type of firearm homicide in general. In Cape Town between 1984 
and 1991 there were 21 fatal shootings in self defence and 18 during arrests on 
average each year. Self defence shootings reached a high in 1985 at the start of the 
civil war, but the average rate dropped from two per 100000 p.a. in the mid-eighties 
to one in the late eighties. By contrast, arrests remained relatively constant over this 
period at an average rate of one per 100000 p.a.u,. 
Characteristics 
Males, adults, whites, the gainfully employed, PSOs and police officers were over-
represented as shooters in self defence shootings and arrests, and people aged 
between 24 and 37 were most likely to perpetrate these shootings. Males, adults and 
Africans were over-represented as victims in self defence homicides as well as 
arrests, and those aged between 20 and 28 years were most prone to being killed ·in 
these shootings. The key difference between victims in self defence and arrest 
shootings was the threat they posed; more of the victims killed in self defence were 
armed, not fleeing, suspected of violent offences or had threatened someone and 
were considered dangerous. 
Licensed guns were more common among shooters in cases of" self defence and 
arrest. Handguns, particularly 9mm semi-automatic pistols, were more common 
100 Undetermined (68%) and criminal (87%). 
101 Undetermined (13%) and criminal (5%). 
102 That is, 18%, 14% and 12% resp. 
103 Including defence of others and preventing escapes resp. 
104 See Tables 7.28 and 7.29 resp. 
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among shooters in arrests. The majority of the victims kiHed in self defence were 
armed, most commonly with weapons other than guns, but in arrests the number of 
armed and unarmed victims was similar. 
More of the self defence homicides took place out-of-doors, in coloured and 
African residential areas and were not politically motivated. The three circumstances 
that most frequently culminated in fatal self defence shootings were: suspects 
attempting to avoid arrest (22%); robbers killed by their victims in the course of a 
robbery (18%); and participants shot in police attempts to suppress political protest 
( 17%). In these cases more victims were shot in the front of the body. Similarly, 
more of the arrests occurred out-of-doors and in African residential areas. The 
majority of the arrests were not politically motivated, instead suspected car theft was 
the main precipitant. More of these victims were shot in the back of the body. A 
majority of the self defence and arrest cases were decided at informal inquests. 
Restraint 
A lower level of restraint might be expected in self defence cases, as these ostensibly 
involve crisis situations in which people resort to shooting in order to protect their 
lives. In this study, however, the average level of minimum force employed in self 
defence was not markedly different from that applied in arrests. 105 This was despite 
the fact that more of the victims killed in self defence were considered dangerous, 
were armed, bad threatened others, were suspected of violent crimes and were not 
fleeing. Identification was the leading restraint employed by police shooters (73%) 
in self defence cases and firing a single potentially fatal shot was most common 
among civilian and police shooters (36%). Aiming at victims' legs was the least 
frequently employed of the minimum force restraints ( 12%) .106 By contrast, foot 
chases were the most common miscellaneous alternative used in arrests (58%), 
whereas informing of the intention to arrest was least common (12% ). 
The average level of proportionality was by definition higher ( 44%) in self 
defence cases than in arrests (15%). Those who killed in self defence upheld the 
protection-of-life standard and used deadly force to protect life without foreseeably 
endangering others to a greater extent than those who killed in order to arrest. 
Notably, however, the extent to which victims actually threatened life was not 
notably different in self defence (25%) and arrests (15%). Also, 78% of those killed 
in arrests and even 20% of those killed in self defence were unlikely to have been 
dangerous had they not been shot. Furthermore, most (76%) of the suspects killed 
during arrests were non-dangerous and shot when fleeing, 107 and 38% of the shooters 
endangered bystanders in their attempts to arrest non-dangerous suspects. As 
105 That is, 27% and 36% resp. 
I 06 The remaining restraints were: other means (34%), warning shots (27%) and 
oral warnings (25%). 
107 Of these victims 96% were black. 
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expected, the comparative figures with respect to self defence cases were low: only 
six per cent of the victims were non-dangerous and fleeing and two per cent of the 
shooters endangered bystanders by firing at non-dangerous suspects. 
Another way of examining restraint in the use of deadly force during arrests is 
to evaluate the necessity of a shooting by taking all relevant factors into account, and 
not just those that were known to the shooter at the time. According to this 
approach shootings may be classified as non-elective or elective, the latter defined as 
those in which the shooter could have refrained from shooting without jeopardising 
life (Fyfe, 198l[c]). The bulk (79%) of arrests in this study were judged to be 
elective shootings. Overall, the restraint exhibited in these, the two most common 
types of justifiable homicides, was not impressive. None of the levels of minimum 
force or proportionality even surpassed the half way mark (50%). 
POLmCALL Y MOTIVATED AND NON-POUTICAL SHOOTINGS 
Prevalence 
The average annual rate of politically motivated firearm homicides was less than half 
the rate of shootings that were not politically motivated: two and five per 100000 
p.a. resp. Politically motivated fatal shootings soared at the start of the civil war, 
rising from 0.1 in 1984 to five per 100000 in 1985.•oa Thereafter, the average rate 
remained constant at two per 100000 p.a., whilst the rate of non-political shootings 
increased slightly from four to five per 100000 p.a. 
Characteristics 
Police officers, Africans and whites were over-represented as shooters in politically 
motivated homicides. Those aged between 22 and 35 were most likely to perpetrate 
non-political shootings, whilst 24 to 37 year olds were more likely to commit 
politically motivated shootings. As regards victims, those aged between 19 and 30 
were most prone to death in politically motivated shootings, whereas those aged 
between 21 and 31 were most at risk of being killed in non-political shootings. 
More of the shooters who perpetrated politically motivated shootings used 
licensed firearms, the most popular being long-guns, particularly 12-gauge shotguns. 
By comparison unlicensed firearms, especially handguns, were more common in 
non-political homicides. Victims' weapons were similar in politically motivated and 
non-political gun homicides. 
More politically motivated shootings were perpetrated out-of-doors, in African 
residential areas, and by at least two shooters who did not know their victims. 
Notably, a higher number of these victims died from multiple pellet-wounds. In 
politically motivated shootings, more of the shooters foreseeably endangered third 
parties and more of the victims were fleeing when shot. By contrast, more of the 
108 See Table 8.5.1. 
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non-political homicides were committed indoors, in coloured and white residential 
areas, by single shooters who were acquainted with their victims, and most victims 
died from single bullet-wounds. The Courts did not reach findings in more of the 
politically motivated gun homicides. Also fewer of the politically motivated cases 
were heard at criminal trials, hence fewer of these shooters were prosecuted. 
Restraint 
Shooters employed a lower average level of minimum force (16%) in politically 
motivated homicides and a higher average level (28%) in non-political homicides. 
In all of the firearm homicides, identification as a police officer was the leading 
form of restraint, followed by firing a single potentially fatal shot. The least 
commonly used restraint was informing of the intention to arrest. There were three 
notable differences in this group of restraints: oral warnings, warning shots and 
aiming at victims' legs were lower in politically motivated homicides. 
The average level of proportionality was statistically similar in politically 
motivated (28%) and other homicides (21 %). The extent to which shooters 
protected life without foreseeably endangering others and upheld the two key 
standards was not markedly different in these two kinds of shootings. In politically 
motivated homicides more shooters foreseeably endangered third parties and more of 
the victims made life-endangering threats; most commonly attacking as part of a 
hostile group (81 %), whereas in non-political homicides the most frequent kind of 
life-threat was shooting (34%). Notably, politically motivated homicides involved 
more victims who were violent crime suspects and victims who were fleeing from 
their shooters. In both kinds of homicides, the highest level of proportionality was 
reflected in the fact that the proportion of youthful victims was low. All of the 
measures considered, shooters who perpetrated politically motivated and non-
political homicides demonstrated a similar lack of proportionality in their use of 
firearms, violating this principle in over 70% of cases. 
POLICE AND CIVILIAN SHOOTINGS 
Prevalence 
Police officers and PSOs were over-represented as shooters in this sample of 
homicides. The average annual rate of gun homicides by police over this period was 
slightly higher than the rate for civilians: four as compared to three per 1()()()()() p.a. 
resp. 109 Fatal shootings by police reached a marked high in the first year of 
intensive political conflict in Cape Town, rising from two per 100000 in 1984 to 
eight in 1985. Thereafter, the average rate dropped from five per 100000 p.a. in the 
mid-eighties to three in the late-eighties. By contrast, the average rate of firearm 
homicides perpetrated by civilians remained stable over this period, at around three 
109 See Table 8.4.1. 
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per I()()()()() p.a. 110 Unfortunately, national rates of police gun homicide were not 
available for comparison. However, the average national rate of police homicide 
over this period was two per I()()()()() p.a. and most of these cases were shootings. 111 
It appears therefore, that the rate of firearm homicide by police in Cape Town was 
higher than the South African rate: four and two per 1000000 p.a. resp. This is in 
keeping with North American fmdings of elevated rates of police gun homicide by 
police in big cities (e.g. Geller & Scott, 1992). Furthermore, the estimated rate of 
firearm homicides perpetrated by police in the mid-eighties was notably higher in 
South Africa than in the USA: two and 0.3 per 1()()()()() p.a. resp. 112 
Characteristics 
Whites were over-represented among the police shooters who perpetrated homicides, 
but the majority of the PSO shooters were coloured. Also most of the law enforcers 
were on duty at the time of the shootings. Police officers aged between 23 and 34, 
PSOs between 23 and 33 and civilians between 22 and 39, were most likely to 
perpetrate firearm homicides. 
Coloureds were over-represented among the victims lrilled by PSOs, whereas 
Africans were over-represented as victims of civilians and police. People aged 
between 19 and 28 were most prone to fatal shootings by police, those between 19 
and 24 were also at risk from PSOs, and those between 20 and 33 were at heightened 
risk from civilian shooters. 
Long-guns, particularly 12 gauge shotguns, were more common among police 
shooters, whereas handguns predominated among civilians and PSOs. More of the 
police and PSO shooters used licensed firearms, but more of the civilian shooters 
used unlicensed guns. The weapon characteristics of victims who were lrilled by 
police, PSOs and civilians were similar. 
More of the police shooters perpetrated homicides out-of-doors and in African 
residential areas, whereas more of the civilians shot their victims indoors, in homes 
or work-places. Most of the PSO homicides were committed in coloured residential 
areas. In addition, more of the police shooters carried out politically motivated 
shootings, and more of the civilian homicides were non-political. More of those 
who were shot by police died from multiple pellet-wounds to the back, but more of 
the victims killed by civilian and PSO shooters died from single bullet-wounds to the 
front of the body. 
In cases of self defence, more civilian shooters killed robbers, whilst more 
police killed political protesters whom they believed were a threat. It is also 
110 Temporal trends in PSO shootings were not analysed due to the small number 
(4) of cases each year. 
Ill See Table 5.4. 
112 Based on the annual estimate of 600 fatal police shootings for the USA, see 
GeJler ( 1986). 
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noteworthy that 11 % of police shooters who killed in self defence were protecting 
themselves against politically motivated attacks. For PSOs the top precipitating 
circumstance for self defence shootings was confrontation with suspects who resisted 
arrest. 
More (89%) of the arrests were perpetrated by police shooters than by PSOs 
(2%) or civilians (9%). 113 Qualitative analysis revealed that most (62%) of the 
police arrests began when officers on routine patrol spontaneously intervened after 
observing suspected lawbreaking. Research has shown such situations to be more 
risky for police, as officers lack vital preparatory information that is generally 
available when they are dispatched (Fridell & Binder, 1992). In this sample, 
citizens' arrests were generally triggered by a civilian becoming aware that someone 
was attempting to steal his/her property. Suspected car theft was the leading 
motivation for both police (30%) and civilian (28%) arrests. 
Restrai.Dt 
The average level of minimum force employed by police (30%) was not substantially 
different from that which characterised civilian shooters (23%) and PSOs (30%). 
Identification was the top restraint among police (68%), followed by foot chases 
(29%). Among PSOs, warning shots (46%) and firing only one potentially fatal shot 
(40%) were the two leading restraints. By contrast, firing a single fatal shot was the 
number one form of restraint ( 48%) among civilian shooters, with warning shots in 
second position (19%). Informing of the intention to arrest was the basic restraint 
least commonly used by all of the shooters. There were no substantial differences 
among police, PSO and civilian shooters in the use of minimum force restraints. 
The average level of proportionality on the part of police (25%) was not 
substantially better than that exhibited by PSO (34%) and civilian shooters (24%). 
However, civilian performance was notably poorer ( 11 %) than police (27%) and 
PSO (25%) shooters in relation to the defence-of-life standard. 114 But, civilian 
(47%) and PSO (64%) shooters performed much better than police shooters (30%) in 
upholding the protection-of-life standard. Interestingly, there were no major 
differences among these three shooter-groups in the extent to which they managed to 
protect life without foreseeably endangering others. In fact it was common practice 
for all of these shooters to foreseeably endanger third parties when shooting. 
Notably, there were a number of important differences in the extent to which police, 
PSO and civilian shooters implemented certain aspects of proportionality: police and 
PSOs killed more victims who threatened others and victims suspected of violent 
113 Figures have been included here because these were additional results. 
114 A1though most (68%) of the victims' threats did not endanger lives, police 
experienced a higher level of life threats than civilians. The three most 
common for civilians and police shooters were: attack by a hostile group, 
being shot at and being stabbed. 
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crimes, whereas civilians shot fewer victims who were fleeing. 
All of the measures considered, police, PSO and civilian shooters displayed a 
lack of proportionality in their use of firearms, violating this principle in at least 
two-thirds of the homicides. The majority of these shooters failed to uphold the 
defence-of-life standard and foreseeably endangered third parties in attempts to 
protect life. It was only PSO shooters who performed according to the protection-
of-life standard in the majority of cases. The highest level of proportionality 
exhibited by police, PSO and civilian shooters was the low incidence of child and 
adolescent victims. 
Legal Process 
More of the homicides committed by police and PSOs went no further than inquest, 
whilst more of those perpetrated by civilians were heard as criminal trials. In other 
words, fewer police and PSO shooters were prosecuted than civilians. The Courts 
found more of the homicides involving police shooters to be lawful arrests and more 
of those involving PSOs to be lawful cases of self defence. 
KEY PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS 
High Premature Mortality 
Because the bulk of these gunshot victims were young adults in their economically 
productive years (20 to 31), these firearm fatalities constituted a considerable loss of 
potential years of life and an unacceptably high level of premature mortality. In 
addition, it was African people, an historically oppressed group, who· were over-
represented as victims in these shootings. Such disparities in mortality are surely 
manifestations of "the deleterious effects of poverty and institutionalised social 
deprivation" (The MRC, 1995:1). This is a public health issue that calls for urgent 
attention in a nation publicly committed to redressing the damage caused by 
Apartheid. 
Justifiable Homicides 
Considering that the major concern in South Africa has been focused on illegal 
possession and the criminal use of firearms, it was noteworthy to find that the lawful 
use of licensed guns, mainly by police officers, constituted a core aspect of the 
problem in relation to intentional firearm homicides in Cape Town between the mid-
eighties and early nineties. The majority (77%) of the intentional homicides were 
perpetrated with licensed firearms. Lawful shootings were the most common kind 
(40%) of intentional homicide, although by the late-eighties the average rates of 
justifiable and criminal homicide had become equivalent.tu The SAP were 
115 That is, three per 100000 p.a. See Table 8.3.1. 
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responsible for the bulk (54%) of the homicidal shootings, 116 including the leading 
two categories of justifiable homicides: arrests (89%) and self defence cases (66%). 
It is reasonable to expect police officers and PSOs to demonstrate greater 
restraint than civilians in the use of guns, considering that law enforcers are given 
specialised training and have a professional duty to protect the public. However, the 
premise was contradicted in this study: neither police nor PSO shooters were found 
to have exercised substantially more restraint than civilians and they performed as 
poorly in upholding the principles of proportionality and minimum force. Notably, 
the restraint that required the least active effort -- police identification -- was the 
only one that was employed by a majority of shooters in any of the three groups. 
Although the range of restraints used by police shooters was wider than civilians, 117 
it was still extremely limited considering the rich variety of less-than-lethal control 
tactics that have been devised for law enforcement purposes. 11• In particular, there 
was little evidence of the use of unarmed control tactics and strategies involving less-
than-lethal equipment (Clede & Parsons, 1987). The only less-than-lethal weapons 
used in these justifiable homicides were teargas and non-live ammunition fired from 
12-gauge shotguns. While the use of teargas was relatively uncommon in the sample 
cases, the police made frequent use of shotguns loaded with pellets in the 
management of political protest over this period in Cape Town. Indeed, this weapon 
was used in more of the politically motivated police shootings and more of these 
victims died from multiple pellet-wounds. Since the incidents resulted in fatalities, 
this usage of non-live ammunition can hardly be classed as a less-than-lethal tactic. 
Instead, it reflects the lethal use of weapons intended for non-lethal use, which 
researchers have shown was common practice among the SAP during the civil war 
(e.g. Haysom, 1987[a]; Duflou, 1986)."9 
As expected, the greatest restraint was exercised in lawful firearm homicides. 
But even this, the 'best performance', was unacceptable: on average minimum and 
proportional force were employed in only one out of every three lawful shootings. 
Five basic restraints were examined: restricting fire to one potentially fatal shot 
(46%), issuing an oral warning (27%), firing a warning shot (26%), aiming at the 
legs (18%) and informing of the intention to arrest (13%). Four of the five were 
found to have been applied in less than a third of these justifiable homicides. Usage 
levels were generally even lower for the tactics grouped together in the 
miscellaneous category of 'other less-than-lethal means': foot chases (16%), 
abbreviated oral warnings (7%), car chases (4%), physical struggle (3%), taking 
cover (3%), firing teargas (0.2%), fleeing (0.1%), communication (0.1%) and 
116 And the bulk (76%) of the justifiable homicides. 
117 Police (15), civilians (8) and PSOs (7). 
118 Like those proposed by Clede and Parsons ( 1987) and Graves and Connor 
(1991). See Chapter Four. 
119 See Chapter Five. 
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vehicle-ramming (0.1.% ). In particular, shooters made very little use of tactics 
effective for diffusing violence, such as communication and strategic positioning 
(Fridell & Binder, 1992). 
The extent to which shooters employed minimum force in self defence and in 
arrests was similarly poor. This was unexpected as the law required greater restraint 
for the defence of effecting an arrest than for self defence. Although the average 
level of proportionality was predictably higher in self defence shootings than arrests, 
it was still below 50%. In practice, the line between arrest and self defence 
shootings was not as clear as it was in law. Efforts to effect arrests were the 
circumstances that most frequently escalated into self defence shootings. It was 
disturbing to find that the shooters in these situations often created the need to use 
deadly force by failing to adopt protected positions and unnecessarily placing 
themselves in danger. In particular, the use of strategic protected positioning was 
extremely poor. In sum then, firearms were used too readily and with a marked lack 
of restraint which lay at the core of the guo homicide problem alongside a 
conspicuous breakdown in proportionality. 
The right to life is a fundamental human right. In these cases human lives, 
especially those of crime suspects, were not accorded sufficient value. In most of 
these lawful shootings firearms were not used to defend life: three quarters of those 
who were killed did not pose an immediate threat to life, and half of the victims 
constituted neither an immediate nor a future threat to life. Overall 36% of the 
victims of lawful shootings were killed despite the fact that they were fleeing and not 
dangerous. Even some (6%) of the victims who were· killed in self defence were 
non-dangerous and shot while fleeing. But it was arrests that were particularly 
problematic with respect to proportionality. In four out of every five arrests the 
victims were unlikely to have been dangerous had they not been killed, and the 
shooters could have refrained from shooting without jeopardising the lives of others. 
The majority (76%) of those killed in arrests were non-dangerous and fleeing 
suspects. Tragically, the leading motivation for these fatal arrests was suspected car 
theft. Proportionality was also seriously undermined by the fact that many shooters 
foreseeably endangered bystanders when perpetrating lawful shootings. Worse still, 
a substantial proportion (38%) of the shooters endangered the lives of innocent 
people while trying to arrest suspects who were not even dangerous. Firing at 
suspects in moving vehicles is a police tactic that seriously endangers other road 
users as well as third parties in the vehicles concerned. For this reason the practice 
has been repudiated among North American police in recent years (Alpert & Fridell, 
1992). Nonetheless, in 16% of these arrests the SAP fired at moving vehicles and 
killed the drivers (38%) and/or the passengers (62%). 
It has long been alleged that there is systematic racial discrimination in the 
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application of deadly force by the North American police. 120 Although racist 
practice was highly likely among the South African Police, 121 this study of fatal 
shootings in Cape Town was not designed to test the police racism hypothesis 
adequately. However, the findings certainly do not contradict the premise of police 
racism in the use of deadly force by the SAP in Cape Town between 1984 and 1991. 
Black people were shown to be over-represented as victims in fatal arrests by white 
police officers (75%), white PSOs (67%) and white civilians (83%). These fatal 
arrests typically involved a white person shooting at a black suspect, 122 and 96% of 
the non-dangerous fleeing suspects who were killed during arrests were black. 1n 
Remarkably, only one of the 142 arrest victims was white and he was shot by a 
white officer. It was also interesting to note that fatal shootings by black officers 
were largely intraracial: coloured officers tended to kill mainly (91 %) coloured 
suspects and African officers mainly (86%) African suspects. By contrast, justifiable 
homicides by white officers were generally inter-racial: the bulk (99%) of those 
killed by white officers were black suspects. This pattern may well be the product of 
Apartheid-based assignment practices within the SAP and the fact that coloured and 
African residential areas were intensively policed during the civil war. 
What this study showed clearly was that black suspects were more likely than 
white, to be lawfully killed by the police. 124 This might have been the result of 
police racism, alternatively it might have been because black suspects were more 
often dangerous. 125 Unfortunately, resolving this dilemma requires a matched 
sample of white and black suspects and these data included only one white suspect. 
Nevertheless, there was one particular finding that pointed definitively in the 
direction of police racism: white police officers killed a much higher proportion 
(57%) of black suspects who were not dangerous, than black officers (30%). 126 
Perhaps the most distressing finding was that the Courts deemed such paltry 
levels of restraint sufficient to legally justify these shootings. Here the problem lay 
in the practice of the inquest courts which adjudicated the vast majority of these 
intentional homicides, mainly in the form of informal proceedings. It is clear that 
these inquest courts did not stringently apply the legal requirements stipulated in law 
at this time. Overall there was a low level of compliance with key legal 
prerequisites in cases that were condoned as lawful shootings in self defence: on 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
See Chapter Four. 
See Chapter Five. 
In Cape Town over this period, however, coloureds and Africans were over-
represented in arrests, whereas whites were over-represented in the SAP and 
among civilian gun owners (Hansard, 27 May 1992). 
Africans (59%) and coloureds (41 %). 
This was also the case in the USA and in South Africa where 96% of those 
who died due to legal intervention with a firearm were black (The CSS, 
1983[i] to 1989[ii]). 
See Chapter Four. 
White police were responsible for killing 81 % of the non-dangerous black 
suspects. 
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average 73% of these shooters failed to employ minimum force and 56% violated 
proportionality. Furthermore, in order to successfully employ self defence as a 
justification for killing, the law required an immediate threat to life. This was not 
the case in 75% of the shootings which were, nevertheless, ruled to be cases of self 
defence. Such limited conformation with legal preconditions was also common in 
shootings that were justified as arrests: 64% of these shooters failed to use minimum 
force, 54% foreseeably endangered third parties by shooting and 88% did not inform 
victims of their intention to arrest. 127 Yet these shootings were legally condoned. In 
spite of the fact that section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act and the case-law 
mandated a stringent set of restraints for the lawful use of deadly force in arrests, 
this defence was among the most successful in the sample. The Courts accepted this 
justification for fatal shootings in 91 % of the cases in which it was proffered, even 
though low levels of restraint had been employed in these incidents. This provides 
additional support for Hansson's (1990[a]) previous claim of laxity in the application 
of deadly force controls by the Courts, resulting in a low level of sanction against 
those who used guns without due restraint. 
Defensive Civilian Gun Use 
In South Africa there has been a real increase in the rate of lawful gun ownership 
among civilians, particularly since 1991: in 1986 the rate was 3802 per 100000 
people, in 1991 it was 3885 and by 1994 it had reached 4495.•u The nineties have 
also seen a marked increase in illegal firearm ownership (The Inter-Departmental 
Strategy Team, 1996[b]). This upward trend in private possession has been 
attributed mainly to widespread fear of violence, and more importantly, the lack of 
public confidence in institutions of collective security. Although the Apartheid State 
was replaced in 1994, public confidence has been slow in recovering. Crime and 
violence have continued to rise and in the short term the massive restructuring, 
especially of the police force, seems to have exacerbated anxieties about personal 
safety. For the economically-advantaged, home protection now involves acquiring 
the services of private security companies and target-hardening techniques like high 
walls, guard dogs, burglar bars, alarms and firearms (Locbrenberg & Stanton, 
1995). 
In South Africa, like the USA, personal protection is the main motivation for 
legal private gun ownership (The Inter-Departmental Strategy Team, 1996). It is an 
established belief that the safety of loved ones and property is enhanced by keeping a 
gun in the home. However, in recent years the veracity of this premise has been 
questioned. A number of empirical investigations have shown that the presence of a 
firearm in the home is associated with a higher risk of domestic homicide and suicide 
127 See Table 5.10. 
128 See Table 3.16. 
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(e.g. Kellerman et al, 1993; Brent et al, 1991). The study at hand showed that 
'family firearms' were seldom employed (8%) to kill intruders and were more 
frequently used (92%) to kill friends or family. In most instances family-members 
used guns to commit suicide (83% ), but domestic deaths also resulted from accidents 
(7%), murder-suicides (6%) and disputes (4%). 129 In short, the sense of security 
afforded by keeping a firearm in the home may be a dangerous myth. However, the 
data generated by this research did not enable a balanced assessment of the defensive 
benefit of gun ownership, which requires at very least information regarding lives 
saved, injuries prevented and property defended. 
CrimiDal Homicides and Gun Crime in General 
Although lawful gun homicides were revealed as a key problem in this study, 
unlawful firearm homicides were also shown to be problematic. Indeed the 
proportion of criminal (36%) and justifiable (40%) gun homicides was quite similar. 
Firearms are used to perpetrate many types of offences such as murder, robbery, 
burglary and rape. 130 Because this was a study of deaths, the sample did not include 
the full range of gun offences. Most importantly, it excluded crimes in which guns 
were used to threaten, rather than to kill or injure. 
Available crime data were thus consulted to shed further light on this issue. 131 
According to conviction statistics (see Table 3.9), robbery was the leading offence 
perpetrated with guns in South Africa, at least from the mid-eighties. This was 
followed by murder, attempted murder and pointing a firearm.m Similarly, robbery 
and attempted murder were the top two gun offences reported in the Western Cape, 
the region that encompasses metropolitan Cape Town.m Notably, the conviction 
statistics show an increase in the role played by firearms in robbery, murder and 
attempted murder since the mid-eighties. 134 In other words, a higher proportion of 
robberies, murders and attempted murders are probably being committed with guns. 
More specifically, handguns appear to have become increasingly popular in murders 
and attempted murders. Since the late eighties handguns have been used in the 
majority of murders and attempted murders (70% on average), whereas long-guns 
have been used in 21% and assault firearms in only nine per cent of such cases. 1' 5 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
The findings from this investigation indicate a growth in the rate of unlawful 
Less than one per cent (7) were residents killed by burglars. 
See Table 3.9. 
Although as previously noted caution must be exercised. 
Excluding illegal possession because it is not strictly an offence in which a gun 
is actively used to perpetrate a crime. 
See Table 3.11. 
See Table 3.8. 
See Table 3.10. The peak for assault firearms ·was 1988/9 when these weapons 
accounted for 21% of the murders/attempted murders for which convictions 
were secured. 
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firearm homicides in Cape Town between the mid-eighties and the early nineties. 136 
In 1984 the rate of criminal gun homicide was lower than justifiable homicide, but 
by the early nineties these rates were equivalent. Handguns and unlicensed weapons 
were found to be the preferred types of firearms in criminal homicides, with little 
use of combat or fully-automatic firearms. 
It is vital not to loose sight of the fact that the line between criminal and 
justifiable gun homicides is not immutable; it depends on the law and, more 
importantly, how it is applied in practice. For if the Courts had applied the legal 
requirements regarding restraint more strictly in the cases in this sample, fewer 
would have been deemed lawful and more unlawful. Furthermore, because culpable 
homicide is about negligence or omission rather than commission, it is an ideal type 
of offence for convicting shooters who kill, yet fail to employ the legally required 
level of restraint and/or use firearms in inappropriate circumstances. Given the low 
levels of legally required restraints that were used by the shooters in this study, a 
higher percentage of culpable homicides was expected. But the Courts did not 
appear to employ culpable homicide assiduously: only two per cent of the intentional 
homicides in this sample were ruled to be culpable homicides. This was the smallest 
category (10%) of criminal homicides. The remainder were classified as murders 
(22%) and unspecified unlawful homicides (68%). 
The unlawful gun homicides in this study were grouped into four basic 
categories: (1) motivation unknown (35%),137 (2) killing as primary motive 
(32%), 131 (3) ostensibly lawful motive (23%)~39 and (4) shooting secondary to some 
other offence (10%), like robbery. Priinary homicides were most common and here 
the intention was to kill or seriously injure, as in the case of political assassinations, 
'rumbles' between rival street gangs, drive-by-shootings, murder-suicides and 
intimate homicides. Secondary homicides were less frequent: only seven per cent of 
these victims were killed during robberies, two per cent in burglaries and 0.3% 
during rapes. 140 Such low levels of killing in robberies perpetrated with guns was 
probably because these offenders armed themselves with guns to gain compliance 
from their victims and only killed when 'things went wrong' (e.g. Cook, 1982, 
1979). The Courts ruled most of the primary homicides to be murders (42%), those 
with ostensibly lawful motives to be culpable homicides (63%), 141 and those with 
136 Which also meant an increase in the frequency of shootings that involved 
extremely low levels of restraint. 
137 Usually a body was found and there was little evidence of the shooter's identity 
or the precipitating circumstances. 
138 Including: conflict between rival street gangs (37%), politically motivated 
killings (24%), murder-suicides (18%), other primary homicides (8%), 
intimate homicides (7%) and drive-by-shootings (5%). 
139 Comprising: self defence ( 43%), accidents (39%) and arrests ( 18%). 
140 The predominance of primary over secondary homicides in this sample is 
probably due to the focus on fatalities. 
141 Which amounts to negligence. 
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unknown motives to be unlawful but unspecified ( 46%). 
The very high proportion of unlawful shootings in which the offence was not 
specified mirrors the fact that the majority of these cases never went further than 
inquest courts. This was generally because the available evidence was not sufficient 
to enable a criminal trial. Inadequate evidence also prevented inquest courts from 
deciding lawfulness in a high proportion (26%) of these cases, particularly those that 
were politically motivated.l42 Notably 57% of the shooters who were involved in 
unlawful homicides were never tried because they were not identified or traced by 
the police. Hence, few of those who used guns with an extreme lack of restraint--
sufficiently low for the Courts to find such shootings unlawful -- were brought to 
trial and even fewer were held criminally liable for the deaths of their victims. 
Although shortcomings at more than one point in the legal process are likely to 
have contributed to this outcome, a low quality of police investigation was a primary 
factor. In the process of collecting and analysing this research data, the following 
types of shortcomings were noted on the part of the SAP: not having necessary 
forensic or ballistics tests conducted, not reconstructing crime scenes, paltry efforts 
to identify and trace key witnesses and alleged shooters (Hansson, 1996). Although 
this points to a definite problem in policing, the aggravating circumstances at this 
time should not be overlooked. The political conflict made for chaotic and 
dangerous conditions in the townships. There was also an intense mistrust, fear and 
antagonism between black communities and the SAP, which translated into a very 
low level of co-operation.t•' 
At first glance, the figures from this study point to civilian rather than police 
shooters as the problem in relation to criminal firearm homicides~ More specifically, 
the Courts found 50% of the civilian, 31% of the PSO and only eight per cent of the 
police gun homicides, to be unlawful. 144 Since the average level of restraint 
employed by each of these three groups was not markedly different, the lower 
incidence of unlawful findings in police shootings should not be t'lken at face value. 
For this could also indicate leniency on the part of the Courts in the treatment of 
police who killed. 
The Impact of Political Conflict 
Considering the widespread political violence that took place between 1984 and 
1991, the lack of restraint in the use of firearms revealed in this research might have 
been part of a generalised readiness to use force. In other words, restraint in gun 
use may have been lower than usual because of the civil war. Although this research 
142 Only 17% of the non-political and 31 % of politically motivated cases were 
undetermined. 
143 An inquest magistrate commented explicitly on black people's reluctance to 
give evidence at this time (Wynberg Inquest 372/91). 
144 However, Special Constables were over-represented in criminal homicides, 
both as shooters (51%) and victims (50%). 
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sample did not enable an adequate test of the premise because it excluded the pre-
and post-war periods, 14' the role of political motivation in gun homicides was 
specifically examined. Somewhat surprisingly, less than a third (31 %) of these fatal 
shootings were found to have been politically motivated but, as hypothesised, these 
shooters employed a lower average level of minimum force. In particular, less use 
was made of oral warnings, warning shots and aiming at victims' legs. However, 
the average level of proportionality was not substantially different in these political 
and non-political firearm homicides. The large majority (84%) of the politically 
motivated homicides were perpetrated by police officers and involved civilians who 
were shot while protesting. 146 By contrast, politically motivated firearm homicides 
were not common among civilian (II %) or PSO shooters ( 4%). It is disturbing to 
note that the Courts found the majority (76%) of these police shootings to be lawful 
despite the generally low level of restraint employed and the fact that bystanders 
were frequently endangered in these incidents. 147 However, a similar percentage 
(80%) of the non-political fatal police shootings were also ruled justifiable. It thus 
seems that the Inquest Courts were generally lenient in assessing the lawfulness of 
fatal police shootings, although more so in politically motivated cases: here the 
Courts were more likely to leave cases undetermined ( 18%) than to rule them 
unlawful (6%). 1• The opposite trend was apparent in non-political gun homicides 
by police. 1«~ Previous research supports the finding of lenience on the part of the 
Courts in relation to SAP violence, particularly that perpetrated during political 
conflict (e.g. Weitzer & Repetti, 1991; Hansson, 1990[a]; Foster & Luyt, 1986). It 
is interesting to note that relatively few of the cases in which police fatally shot 
political protesters were justified in terms of crowd dispersal or the Emergency 
Regulations. Instead, these officers tended to use arrest or self defence as 
justifications for killing during political conflict. uo 
A number of empirical studies have shown significant correlations between 
increases in non-natural deaths and gun homicides during periods of intensified 
political conflict in Cape Town (e.g. MacDonald & Lerer, 1994; Hoffman et al, 
1986; Knobel, 1986). This investigation also indicated such a temporal association: 
the rate of politically motivated shootings sky-rocketed in 1985 when the political 
conflict first intensified in this area. It then declined slightly but remained above the 
pre-war rate into 1991. In addition, more of the politically motivated shootings took 
place in African residential areas which constituted flashpoints of political conflict in 
the greater Cape Town area. 
145 Furthermore, political conflict has not yet ceased, although it is no longer over 
Apartheid. 
146 These shootings comprised 48% of police gun homicides. 
14 7 Most of the PSO and civilian shootings remained undetermined. 
148 Lawful: police (79%), PSOs (56%) and civilians (29%). 
149 Undetermined (8%) and unlawful (12%). 
150 Self defence (36%) and arrests (27%). 
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This empirical study highlighted a range of problems pertaining to the use of guns in 
Cape Town during the civil war years and these point to specific policy 
interventions. But there has been major sociopolitical change in this country since 
1991 : most noticeably the civil war over Apartheid was formally brought to an end, 
the Apartheid State has been replaced and government has been profoundly 
restructured. Hence, the question is: are these still the key problems with respect to 
firearms in contemporary South Africa? In other words, can these findings be 
reliably extrapolated beyond the original research area and period? 
According to accumulated research, spatial variations in gun use should be 
expected (e.g. Geller & Scott, 1992). For instance, because firearm homicide is 
frequently more prevalent in large cities, restraint in gun use may have been worse 
in urban Cape Town than in rural areas of South Africa. This investigation indicated 
that the rate of gun death, particularly due to homicides, was consistently higher in 
Cape Town than in the country as a whole. However, the Western Cape did not 
suffer the. worst of the political conflict: metropolitan Cape Town experienced its 
most intense political violence at the start of the war in 1985 and 1986. 1 Since 1987, 
however, the vast majority of deaths due to political conflict have occurred in 
KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng (The SAIRR, 1992).2 Similarly, lCD statistics for 
1997 indicate that the Western Cape is fourth out of the nine provinces with respect 
to police killings and fatal shootings: K waZulu-Natal (34%), Gauteng (28% ), 
Eastern Cape (10%) and the Western Cape (8%) (Bruce, 23 July 1997). Arguing in 
favour of generalising some aspects of these research findings beyond pre-1992 Cape 
Town is certainly not meant to deny or underplay inter-regional differences. To the 
contrary, empirical research is urgently needed to map these specificities. But at this 
stage, in the absence of evidence indicating that Cape Town was characterised by a 
significantly lower level of restraint in gun use than other urban areas in this 
country, it would seem reasonable to hypothesise that this was a national problem. 
The increased prevalence and use of unlicensed fully-automatic firearms is a 
current priority in South Africa (The Inter-Departmental Strategy Team, 1996[b]). 
The black market in illegal assault weapons has flourished in this country particularly 
Although there was a resurgence of faction fighting in 1991 due to the taxi-
wars. 
2 On average 72% and 20% resp. 
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since 1991 , and these guns have been used increasingly in the ongoing political 
conflict in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng (The Argus, 7 September 1993; The 
Goldstone Commission, 1993 resp). Predictably then, combat firearms did not 
emerge as a key problem in this research because of the focus on Cape Town in the 
period before 1992. 
In relation to temporal reliability it could be argued that the low levels of 
restraint revealed by this study were a product of the civil war conditions and that 
people are likely to employ greater restraint in their use of firearms now that the 
major conflict is over. Without a doubt the Anti-Apartheid civil war made this 
country a particularly violent place. Between the onset of the fighting in 1984 and 
the early stages of the S<H:alled transition in 1991 , the national mortality rate due to 
political conflict increased twelvefold and in 1994 the rate was still six-times higher 
than the pre-war level: one death per 100000 people in 1984, 12 in 1991 and six in 
1994 (The SAIRR, 1994 to 1984). Nevertheless, it is important not to attribute high 
levels of interpersonal violence in South Africa solely to this particular political 
struggle. This was a violent society long before the outbreak of tbe recent civil war 
and politically motivated violence has continued to rage between different groups 
since the formal removal of the Apartheid State (e.g. Bradshaw et al, 1984; The 
Inter-Departmental Strategy Team, 1996[b]; The Sunday Independent 13 October 
1996 resp). What the civil war did was to exacerbate an already high level of 
violence, particularly firearm homicide. 
The level of violence has not decreased since the civil war officially ceased. 
To the contrary, both violent crime and politically-related violence appear to be 
spiralling upwards (e.g. The Mail & Guardian, 26 Jan- 1 Feb 1996; Nedcor, 1995; 
The Ministry of Safety & Security 1995; Scharf, 1994[a]). Indeed, South Africa 
now has the infamous title of the most violent country in the world (The Argus, 7 
September 1993). Significantly, guns seem to be playing an increasing role in the 
perpetration of violence. Although comprehensive reliable national data have been 
lacking in this respect, available conviction statistics have shown an upward trend in 
the unlawful use of guns since 1991: convictions for murder and robbery with 
firearms rose by six per cent and 10% respectively between mid-1990 and mid-1994 
(The CSS, 1995 to 1989). The nineties have also seen an increase in violence 
against the police and deaths in the line-of-duty (Cilliers & Van Zyl Smit, 1995; The 
Commissioner of the SAP, 1993 to 1984). Police officers in this country are now at 
greater risk of homicidal death. 
Heightened violence has not been limited to the civilian population. In spite of 
radical reform, the SAP 'tradition' of excessive force appears to have continued 
within the new police service. A recent investigation of human rights violations by 
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police between 1990 and 1995 concluded that: 
". . . torture, assaults and unlawful shootings continue to remain features 
of policing under the new dispensation. . . . [H]uman rights violations are 
a systemic and nationwide problem within the police" (The Network of 
Independent Monitors et al, 1995: I). 
More specifically this report outlined factors contributing to the continued use of 
excessive force by the SAPS. Since these variables ought to be taken into account in 
developing current interventions they have been summarised in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1: Summary of Factors Contributing to Excessive Force by SAPS, 
1990-1995. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
A 'siege mentality' and high level of fear within the SAPS . 
Continued use of assault firearms and high velocity ammunition for 
general law enforcement. 
Frustration and low confidence in the legal system among police . 
Inadequacies in police methods of arresting and restraining 
suspects. 
A 'trigger-happy' and 'shoot-to-kill' attitude among police . 
An ineffective and poorly implemented police procedure for 
monitoring police gun use. 
Ineffective and highly partial mechanisms for investigating injuries 
and deaths caused by police. 
Law and policy that condones the use of deadly force with little 
restraint. 
A high level of impunity from criminal sanction for police officers 
who injure or kill. 
Source: The Network of Independent Monitors et al, (1995). 
< 
Regrettably then, the available evidence does not suggest a disappearance of the 
overall problem of excessive force by police or civilians in the contemporary South 
African context. 1 
The primary problem identified by this study -- a high and rising rate of gun 
homicide -- has continued into the mid-nineties in Cape Town. In 1994 firearms 
were the second leading cause of homicidal death in this city and were responsible 
for a much higher proportion of homicides than previously (The MRC, 1995). 
According to the public health authorities the incidence of injury and violence in this 
city are "disturbingly high" and "contribute significantly to the burden of disease" 
(The MRC, 1995:i). Furthermore, the young ages of many of those who die in this 
way results in an enormous loss of potential years of life due to non-natural death, 
e.g. 130000 potential years of life in 1994, which was almost half the total lost 
3 Including unrestrained gun use. 
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due to all causes (The MRC, 1995:i). 
In some respects gun-related death has worsened in this area since 1991. The 
rate of firearm suicide has increased and the already high rate of police suicide has 
sky-rocketed (The MRC, 1995; The Commanding Officer of the W.Cape SAPS, 13 
April 1995 resp. ). It also seems likely that unintentional shootings have increased 
given the substantial growth in gun ownership which has taken place over the past 
few years.• As a consequence the profiles of gun victims are probably changing: for 
instance, the increased prevalence of guns among black civilians is likely to place 
this group at heightened risk of firearm suicide and domestic gun accidents. Indeed, 
there is some evidence indicating that by 1994 coloured people had become a high-
risk group for gun suicide in Cape Town (The MRC, 1995). 
On the positive side, however, lCD figures suggest a recent decline in fatal 
shootings by the police in the Western Cape. In the three months between April and 
June 1997, seven firearm homicides were perpetrated by police in this region (Bruce, 
23 July 1997). If this level remained constant throughout 1997 the total would be 
28, which is substantially lower than the annual total of 47 that occurred in the 
smaller area of metropolitan Cape Town during 1991. This progress may well 
reflect the impact of police reforms, including the depoliticised and community-
oriented service role now played by the SAPS, who are no longer at the frontline of 
the political conflict. Even though the use of deadly force by the SAPS appears to 
have improved somewhat since 1991, it would seem important to continue treating 
the police as a key target group for gun-related interventions. They constitute 
important role models for gun use and visible attempts to reduce the unnecessary use 
of deadly force by police may serve to enhance public confidence. Furthermore, the 
existing commitment to change within the SAPS is a favourable context for 
intervention. 
Although the police may now be responsible for fewer fatal shootings, this 
advance may have been accompanied by a deterioration within another group of gun 
users -- armed private security officers (PSOs) -- who now outnumber the public 
police and are also responsible for fatal shootings. However, reliable counts of PSO 
shootings have not been forthcoming, which makes the overall level of gun 
homicides perpetrated by law enforcement officers in this country at present 
uncertain. This is a matter requiring urgent attention. 
To conclude, because gun use must have changed in this country since 1992, 
likely shifts and reforms that have already been implemented have been taken into 
account in recommending interventions. Furthermore, proposals have not been 
limited to the findings from this study but have been based on accumulated research 
in this field. 
4 Although up-to-date figures were not available. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
Key Reforms 
Introductory Comnumt 
332 
This research was focused on the civil war years between 1984 and 1991 but 
profound changes have since taken place in South Africa. For the first time in 
history this country has a democratically elected government committed to non-
racism, a Constitution and a Bill of Rights that guarantee internationally accepted 
hu111a;11 rights. Although the formal system of Apartheid has been dismantled, the 
consequences of 43 years of institutionalised racial oppression and a civil war 
endure. This is a society in transition; a nation in a state of flux: numerous reforms 
are still on the drawing board, some are in the process of being implemented and 
others are too recent for their impact to be evaluated fairly. Notably, many 
interventions suggested by researchers for reducing excessive force by the South 
African police have now been implemented. These, and other changes that are likely 
to have affected restraint in contemporary gun use, have been considered in this 
section and what remains to be done has been discussed thereafter. 
DnelopiMntS in Gun CoiiiTol ugisltltion 
South Africa bas a rather comprehensive body of law intended to regulate the 
manufacture, supply, possession, carrying and use of firearms.' Like many Western 
nations this gun control legislation bas long been the dominant type of intervention in 
relation to firearms. In recent years firearm law bas been developed in rather 
traditional ways: the range of criminal offences pertaining to guns bas been 
expanded, 6 punishments for offences involving guns and repeat offending have been 
increased, and mandatory minimum sentences for certain gun-related offences have 
been introduced. Arguably, the foUowing have been among the most notable 
reforms made during the nineties: increased restrictions on the carrying of firearms, 
stricter requirements for safe-keeping, a "sound reason" for possession and certified 
competence as prerequisites for gun licensing. 7 The current Act contains the basic 
legal provisions that have generaUy proven most effective (e.g. Kleck & Patterson, 
1993). 
CoiU:trUcting a ·Gun Probkm ' 
The nineties have seen the development of a particular conception of firearms as a 
social problem which significantly informs the nature of contemporary gun-related 
interventions. In short, illegal possession and the use of firearms to perpetrate crime 
are seen as the core of the firearm problem. More specifically, according to the 
5 Discussed at length in Chapter Three. 
6 See Figure 3.19. 
7 See Chapter Three for details of reforms after 1991 . 
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National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS): 
"[i]t is clear that the availability of firearms in South Africa contributes 
to higher levels of violence associated with crime . . . thereby increasing 
the costs to society, both in terms of physical loss of life and injury" 
(The Inter-Departmental Strategy Team, 1996[b]:30-l). 
This quote reveals the following three basic premises: ( 1) the availability of guns has 
increased in contemporary South Africa; (2) this has resulted in a higher incidence of 
gun use in the perpetration of crime; and (3) as a consequence, there are now more 
deaths and injuries associated with crime. Since it has also been assumed that most 
offences are committed using unlicensed guns, it is illegal firearms that have been 
the focus of attention. In keeping with this understanding of the problem, the State's 
gun-related interventions have been almost exclusively focused on the removal of 
illegal guns from society. Reducing gun prevalence has also been adopted as the 
main objective of the Gun Free South Africa Campaign (GFSA), the principal non-
government organisation in this arena. 
Police CampaigJU aglliJUt UnliceJUed FirellTIIIS 
During the civil war years the Nationalist government published very little 
information about the State's gun control initiatives. Over this period active 
prohibitionist organisations like the GFSA Campaign were absent and it seems that 
the intense violence of the civil war overshadowed the rather specific issue of 
firearms. But since the -so-called transition to democracy, there has been a marked 
increase in discourse on gun-related interventions. 
In 1990, the police launched an intensive campaign to trace and confiscate 
illegal guns within the country (The Goldstone Commission, 1993). To this end, 
specialist police units dealing with firearms were restructured and the number was 
increased (The Argus, 7 September 1993). The police intelligence mechanism was 
improved and a widely publicised system of monetary rewards for relevant 
information on illegal firearms was introduced. Police intensified activity in high 
crime areas, for example: during Operation Alpo on the Witwatersrand, 59 people 
were arrested for the illegal possession of guns and 39 illegal firearms with 532 
rounds of ammunition were confiscated over a two month period (The Commissioner 
of the SAP, 1992:49). The police also employed surprise raids, for instance: at the 
height of the taxi-war in the Cape Peninsular, police conducted a series of surprise 
searches at taxi-ranks in Nyanga and Khayelitsha (The Weekend Argus, 27-28 May 
1995; The Argus, 2 December 1994). Together the police and the army also carried 
out house-to-house searches in politically volatile areas like KwaZulu-Natal (The 
Argus, 17 August 1995). By 1993 the police stated that this approach had proven 
effective and this was reinforced by the Goldstone Commission (1993) which 
endorsed the ongoing use of the strategy. Furthermore, the Minister of Safety and 
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Security emphasised that the police are highly motivated to decrease the prevalence 
of illegal firearms, not only to reduce violent crime, but to lessen the danger to 
which they are exposed (Hansard, 11 May 1995). In recent years there have been 
increases in reports of illegal possession and illegal firearms confiscated by police 
(The Cape Times, 17 March 1995; The Commissioner of the SAP, 1993). 
This aspect of the police campaign was concerned with locating illegal guns 
already inside the country. However, an increasing proportion of illegal firearms 
were smuggled into South Africa, particularly from Mozambique via Swaziland and 
from Angola via Namibia. Trade in illegal weapons from such nations was fuelled 
by the availability of numerous military weapons left over from recent civil wars 
combined with intense poverty and severe drought conditions (The Sunday Times, 27 
August 1995). The fact that many of these guns are capable of firing continuous 
bursts of hundreds of high velocity bullets has made contemporary gun running a 
high priority issue. There has been particular concern over the use of fully-
automatic firearms in ongoing political conflict between the ANC and IFP in 
KwaZulu-Natal. In late 1992 the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of 
Public Violence and Intimidation held public hearings to consider: "... ways and 
means of curbing the illegal importation of automatic weapons and their distribution 
and use in South Africa in the furtherance of political violence • (The Goldstone 
Commission, 1993: 1 ). The Commission made a range of recommendations which 
included inter alia: additional funding for p lice campaigns aimed at preventing the 
entry of illegal guns; the acquisition of scanning equipment ro check for concealed 
firearms in goods-loads entering the cOUJ;ltry and a number of legal amendments.• 
Despite the State's concerted efforts, the trade in illegal automatic weapons has 
continued. This problem has subsequently been afforded priority within the NCPS 
and in 1995 the police launched Operation Safety to limit the flow of illegal firearms 
from frontline states into South Africa. In addition, the government has sought to 
foster regional co-operation in order to stem gun smuggling. South Africa and 
Mozambique have signed a treaty and agreed to conduct joint missions to locate and 
destroy illicit gun caches in Mozambique. A committee has been established to 
integrate the police intelligence services of Mozambique, Swaziland and South 
Africa so that information on gun-running can be pooled (The Sunday Times, 30 
April 1995). Operation Rachel was instituted as part of this venture in June 1995. 
This comprised search and destroy missions into Mozambique by joint South 
African-Mozambiquan police units and, by August 1995, 70925 illegal weapons had 
been seized (The Cape Times, 14 July 1995; The Weekend Argus, 24-25 June 1995; 
The Argus, 22 August 1995 resp). 
Police successes in Mozambique have made it a less hospitable context for gun 
8 Induding: requiring routine carrying of gun licences and production at po~ce 
request, making failure to produce a licence an offence, and empowenng 
police to confiscate guns and ammunition if licences are not produced. 
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runners. Hence this enterprise has been gradually shifted to Angola, a country that 
has been less intensively policed. Here, Unita soldiers have been a key source of 
illicit firearms. The weapons have generally been bought-- at around fifty rand for 
an AK-47 assault rifle with a few clips of ammunition-- by Xhosa women who work 
the Namibian-Angolan border, and then collected at border points like Rundu, 
shipped to Windhoek and transported by road into the Western Cape and Gauteng 
(The Sunday Times, 30 April 1995). In response to this shift in gun trafficking, 
police have now targeted the route used to bring illegal guns from Angola into South 
Africa (The Weekend Argus, 9-10 September 1995). 
Over the past few years another noteworthy change has taken place in illegal 
trade in southern Africa. Organised gun-running has long been the province of 
crime syndicates which have recently expanded their activities beyond guns, mainly 
to stolen cars and drugs. In view of the shifting patterns of illegal trading in this 
region, South Africa, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe have adopted a 
collaborative approach to combatting organised crime in southern Africa (The Argus, 
22 August 1995). To sum up, during the nineties the key objective of police 
interventions in relation to guns has been to reduce the number of illegal firearms in 
this country. 
Tire Nllliolllll Crime Prewntion Strat~gy 
Rising crime has been recognised as a major impediment to the process of 
reconstruction and development currently underway in South Africa. Indeed shortly 
after the 1994 election the· government identified the prevention of crime as a 
national priority and, in March 1995, the cabinet formally introduced the National 
Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). This multifaceted, long-term approach 
comprises a large range of national, provincial and local-level interventions aimed at 
preventing offending (The Inter-Departmental Strategy Team, 1996[b]). Crime 
involving firearms has been designated as one of seven categories of offences 
requiring priority treatment in this strategy .9 Since the launch of the NCPS, State 
gun control has become an integral part of the NCPS. The primary gun-related 
objectives adopted by May 1996 have been summarised in Table 10.2. The police 
were clearly the key role-players in gun-related initiatives during the first year of 
operation, although inter-agency co-operation has been stressed as a central aspect of 
the NCPS. 
9 The other six are: organised crime, white collar crime, gender violence and 
crimes against children, violence associated with intergroup conflict, vehicle 
theft and high-jacking, and corruption within the criminal justice system. 
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Table 10.2: Primary NCPS Objectives re Firearm Crime, May 1996. 
The SAPS 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Establish a national computerised firearm register. 
Set up a national desk to co-ordinate police strategy in relation to 
illegal firearms. 
Create specialised police task forces for dealing with illegal 
firearms. 
Introduce specialist police firearm units in the former TBVC 
territories. 
Foster co-operation from neighbouring countries. 
Undertake joint operations with police in borderline states to seize 
illegal firearms. 
Improve police intelligence with respect to gun smuggling. 
Continue the reward system for information on illegal firearms. 
Help customs officials improve controls at border crossings. 
Develop technology for identifying illegal guns bidden in cargo. 
Enhance regulation of firearms within the SAPS. 
Improve enforcement of legal controls on licensed firearms. 
Build working relationships with key organisations such as the 
South African Gun Owners Association and the Firearm Dealer's 
Association. 
Identify priority areas for intensive crime prevention operations. 
Th~ South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Develop a reaction force capacity, together with the SAPS, to 
enable swifter responses to violent crime incidents. 
Improve SANDF intelligence in relation to gun smuggling. 
Assist the SAPS in patrolling border crossing points. 
Enhance regulation of firearms in the SANDF. . 
Conduct search-and-seizure operations to locate illegal caches of 
firearms in neighbouring countries. 
The Secretariat for Safety and Security 
* Conduct a critical evaluation of gun control legislation. 
The Justice System 
* 
* 
Hold frrearm-related prosecutions in higher courts to enable the 
imposition of heavier sentences. 
Conduct more comprehensive assessments of bail applications in 
~-related cases. 
The Department of Correctional Services 
* Improve controJ over firearms in the department. 
Source: The Inter-Departmental Strategy Team (1996[b]:30-3). 
Although it is too early for a fair assessment of the success of the NCPS in relation 
to firearms, a number of particularly positive aspects are worth emphasising. The 
NCPS is the first large-scale planned and co-ordinated approach to gun-related crime 
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and it has drawn attention to firearm-related issues in South Africa. Because the 
strategy makes allowance for a wide range of state and civil initiatives it is likely to 
encourage innovation in the 'firearms arena'. 
Encouraging Vollllllary Surrender 
Since the 1994 election, a number of periods of indemnity from prosecution have 
been offered as a means of motivating people to surrender their unlicensed guns and 
ammunition (The Cape Times, 8 December 1994). These amnesties have been 
aimed specifically at disarming the so-called private armies and self protection units 
that developed out of the civil war (The Sunday Times, 20 August 1995; The Cape 
Times, 15 December 1994). Overall, such voluntary initiatives have not met with 
resounding success. The previously lax administration of firearms by State 
authorities in the former TBVC states has been identified as a key factor enabling 
illegal possession. Firearm owners in these regions have thus been required to re-
register or surrender their firearms. This strategy does not appear to have been very 
successful, however, as only 23% of licensed guns were re-registered by the, 
deadline in September 1996 (The Sunday Independent, 6 October 1996). 
TU Gull Free Solllh Africa Campaign (GFSA) 
The GFSA Campaign was the first nationally organised non-government gun control 
initiative in South Africa. The initial objective was: 
"[t]o make a material contribution to peace and stability in South Africa 
by involving the people of the country in elimin3ting guns from our 
society and by actually removing and destroying a significant percentage 
of those guns" (GFSA Campaign, 1994[a]:l) 
The Campaign was established by a coalition of religious bodies in mid-1994, but 
was subsequently endorsed by a wide range of non-government organisations (NGO) 
and the leaders of all the major political parties, including President Mandela himself 
(The Cape Times, 15 December 1994). The GFSA Campaign was launched on the 
Day of Reconciliation -- 16 December 1994 -- by way of a day-long nationwide 
voluntary hand-in of legal and illegal firearms. Anyone in possession of guns or 
ammunition was encouraged to surrender these at churches and police stations 
throughout the country. Those who handed in unlicensed firearms were 
automatically granted immunity from prosecution. The guns that were collected 
were welded closed under police supervision and destroyed (The Cape Times, 9 
December 1994). 10 The hand-in was widely publicised and raffle tickets for 
substantial cash prizes were used as an incentive (The Argus, 1 December 1994). In 
the Western Cape, street gangs were specifically targeted and one gang even publicly 
10 Melted down at an iron and steel plant. 
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challenged rivals to match their contribution (The Weekend Argus, 17-18 December 
1994). 
The broader aim of the GFSA campaign was to educate the public, particularly 
children, with regard to the dangers of owning guns (The GFSA Campaign, 
1994[a]:2). As part of the GFSA launch children were invited to hand in their toy 
guns and a major chain store agreed to refrain from stocking authentic-looking toy 
guns (The Cape Times, 9 December 1994). Every child who participated was 
awarded a certificate signed by Nelson Mandela and bearing the words: "I pray you 
will grow up in a South Africa free from violence and free from fear". A number of 
schools in economically disadvantaged areas were given a library book for every toy 
gun handed in by a pupil (The Weekend Argus, 3-4 December 1994). 
Unfortunately, however, the immediate success of this project was extremely 
limited. A total of 327 guns and 6800 rounds of ammunition were collected for the 
entire country (The GFSA Campaign, 1994[b]:2). Even in the Western Cape, where 
the programme was best publicised and most successful, only 108 guns were handed 
in. 11 Indeed Campaign representatives admitted being •a little disappointed• with 
the outcome, especially in view of the poor results achieved in violent areas (The 
Cape Times, 20 December 1994; The Sunday Times, 18 December 1994). This 
experience bred the realisation that "it will take time to change the gun culture • (The 
GFSA Campaign, 1994[b]:l; The Argus, 20 December 1994 resp). The 
organisation emphasised subsequently that this "call for people to reconsider their 
need to own a firearm and to voluntarily hand in weapons for destruction • was only 
a first step. 
The GFSA Campaign modified it's techniques hereafter. In an interview 
conducted in late 1995, a representative highlighted research, lobbying, campaigning 
and public education as the new key strategies (The GFSA Campaign, 4 September 
1995). And the organisation adopted the following objectives for 1995: (1) to make 
a submission to the Constitutional Assembly opposing the inclusion of the right to 
bear firearms in the new Constitution; (2) to assist in establishing a committee to 
review the law on firearms and to acquire representation on this body; (3) to set up a 
national committee for the GFSA Campaign comprising representatives from every 
region; and (4) to organise an annual national conference on gun control (The GFSA 
Campaign, 1995). Nevertheless, the GFSA Campaign has remained strongly 
prohibitionist in orientation, with the focus on disarming civilians, stricter gun 
licensing laws and tougher measures against unlawful possession. 
This is the first politically powerful prohibitionist lobby in South Africa and its 
emergence has been met with a backlash from anti-prohibitions, as has been the case 
in most countries (The Argus, 1 December 1994). The stage is set for political 
II And 34 in Johannesburg, 16 in KwaZulu-Natal, 15 in Eastern Transvaal, 
14 in East London and nine in Grahamstown. 
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warfare between these camps; a gun-control-controversy is in the making. 
Clumges to Deadly Force Law 
The highly controversial extra-ordinary legal powers that were afforded members of 
the security forces under the Security Emergency Regulations and the Defence Act 
44 of 1957 have been terminated (Burchill & Milton, 1994). In 1991, a process of 
reforming the law and policy governing public protest in South Africa was initiated 
and in 1993 the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 was passed. 12 Promoting peaceful 
public protest, even when illegal, is the ethic embodied in the new legislation. The 
preamble to the Act states that: 
"[i]t is the right of every person to assemble with other persons and to 
express his[her] views on any matter freely and publicly and to enjoy the 
protection of the State while doing so". 
Emphasis bas been placed on planning for public gatherings in order to limit 
disruption to everyday business and damage to life and property. To this end, the 
police must aim to prevent injury to persons and property damage, and must notify 
convenors if they believe they will be unable to provide adequate protection for 
participants. Significantly, the Act stresses negotiation and other non-violent 
methods to achieve these goals. 
The police are permitted to employ force in the context of public gatherings if 
an officer, no lower than the rank of Warrant Officer, bas reasonable grounds for 
believing that a life or property ·are endangered and that the danger cannot be averted 
by peaceful means. Under these circumstances the officer concerned is required to 
obtain the attention of the assembled persons and call upon them to disperse, within 
a reasonable period of time, from the place where they are gathered. This order 
must be audible and issued in at least two of the official languages. If possible, it 
should be given in a language that is likely to be understood by the majority of those 
gathered. If the people concerned have not dispersed or have made no preparation to 
disperse after the specified time, the officer in charge may order the police to 
disperse the gathering using force but "excluding weapons likely to cause serious 
bodily injury or death". Furthermore, the minimum force necessary to disperse a 
gathering must be used, and the force must be proportional to the circumstances and 
the object to be attained. The legislation expressly restricts the police use of deadly 
force and lethal weapons to circumstances in which killing, serious injury or 
significant damage to valuable property is likely. An order to use deadly force must 
be given by a relatively senior officer, who must believe that deadly force is the least 
force necessary to prevent the violent actions in question: s/he must consider all 
other methods to be ineffective or inappropriate. Even under these conditions, the 
12 See Todd (1994). 
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force used must be moderated and kept proportional to the circumstances and the 
objective. 
Table 10.3: Summary of New Restraints for Dispersing Public Gatherings. 
* 
* 
* 
The minimum force necessary to disperse the gathering or avert 
killing, serious injury and/or severe damage to valuable property. 
Proportionality between the force employed and the objective, i.e. 
dispersing a gathering or preventing death, serious injury or severe 
damage to valuable property. 
Whenever feasible: 
first use negotiation and non-violent methods to disperse a 
gathering; 
if necessary, give audible orders to disperse in a specified 
time· 
' allow those gathered sufficient time to comply with orders to 
disperse; 
if a gathering fails to disperse, use less-than-lethal force to 
disperse it; 
use deadly force only to avert killing, serious injury and/or 
serious damage to valuable property. 
Source: The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
The new legal approach to public protest is certainly a substantial improvement. 
Disappointingly, however, it still violates proportionality by permitting the use of 
deadly force to defend property. 
In 1993 the AD ruled that during arrests, police were required to verbally warn 
of their intention to shoot and to ftre a warning shot before shooting to kill ~ 
Minister of Law and Order v Ntsane, 1993). Additionally, under the new 
constitution, n an arrestee now has the right to "promptly be informed, in a language 
which he or she understands, that he or she has the right to remain silent and to be 
warned of the consequences of making any statement". In early 1996 the 
constitutional validity of section 49(2) -- which permits the use of deadly force in 
order to effect an arrest or prevent an escape -- was challenged following the 
controversial killing by police of a 10 year old boy (The Sunday Times, 24 March 
1996). The Minister of Safety and Security defended the section as vital for 
effective policing, but the Minister of Justice stated that he was not supportive of the 
provision (The Sunday Times, 24 March 1996). This issue has generated heated 
controversy and debate over the optimal minimum standard for arrest (e.g. The 
National Standards & Management Services Division, 3 March 1997). 
13 Act 200 of 1993 as amended. 
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Changes to Police Standing Orders 
In response to sustained criticism the National Standards and Management Services 
Division of the SAPS undertook to develop an improved set of National Police 
Standing Orders (Scharf, 5 November 1995). As part of this endeavour, and in 
reaction to the controversy over the arrest-law, a Special Service Order on the use of 
force in police arrests was issued in late 1996 (The SAPS Special Service Order, 
1996). The stated rationale was to bring police regulations into line with 
constitutional requirements pending expected legislative reform and the Director 
summarised the key change as follows: "the offences in respect of which lethal force 
may be used have been limited [further]" (The National Standards & Management 
Services Division, 3 March 1997). 
To elaborate: the police may no longer use deadly force in the arrest of persons 
suspected of the following offences: sodomy, bestiality, receiving stolen property, 
fraud, forgery, theft (except for livestock and motor vehicles), and offences relating 
to coinage (The SAPS Special Service Order, 1996). 14 However, police may use 
deadly force in the arrest of certain additional categories of suspects: those suspected 
of any offence relating to intimidation, terrorism or control over armaments, arms, 
ammunition, explosives, drugs or radioactive material, for which the punishment is 
at least five years imprisonment, any offence involving serious violence which is 
life-threatening including the use or threatened use of a firearm or explosives. 
According to the National Commissioner of the SAPS this change is intended to: 
". . . prohibit police from shooting persons suspected of having committed 
petty crimes, while ensuring that police may use proportionate force, 
including lethal force, when it is warranted" (3 March 1997). 
But this does not appear to be altogether accurate, for although deadly force may no 
longer be used to arrest those suspected of relatively minor offences, it is still 
permitted in relation to suspected theft of livestock and motor vehicles. The reform 
is clearly an attempt to enhance proportionality: the Orders state that if the degree of 
force to be used to arrest is disproportionate to the seriousness of the suspected 
offence, force should not be used, even if this results in the suspect evading arrest. 
Section 8 is something of a lengthy caveat to Section 3 and seems to be a brace 
included to strengthen the proportionality requirement which nonetheless falls short 
of the defence-of-life standard. These regulations still permit police to kill non-
dangerous, fleeing suspects and the nature of the suspected offence -- a rather 
unreliable predictor of dangerousness -- has been retained as the decisive factor. In 
14 Lethal force may still be used in the arrest of suspects for the following 
Schedule One offences: treason, sedition, murder, public violence, rape, 
robbery, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, kidnapping, 
childstealing, arson, breaking or entering with intent to commit one of these 
listed offences, escaping from lawful custody where the person is in custody 
for one of these offences or for the offence of escaping. 
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other words, proportionality has been sought between the force used and the 
seriousness of the suspected offence, rather than with the actual danger to be averted. 
As has already been argued, violent behaviour by suspects at the time of an arrest is 
the most reliable indicator of threat and a fairer criterion for decisions to use lethal 
force.u It is also easier for officers' to remember than a list of offences and enables 
more rapid decision-making under stressful conditions. To elaborate further: 
"[police firearm policy] based on the dangerousness of a suspect 
confronted by police is preferable to one based on the nature of the 
original offence. The two factors are obviously related, but a policy 
based on danger can be clearer and more concise, can exclude many 
questionable shootings, and need not require an officer to attempt so 
elaborate an evaluation of the facts before deciding whether to shoot• 
(Milton et all977:130). 
Table 10.4: Summary of New Criteria for Police Arrests and Preventing 
Escapes. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The use of force must be authorised by law. 
The force used must be the minimum reasonable in the 
circumstances. 
Force may only be used if a suspect resists attempts to arrest 
her/him, or flees to escape arrest. 
Force may only be used when a suspect cannot be arrested without 
the use of force. 
The force used must be reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances, to overcome a suspect's resistance or prevent a 
suspect from fleeing. · 
The degree of force must be proportional to the seriousness of the 
suspected offence. 
Force likely to cause death is permissible only in relation to those 
reasonably suspected of the offences (listed in Section 4) .16 
If force is to be used, whenever feasible a clear warning must be 
issued to the suspect that force will be used against her/him unless 
s/he submits to arrest. 
A warning shot must precede any shot fired at the s-ospect, unless 
the firing of a warning shot may endanger the lives of other people 
or could reasonably be expected to cause the person to escape. 
Source: The SAPS Special Service Orders (1996). 
Despite this rather serious limitation, other aspects of the Orders constitute a 
significant improvement. Importantly, restraint in the use of deadly force and the 
basic principles of minimum force and proportionality have been explicitly stressed 
along with actual restraints required, such as warning shots and verbal warnings. 
15 See Chapter Four. 
16 Discharging a firearm at a person is defined as deadly force irrespective of the 
part of the body aimed at (Section 5). 
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Notably Section 2 underscores the fact that: 
" ... force need not necessarily be applied during an arrest .... [And that] 
the purpose of the use of force in such circumstances may only be to 
confine the body of the person and may never be to punish" (The SAPS 
Special Service Order, 1996). 
Strict adherence to these Orders is stipulated and the regulations have been presented 
with greater clarity yet more specificity, than previous Standing Orders. 
Structural turd Legal Clumges re the PoUce 
In 1994, after 16 months of work by a multidisciplinary technical committee, a draft 
of the police bill was released for public comment (The Sunday Times, 20 August 
1995). Its overall objective was to establish a new identity for the police in Post-
Apartheid South Africa as contemplated in the Constitution, 17 and more specifically, 
"to create a highly professional, accountable, impartial and transparent Police 
Service" (The Weekend Argus 2-3 September, 1995). However, this draft bill was 
withdrawn rather rapidly under a barrage of criticism. It was subsequently modified 
in the light of broad consultation and finally enacted in late 1995 as the South 
African Police Service Act 68. This lengthy piece of legislation details a new set of 
aims and structure for the SAPS, as well as a range of regulatory mechanisms. 
The implementation of these legislated requirements bas been orchestrated by 
nine provincially-based Change Management Teams. Executive control of the SAPS 
no longer resides with the militaristic State Security Council but with parliament, a: 
civilian Secretariat for Safety and Security and an Executive Co-ordinating 
Committee. 11 The main purpose of the Secretariat is to ensure civilian oversight, 
democratic accountability and transparency of the SAPS. More specifically it has 
been tasked with evaluating the functioning of the SAPS, developing and monitoring 
the implementation of police policy and conducting other relevant research. 19 
The SAPS is structured at both national and provincial levels and functions 
under the direction of the national government as well as the nine provincial 
governments. The security branch and the riot police, two of the most controversial 
branches of the SAP, have been replaced with two specialist national units for 
intelligence and public order policing. An Independent Complaints Directorate 
(lCD) and a system of Community Police Forums and Boards have been established 
as the chief accountability mechanisms. 
17 In terms of section 214( 1). 
18 Which includes the Minister of Safety & Security. 
19 To this end a National Standards and Management Services Division has been 
established. I 
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Police Accountability Mechanisms 
Until recently civilian oversight of the police and effective accountability 
mechanisms simply did not exist (Weitzer & Repetti, 1991). To backtrack a little: in 
1992 a permanent judicial commission on the prevention of violence and intimidation 
was established. 20 This publicly transparent inquiry operated under wide terms of 
reference and was accorded full powers of investigation and subpoena. Although 
this Commission was set up to investigate political violence, it exposed many abuses 
perpetrated by the SAP, provided valuable insight into the role played by the police 
in perpetuating the political conflict and ". . . increased the quality of external 
surveillance over the police and other arms of the security establishment" (Scharf, 
1994[b]:2). 
A complaints mechanism established under the National Peace Accord was also 
operative from late 1991 onwards. This comprised a system of Police Investigation 
Units and civilian Police Reporting Officers. 21 Unfortunately, however, this 
mechanism proved to be generally ineffective at bringing guilty officers to book (The 
Network of Independent Monitors et al, 1995; Scharf, 1994[b]). Two of the main 
reasons cited for this inefficacy were the limited powers accorded civilian overseers 
and the fact that investigatory mechanisms were not sufficiently independent of the 
police. In June 1995 the Police Reporting Officer for the Witwatersrand released a 
condemnatory report claiming that the system of civilian oversight was a failure 
because high-ranking police officers, supported by the AG, consistently blocked 
overseers acceSs to vital evidence. He underscored the gravity of the issue stating 
that: 
"... the problem of police misconduct is huge and is in my view the 
single most important factor contributing to the level of crime in SA" 
(Advocate Munnik quoted in: The Weekend Argus, 2-3 September 
1995). 
Despite the failure of the National Peace Accord police accountability mechanism, 
the lessons learned were used to inform the development of the lCD, the permanent 
complaints mechanism which has now been established in terms of the 1995 SAPS 
Act. According to this legislation the ICDs two principal functions are to 
investigate, mero motu or on receipt of a complaint, misconduct or offences 
allegedly committed by police and all deaths resulting from police action as well as 
those that occur in police custody. 22 Heated debate over optimal structure and 
functioning preceded, and has followed, the establishment of the lCD. Operational 
and financial independence seem to have been the main concerns (e.g. The Network 
20 Popularly known as the Goldstone Commission. 
21 Eleven police investigation units were operational by the end of 1992 (The 
Commissioner of the SAP, 1993). 
22 It may also investigate any matter referred by the Minister or other member of 
the Executive Committee. 
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of Independent monitors et al, 1995; The Weekend Argus, 2-3 September 1995; The 
Sunday Times, 8 August 1995; Scharf, 1994[a), 1994[b]). This matter bas been 
addressed in numerous ways throughout the Act: it is stated explicitly that the lCD 
shall function independently from the SAPS and that "all organs of state shall accord 
such assistance as may be reasonably required for the protection of the 
independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of the directorate in the 
exercise and performance of its powers and functions". Furthermore, the executive 
bead of the lCD has been accorded quite substantial powers to investigate, and the 
Minister of Safety and Security is required to consult with the parliamentary 
committees in appointing or removing this bead. Notably, the lCD is funded 
directly by parliament and not via the Secretariat. 
One of the serious remaining concerns is the fact that the investigatory arm of 
the lCD is dominated by police officers, despite deliberate efforts to appoint civilian 
staff. This is due to scarcity of skilled investigators outside of the police force. 
Although it is hoped that the civilian component of the lCD will act as a watchdog 
with respect to the police investigatory component, such a composition is vulnerable 
to the well-known shortcomings of police investigations of police. Overall a great 
deal of critical evaluation and planning has gone into the development of the lCD 
and even at this early stage its impact is being systematically evaluated (Bruce, 23 
July 1997).n 
The SAPS Act makes provision f r another type of accountability mechanism: 
a liaison system between civilians and police comprising Community Police Forums 
and Boards. The legislated aims of these structures are to: (1) establish and maintain 
a partnership between the community and the police, (2) encourage communication, 
(3) promote co-operation in fulfilling the policing needs of the community, (4) 
improve the rendering of police services, (5) enhance the transparency and 
accountability of the SAPS, and (6) promote the joint identification and solving of 
problems. Importantly, the SAPS appears to be operating in a more transparent 
manner than the SAP and it is now generally easier to obtain information about 
police in this country. The prohibition on officers speaking to the press bas been 
lifted, the SAPS makes regular informative public statements, and previously secret 
information is being made available (e.g. Van Wyk, 1995). Furthermore, police 
interest in research and co-operation with non-police researchers has improved 
markedly. 
A N~ Discourse of PoUce-Work 
The leadership of the SAPS bas recognised that transforming police subculture and 
the managerial climate within which it operates are urgent imperatives (Van Wyk, 
1995; The Chief of SAP Efficiency Services, 1993). Perhaps the most visible 
23 The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. 
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intervention in this regard has been the formal adoption of a new discourse of police-
work, termed community-supported policing. 2• Indeed the new name and legislated 
objectives of the SAPS clearly reflect the most basic premises of this approach. To 
elaborate: the police force has been renamed a police service and the following aims 
have been set down in the Preamble to the Act: (1) to ensure the safety and security 
of all persons and property in the country, (2) to uphold and safe-guard the 
constitutional rights of every person, (3) to ensure co-operation between the SAPS 
and the communities it serves in combating crime, (4) to show respect for, and 
understanding of, the needs of crime victims, and (5) to ensure effective civilian 
supervision of the SAPS .. 
Peno~~Ml-Relllled Clumges 
Many of the SAP officers who perpetrated atrocities during the reign of the 
Apartheid State have been revealed and removed from the SAPS.u In general, 
however, members of the erstwhile SAP have not been prosecuted for abuses 
committed during the civil war. The key approach has been to publicly expose, 
learn from past 'mistakes' and then let bygones be bygones, which is exemplified by 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
The staff composition of the SAPS has been overhauled and, to some extent, 
undesirable elements have been purged. From 1993 top police leadership was 
effectively replaced; SAP generals were enc uraged to retire and new, mainly black 
generals were appointed. The 1994 election brought a new police Minister, National 
Commissioner and nine Provincial Commissioners. In addition, the SAPS has made 
a fonnal commitment to eliminate the longstanding over-representation of white 
males, especially in top positions. By implementing equal opportunity and 
affirmative action policies, the SAPS hopes to develop a police service that is more 
representative of the broader population (Van Wyk, 1995). Discrimination against 
police personnel on the grounds of sex and race has been prohibited by regulation. 
Thus far females, particularly in higher ranks, have remained under-represented 
within the SAPS. By contrast, the numbers of black officers have been boosted at 
all levels of the police service. This was largely a result of the amalgamation in 
1995 of the SAP and the 10 predominantly African police forces of the old TBVC 
states and self-governing territories. 
Specific efforts have been directed at eliminating Apartheid mentality from the 
SAPS. All aspects of the service have been racially integrated and anti-racism 
training has been introduced. A range of interventions have been aimed at 
demilitarising and depoliticising the police. A more civilian-style rank system, akin 
to that used in Britain, and a less militaristic police uniform are being introduced 
24 This is the context in which other SAPS reforms must be understood. 
25 Especially those who were involved in torture and assassinations. 
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(Van Wyk, 1995). Under the SAPS Act, police officers are now prohibited from 
holding office in political organisations, publicly expressing or displaying their 
political affiliations, or furthering or prejudicing party-political interests. 26 It is also 
noteworthy that conduct sheets now have to be maintained with respect to every 
police officer in the SAPS. This is promising as it implies the systematic monitoring 
of police conduct. 
PoUce Training ll1lll Re-education 
The dire importance of effective retraining bas been acknowledged within the SAPS, 
especially since 11 police agencies, each with differing approaches and methods, 
have been merged. A comprehensive assessment of police training programmes bas 
been undertaken by an interdisciplinary team of experts (VanWyk, 1995). One of 
the criticisms that bas emerged is that police training bas been too theoretical and 
legalistic in orientation, with insufficient emphasis on experiential learning in 
realistic conditions (The Chief of SAP Efficiency Services, 1993). Furthermore, too 
little attention bas been paid to key issues such as human rights, race relations, 
cultural sensitivity and skills like negotiation, consultation and conflict management. 
In 1995, 1800 police recruits underwent a pilot training programme, the overall aims 
of which were to demilitarise police attitudes, instill respect for human rights and 
orient officers toward the new community-style of policing. The efficacy of this 
pilot programme bas been evaluated and used in the development a retraining 
programme for the entire SAPS (Van Wyk,1995). 
Improving Weapons ll1lll Equip~lll for Law Enjorce~lll 
. Contrary to expert opinion, paramilitary weapons have remained part of the SAPS 
arsenal and have not been expressly prohibited from use in routine police-work. 
Indeed the Rl assault rifle, which was withdrawn due to its extreme lethality and 
high risk to bystanders, has been replaced with the R5 combat rifle. Similarly, the 
use of ostensibly non-lethal weapons with high fatality rates have not been rejected. 
For instance, rubber bullets were still being used to manage public protests at the 
-end of 1996 (The Mail & Guardian, 6-13 December 1996). There bas also been no 
indication from the SAPS that the issue of less-than-lethal equipment and tactics is 
being given the serious attention it requires. 
By contrast, officer safety is currently being treated as a priority within the 
SAPS and the rate of police homicides is said to have declined since 1994 (Van 
Wyk, 1995). Over the past few years the police have purchased large quantities of 
new generation body armour. 27 Although this increase in availability is a step in the 
26 However, they are permitted to attend political meetings, belong to political 
organisations and vote. 
27 In 1993 the total was 13755 complete sets and 3690 outer garments (The 
Commissioner of the SAP, 1993: 1 0). 
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right direction, creative efforts may be necessary to encourage routine wearing by 
police in this hot climate. 
The recognition by police management of the negative impact of stress on 
officer performance constitutes another promising development in the arena of 
officer safety. Police supervisors are being trained to identify symptoms of stress 
and to make appropriate referrals. Officers who have been involved in violent 
interactions with civilians are now being routinely referred for counselling. 
Significantly, the Centre for Academic and Research Psychology is investigating 
ways of preventing suicides among police (The Commissioner of the SAP, 1993). 
Finally, the mobile forensic laboratory is a rather impressive recent addition to 
police equipment. A number of these laboratories have been introduced since early 
1995 as a means of improving the quality of police investigations in outlying rural 
areas (The Cape Times, 16 February 1995). This appears to be part of the SAPS 
commitment to improving the quality of police investigations in general. 
Relewmt Clulllges to the ugal System 
The entire South African legal system is being overbauled and hopefully these 
reforms will improve the quality of justice rendered by the Courts in this country. 
Whilst the scale of reforms is too large to discuss here, interventions that are 
changing the pool of adjudicators in criminal trials are worth noting. For instance: 
lay assessors are being used increasingly to assist magistrates and judges, steps have 
been taken to modify the composition of the bench,u and the practice of appointing 
magistrates from the ranks of prosecutors is to be altered. 29 In short, these kinds of 
changes may help to address two key aspects of the 'gun problem': inconsistency in 
the application of the law, and Courts' customary lenience in the treatment of police 
officers. 
llllerim Evaluative Commellls 
Since many of these reforms are still in flux or have been introduced only recently, a 
conclusive evaluation of their impact is not feasible. Nevertheless, a number of 
preliminary assessments of the initial impact of some police reforms have already 
been conducted and remaining problems identified. Relevant findings from two of 
the most thorough published assessments available have been briefly discussed here, 
namely, those of the Network of Independent Monitors et al ( 1995) and the 
Confronting Crime Workshop (Lochrenberg & Stanton, 1995). 
The Network of Independent Monitors (NIM) et al (1995) investigated 
allegations of human rights violations by police between 1990 and 1995. Their main 
28 For example, fusing the bar has increased the number of black lawyers who 
will be eligible for appointment to the judiciary in the longer term. 
29 Since prosecutors work very closely with police, this is likely to decrease 
magisterial lenience toward officers. 
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conclusion was that although "powerful, symbolic steps in the right direction" had 
been taken in transforming the SAPS, some serious problems had not been 
adequately addressed (1995:47). Most worrying was the fact that the government 
had failed to take the crucial first step of publicly acknowledging that routine abuses 
of power by police, including the use of excessive force, were not a thing of the 
past. Additional interventions were recommended to address the main residual 
problems including inter alia: (1) the establishment of a National Task Force on 
Human Rights and Policing to propose and monitor the implementation of 
interventions aimed at preventing unnecessary deaths and the use of torture by 
police, (2) the addition to the SAPS Act of a new police code of practice based on 
the United Nations' Basic Principles (1990),30 (3) the provision of specific training 
for police, prosecutors and judicial officers with respect to the new police code of 
practice, (4) the introduction of a law specifically prohibiting torture, (5) and another 
obligating police to report misconduct by their colleagues, (6) law reform to enable 
greater command responsibility with the SAPS, and (7) a nationwide audit, by the 
Safety and Security Secretariat, of individual officers and police units allegedly 
involved in the repeated use of excessive force. Notably, the NIM report also 
underscored improvements to internal police disciplinary mechanisms as imperative, 
and proposed: increased transparency through civilian representation and regular 
public reports, as well as automatic suspension for officers accused of serious 
misconduct pending the outcome of investigations, and dismissal for those convicted 
of serious human rights violations. 
The community-supported approach to policing was one of the key i~es to 
receive attention at the Confronting Crime Workshop. This conference was an 
unprecedented event that involved dialogue among representatives from ~on­
government organisations, specialist academics, international experts and key 
officials from the new government. The participants generally agreed that, although 
community-supported policing showed great promise, the necessary paradigm shift 
had not been uniformly achieved throughout the SAPS. And as a consequence, the 
application of this new policing style had been fragmented. It was pointed out that 
the formal adoption of policy was just the first step and that specific interventions 
and sustained effort were necessary to modify established police practices. Indeed 
the resilience to change of cop culture in the South African context was not 
unexpected (e.g. Brogden, 1991; Jeffery, 1991; Rauch, 1991). In the words of 
Jeffery, " [ c ]hanging deep-rooted attitudes and prejudices is not an easy task 
especially when these have consistently been reinforced by 43 years of apartheid 
policing" (1991:174). It seemed that more direct means of changing cop culture 
were required, e.g. introducing a significant number of officers who operate 
30 Thus making it legally enforceable. 
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according to the new culture, to act as change agents.31 However, it was not just the 
rank-and-file who constituted the problem at this stage (the second half of 1995). 
Elements of the SAPS leadership and the managerial climate also remained 
problematic. To illustrate: in his refusal of a request by the Provincial Cabinet for 
the temporary suspension of 29 detectives, who were charged with murder and 
torture, the Guateng Commissioner of Police explained that: 
"[t]he SAPS has already gained enormous credibility in the community 
with a new constitutional approach and it is therefore not necessary to 
suspend or dismiss members" (The Sunday Times, 9 July 1995). 
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE? 
Mai.Dtaining Perspective 
A high and rising rate of intentional firearm homicide was the primary gun-related 
problem revealed by this study. From the mid-eighties the incidence of gun 
homicide increased, making guns the leading cause of firearm death in Cape Town. 
The upward trend in gun homicide was not only characteristic of this one city, but of 
the RSA as a whole. The national rate even swpassed that of the USA, a country 
known for its unacceptably high rate of firearm homicide. Nonetheless, in mapping 
guns as a social problem it is crucial not to loose sight of the fact that contemporary 
South Africa is a violent society in which most people have been killed by weapons 
other than guns. In Cape Town many more homicide victims have died from stab-
wounds rather than gunshots. Even in KwaZulu-Natal, a region renowned as a 
killing field, the majority (60%) of the homicides committed in recent years have 
been perpetrated with weapons other than firearms (The SAPS in: The Weekly Mail 
& Guardian, 4 April 1996).32 Furthermore, this is a country in which the vast 
majority of people tend to die from so-called natural causes, many of which are 
related to poverty and inequality (The MRC, 1995; The CSS, 1993; Wilson & 
Ramphele, 1989). It is thus important that firearms be kept in perspective as one of 
many factors that may contribute to heightened violence. Efforts to reduce gun-
related violence must be balanced with those aimed at diminishing other forms of 
violence, as part of a larger peace initiative. 
Worldwide, strategies for reducing gun-related violence have generally been 
limited to criminal law and the criminal justice system, and interventions aimed at 
changing variables like poverty and unemployment have been noticeably uncommon 
(Kleck, 1986). Yet it is relative economic inequality -- mediated by race -- that has 
been established as a key determinant of elevated rates of homicide in the USA (e.g. 
Huff-Corzine et al, 1991; Baron & Straus, 1988). This is also a plausible 
explanation for the high rate of homicide in South Africa where much of the ongoing 
31 See Brogden ( 1991) on this culturalist approach. 
32 On average between 1991 and 1995. 
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violence is among black people who were disadvantaged under Apartheid and are 
now vying to acquire political and socio-economic advantages within the new 
dispensation. If a sustainable reduction in the overall level of violence is to be 
achieved, it is vital to address the structural factors that fuel social conflict and 
violence. Indeed, "the reduction of inequality and exploitation is probably the most 
effective single means of decreasing conflict and violence in the long term" 
(Hansson, 1990[a]:l10). Many initiatives introduced in the RSA since 1991 have 
embraced this kind of objective. Major changes have been made to enable political 
equality: the Apartheid State has been replaced with a democratically elected 
government and a new Constitution has been introduced which outlaws most forms 
of discrimination.n Although socio-economic equality is a more elusive goal, 
upgrading the living standards of the majority has been adopted as a state priority 
and massive amounts of resources are being poured into this endeavour, most visibly 
by way of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). In the context 
of such large scale and concerted efforts to address fundamental social problems, 
smaller scale initiatives like those proposed here would seem to have better prospects 
for success. 
Why Not Ban Handguns? 
In view of the generalised misuse of handguns revealed by this study, outlawing 
private ownership might seem appropriate.,. However, this approach is contra-
indicated once empirical evidence on the impact of this kind of intervention and the 
current sociopolitical context of South Africa are taken into account. The reasons 
are many and varied: first, such a prohibition is aimed at disarming civilians, so 
neglects police and PSOs who have been shown to constitute a significant aspect of 
the 'gun problem'. Secondly, since legislated gun controls do not prevent illegal 
possession and often serve to boost the black market, removing licensed guns may 
serve to increase the relative power of armed lawbreakers, as was the case in 
Nigeria. Thirdly, there is likely to be significant opposition to a handgun ban in this 
country at present. Black people have only just been afforded equal access to legal 
gun ownership. This is a frontier society in which there is an established tradition of 
private gun ownership and an entrenched belief in the right to be armed. Fear of 
violence is high and public confidence in the institutions of collective security is low. 
Legal and illegal gun possession is prevalent and has increased in the post-election 
years. Any talk of outlawing private gun ownership may well boost the acquisition 
of frrearms, as has been the case in many countries. Fourthly, the results of various 
voluntary hand-ins implemented since 1991 have been disappointing; clearly 
reflecting strong public opposition to giving up privately owned frrearms (e.g. The 
33 With a Bill of Rights. 
34 As Canada, Australia and Britain have done in recent years. 
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GFSA Campaign, 1995). Low levels of voluntary compliance would mean 
enormous effort by police to enforce a handgun ban and this seems unlikely because 
the SAPS is already stretched. 35 Most countries that have outlawed handguns have 
boosted compliance by offering firearm owners financial compensation. In Britain in 
September 1997, for instance, the going rate was around 150 pounds for each 
handgun surrendered, with a total bill in the region of 150 million pounds (The Mail 
on Sunday, 24 August 1997). At this stage South Africa simply could not afford 
such an expense. Fifthly, outlawing handguns may result in a number of negative 
side effects, such as: the substitution of long-guns, especially those with shortened 
barrels which are more deadly than handguns, and displacement to more vulnerable 
robbery targets (Kleck, 1986[a]). Finally, even if licensed civilian gun owners were 
to be successfully disarmed, this might not significantly reduce overall rates of 
violent crime, for there are more fundamental factors fueling crime and violence in 
this country. 
In the contemporary milieu, legislative initiatives aimed at disarming the 
populace appear to be unrealistic and may even serve to provoke violence. As it 
appears likely that this society will remain armed, both legally and illegally, at least 
in the foreseeable future, the issue of gun use is of added importance. Hence, the 
management of gun use has been proposed as the focus of gun-related policy in 
South Africa in the short to medium term (Hansson, 1996). 
Guiding Objective 
This research showed that, in Cape Town between the mid-eighties and early 
nineties, licensed and unlicensed guns were used with a marked lack of restraint by 
all kinds of shooters (police, PSOs and civilians), in various situations (overtly 
political and everyday circumstances, public order policing and general law 
enforcement) and for different purposes (lawful and criminal). Notably, even 
licensed guns that were employed lawfully were used too readily and the result was 
an unnecessary loss of life. It is thus proposed that decreasing the rate of firearm 
fatalities and injuries be adopted as the overarching objective in addressing guns as a 
social problem in contemporary South Africa. 
To reiterate: violence is perpetrated by people and not by guns, hence policy 
ought to be aimed at managing people rather than controlling guns. Death and 
injury resulting from the use of firearms have been afforded priority in this study. 
Since these are consequences of shots being fired, gun use constitutes the 
rudimentary problem. More specifically, the frequency with which shots are fired 
must be decreased in order to reduce unnecessary deaths and injuries from firearms. 
Of course, crime in which guns are present but not frred may also constitute a 
problem. 
35 And still undergoing major transformation, so is not yet functioning optimally. 
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But these research data, being limited to fatalities, were not informative in this 
regard. 
Multiple Problems, Multiple Interventions 
This study identified a range of problems in relation to the fatal use of firearms. 
Gun suicides, accidents and homicides were problematic in different respects, as 
were some of the problems associated with law enforcers as opposed to civilian gun 
users. Nevertheless, intentional gun homicides constituted the biggest part of the 
firearm problem and, more specifically, a lack of restraint in the use of guns in 
justifiable homicides.36 Hence the primary aim of intervention with respect to this 
issue must be to increase the restraint with which guns are used lawfully. Research 
has shown that numerous factors contribute to the excessive use of force in this 
country (summarised in Table 10.5), and this points to the need for a multifaceted 
intervention strategy. 
In the USA, restraint in the use of firearms by police has been effectively 
increased without jeorpardising the safety of officers and in spite of heightened 
violence among civilians. Furthermore, the number of unnecessary fatal police 
shootings has been significantly reduced without compromising the efficacy of law 
enforcement. This very commendable outcome has been achieved mainly by using a 
combination of rule tightening, the provision of less-than-lethal alternatives, and 
training in officer safety and violence reduction techniques (Geller & Scott, 1992).37 
These basic elements were thus ·given priority in the firearm strategy proposed here 
for law enforcement and licensed civilian gun users in South Africa. 
Although the police have been recognised as key targets for intervention, the 
objective of increasing restraint in gun use has not been limited to this group. 
According to these research results, licensed civilian gun owners and PSOs were also 
important target-groups for intervention.n Indeed the number of private law 
enforcement officials has continued to rise and because PSOs are routinely armed 
with guns it is imperative that this group be included in efforts to increase restraint in 
the use of deadly force (The Ministry of Safety & Security et al, 1995). 
36 
37 
38 
Problems associated with criminal homicides have been discussed 
subsequently. 
Based mainly on the Scharf-Binder and Graves-Connor models discussed in 
Chapter Four. 
Illegal gun owners have been considered subsequently. 
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Table 10.5: Summary of Key Factors Contributing to Lack of Restraint in Gun 
Use, South Africa. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Macro factors that fuel social conflict, especially relative economic 
inequality and racial discrimination. 
A 'climate of fear' among civilians and law enforcers spawned by 
the civil war over Apartheid. 
Racism on the part of the police. 
A hostile relationship between police and civilians. 
A lack of equipment for improving officer safety, especially soft 
body armour (SBA). 
An established police subculture and a managerial climate 
su~rtive of excessive force. 
A macho subculture' among men which encourages the use of 
force over 'softer' options, attack rather than withdrawal and the 
taking of unnecessary risks. 
A 'culture of violence' among civilians which condones violen~e as 
a first resort in dealing with conflict. 
Few less-than-lethal alternatives available. 
Lethal use of weapons intended to be non-lethal, especially non-live 
ammunition. 
Defective police techniques of arrest and restraint which increase 
the probability of resistance to arrest and attempted escapes. 
Dangerous police tactics like firing at moving v hicles. 
Problematic police practices like the obligation to intervene and the 
carrying of service firearms when off duty. 
Inappropriate policing of political protest under Apartheid. 
Shortcomings in police standing orders and law governing the use 
of deadly force, particularly: 
inadequate emphasis on restraint in the use of deadly force; 
inconsistencies in the standard of proportionality required in 
different defences; 
insufficient weight accorded the right to life, especially in 
arrest; 
indemnity for those who create the need to use deadly force; 
the incremental use of force not explicitly required. 
Ineffective independent oversight of police. 
Deficient police investigations and a low quality of evidence in fatal 
shootings. 
A high proportion of undetermined shootings and many shooters 
who perpetrate unlawful homicides not tried for killing. 
A reliance on less-thorough informal inquest proceedings to decide 
lawfulness in most fatal shootings. 
Inconsistent and lax application of legal requirements on the use of 
deadly force, especially by inquest courts. 
Prosecutors reticent to charge police officers. 
Lenient treatment by the Courts of police officers responsible for 
fatal shootings. 
Insufficient empirical data and inadequate monitoring and data 
sources. 
Sources: Chapters Three, Five and the fmdings from this investigation. 
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Law Reform 
A serious defect in the South African law governing the use of deadly force has been 
inconsistent minimum force and proportionality requirements for different grounds 
of justification. Many aspects of the law violate the defence-of-life standard: the 
most conspicuous being the provisions that justified deadly force in the defence of 
property, the dispersal of public gatherings at which property was being damaged, 
and the arrest or prevention of escape of suspects who did not pose an immediate 
threat to life. This study showed that 75% (281) of the people who were killed 
justifiably could have been spared without jeopardising the lives of others.39 Indeed 
in a substantial 61 % (229) of these cases shooters posed at least as great a threat to 
life as their victims, since they foreseeably endangered innocent third parties by 
shooting. Overall, killing for purposes other than defending life resulted in a 
significant number of unnecessary deaths, for which shooters were not generally held 
criminally liable. Arrests were especially problematic in this respect because they 
involved a high proportion of unnecessary killings of black people who were not 
dangerous, were fleeing, and were suspected of relatively minor offences like car 
theft. Here it is noteworthy to recall that the proportion of black suspects fatally 
shot by the North American police declined substantiaiJy following the introduction 
of a minimum legal standard for arrest (Geller & Scott, 1992). 
South Africa has only recently been permitted to rejoin the United Nations 
after many years of exclusion due to Apartheid. The country also now has a bill of 
rights and a constitution based on internationally accepted notions of human rights. 
In order to ensure a consistent standard of proportionality in keeping with the spirit 
of human rights, it is recommended that defence-of-life be adopted as the sole legal 
standard for justifying the intentional use of deadly force in South Africa. 40 More 
specifically, the existing law must be amended to this effect and new legislation 
introduced reflecting the following key principles: 
"[firearms shall not be used against persons] ... except in self defence 
or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury 
[emphasis added], to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious 
crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a 
danger and resisting authority or to prevent his or her escape, and [then] 
only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these 
objectives. 41 In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be 
made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life" (Section 9 of The 
United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by 
Law Enforcement Officials, 1990). 42 
39 And 50% (180) of those who were lawfully killed were unlikely to have been a 
future danger to anyone. 
40 Leaving the defence of unintentional or accidental killing intact. 
41 Section 14 of the Code specifies that this defence-of-life standard be applied to 
the dispersal of unlawful and lawful public gatherings. 
42 Hereafter abbreviated as: The UN Basic Principles. 
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To clarify: although these principles refer specifically to the use of firearms by law 
enforcement officials, the suggestion here is that they be applied in South Africa to 
the use of all forms of deadly force by civilians, police and PSOs. 
Since one of the key goals of intervention in this arena is to promote increasing 
restraint in the application of means capable of killing or seriously injuring people, 43 
it is essential that the principles of minimum force and the incremental application of 
force be explicated as fundamental requirements of the defence-of-life justification. 
It is also recommended that the following two provisos be included in this new 
defence: not foreseeably and unnecessarily (I) creating the need to use deadly force, 
and (2) endangering any third party by using deadly force. The intention here is to 
exclude those who violate either of these conditions from the legal protection of this 
justification. The main advantage of having one relatively simple justification for 
the intentional use of deadly force is ease of recollection and application, which is 
important considering the stressful conditions in which these decisions must usually 
be made. Such a provision may also facilitate a stricter and more consistent 
assessment of cases by the Courts. 
Although the extra-ordinary legal powers that were afforded the security forces 
during the political conflict have been revoked, 44 it would seem advisable to adopt 
the following clause in South African law as a preventative measure: 
"[e]xceptional circumstances such as internal political instability or any 
other public emergency may not be invoked to justify any departure from 
these basic principles [including the defence-of-life standard] (Section 8 
of The UN Basic Principles, 1990). 
In recent years overwhelming evidence of extreme abuse, perpetrated by the police 
under orders from senior SAP officers during the civil war, has been exposed in 
testimony delivered to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and in various 
criminal trials such as that of the Vlakplaas commanding officer Eugene De Kock. 
Not only has this raised awareness of the potential for abuse of power by police, it 
has highlighted a serious shortcoming in the law: commanding officers have not been 
held sufficiently accountable for the consequences of their orders. To rectify this 
deficiency in legal accountability it is suggested that seCtion 24 of the UN Basic 
Principles be used to draft a new provision: 
"[s]uperior officers [must be] held responsible, if they know, or should 
have known, that law enforcement officials under their command, are 
resorting, or have resorted, to the unlawful use of force and firearms, 
and they did not take all measures in their power to prevent, suppress or 
report such use". 
43 See Section 2 of the UN Basic Principles (1990). 
44 See Burchill and Milton (1994). 
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In sum, this is an attempt to shift the goal posts by reformulating the boundaries of 
what is deemed to be acceptable conduct in the use of deadly force. The main aim is 
to further restrict the circumstances under which killing is legally justified. 
Modifying Regulations 
In general, changing administrative police regulations has been more effective at 
improving restraint in the use of deadly force by officers than legislative reform 
(Geller & Scott, 1992). In South Africa these regulations, known as the Police 
Standing Orders, have been heavily criticised on various grounds including a failure 
to stress restraint in the use of force, minimum force, incremental use and 
proportionality. Indeed these orders have tended to impose very few absolute 
obligations on the police (Network of Independent Monitors et al, 1995).45 Some of 
these deficiencies have been rectified in the revised arrest provisions that were issued 
in late 1996 and others are still in the reform process. But the continued reliance on 
predicted dangerousness in assessing proportionality -- using suspected offences as 
predictors of immediate and future dangerousness -- is particularly problematic. It 
does not even measure up to the protection-of-life standard because, in theory, it 
permits the use of deadly force against people who are not currently violent and who 
are not likely to be dangerous in the future. 46 
Civilian gun users have not had the benefit of explicit regulations to guide their 
deadly force decisions. They have had to rely on the law which has been somewhat 
inconsistent, complicated and ambiguous (Hansson, 1990). Because people tend to 
use firearms in highly stressful, often life threatening circumstances, it is important 
that gun owners be familiar with appropriate conduct before they find themselves in 
a potentially violent confrontation. It is thus recommended that a new set of 
regulations on the use of firearms (and deadly force in general) be devised and 
implemented in South Africa. In effect, these would function as a code of conduct 
and would be applicable to civilians, police, PSOs and other law enforcement 
officials. It is important that these regulations apply to the use of deadly force and 
not just firearms because civilians more often use knives to kill, and the majority 
(53%) of homicides committed by police are not shootings (The MRC, 1995; Bruce, 
23 July 1997 resp). Furthermore, the code should be straightforward, practical, in 
keeping with the relevant law and should emphasise restraint (for example, see Table 
10.6). 
45 See Chapter Five for details. 
46 See Table 10.4. 
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Table 10.6: Guidelines for Regulations on Deadly Force including Gun Use.-n 
Preamble 
Deadly force is any kind of force reasonably capable of causing serious injury or 
death, the most common being the use of guns and knives. The overall objective of 
these regulations is to limit the use of deadly force to the defence of life and to 
promote increased restraint in the use of force in general: in short, to encourage the 
safe diffusion of conflict. 
1. Aim to Defend Life 
1.1 You may only intentionally use deadly force to defend yourself or someone 
else against an imminent threat of death or serious injury. 
1.2 You may only use deadly force to defend life when strictly unavoidable, 
because less extreme methods are not feasible in the circumstances or have 
already been used unsuccessfully. 
1.3 You must not foreseeably create the need to use deadly force. In particular, 
refrain from placing yourself in danger or taking unnecessary risks: think 
safety first. 41 And remember that sometimes it is better for all concerned if 
you withdraw. 
1.4 A void unnecessarily endangering anyone other than the person intended. 
2. Use Minimum Force 
You must use the least force possible to effectively defend life. 
3. Use Force Incrementally 
3.1 You must start with non-violent methods, like persuasion and withdrawal, 
whenever feasible. 
3.2 You must use force only if non-violent methods prove unsuccessful. Then, 
whenever feasible, use less-than-lethal force, like physical control tactics, mace 
and stun guns. 
3.3 You must use deadly force only if the use of less-than-lethal force proves 
unsuccessful. 
3.4 If you are a law enforcement officer, whenever feasible and before using force, 
you must identify yourself and tell the person concerned that s/he is under 
arrest (if appropriate). Do this loudly so that s/he is able to hear you and if 
possible speak in a language you think s/he is likely to understand. 
47 Based on The United Nations Basic Principles (1990). This is a second draft; 
see Hansson ( 1996) for the first version. 
48 Jf available, the wearing of soft body armour by law enforcement officers 
should be stressed. 
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4. When Deadly Force is Envisaged: 
4.1 Do not draw a gun unJess shooting is justified, necessary and unavoidable. 
4.2 Do not fire at or from a moving vehicle. 
4.3 Whenever feasible, you must give the person concerned verbal warning that 
you intend to use deadly force against him/her, e.g. "Stop or I'll shoot". Do 
this loudly so that s/he is able to hear you and if possible speak in a language 
you think s/he is likely to understand. 49 
4.4 If the person does not comply with your verbal warning within a reasonable 
period and still constitutes a significant threat to life, then you should fire one 
shot at his/her legs if feasible. 
5. When Deadly Force is Used: 
5.1 You must avoid unnecessarily endangering anyone other than the person who 
constitutes the threat. 
5.2 If you actually injure anyone, you must make sure the police are notified and 
an ambulance is called to the scene as soon as possible.~ 
5. 3 If anyone at the scene is qualified and willing to render first aid, this should be 
done promptly. 
Improving Equipment 
Providing less-than-lethal alternatives is vital if the use of guns is to be decreased, 
especially among law enforcers. Yet traditionally, little use has been made of such 
weapons in this country. The South African police and private security industry 
need to follow the example of North American police agencies that have selected 
reliable less-than-lethal equipment by regularly and systematically assessing the 
efficacy and suitability of available alternatives in context. Greater investment also 
needs to be made in the development of new types of less-than-lethal equipment. 
Considering the widespread fear and insecurity that permeates this society, it is 
critical to improve people's sense of personal safety. After all, a fearful person with 
a gun may well prove trigger happy. Since the election the police force and the legal 
system have been extensively reformed and, in time, this will hopefully serve to 
improve public confidence in the institutions of collective security. It may also help 
to stem the current upward spiral in the defensive acquisition of guns. The police 
have been particular targets for violence during the political conflict and a climate of 
fear still permeates the police service, which increases the likelihood of gun use (The 
49 Note that warning shots have been excluded because these can endanger 
innocent third parties and be used by police to cover-up unacceptable 
shootings. See Chapter Four. 
50 Police control must be notified immediately, even when the perpetrator is a 
police officer. 
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Network of independent monitors et al, 1995). Today, as both police and PSOs face 
a heightened risk of violence and are more likely to use firearms in their role as law 
enforcers, enhancing their safety is imperative. In the USA, the wearing of new 
generation soft body armour has proven to be a most effective means of lowering the 
police fatality rate from gunshots and enhancing officers' sense of safety.'1 In recent 
years, the SAPS do appear to have begun introducing a type of SBA. This process 
must be boosted so that SBA becomes a routinely available piece of equipment that is 
regularly worn by police and PSOs. 
Training, Re-Education and related Legal Changes 
The way in which force is used has much to do with attitudes and perceptions of 
available options, hence emphasis has been placed on retraining people to enhance 
their safety and employ greater restraint while providing them with a wider range of 
alternatives to deadly force. Recent legal reform has made it necessary for gun 
licence applicants to be certified by a recognised body as competent to possess a 
firearm. For civilians, including PSOs, this generally involves completing and 
passing a certified instruction course at a registered gun club; the police have their 
own firearms training. This requirement has made preparatory training a valuable 
mechanism for changing gun use among licensees. But at this early stage the content 
and quality of this training needs to be improved and standardised. 
As was discussed at some length in Chapter Four, police training programmes 
-- based on a combination of the Scharf-Binder sequential decision-making model, 
the Graves-Connor use-of-force-options model and officer safety training - have 
proven highly effective at improving the safe use of restraint by police in the USA. 
In short, these training models aim to re-orient officers to the alternate goal of safely 
diffusing violence by teaching them a range of less-than-Ietbal tactics and an 
approach that stresses expanding the options for dealing with confrontations from the 
outset (Fridell & Binder, 1992; Scharf & Binder 1983). Significantly, the efficacy 
of this kind of training depends largely on the simulation of conditions similar to 
those in which decisions to use deadly force are likely to be made. It is thus 
recommended that firearm training programmes of this ilk be developed and used as 
the standard competency training in this country. Since law enforcement officers are 
likely to fmd themselves in dangerous situations more frequently than the average 
civilian, however, it is suggested that two types of training programme be 
developed; one tailored to the needs of law enforcement officers and one to civilians. 
Considering the problem of inadequate restraint in firearm use by police, PSOs and 
civilians that was revealed in this study, it is proposed that all current licence holders 
be required to undergo the new competency training within a certain period.'2 
51 The latest variant of SBA is also resistant to sharp instruments. 
52 Including PSOs and police. 
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A standard competency test ought to be developed as a complement to the 
proposed training in order to assess: (1) knowledge of the law and regulations on the 
use of deadly force, (2) adequate knowledge of safe-keeping and safe-handling of 
firearms and ammunition, (3) ability to correctly apply knowledge of firearms in a 
range of likely circumstances, (4) skill at safely and appropriately handling and using 
a gun under simulated realistic conditions,'3 and (5) weapon retention and bullet 
placement skills. Before a certificate of competence is granted, the device in which 
an applicant intends to keep his/her firearm should be inspected to assess whether it 
accords with the required standards for safe-keeping. 
At present, a gun licence remains valid until the holder permanently transfers 
or forfeits ownership. It is recommended alternatively that the law be amended to 
make gun licences valid for a maximum of five years and/or until 60 years of age. 
This reform implies regular retesting of gun owners for competency in order to 
retain licences. 
Further Legal Resbictions on Ownership 
The thrust of the strategy discussed thus far has been to make training in restraint a 
prerequisite for legal gun ownership so that only those who are properly trained are 
legally permitted to possess guns. Since the following legal provisions are likely to 
seriously undermine the success of this endeavour they require reform. Firstly, the 
section that permits an unlicensed person, who is usually not properly trained, to 
borrow a gun with the permission of a licensed owner, ought to be abolished. This 
provision has already been used by street gangsters on the Cape Flats as a loophole 
to acquire guns for illegal use (The Ministry of Safety & Security, 1995). Similarly, 
temporary possession of a gun under the supervision of a licensed holder should be 
disallowed, except under the direct supervision of a registered firearms instructor for 
the purpose of competency training and provided that the unlicensed person is at 
least 18 years of age. 
In South Africa, people are permitted to vote and to hold a driver's licence 
from the age of 18 years. It is believed that by this age people have usually 
developed the moral responsibility and rational decision-making capacity necessary 
to make proper use of such options. Since using a firearm requires at least as much 
skill as driving a car, it is contended that the minimum age for acquiring a gun 
licence should be increased from 16 to at least 18 years. 
Of late there has been growing dissension over the legal provision that permits 
licensed civilians to possess multiple firearms and large quantities of ammunition 
(e.g. Jagwanth & Thipanyane, 1993; Hansson, 1990[a]).,. Like other work, this 
53 Similar to the components of a driving test. 
54 At present one must legally possess the firearm capable of firing the 
ammunition in question and quantity is limited to 100 rounds for certain 
firearms. 
• I 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
362 
study suggested that the presence of guns in the home is associated with increased 
risk of suicide, accidents and homicides among residents and friends. It is thus 
proposed that the Act be amended so as to restrictts lawful possession to a single 
handgun per adult and sufficient ammunition for the said gun to enable self defence. 
This limit is justifiable on the grounds that the majority of civilians claim to own 
guns for protection and handguns are the most appropriate firearm for this purpose. 
Persons who wish to legally possess long-guns, more than one handgun or more than 
the standard quota of ammunition, must be required to furnish proof that the said 
items are essential for their work or sporting activities, or that they are bona fide 
collectors of firearms. It is important that such instances should be treated as 
exceptions to the rule. 
Table 10.7: Additional Interventions re SAPS and PSOs. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Regular reviews of training programmes and operational 
procedures, particularly in the light of actual incidents in which 
force or deadly force has been employed. 
Emphasis in training on: ethics and human rights, strategies for the 
peaceful settlement of conflicts, methods of persuasion, negotiation 
and mediation, and tactics for immobilising rather than killing 
violent suspects. 
Regular testing of officers' proficiency in the proper use of force 
(with failure resulting in suspension from active duty). 
Commitment to the development of non-violent, less-than-lethal 
law enforcement tactics and equipment, and means for improving 
the safety of officers. · 
Routine equipping and regular training in the proper use of non-
violent, less-than-lethal and safety techniques and equipment; 
Prohibit officers from possessing service firearms when off duty. 
Outlaw the practice of firing at or from a moving vehicle. 
Stop arming law enforcement officers with assault weapons, 
especially for riot control. Limit use to specialist police units for 
specific purposes like dealing with hostage situations. 
Stop arming officers with ammunition that causes unwarranted 
injury and/or presents additional risk to bystanders. 
Stop arming officers with non-live ammunition.ss 
Disarm and limit to office tasks any officer who kills or injures 
anyone while on-duty, until the lawfulness of his/her conduct has 
been decided. 
Routinely refer officers involved in violent incidents for evaluation 
and stress counselling. 56 
Maintain conduct sheets for every PSO and regularly submit these 
to an independent committee for examination and feedbackY 
Source: The United Nations (1990). 
55 As it routinely causes death and officers tend to use it with less restraint 
believing it to be non-lethal. 
56 This is already being done to some extent within the SAPS. 
51 The SAPS already requires the keeping of conduct sheets for police officers. 
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To facilitate the assessment of gun licence applicants it is suggested that a 
confidential computer database be kept of psychiatric patients with a history of 
violent behaviour and those at significant risk of suicide. '1 Although this is likely to 
be contentious, applicants for gun licences are already required to have their 
fingerprints taken and to divulge any previous psychiatric history. The proposed 
reform would only involve granting a designated authority permission to check this 
information. 
Improving Police Investigations and Evidence 
The current government has recognised the longstanding lack of co-operation 
between the public and the police as a serious obstacle to effective policing. To this 
end, the SAPS bas been restructured with an eye to establishing greater racial 
representivity and reducing racism. Community-police forums have been set up 
where issues can be regularly discussed. Efforts are being made to change from a 
militaristic repressive approach to a service-oriented community style of policing 
(Jagwanth, 1994; The Chief of SAP Efficiency Services, 1993; Rauch, 1991). It is 
hoped that such interventions will gradually facilitate public co-operation with the 
police, so enhancing inter alia the quality of investigations. 
It is also vital that the police improve their investigatory efforts. This study 
and more recent national research have underscored shortcomings in police 
investigations as a key problem with serious ramifications within the criminal justice 
system. The following unacceptable routine practices in police inquiries have been 
revealed: inadequate managing of crime scenes leading to the destruction of 
evidence, failing to reconstruct scenes in order to test the feasibility of statements, 
neglecting to have alleged shooters tested for residual gunpowder and other relevant 
ballistics tests, making little effort to trace and take statements from material 
witnesses (The Network of Independent Monitors et al, 1995). 
Apart from the need for direct interventions to remedy the specific problems, 
these findings underscore the importance of bolstering the independence of 
mechanisms for investigating abuses within the SAPS. The new Independent 
Complaints Directorate (lCD) is tbe primary mechanism in this regard. In terms of 
the SAPS Act (1995) the lCD shall investigate "any death in police custody or as a 
result of police action", and police commissioners are required to notify tbe lCD of 
all such deaths. '9 The lCD may also investigate any misconduct or offence allegedly 
committed by police or any matter referred by the Minister or Executive Council. 
Although numerous steps have been taken to boost tbe independence of this 
Directorate, the bulk of those who conduct the investigations are still police officers. 
58 Criminal records are currently being computerised. 
59 See Bruce (Forthcoming) for a critique of this requirement. 
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This requires careful monitoring. 
Whilst the automatic referral and inspection of police deaths by the lCD is 
certainly a positive development, an addition to this process is indicated. In 
developing use-of-force policy for the police, it is not enough to take only killings 
into account. The following aspects also require routine examination: (1) all shots 
fired by police, (2) averted shootings, and (3) averted force incidents in which police 
manage to diffuse potentially violent encounters without using force.60 Since there 
are already concerns about the lCD being overloaded, it is recommended that the 
Secretariat for Safety and Security, which is tasked with policy development, take on 
this function. Cases involving deaths could be passed on to the Secretariat from the 
lCD and those involving injuries and missed shots could be identified from police 
logs of shots fired. However, the Secretariat would need to devise a procedure for 
locating averted force incidents for consideration. 
There bas been a growing sense of frustration within the police force since the 
1994 elections. Many of the old-guard view the treatment of suspects under the new 
dispensation as ineffectively lax, and this may encourage police to dispense their 
own versions of street-justice (The Network of Independ nt Monitors et al, 1995). 
Systematic monitoring is a vital aspect of controlling the police use of force. 
Importantly, it enables prompt intervention when force is used inappropriately. To 
assist in monitoring the use-of-force by police officers, conduct sheets should include 
inter alia: details of assignments, data identifying the service firearm/s, ammunition, 
less-than-lethal weapons and equipment issued, details of incidents in which the 
officer bas fired shots, complaints made against the officer, injuries suffered in the 
line-of-duty and regular assessments of the officer's use of restraint in general, and 
less-than-lethal and non-violent tactics in particular. ' 1 
Since the police have a reputation for compromising investigations, reforms 
designed to increase the impartiality of investigations would seem appropriate. It is 
thus recommended that responsibility for state mortuaries, and hence autopsies, be 
transferred from the SAPS to the Ministry of Health (The Network of Independent 
Monitors et al, 1995).62 This reform may serve to improve the image of the SAPS, 
free up police officers for other duties, enhance the quality of some of the primary 
physical evidence and decrease the chance of police interference with initial 
evidence. 
It is important not loose sight of the fact that it is not only the investigation of 
deaths and injuries caused by police which is inadequate. In general evidence 
provided by police has a pivotal impact on Court decisions. Inquest courts must 
have evidence sufficient to decide the lawfulness of a death on a balance of 
probabilities, while criminal courts require more evidence to enable a decision 
60 See Chapter Four. 
61 See Geller and Scott (1992) for further suggestions. 
62 As in the UK. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, limited or inadequate evidence in relation to a 
fatal shooting leaves a Court with little chance of making an unlawful fmding. This 
was the trend which emerged from the study at hand: where there was little evidence 
the Courts were usually unable to decide the lawfulness of a shooting. In this 
research there was also a high incidence of cases in which the only statements were 
from the shooters themselves and the Courts tended to find these fatal shootings 
lawful. 61 Generally speaking a Court requires more evidence to make an unlawful 
finding. Thus, when faced with only a shooter's justification for a homicide, the 
likelihood of a lawful or undetermined finding is increased. It is recommended 
therefore, that police training in investigative procedures emphasise the importance 
of actively seeking and recording information pertaining to restraint. A checklist of 
the required restraints could be devised to assist police in the collection of such 
evidence. 
The quality of evidence has a crucial effect at many junctures in the legal 
process including inter alia: the finding of the Inquest Court, the decision of whether 
to prosecute, the probability of conviction and the severity of the sentence. To 
elaborate, a prosecutor bases his/her decision to try a case on the chances of a 
successful conviction. Cases in which the evidence is deficient are thus unlikely to 
be prosecuted. This could explain the high proportion of fatal shootings in this study 
that were not brought to trial despite being found unlawful at inquest. To conclude, 
the quality of police investigations and evidence must be improved if there is to be a 
sustainable increase in restraint in the use of deadly force. It would be fruitless to 
introduce more stringent legal criteria for justifying the use of deadly force if 
deficiencies in evidence effectively prevented prosecutors and Courts from 
identifying and penalising those who failed to employ adequate restraint. Succinctly 
put, the police are arguably the primary link in this chain of intervention. 
Enhancing Adjudication 
Whilst law reform is often necessary to facilitate change, without routine application 
it can have little impact. Indeed inconsistent implementation has been identified as a 
prime impediment to the efficacy of gun control in South Africa (e.g. Hansson, 
1996; 1990[a]; Zazeraj, 1973). This study showed that Inquest Courts did not 
consistently or strictly apply the legal requirements regarding restraint in the use of 
deadly force. Hence, gun users who killed and failed to employ the stipulated legal 
restraints were rarely criminally sanctioned. Therefore, it is recommended that 
judicial officers and prosecutors be trained with regard to any new legal 
requirements. It is hoped that such training, when combined with more stringent 
legal requirements and better evidence, will encourage a more rigorous application 
of the law and an increased certainty of punishment for those who use deadly force 
63 This was particularly common in police shootings. 
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without due restraint (Hansson, 1996). 
This study showed, in accordance with previous fmdings, that the vast majority 
of fatal shootings were adjudicated at informal inquests. Hence, lawfulness was 
decided out of the public eye and on documentary evidence alone, without oral 
evidence or the cross-examination of witnesses to test credibility. The need to 
implement the following longstanding recommendation remains: formal inquests in 
all homicidal shootings not tried in criminal courts. The basic aim is to upgrade 
adjudication and increase transparency in fatal shootings. 
What about Illegal Usen? 
Thus far, emphasis bas been placed on changing the conduct of licensed gun owners. 
Legal owners were targeted for intervention because this was the largest group of 
firearm users in the study, and inadequate restraint in gun use was the key problem 
within this group. Although illegal gun owners also constituted a problem in terms 
of restraint, they were not accessible to the compulsory training initiatives suggested 
here. Hence, this group bas to be approached by other means including macro-level 
reforms, public education and criminal sanction. In short, some of those who use 
unlicensed guns to commit crimes will be penalised within the criminal justice 
system, along with some of those who break the law using licensed firearms. 
Levels of Intervention 
Under the new dispensation, government bas been restructured in a way that 
devolves previously centralised government to provincial and local levels. There are 
significant regional variations in political dynamics and associated patterns of 
violence. For instance: in the Western Cape much violence bas been related to the 
so-called taxi-wars and street gangs, while in Gauteng, train shootings, hostel-related 
violence and carjackings have been more common, and KwaZulu-Natal bas been 
dominated by political conflict between the IFP and the ANC. Regionally, and even 
locally, specific firearm policies are necessary adjuncts to national policies if the 
needs of different jurisdiction are to be addressed. 
Co-ordinating Body 
Considering the range of suggested interventions and the complex and dynamic 
nature of gun-related problems, it would seem prudent to establish a body to develop 
an overall plan of action, to systematically implement the necessary changes, to 
conduct ongoing impact evaluation and to develop future policy. 64 Furthermore, the 
rapidly changing sociopolitical circumstances make up-to-date monitoring of the 
64 Comprising inter alia representatives from: the Ministries of Justice, Safety and 
Security, Health and Welfare, the offices of the AG, and the civil sector, 
particularly gun owners' associations, the GFSA Campaign and those with 
expertise in public health and policy evaluation. 
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situation critically important. Shifts in the dynamics of violence must be identified 
promptly and responded to appropriately. Given the country's limited resources and 
the serious consequences of gun-related violence, it is also essential that policy be 
constantly evaluated and improved using regular feedback on the impact of 
interventions. The legacy of a lack of public confidence in government, the legal 
system and the police force in South Africa has made the transparency of state 
agencies and public accountability compelling goals. Therefore the nature, aims and 
impact of new gun policy should be widely publicised. Notably, sustained public 
pressure has been identified as a central ingredient in successful violence reduction 
initiatives among North American police. It would thus seem important to foster 
such pressure for change in the South African context. 
Developing the Data 
In view of the paucity of empirical work on gun use and possession in the RSA 
it is important that systematic research in this field be encouraged. The following 
are some examples of important topics: ( 1) characteristics of licensed and unlicensed 
gun owners, (2) circumstances in which civilians, police and PSOs fire shots, (3) 
injuries resulting from firearms, (4) potentially violent encounters in which shootings 
are averted, (5) the impact of specific interventions, (6) the effects of different kinds 
of restraints on rates of death and injury, and (7) the efficacy of different less-than-
lethal equipment and tactics. 
Accurate and sustainable sources of empirical data are vital to enable 
systematic monitoring, evaluation and policy development in this field. Reliable 
information is necessary to identify and prioritise problems, to design more 
appropriate interventions, to allocate resources and to monitor change (Hansson, 
1990[a]; Steoning & Moyer, 1981). Data relevant to firearms have been relatively 
scarce in South Africa and a permanent computerised database designed to inform 
gun-related issues is urgently required. 65 The RDP has recently recognised the 
problem posed by the poor quality of national vital statistics in this country and is 
currently supporting the development of a National Health Information System as a 
foundation for health-related policy making. Mortality data have been emphasised as 
crucial components of this system, to elaborate, "[i]nformation on violence and 
injury, and their health impacts, should form the foundation of a multi-sectorial 
collaboration to create a 'safe and healthy' community" (The MRC, 1995:ii). In 
view of the complementary goals, it is suggested that the proposed gun-related 
database be developed as part of the National Health Information System .66 
65 Ideally linked from local to national levels. 
66 Once computerised the CFR could be linked. 
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A Closing Thought 
Fostering people's sense of safety and confidence in the institutions of collective 
security, and educating the public are crucial to achieving attitudinal and behavioural 
change in relation to violence and guns in South Africa. But the ultimate objective 
must be to build a culture of disarmament and peace, in which people will no longer 
feel it necessary to have or to use guns; a society in which the social order is not 
precariously dependent on the majority being armed and dangerous to one another. 
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APPENDIX A: 
New and Modified Variables. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Year in which shooting occurred. 
Place in which shooting occurred. 
Whether shootings were politically motivated. 
Victims' and shooters' age-groups. 
Whether victims and shooters were gainfully employed. 
Whether victims were civilians, police officers or private 
security officers. 
Ranks held by police victims and shooters. 
Number of entry-wounds sustained by victims. 
Characteristics of victims' and shooters' guns. 
Shooters' motives. 
Whether shooters informed victims when their intention was 
to arrest. 
The direction in which warning shots were fired. 
Types of less-than-lethal means. 
Whether victims threatened anyone and in what way/s. 
Whether victims directly endangered life and in what way/s. 
Whether victims were likely to have posed a significant 
current or future threat to life if. they had not been shot. 
Whether shooters foreseeably endangered any third party by 
shooting. 
Whether victims were fleeing when shot. 
Whether victims were suspects or convicts, and the nature of 
their most serious offence. 
The type of criminal court in which trials were heard. 
Whether shooters were charged. 
Whether shooters were prosecuted. 
Whether shooters were convicted. 
Whether convicted shooters appealed and the outcomes. 
